State v. Burrell , 2011 Ohio 2533 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Burrell, 2011-Ohio-2533.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95512
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
LEBRIAN T. BURRELL
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-521667
2
BEFORE: Blackmon, P.J., Stewart, J., and Sweeney, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 26, 2011
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Paul Mancino, Jr.
75 Public Square
Suite 1016
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Katherine Mullin
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
3
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant Lebrian T. Burrell (“Burrell”) appeals his plea and
sentence and assigns six errors for our review.1
{¶ 2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm
Burrell’s plea and sentence, but remand the matter to the trial court
regarding the imposed court costs. The apposite facts follow.
Facts
{¶ 3} The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Burrell on 36 counts,
which included numerous counts of rape and kidnapping and one count of
gross sexual imposition. The charges arose from Burrell’s rape of five
children under the age of 13 numerous times over the years.
{¶ 4} Burrell entered a plea to five counts of rape. All the remaining
counts were dismissed, and Burrell agreed to a minimum 25 year sentence
with the option for the trial court to impose a greater sentence. After
hearing from the victims’ mothers and Burrell’s grandmother, the trial court
sentenced Burrell to six years on each count to be served consecutively for a
total of 30 years in prison. The trial court also classified Burrell as a Tier III
sex offender.
Nature of the Offenses
1
See appendix.
4
{¶ 5} In Burrell’s first assigned error he argues his plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the trial court failed
to advise him as to the nature of the offenses to which he was pleading.
More specifically, he argues the trial court failed to explain what “sexual
conduct” he allegedly committed as set forth in the rape indictments and
which victim was involved.
{¶ 6} Courts have divided Crim.R. 11 rights into constitutional and
nonconstitutional rights. Concerning constitutional rights, courts must
strictly comply with Crim.R. 11 mandates; for nonconstitutional rights, the
standard is substantial compliance. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d
86, 364 N.E.2d 1163. “Substantial compliance means that under the totality
of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications
of his plea and the rights he is waiving. Furthermore, a defendant who
challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made must show prejudicial effect.” State v.
Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 564 N.E.2d 474.
{¶ 7} Courts are not required to explain the elements of each offense, or
to specifically ask the defendant whether he understands the charges, unless
the totality of the circumstances shows that the defendant does not
understand the charges. State v. Kavlich (June 15, 2000), Cuyahoga App.
No. 77217, citing State v. Rainey (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 441, 442, 446 N.E.2d
5
188; State v. Swift (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 407, 412, 621 N.E.2d 513,
jurisdictional motion overruled (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 1410, 615 N.E.2d 1044;
State v. Burks (Nov. 13, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71904.
{¶ 8} In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances indicates
that Burrell understood the charges against him. Before the court explained
the rights he would be waiving, the court instructed him to interrupt the
proceedings at any time if there was anything he did not understand. The
court then advised him of his constitutional rights, and he indicated that he
was pleading guilty of his own free will, that he was satisfied with his
attorney, and that no threats or promises were made to induce his plea.
{¶ 9} The court read the indictment for the five counts, each which
contained the following language “On or about January 2, 2007, to February
9, 2009, and in Cuyahoga County, you unlawfully did engage in sexual
conduct with Jane Doe * * *, who is not your spouse and whose age at the
time of the sexual conduct was less than 13 years, whether or not you knew
her age.” After reciting the language in the indictments, the court asked,
“how do you plead to those five counts as I have read them to you.” Burrell
responded, “guilty.” At no time did he appear to be confused regarding the
elements of the offenses or who the victims were. Thus, the trial court did
not err by failing to detail the exact sexual conduct that Burrell engaged in
with the victims. Accordingly, Burrell’s first assigned error is overruled.
6
Effect of Guilty Plea
{¶ 10} In his second assigned error, Burrell argues that his guilty plea
was invalid because the court failed to inform him of the “effect” of his plea as
required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).
{¶ 11} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) states that the court shall not accept a guilty
plea without first ensuring that “the defendant understands the effect of the
plea of guilty or no contest.” The “effect” of a guilty plea is that the plea
constitutes a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt. See Crim.R.
11(B)(1).
{¶ 12} The court did not advise Burrell that the effect of his guilty plea
would be a complete admission of his guilt, but the error was harmless. The
rights contained in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) are nonconstitutional, so Burrell is
required to show that he suffered some prejudice from the court’s omission.
See State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, at
¶52; State v. Taylor, Cuyahoga App. No. 94569, 2010-Ohio-5607. He makes
no argument that he was prejudiced by the court’s failure to advise him of the
effect of his guilty plea, nor is any prejudice apparent on the record. At no
time during the plea proceedings did Burrell assert his innocence or in any
other way indicate that he was unaware that his plea would constitute a
complete admission of his guilt. Hence, the totality of the circumstances show
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no prejudice from the court’s failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Jones
at ¶54; State v. Esner, Cuyahoga App. No. 90740, 2008-Ohio-6654.
Accordingly, Burrell’s second assigned error is overruled.
Court Costs
{¶ 13} In his third assigned error, Burrell argues the trial court erred by
imposing court costs as a part of the sentence because the court failed to
notify him of the costs at his sentencing hearing. The state concedes this
error, relying on the recent Ohio Supreme Court case of State v. Joseph, 125
Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-954, 926 N.E.2d 278.
{¶ 14} We agree that the trial court erred. In Joseph, the court held
that it was error for the trial court to impose court costs on a defendant when
the defendant was not notified of the costs during the sentencing hearing.
The court concluded, however, that such error did not void the defendant’s
sentence. The court explained that “[t]he civil nature of the imposition of
court costs does not create the taint on the criminal sentence that the failure
to inform a defendant of postrelease control does. Nor does the failure to
inform a defendant orally of court costs affect another branch of government.
It affects only the court and the defendant.” Id. at ¶21.
{¶ 15} The Joseph court held that the defendant was not entitled to a
full resentencing hearing, but remanded the matter for the limited purpose of
allowing the defendant to file a motion for a waiver of payment of court costs.
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Id. at ¶23. Accordingly, Burrell’s third assigned error is sustained and the
matter remanded for Burrell to seek a waiver of the court costs.
Sentence Arbitrary
{¶ 16} In his fourth and fifth assigned errors, Burrell argues the trial
court failed to consider the criteria set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B) regarding the
seriousness of the offenses in imposing the 30-year prison sentence and relied
upon facts outside the record.
{¶ 17} Appellate courts review sentences by applying a two-prong
approach set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio
St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124. First, we must determine
whether the sentencing court complied with all applicable rules and statutes
in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is contrary to
law. Kalish at ¶4. If the sentence is not contrary to law, we then review the
trial court’s decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. The term
“abuse of discretion” connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it
implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d
144.
{¶ 18} Burrell argues that in imposing the sentence, the trial court
failed to consider the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C.
2929.12. Pursuant to the holding in Foster, trial courts are no longer required
9
to make findings or give reasons for imposing the sentence; however, R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 remain operative. While R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12
remain operative, the court is not required to make findings pursuant to R.C.
2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12; it need only consider these provisions. State v.
Nolan, Cuyahoga App. No. 90646, 2008-Ohio-5595; State v. Page, Cuyahoga
App. No. 90485, 2008-Ohio-4244; State v. McSwain, Cuyahoga App. No.
90358, 2008-Ohio-3661; State v. Garrett, Cuyahoga App. No. 90428,
2008-Ohio-3549.
{¶ 19} In the instant case, the record demonstrates that the trial court
considered R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 because the sentencing journal
entry reads in part: “The court considered all required factors of the law.
The court finds that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.”
This is enough to show the trial court considered the factors in R.C. 2929.12.
Cf. State v. Harris, Cuyahoga App. No. 90699, 2008-Ohio-5873, ¶103; State
v. Snyder, Cuyahoga App. No. 90869, 2008-Ohio-5586; Nolan. Additionally,
Burrell’s 30-year sentence was within the permissible statutory range for his
crimes. He could have received 50 years. Because the court imposed a
sentence within the statutory range and considered R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
2929.12 in imposing the sentence, the sentence is not contrary to law.
{¶ 20} Having satisfied the first step, we next consider whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Kalish at ¶4. We find no evidence that the trial
10
court abused its discretion by sentencing Burrell to 30 years in prison.
Although Burrell argues the trial court considered evidence outside the
charges he pled to, the trial court stated: “I also have to mention that I can
only sentence you for what you pled guilty to. I cannot sentence you for any
crimes that you were not charged with and that were dismissed. I cannot
sentence you for anything that may have happened that we don’t know about.
I am limited to the five rapes.” There is no evidence that the trial court did
not abide by the above statements.
{¶ 21} Moreover, as part of Burrell’s plea agreement, he was aware he
would receive a minimum of 25 years, but that the trial court could sentence
him to more. Burrell, himself, stated at the sentencing hearing, “25 years
ain’t enough. If they hate me like that, my sisters, Nici, my cousins, I don’t
deserve no 25 years. * * * I wish you would have found me sooner. 25 years
ain’t nothing.” Tr. 36. Even he conceded he deserved more time than 25
years in prison. Accordingly, Burrell’s fourth and fifth assigned errors are
overruled.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶ 22} In his final assigned error, Burrell argues that the trial court
failed to make the necessary required findings to justify the imposition of
consecutive sentences. Although he recognizes that the Ohio Supreme Court
in Foster, excised those statutory provisions that required judicial fact finding
11
before imposing consecutive sentences, he argues that the United State’s
Supreme Court decision in Oregon v. Ice (2009), 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711,
172 L.Ed.2d 517, essentially overruled Foster. The Ohio Supreme Court
recently rejected this argument and held that trial courts are not obligated to
engage in judicial fact finding prior to imposing consecutive sentences. See
State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768.
Accordingly, Burrell’s sixth assigned error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this
judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed,
any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for
execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, J., and
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR
APPENDIX
12
Assignments of Error
“I. Defendant was denied due process of law when the
court did not properly determine that defendant
understood the nature of the offense.”
“II. Defendant was denied due process of law when the
court failed to inform the defendant as to the effect of a
plea of guilty.”
“III. Defendant was denied due process of law when the
court, in a sentencing entry, assessed court costs when
there was no pronouncement of court costs at the time of
sentencing.”
“IV. Defendant was denied due process of law when the
court imposed a sentence based upon arbitrary
consider-ations.”
“V. Defendant was denied his constitutional rights under
the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments when the court
based its sentence on facts neither alleged in the
indictment nor admitted by defendant at the time of the
plea.”
“VI. Defendant was denied due process of law when the
court imposed consecutive sentences without any proper
findings.”