Harris v. Mayfield Hts. , 2011 Ohio 1943 ( 2011 )

[Cite as Harris v. Mayfield Hts., 2011-Ohio-1943.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95601
DEMETRIUS HARRIS
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
2
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CV-728167
BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Stewart, P.J., and Cooney, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 21, 2011
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
James R. Willis
323 W. Lakeside Avenue
420 Lakeside Place
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1009
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Leonard F. Carr
Bryan L. Carr
The Carr Law Firm
1392 S.O.M. Center Road
Mayfield Hts., Ohio 44124
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
3
{¶ 1} Demetrius Harris appeals from the decision of the trial
court dismissing his action in replevin for lack of jurisdiction.
Harris argues the trial court erred when it dismissed his action,
when it ruled that it did not have jurisdiction, and when it failed to
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the following
reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court.
{¶ 2} On June 1, 2010, Harris filed the instant complaint in
replevin as well as a motion for immediate return of seized property
against the city of Mayfield Heights, the Mayfield Heights Police
Department, the Mayfield Heights Chief of Police, and five unknown
law enforcement officers (defendants-appellees, hereinafter
“appellees”). The trial court set a hearing date for June 21, 2010.
{¶ 3} On June 16, 2010, the appellees filed a motion to dismiss
and a motion to adjourn the hearing, arguing that since agents of
the United States government took possession of the funds, the
court of common pleas was without jurisdiction to hear Harris’s
replevin action. Harris opposed this motion.
{¶ 4} On June 21, 2010, the trial court conducted a replevin
hearing and ordered Harris to file a brief within 14 days, showing
cause why his case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
4
Subsequently, Harris and the appellees filed their briefs on the issue
of jurisdiction. On July 26, 2010, the trial court granted appellees’
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that Harris’s
motion for the immediate return of the seized property was moot.
Harris appeals, raising the three assignments of error contained in
the appendix to this opinion.
{¶ 5} The underlying facts of this case began on May 24, 2010,
when Andrew Rocco, an off-duty Mayfield Heights police officer, was
driving on Mayfield Road in that city and observed a black Land
Rover driving beside him. Rocco wrote in the police report, which
was attached to appellees’ motion to dismiss/motion to adjourn filed
in the trial court: “I recognized the vehicle from a previous traffic
stop and recalled that the driver from the previous traffic stop was
currently suspended and had a warrant for his arrest. I looked at
the driver and noticed that he met the same physical description as
the driver that had been previously stopped.”1
{¶ 6} Off-duty Officer Rocco notified Officer Joseph
1
Harris’s reply brief reflects that the owner of the Land Rover in question was
a 40-year-old man who weighs approximately 340 pounds and that Harris was a
22-year-old man who, according to police reports attached to appellees’ motion to
dismiss, weighed 210 pounds.
5
Mytrosevich via portable radio of his suspicions, and Mytrosevich
effected a traffic stop of the Land Rover. Officer Rocco and Officer
Thomas Rovniak, who had arrived on the scene, assisted Officer
Mytrosevich with the stop.
{¶ 7} Officer Mytrosevich spoke with Harris and asked for his
driver’s license. Harris indicated that he did not have any
identification with him, but he provided his name and social
security number to Officer Mytrosevich. During this conversation,
Officer Rovniak instructed Officer Mytrosevich to remove Harris
from the vehicle, which he did, and after patting him down for
weapons, Mytrosevich placed Harris in handcuffs. According to the
police reports, which were made part of the record, Officer
Mytrosevich recovered approximately $600 from Harris’s person.
Additionally, Officers Rovniak and Rocco recovered approximately
$14,000 in U.S. currency from the front passenger seat where,
apparently, it was in plain view. When asked about the money,
Harris related to the officers that $6,000 was his, which he planned
to use to purchase a 2002 Honda, and the balance of $7,500 was his
uncle’s, which was going to be used to post bond for an unidentified
person.
6
{¶ 8} It was at this point, after Harris’s detention and the
seizure of his property, that Mayfield Heights police dispatch
informed the officers that the social security number, which Harris
had provided, reflected that Harris was driving under suspension.
The officers placed Harris under arrest. The officers ordered the
Land Rover towed and placed the seized U. S. currency into one of
three containers at police department headquarters. Officers
deployed a K-9 dog to perform a “currency sniff” and the dog alerted
to the container into which the officers had placed the seized
money. The officers then counted the seized monies, which totaled
$15,084.47 ($564.47 from Harris’s pocket and $14,520 from the front
passenger seat), all of which was presumably secured at the
Mayfield Heights Police Department.
{¶ 9} Reports reflect that Mayfield Heights Police Sergeant,
Steve Brown, contacted an agent from the Drug Enforcement
Administration. According to Officer Mytrosevich, who prepared
Mayfield Heights Police Department Incident Report number
10-03359, the agent “said that he would be coming in on Tuesday,
May 25, 2010 to pick up the U.S. currency that was seized.”
{¶ 10} As stated above, Harris appeals the dismissal of his
7
replevin action for lack of jurisdiction. The three assignments of
error are contained in the appendix to this opinion. Because we
find Harris’s second assignment of error dispositive, we shall
address it first. In his second assignment of error, Harris argues
the trial court erred when it determined it did not have jurisdiction
to hear the instant replevin action. For the following reasons, we
find Harris’s assigned error to have merit.
{¶ 11} Initially, we note that based on the record before this
court, it is unclear whether the federal government now possesses
the funds at issue. On May 24, 2010, Mayfield Heights Police
Department seized $15,084.47 from Harris. On May 26, 2010,
Mayfield Heights completed a Request for Adoption of State or Local
Seizure form. From that point on, the record is silent as to whether
the federal government approved the Request for Adoption and
whether the federal government actually took custody of the funds.
The appellees state in their brief that the DEA “took possession of
the currency.” However, they cite no evidence in the record
supporting this allegation.
{¶ 12} The United States Code outlines three options for
seizures, as follows:
8
“(2) Seizures pursuant to this section shall be made pursuant
to a warrant obtained in the same manner as provided for a
search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, except that a seizure may be made without a
warrant if
(A) a complaint for forfeiture has been filed in the United
States district court and the court issued an arrest warrant in
rem pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims;
(B) there is probable cause to believe that the property is
subject to forfeiture and
(i) the seizure is made pursuant to a lawful arrest or
search; or
(ii) another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement would apply; or
(C) the property was lawfully seized by a State or local law
enforcement agency and transferred to a Federal agency.”
18 U.S.C. 981(b)(2).
{¶ 13} Although it is not clear in the present case, it appears
that the appellees argue that under subsection (C), the money was
lawfully seized by local law enforcement and transferred to a federal
agency. In particular, the appellees claim the seizure was an
adoptive forfeiture by the federal authorities.
{¶ 14} Additionally, attached to appellees’ motion to dismiss
(Exhibit B) is a copy from the “Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual” of
unknown origin, “Appendix F — Equitable Sharing Attachments
9
— Request for Adoption of State or Local Seizure.” Page three of
that document reads as follows:
{¶ 15} “Immediate Probable Cause Review needed if following
factors are not present:
• seizure was based on judicial warrant
• arrest made in connection with seizure
• drugs or other contraband were seized from the person
from whom the property was seized.”
{¶ 16} Immediately below the above-quoted language is the
following statement: “Investigative Agency Headquarters Approval”
and then a signature and date line, both of which remain blank.
Accordingly, there is no evidence before this court that the federal
government ever granted approval of this seizure.
{¶ 17} It is obvious and uncontroverted that the seizure in this
case was NOT based on a federal warrant and that drugs or other
contraband were NOT seized from the person from whom the
property was seized. And, although the officers did place Harris
under arrest, the arrest was NOT made until after the seizure and
cannot possibly be asserted to have been made in connection to the
seizure as the officers only charged Harris with the offense of
10
driving under suspension. This court notes that the appellees make
gratuitous references in their briefs to criminal charges filed
against Harris for arrests in 2008 and 2009. We find these
references to have no bearing to the stop and arrest on May 24, 2010
and find the references merely superfluous and misleading.
{¶ 18} Appellees do not, and cannot, indicate how the
requirement that the cash was lawfully seized was established prior
to forfeiture other than it was likely based on the K-9 positive
identification of narcotics on the currency and the police officer’s
inference of criminal activity. Moreover, the officers’ inference of
criminal activity was not based on the activity of Harris, but on that
of a known driver of the black Land Rover, which Harris was
unfortunate enough to be driving at the time of his arrest.
{¶ 19} We find the appellees’ reliance on the drug dog’s positive
hit on Harris’s currency insufficient to support an inference of
criminal activity. In United States v. $5,000 in U.S. Currency (C.A.6,
1994), 40 F.3d 846, the court addressed the unreliability of using
narcotics-trained dogs in drug cases. The court relied on studies
showing that most currency in this country is tainted with traces of
narcotics. Id. The court found “the evidentiary value of the
11
narcotics dog’s alert to be minimal.” Id. at 849. The court reversed
the order of forfeiture because there was little other evidence to
connect the currency to drug activity. Id. at 850; See United States
v. $53,082.00 in United States Currency (C.A.6, 1993), 985 F.2d 245,
250, citing United States v. $80,760.00 in United States Currency
(N.D.Texas 1991), 781 F.Supp. 462, 475, fn. 32 (“There is some
indication that residue from narcotics contaminates as much as 96%
of the currency currently in circulation.”); see, also, $5,000 in United
States Currency at 849; United States v. Carr (C.A. 3, 1994), 25 F.3d
1194; United States v. $639,558.00 in United States Currency (C.A.
D.C. 1992), 955 F.2d 712, 714.
{¶ 20} In Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and
Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, the court
cited the testimony of an expert, Dr. James Woodford, who testified
that 90% of all cash in the United States contains sufficient
quantities of cocaine to alert a trained dog. The court also noted
that there was at least one study indicating that up to 97% of all bills
in circulation are contaminated by cocaine, with an average of 7.3
micrograms of cocaine per bill. Crime and Chemical Analysis 243
SCIENCE 1554 (1989). Id. At a footnote, the court wrote:
12
{¶ 21} “Why the nation's currency is so thoroughly corrupted
has been a topic of inquiry. It has been estimated that one out of
every three circulating bills has been involved in a cocaine
transaction. R. Siegel, Intoxication 293 (1989). Cocaine attaches —
in a variety of ways — to the bills, which in turn contaminate others
as they pass through cash registers, cash drawers, and counting
machines at banks and commercial establishments, id.; Crime and
Chemical Analysis, supra note 2, at 1555; Tr. I at 28. Dr. Woodford
testified that, as a result, bills may contain as little as a millionth of
a gram of cocaine, but that is many times more cocaine than is
needed for a dog to alert. Officer Beard related that 10 percent of
the alerts he had witnessed were to cash alone, a phenomenon we
have encountered before. United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805,
808-09 & n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1990). See generally Taslitz, Does the Cold
Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42
Hastings L.J. 15, 29 & n. 71 (1990). If the information related above
proves accurate, a court considering whether a dog sniff provides
probable cause, see generally United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469,
471 & n. 2, 483 (D.C.Cir.1989), may have to take into account the
possibility that the dog signaled only the presence of money, not
13
drugs.” Id. at fn 2.
{¶ 22} Here, similar to the federal cases cited above, the city of
Mayfield Heights had no evidence, other than the positive drug sniff
of the narcotics dog, that the money found on Harris was related to
drug activity. Additionally, they had no basis to seize the funds as
evidence of the crime for which Harris was being arrested, driving
under suspension. Lastly, the appellees’ allegation that Harris’s
criminal history supports this seizure cannot be used as a basis to
seize the funds. Harris’s criminal history has no bearing on the
seizure of the funds on May 24 as, on that date, the police arrested
him only for driving under suspension. Moreover, Harris had a
reasonable explanation for his possession of the money.
{¶ 23} The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States made applicable to the several States through the Fourteenth
Amendment states:
{¶ 24} “No person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.”
{¶ 25} Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:
“All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain
inalienable rights, among which are those of * * * acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property * * *.”
14
{¶ 26} In the present case, $15,084.47 was taken from Harris by
the State, without due process of law or probable cause. It was,
pure and simple, an unconstitutional taking.
{¶ 27} Primarily, there was no crime associated with this
seizure. In fact, the officers charged Harris with only a
misdemeanor offense of driving under suspension. Harris had no
opportunity to challenge the illegal taking of the money but for the
filing of this action in replevin as the State, after seizing the
currency, allegedly funneled it to the United States of America.
Within eight days of the State’s taking of his property, Harris did file
this action in replevin. Harris asserted his rights immediately and
there is no evidence before this court that the appellees provided
Harris with any notice of a forfeiture action in any court(s); rather,
the record contains only a “request for adoption.” Therefore, the
State effectively precluded Harris from asserting any claim in the
United States District Court. Harris then properly filed this action
in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County.
{¶ 28} The State’s arguments that they do not have the seized
property are disingenuous. The State, by acting as a conduit from
the owner or possessor of the property to the United States of
15
America is entitled, upon forfeiture, to the return of a substantial
amount of the monies seized. Accordingly, the State has a genuine
pecuniary interest in any seized property. The artificiality of their
specious claims that since they no longer are in possession of the
seized property, they cannot be held accountable in replevin, can be
viewed as an attempt by the State to knowingly circumvent the
replevin statutes. The State levies a preposterous argument. For
example, if a thief places stolen property in the home of a third
person, should he not be held accountable for its return when the
whereabouts of the property are discovered? The mere deposit of
currency in a repository operated by the United States government
does not obviate the obvious, the depositor has rights to that which
has been deposited.
{¶ 29} In Black v. Cleveland (1978), 58 Ohio App.2d 29, 387, 387
N.E.2d 1388, this court held that one in possession of property
sought to be replevied at the time the action is commenced may not
evade the action in replevin by transferring possession of property
to a third party. Specifically:
“Another reason exists for the decision reached herein. An
action in replevin is founded upon an unlawful detention,
regardless of whether an unlawful taking has occurred. The
action ‘is strictly a possessory action, and it lies only in behalf
16
of one entitled to possession against one having, at the time the
suit is begun, actual or constructive possession and control of
the property.’ J. E. Cobbey, Replevin, Section 64 (2d ed. 1900).
It has been held, however, that replevin will lie even though the
defendant did not have actual possession of the property at the
commencement of the action, where the defendant sold the
property just prior to the actual filing of the action and the
plaintiff was without knowledge of that fact. Tischler v. Seeley,
12 C.D. 750, 14 C.C. (N.S.) 236, affirmed without opinion, 60 Ohio
St. 629, 54 N.E. 1110 (1899); See also Helman v. Withers (1892), 3
Ind.App. 532, 30 N.E. 5.” Id. at 32-33.
{¶ 30} The Mayfield Heights Police Department may not have
actual possession of the $15,084.47 taken from Harris, but they most
certainly have constructive possession of that money. Actual
possession entails ownership or physical control, whereas
constructive possession is defined as knowingly exercising dominion
and control over an object even though that object may not be
within one’s physical possession. State v. Chandler, Cuyahoga App.
Nos. 93664 and 93665, 2011-Ohio-590, citing State v. Hankerson
(1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 87, 434 N.E.2d 1362.
{¶ 31} Like our prior holding in Black, we find that the city of
Mayfield Heights has constructive possession of the funds and,
therefore, they cannot abdicate any and all responsibility for the
seized property in an action in replevin by transferring the funds to
the federal government.
17
{¶ 32} The separate concurring opinion to State v. Primm,
Cuyahoga App. No. 94630, 2011-Ohio-328, analyzed similar facts and
circumstances, and accordingly, we find it instructive on this case.
In Primm, the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation, and in
addition to the $26,318 in cash, police also seized approximately 155
grams of marijuana and a 9 millimeter handgun. The record in
Primm reflects that the police transferred the $26,318 pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 981(b)(2). Contemporaneous to the filing of the indictment,
the State filed a forfeiture petition against Primm on September 26,
2007, seeking the $26,318, a handgun, and two cell phones.
{¶ 33} As a condition of his plea, Primm agreed to forfeit a
firearm and two cellular phones. The court signed the order of
forfeiture, which included the seized funds, on October 1, 2007, and
it was not until June 6, 2008 that Primm filed a motion for the return
of the monies seized. In the Primm case, as distinguished from the
instant case, the monies had been turned over to the United States
and, in April 2007, the Department of Justice issued a “Declaration
of Administrative Forfeiture.” No claims were filed, and the funds
were officially forfeited.
{¶ 34} Nonetheless, the separate concurring opinion in
18
Primm analyzed the applicable U.S. Code and determined that
although the federal government possessed the currency, the police
effectively acted preemptively and forfeited the money independent
of judicial review. Id. Although the opinion in Primm
acknowledges that once the federal government lawfully seizes
currency, a defendant’s remedy no longer lies with the state court
system, the facts in the instant case are distinguishable. Id., see,
also, 18 U.S.C. 983(e)(5); State v. Scott (Mar. 22, 2000), Mahoning App.
No. 98 CA 174; State ex rel. Chandler v. Butler (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d
592, 575 N.E.2d 833. Here, this court has no evidence before it that
the federal authorities ever adopted Mayfield Heights’ Request for
Adoption of State or Local Seizure and, therefore, the State never
lawfully transferred the seized property.
{¶ 35} The local law enforcement’s immediate transfer of the
funds, without any proper determination as to whether the seizure
was lawful, is tantamount to hiding the funds with the federal
government and washing their hands of any responsibility for
control or refund of the currency. Although distinguishable, it is
analogous to Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215, where the United States Supreme Court determined
19
that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution. This court analyzed the
requirements of Brady in the context of newly discovered
exculpatory evidence in State v. Russell, Cuyahoga App. No. 94345,
2011-Ohio-592, and determined that the prosecutor’s argument that
it did not have access to the exculpatory evidence was not good
enough. Specifically, the Russell court held that prosecutors have a
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on
the government’s behalf in the case and that failure to turn over
exculpatory evidence violates their constitutional duty.
{¶ 36} Accordingly, like Russell, we find that “it is not good
enough” that the appellees in this case merely argue that they no
longer have possession of the currency at issue. Especially
because the record is conspicuously silent as to whether the federal
authorities possess the funds at issue and whether the local
government lawfully seized the funds on May 24, 2010.
{¶ 37} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred
when it dismissed Harris’s replevin action. Our analysis of Harris’s
20
second assignment of error renders his first and third assignments
of error moot.
{¶ 38} The decision of the trial court is reversed, and the case
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellees costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing
the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., CONCURS IN
JUDGMENT ONLY;
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCURS
IN JUDGMENT ONLY (WITH SEPARATE
OPINION ATTACHED)
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT
ONLY:
{¶39}I concur in judgment only.
{¶40}Harris’s replevin action was improperly dismissed
21
because, unlike the situation in State v. Primm, Cuyahoga App. No.
94630, 2011-Ohio-328, there is no evidence of a forfeiture in the
instant case. Defendants’ Ex. B., the request for adoption of state or
local seizure form, specifically indicates no state forfeiture action
was initiated and denies that another federal agency has been
contacted and declined to proceed with this forfeiture. On this
record, the trial court has jurisdiction under R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) to
hear Harris’s petition that alleges the unlawful seizure of his
property.
Appendix A
Assignments of Error:
“I. The trial court erred, or abused its discretion, when it
summarily dismissed the appellant’s replevin action.
“II. Given the insuperable tenet that possession obtained
through an invalid seizure neither strips the first court of its
jurisdiction nor vests it in the second court, it follows the court
erred when it inferentially ruled it lacked jurisdiction.
“III. The court erred, and the appellant was denied due
process, when the court summarily dismissed the appellant’s
replevin action, indeed without making any findings of fact or
articulating any conclusions of law.”