State v. Tayse , 2017 Ohio 2837 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Tayse, 2017-Ohio-2837.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 28277
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JIMMY TAYSE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 07 04 1285
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 17, 2017
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Jimmy Tayse, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In 2007, Tayse was convicted of numerous felony offenses in the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas. The horrific circumstances which gave rise to Tayse’s convictions
commenced when he climbed into the backseat of an SUV in the parking lot of a grocery store in
Pennsylvania and put a knife to a baby’s neck. Tayse demanded that the mother of the baby,
who was the driver of the SUV, drive him out of town. Tayse forced the mother to drive him to
several locations in Northeast Ohio. Tayse was eventually apprehended, but not before he raped
the mother multiple times, committed numerous additional offenses, and was involved in a
dangerous car chase with police. Tayse was convicted of fourteen offenses including felonious
assault, multiple counts of rape, and multiple counts of kidnapping. Tayse was also convicted of
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numerous sexually violent predator and repeat violent offender specifications. All of Tayse’s
convictions were affirmed on direct appeal with the exception of his conviction for disrupting
public services, which was reversed on sufficiency grounds. State v. Tayse, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 23978, 2009-Ohio-1209.
{¶3} In the years following his direct appeal, Tayse filed a bevy of motions in the trial
court challenging his convictions. In 2013, Tayse unsuccessfully moved the trial court for post-
conviction relief. This Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition on appeal. State
v. Tayse, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27050, 2013-Ohio-5801.
{¶4} On November 20, 2015, Tayse filed a pro se “motion to vacate void judg[]ment
and issue a judg[]ment entry that complies with [Crim.R. 32(C)].” Therein, Tayse maintained
that the trial court never issued a final, appealable order in this matter. The State filed a
memorandum in opposition to the motion. On May 17, 2016, the trial court issued an order
denying Tayse’s motion.
{¶5} On appeal, Tayse raises two assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATE OF CRIM[.]R[.] 32(C), WHICH FAILED TO MAKE CASE NO.
CR-2007-04-1285 FINAL OR APPEALABLE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT JUDGE [] FAILED TO
ENTER A RULING ON THE PETITIONER[’]S SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENT SPECIFICATION, THAT WAS CHARGED IN THE
INDICTMENT UNDER [R.C.] 2971.03[(A)(4).]
{¶6} Both of Tayse’s assignments of error are predicated on the notion that the trial
court failed to comply with Crim.R. 32(C) and, therefore, did not issue a final, appealable order
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in this case. Tayse suggests that because the trial court never disposed of the specifications in
the indictment, this Court’s decision resolving his direct appeal is a nullity. This Court
disagrees.
{¶7} Former Crim.R. 32(C) stated, in pertinent part:
A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the
sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment entry and the clerk shall enter it
on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the
clerk.
{¶8} In explaining former Crim.R. 32(C), the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that “[a]
judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the
guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2)
the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.”
State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, syllabus.1 The requirements for a final,
appealable order apply to specifications attendant to convictions. See State v. Lewis, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 08CA09379, 2009-Ohio-3322, ¶ 4-5.
{¶9} On appeal, Tayse argues that the record is “completely silent” regarding the
specifications contained in the indictment. Though Tayse does not hone in on a specific charge,
the crux of his argument appears to be that the trial court never made a determination with
respect to applying the sentencing enhancement scheme set forth in R.C. 2971.03.
{¶10} Tayse’s argument is without merit. “Crim.R. 32(C) requires a resolution of only
those charges for which there were convictions.” State ex rel. Grinnell v. Reese, 135 Ohio St.3d
1In 2011, the Supreme Court modified its holding in Baker and held that “[a] judgment of
conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of
conviction, (2) the sentence, (3), the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the
entry upon the journal by the clerk.” State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204,
paragraph one of the syllabus.
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255, 2013-Ohio-733, ¶ 2. A review of the trial court’s November 2007 sentencing entry reveals
that in addition to addressing all of Tayse’s underlying convictions, the trial court’s sentencing
entry resolved each of the sexually violent predator and repeat violent offender specifications for
which Tayse was convicted. In specific regard to Crim.R. 32(C), the entry sets forth the manner
of conviction as well as the sentence for each offense and specification for which Tayse was
convicted. The entry was also signed by the trial judge and entered on the journal by the clerk of
court. See former Crim.R. 32(C); Baker at syllabus. Though Tayse suggests that the trial court
never determined whether he was subject to the sentence enhancement scheme set forth in R.C.
2971.03, a review of the sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the trial court relied on R.C.
2971.03 when imposing sentences for Tayse’s rape convictions contained in counts five, six, and
seven of the indictment. The trial court’s sentences for those counts were reflected in the
sentencing entry. To the extent that Tayse contends that the trial court misapplied the sentencing
enhancement scheme set forth in R.C. 2971.03, the alleged error, if true, would not impact
whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 32(C). Under these circumstances, Tayse cannot
prevail on his claim that the trial court’s judgment of conviction failed to comply with Crim.R.
32(C).
{¶11} The assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶12} Tayse’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JIMMY TAYSE, pro se, Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.