State v. Hockett ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Hockett, 
    2011-Ohio-2911
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 95232
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    MAURICE C. HOCKETT
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case Nos. CR-518448 and CR-519602
    BEFORE:        Sweeney, J., Boyle, P.J., and Keough, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     June 16, 2011
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Ronald Skingle, Esq.
    2450 St. Clair Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason, Esq.
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Katherine Mullin, Esq.
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.:
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Maurice C. Hockett appeals his convictions
    for   felonious   assault,   domestic   violence,    and    two   counts   of   child
    endangerment as being based upon insufficient evidence. For the reasons
    that follow, we affirm.
    {¶ 2} Defendant was indicted in various cases with multiple count
    indictments, which were consolidated for trial.            The charges arose from
    injuries suffered by defendant’s four month old daughter, N.C.H.                 The
    offenses were alleged to have occurred between November 1, 2008 and
    November 24, 2008. N.C.H.’s mother, Sharday Clapton, was also charged as a
    co-defendant in one case. Defendant moved for acquittal on all counts. In
    CR-518448, the jury found defendant guilty of child endangering in violation
    of R.C. 2919.22(A) with an additional finding that the victim was under
    eighteen years of age.    In CR-519602, the jury found defendant guilty of
    felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); two counts of child
    endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) and 2919.22(B)(1), with an
    additional finding that the victim was under the eighteen years of age; and
    domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).
    {¶ 3} Defendant’s sole assignment of error relates to his convictions in
    CR-519602 only, and he contends:
    {¶ 4} “Appellant’s four convictions of felonious assault, endangering
    children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) and (B)(1) and domestic violence in
    Case No. CR-519602 are not supported by sufficient evidence.”
    {¶ 5} An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence
    admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
    convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
    Thompkins (1997), 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    .
    {¶ 6} Defendant was charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C.
    2903.11(A)(1), which provides: “(A) No person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause
    serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn;”
    {¶ 7} He was also charged with child endangering pursuant to R.C.
    2919.22(A) and (B)(1), which provides:
    {¶ 8} “(A) No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person
    having custody or control, or person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen
    years of age or a mentally or physically handicapped child under twenty-one
    years of age, shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child,
    by violating a duty of care, protection, or support. It is not a violation of a
    duty of care, protection, or support under this division when the parent,
    guardian, custodian, or person having custody or control of a child treats the
    physical or mental illness or defect of the child by spiritual means through
    prayer alone, in accordance with the tenets of a recognized religious body.
    {¶ 9} “(B) No person shall do any of the following to a child under
    eighteen years of age or a mentally or physically handicapped child under
    twenty-one years of age:
    {¶ 10} “(1) Abuse the child.”
    {¶ 11} Defendant’s final conviction was for domestic violence as set forth
    in R.C. 2919.25(A) as follows: “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to
    cause physical harm to a family or household member.”
    {¶ 12} These charges related to injuries sustained by defendant’s
    daughter, including a subdural hematoma. The indictment charged that the
    offenses occurred between November 1, 2008 and November 24, 2008, the day
    she was admitted to the hospital due to concerns over her low weight.
    {¶ 13} Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
    establish that he knowingly caused serious physical harm or physical harm to
    his daughter and that he recklessly abused or violated a duty to protect her
    from abuse. He premises his argument on the fact that various individuals
    participated in the care of N.C.H. and an absence of direct evidence that he
    inflicted any of the injuries that were suffered by his four month old
    daughter, which included failure to thrive, a fractured wrist, chronic subdural
    hematomas caused by “non-accidental trauma, inflicted trauma, or shaken
    baby syndrome,” and retinal hemorrhages.
    {¶ 14} A social worker from Cuyahoga County Department of Children
    and Family Services testified to her involvement with N.C.H. that began on
    April 29, 2008.    She testified that defendant and Clopton turned down
    offered assistance for both N.C.H. and her older brother. They also refused
    five referrals for in-home nursing assistance.
    {¶ 15} Another social worker, Holly Williams, testified concerning the
    agency’s efforts concerning the care and custody of N.C.H. and her older
    brother who had been removed from the home.           Williams testified that
    defendant had threatened her and refused her entry during an attempted
    home visit.   Williams said that defendant stated he would “harm me, he
    would shoot me, he would bomb the agency.”       The parents also canceled
    several home visits and failed to take N.C.H. to scheduled medical
    appointments despite an on-going concern over the infant’s low weight.
    Williams testified that defendant took N.C.H. to some medical appointments,
    which were required once a month.         However, he indicated that the
    appointment was not conducive to his work schedule. Efforts were made to
    accommodate defendant’s schedule but he still failed to bring N.C.H. back for
    the appointment.
    {¶ 16} After three or four home visits were canceled, Williams attempted
    to facilitate a visit by coordinating a sibling visit between N.C.H. and her
    brother at the hospital. By this time, N.C.H. was “extremely, extremely tiny
    and looked the size of a newborn.” Williams and others were able to convince
    Clopton to take N.C.H. to the emergency room where she was admitted with
    concerns regarding her weight.
    {¶ 17} Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient that it was
    him who caused these injuries to N.C.H. Defendant points to the witnesses’
    inability to identify how N.C.H. had sustained the injuries, exactly when she
    sustained them, and who caused them.
    {¶ 18} As set forth above, there is sufficient testimony that N.C.H.
    suffered a fractured wrist and head injuries within weeks prior to being
    admitted to the hospital.      There is also evidence that defendant and the
    co-defendant were the ones who took care of her. There is direct evidence
    that N.C.H was obviously underweight yet defendant failed to take her to
    scheduled appointments. That she gained weight without a problem when
    properly fed indicates that her caretakers, which were defendant and the
    co-defendant, were not properly feeding her. Both caretakers were indicted
    in the case at bar.
    {¶ 19} We note that defendant is not challenging his conviction for child
    endangering that stemmed from the incident at that occurred at the hospital.
    However, the evidence is probative of how defendant handled and treated
    N.C.H.
    {¶ 20} Defendant simply ignores his erratic behavior at the hospital,
    where multiple witnesses observed him handling the child in a rough and
    unsafe manner. These facts alone distinguish this case from those at issue
    in State v. Miley (1996), 
    114 Ohio App.3d 738
    , 
    684 N.E.2d 102
    , upon which
    defendant relies.     See, also, State v. Cheney-Shaw, Cuyahoga App. Nos.
    76828 and 76829.1 Witnesses observed defendant squeezing the baby harder
    1
    Further, the injuries at issue in Miley were internal without any external
    manifestations. Here, while there were internal injuries, there also was an on-going
    concern over the child’s low weight in spite of which defendant failed to attend some
    scheduled                                                               appointments.
    and harder causing her eyes to bulge; ramming into doors at full force while
    holding the baby and without properly supporting her head.
    {¶ 21} A few hours after N.C.H. had been admitted to the hospital on
    November 24, 2008, defendant entered her hospital room.            Nurses at
    Rainbow Babies and Children Hospital testified that they heard a commotion
    and saw defendant running out of the room with N.C.H. in his arms. He
    “ran through the nurses station, jumped over the reception desk * * * and was
    holding the baby. He tried to ram his body into the locked double doors to
    try to escape* * *.” Security was called because of defendant’s behavior and
    the danger it posed to the baby including that “he tried to ram through double
    doors holding an infant in his arms.” It was possible that the baby could
    have touched the double doors as he was ramming forward into them. Other
    witnesses described defendant ramming the door with his shoulder with full
    force while holding the baby.
    {¶ 22} The baby’s head was draped over defendant’s arm and he was not
    supporting it. Clopton asked defendant to give her the baby but he refused.
    Defendant was handling N.C.H. roughly, “her head was not being supported.”
    A nurse told defendant to support the baby’s head and defendant responded
    by yelling obscenities and hitting the nurse. A few times defendant said, “I’m
    her protection and she’s mine.”
    {¶ 23} When nurses approached and attempted to take the baby from
    him for safety, defendant yelled, “F*** you. Who are you to be telling me
    about my child.” Nurses and aids continued their efforts to obtain the baby
    “so she would be safe.” Their primary concern was for the safety of the child.
    One of the nurses was reaching for the baby saying, “Please give me the
    child so she can be safe” and defendant slapped her.
    {¶ 24} Security guards arrived with pepper spray.      As security was
    trying to take the baby, defendant was struggling “whipping his body around
    and her head is just going around.” The nurse was very nervous for the
    baby, “how she was being handled.”      A security guard observed defendant
    continuously squeezing the baby hard. Defendant said at one point, “You are
    making me hurt her.       You are making me hurt her,” and he would keep
    squeezing her harder. According to the guard defendant “keeps squeezing
    the child harder and harder. Her eyes are starting to bulge from her head * *
    * When he’s squeezing her, her eyes were bulging out of her head.”
    {¶ 25} Clopton jumped on one of the security guards.    Eventually, the
    baby was recovered and taken by nurses to a secured area. The baby’s face
    was red on her nose, forehead, and cheek. The guards had to force defendant
    to the floor.
    {¶ 26} The agency obtained a telephonic order of removal based on
    defendant’s erratic behavior and attempt to remove N.C.H. from the hospital
    against medical advice.
    {¶ 27} With respect to the charges involved in CR-519602, it was
    determined that N.C.H. was gaining weight when fed properly. The wrist
    injury occurred approximately 7 to 10 days prior to N.C.H.’s admission to the
    hospital.    Upon further examination, other injuries were discovered that
    pre-dated N.C.H.’s admission to the hospital and included a subdural
    hemotoma.
    {¶ 28} The pediatric neurosurgeon testified that after N.C.H. was
    admitted for failure to thrive, the hospital took an x-ray to evaluate for
    rickets.    That x-ray revealed a fractured wrist, which prompted further
    evaluation for inflicted trauma. Imaging studies of N.C.H.’s head, taken on
    November 26, 2008, showed she had abnormal fluid collections over the brain.
    Between the time N.C.H had been admitted and when the neurosurgeon saw
    her, the baby’s head circumference had increased markedly, which is
    indicative of pressure. The infant required surgery to relieve the pressure on
    her skull. The neurosurgeon concluded that the injury was “some assault to
    the baby that was not a natural accident.” The type of subdural hematoma
    present in N.C.H. takes a significant amount of force to inflict, such as violent
    shaking or slamming the child’s head against the wall.         According to the
    doctor, the injury could not have resulted from an accidental drop or fall.
    The doctor was unable to tell whether N.C.H. will suffer permanent
    developmental delays as a result of the injury. N.C.H. has also developed
    seizures.   N.C.H. also had retinal hemorrhages that can be present from
    immediately after the injury and last for about two weeks.
    {¶ 29} The doctor opined that N.C.H.’s injuries could have been inflicted
    during a time frame somewhere between three days up to a few weeks prior.
    The doctor did not know where the injuries were caused or who caused them
    but stated that “somebody inflicted this on [N.C.H.].”
    {¶ 30} According to the record, defendant was at home with N.C.H.
    when she was not at day care. Clopton indicated to the social worker that
    defendant was the primary caregiver of the children due to the fact that
    Clopton worked full-time and attended school. The social worker was aware
    that defendant worked from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m. and Clopton worked from 6 a.m.
    to 3 p.m. Numerous witnesses testified to the fact that N.C.H. was obviously
    underweight. The parents did not take N.C.H. to medical appointments and
    missed well visits. The medical professionals testified that N.C.H. gained
    weight when she was fed properly.         Despite the child’s fractured wrist,
    neither parent reported any injury to the child, nor did either parent ever
    express any concerns about it. At least one medical professional testified
    that the child most likely would exhibit symptoms as a consequence of the
    fracture. Similarly, neither parent noticed or reported any symptoms of the
    child’s head injury that was discovered at the hospital.
    {¶ 31} A parent clearly has a duty imposed by law to protect his or her
    child from abuse and to care for the child’s injuries. See State v. Sammons
    (1979), 
    58 Ohio St.2d 460
    , 463, 
    12 O.O.3d 384
    , 
    391 N.E.2d 713
    .
    {¶ 32} The standard of review requires that the evidence be viewed in a
    light most favorable to the state. Applying this standard, the record contains
    sufficient evidence to withstand defendant’s motions for acquittal on the
    subject counts and this assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
    conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
    Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95232

Judges: Sweeney

Filed Date: 6/16/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014