State v. Reddy ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Reddy, 
    2011-Ohio-2927
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 95814
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    JOSEPH REDDY
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-505854
    BEFORE: Keough, J., Boyle, P.J., and Jones, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 16, 2011
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    James E. Valentine
    323 Lakeside Avenue
    Suite 450
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    Joseph Reddy, pro se
    Inmate No. 562-809
    Trumbull Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 901, 5701 Burnett Road
    Leavittsburg, OH 44430
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By:   Thorin O. Freeman
    Pinkey S. Carr
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
    The Justice Center, 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Joseph Reddy (“Reddy”), appeals from the
    trial court’s judgment rendered from the resentencing hearing ordered by this
    court in State v. Reddy, Cuyahoga App. No. 92924, 
    2010-Ohio-5759
     (“Reddy
    II”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
    {¶ 2} In 2007, Reddy was convicted of aggravated murder, which he
    appealed to this court challenging his conviction. This court found that the
    evidence was insufficient to satisfy the element of “prior calculation and
    design” for aggravated murder, but concluded that the lesser offense of
    murder was established.          State v. Reddy, Cuyahoga App. No. 92924,
    
    2010-Ohio-3996
     (“Reddy I”).      Thus, this court modified Reddy’s conviction
    from aggravated murder to murder, vacated his sentence, and remanded for
    resentencing. 
    Id.
     at 80. Reddy also raised as error that his counsel was
    ineffective; this court found no error.          Reddy immediately sought
    reconsideration of Reddy I.
    {¶ 3} On remand from this court, the trial court entered judgment
    reflecting the modification of Reddy’s conviction to murder and sentenced him
    on the murder conviction to life in prison, with parole eligibility after 15
    years.
    {¶ 4} While the motion for reconsideration was pending with this court,
    Reddy appealed Reddy I to the Ohio Supreme Court, raising the following
    pertinent propositions of law:
    {¶ 5} “Proposition of Law I:    “When a conviction is not sustained by
    sufficient evidence[,] on appeal due process requires that the conviction is
    reversed and remanded for a new trial rather than modified to a
    lesser-included offense if mitigating circumstances were presented at trial
    that could further lesse[n] the charge to an inferior degree offense.
    {¶ 6} “Proposition of Law II:      Appellant was denied his right to
    effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the
    U[.]S[.] Constitution and Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.”
    {¶ 7} After he filed his notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court,
    Reddy filed this appeal of the trial court’s judgment upon remand.
    {¶ 8} In November 2010, this court granted Reddy’s application for
    reconsideration and issued a new opinion on the original appeal. Reddy II.
    This court made the same finding it made in Reddy I, i.e., that Reddy should
    have been convicted of murder, not aggravated murder, and modified his
    conviction accordingly. However, this court also elaborated on Reddy’s pro se
    assignments of error that challenged his conviction on aggravated murder.
    In one assignment of error, Reddy argued that the trial court “abused its
    discretion in refusing to consider [a] lesser degree of homicide * * *.” In
    finding no merit to the argument, this court stated:
    {¶ 9} “Reddy   argues that the evidence presented at trial was
    insufficient to demonstrate that he acted with prior calculation and design
    and that lesser included offenses should have been considered by the trial
    court. We agree, and having sustained a similar argument in Reddy’s first
    assignment of error, we modified the judgment accordingly. Although Reddy
    argues specifically that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to
    consider convicting him of voluntary manslaughter, we have already found
    that the evidence in the record, while insufficient for aggravated murder, was
    sufficient to convict Reddy of murder. We presume that in reaching a verdict,
    the trial court considered all lesser and included offenses as well as inferior
    degree offenses, unless the record shows otherwise. Reddy’s seventh
    assignment of error is overruled.” Reddy II at 78.
    {¶ 10} After this court issued its opinion in Reddy II, Reddy filed a
    motion to withdraw his appeal regarding Reddy I that was pending in the
    Ohio Supreme Court.       Reddy then filed another appeal with the Ohio
    Supreme Court, this time appealing this court’s decision in Reddy II. Reddy
    raised the following pertinent propositions of law:
    {¶ 11} “Proposition of Law No. I:     When a conviction is not sustained by
    sufficient evidence[,] on appeal due process requires that the conviction is
    remanded if mitigating circumstances are present that could further lesser
    the charge to an inferior degree offense.
    {¶ 12} “Proposition of Law No. III:    The defendant was denied his right
    to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of
    the U[.]S[.] Constitution and Section 10 Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution [* *
    *].
    {¶ 13} “Proposition of Law No. VI:   The trial court abused its discretion
    by refusing to consider [a] lesser degree of homicide in violation of the
    defendant’s right to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
    Amendments of the U[.]S[.] Constitution and Ohio Constitution.”
    {¶ 14} In January 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a journal entry
    declining to hear Reddy’s first appeal and denied his motion to withdraw his
    appeal as moot.
    {¶ 15} In March 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a journal entry
    declining to consider his second appeal.
    {¶ 16} Also in March 2011, Reddy sought to reopen his original appeal in
    Appeal No. 92924 from which Reddy I and II were decided, claiming that his
    appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that “because the
    evidence was insufficient for aggravated murder, the case should have been
    remanded for a new trial so that the lesser included offense of voluntary
    manslaughter may have been considered.” State v. Reddy, Cuyahoga App.
    No. 92924, 
    2011-Ohio-2144
    , 1. (“Reddy III”). In denying his application,
    this court concluded that res judicata barred Reddy’s application for
    reopening because he had filed a pro se brief in the original appeal wherein
    he raised this argument, the court considered it, and overruled it. 
    Id.
     at 6.
    {¶ 17} In this appeal, Reddy has once again raised the issues that have
    been previously raised and considered. Reddy presents one assignment of
    error through counsel and raises three additional assignments of error in his
    pro se supplemental brief. Those assigned errors are as follows:
    {¶ 18} “I.     Appellant’s due process rights were violated when a
    conviction which was not supported by sufficient evidence was modified to a
    lesser-included offense rather than being reversed and remanded for a new
    trial where mitigating circumstances were presented at trial that could result
    in a conviction of an inferior degree offense.1
    {¶ 19} “II.    The Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel
    when counsel failed to present expert psychiatric testimony regarding the
    appellant’s mental state and/or perception of danger based on the diagnosis of
    post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from physical childhood abuse in
    support     of      affirmative     defenses      of    self-defense      and/or     voluntary
    manslaughter.
    {¶ 20} “III.    Trial counsel was ineffective under the standard United
    States v. Cronic when counsel was absent during a critical stage of trial for
    the four months leading to trial.”
    {¶ 21} The assignments of error raised are barred by res judicata.                    The
    doctrine of res judicata bars further litigation in a criminal case of issues that
    were raised previously or could have been raised previously in a direct appeal.
    This assignment of error was raised by both Reddy’s appellate counsel and by Reddy, pro se.
    1
    To avoid confusion, we will consider them as one assignment of error.
    State v. Leek (June 21, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 74338, citing State v. Perry
    (1967), 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    , 
    226 N.E.2d 104
    , paragraph nine of the syllabus.
    {¶ 22} We find that the issues raised in the appellate and supplemental
    briefs have previously been considered or could have been considered by this
    court in Reddy I, II, and III.      Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has
    declined to accept both of Reddy’s appeals, wherein he raised as propositions
    of law those issues raised as assignments of error in this appeal.
    {¶ 23} Since we have addressed or could have addressed these issues
    and the Ohio Supreme Court has refused to review this court’s decisions, our
    disposition of them remains the “law of the case,” and Reddy’s assignments of
    error and supplemental assignments of error are barred by the doctrine of res
    judicata. State v. Saxon, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1245
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 824
    , 18. Therefore, the errors assigned are overruled.
    {¶ 24} Finally, Reddy presents no argument that the trial court erred in
    resentencing him, and since the record reflects that upon remand, the trial
    court complied with this court’s order in Reddy II and duly imposed a
    sentence on Reddy’s conviction in his presence, his sentence is affirmed
    pursuant to App.R. 12(B).
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
    conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
    Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
    LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95814

Judges: Keough

Filed Date: 6/16/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014