Springfield v. State , 2016 Ohio 725 ( 2016 )

[Cite as Springfield v. State, 2016-Ohio-725.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant : C.A. CASE NO. 2015-CA-77
:
v. : T.C. NO. 15CV202
:
STATE OF OHIO : (Civil appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellee :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the ___26th___ day of ____February____, 2016.
...........
JEROME M. STROZDAS, Atty, Reg. No. 0003263, 76 East High Street, Springfield, Ohio
45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
HALLI BROWNFIELD WATSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0082466 and NICOLE M. KOPPITCH,
Atty. Reg. No. 0082129, 30 East Broad Street, 16th floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
.............
DONOVAN, P.J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant City of Springfield (hereinafter “Springfield”) appeals a
decision of the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, denying its motion
for summary judgment and granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant-
appellee the State of Ohio (hereinafter “the State”). Springfield filed a timely notice of
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appeal with this Court on August 20, 2015.
{¶ 2} On March 18, 2015, Springfield filed a “Complaint,” in which it challenged the
constitutionality of Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 342 (hereinafter “Am.Sub.S.B. No.
342”) on the grounds that it violates Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution,
otherwise known as the “Home Rule Amendment.” Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 served to
amend and enact several statutory provisions governing traffic law photo-monitoring
devices. See R.C. 4511.092 – R.C. 4511.0914.
{¶ 3} In its complaint, Springfield specifically challenged the requirement in R.C.
4511.093(B)(1) that a law enforcement officer be present at the location of any traffic law
photo-monitoring device when it is being operated. Springfield also challenged R.C.
4511.095(A)(1) and (2), the provisions which require that a local authority must conduct
a safety study and public information campaign for the location under consideration for
the placement of a new device before any new photo-monitoring equipment can be
deployed. Springfield further asserted that R.C. 4511.0912(A) and (B) violated the home
rule amendment because it prohibits municipal authorities from issuing speeding tickets
for violations recorded by traffic law photo-monitoring devices unless the individual was
driving more than six miles per hour above the speed limit in a school zone and/or park,
or ten or more miles per hour above the speed limit in any other location. Springfield
argued that the aforementioned provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 “interfere with the
City’s power of ‘local self-government’ and with the City’s exercise of its police power in
a manner ‘not in conflict with general laws.’ ” We note that although Springfield’s
complaint only references five specific provisions which it finds objectionable, it sought a
declaratory judgment that all of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 violates the home rule amendment,
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and is therefore unconstitutional.
{¶ 4} On May 26, 2015, Springfield filed its motion for summary judgment. In
addition to arguing that R.C. 4511.093(B)(1), 4511.095, and R.C. 4511.0912 were
unconstitutional as it had in its complaint, Springfield asserted that R.C. 4511.0911, R.C.
4511.092, R.C. 4511.094, R.C. 4511.096, R.C. 4511.097, and R.C. 4511.099 were
unconstitutional “incursions” into its power of local self-government. Springfield also
argued that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is not a general law because it does not “prescribe a
rule of conduct for citizens generally,” but only serves to place unconstitutional limits on
a municipality’s legislative ability. Finally, Springfield asserted that the only provisions of
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 that could survive being severed were R.C. 3937.411, R.C.
4511.010, and R.C. 4511.204(C)(2). According to Springfield, the remainder of
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 should be stricken as unconstitutional.
{¶ 5} Shortly thereafter on June 9, 2015, the State filed its motion for summary
judgment and memorandum contra in which it argued that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is a
general law, and therefore not subject to the home rule amendment to the Ohio
Constitution. As such, the State asserted that Am.Sub. S.B. No. 342 was constitutionally
permissible.
{¶ 6} On August 17, 2015, the trial court issued an entry overruling Springfield’s
motion for summary judgment. In the same entry, the trial court granted the State’s
motion for summary judgment, concluding that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was constitutionally
valid in its entirety, and therefore did not violate the home rule provisions of the Ohio
Constitution.
{¶ 7} It is from this judgment that Springfield now appeals.
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The Springfield Ordinance / No. 05-41
{¶ 8} On February 15, 2005, Springfield enacted an ordinance authorizing an
“automated traffic control photographic system” (ATCPS) for placement at intersections
throughout the city. The system only provides for the enforcement of red light violations.
The ordinance is codified in Section 303.09 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of
Springfield, Ohio. Springfield states that the purpose of the traffic law photo-monitoring
system is to reduce the number of red light violations and automobile accidents in the
city. Springfield also asserts that the system helps to conserve limited police resources.
According to Springfield, there are approximately ten intersections where red light
cameras are operating throughout the city.
{¶ 9} Springfield maintains that the ordinance creates a system which is civil in
nature, not criminal. The ordinance provides for civil enforcement imposing monetary
fines upon the owners of vehicles who commit red light violations. Offenders who are
recorded by the ATCPS are not issued criminal traffic citations, and offenses are not
adjudicated by the Springfield municipal court. Offenders are not assessed points on
their driving records, and Springfield has created and implemented an administrative
hearing process presided over by an independent third party not employed by the City of
Springfield or the police department. The ordinance states, however, that the Springfield
Police Division shall administer the ATCPS program.
{¶ 10} Contained in the notice of liability sent to the offender are the following: 1)
the images of the vehicle and its license plate; 2) the ownership records of the vehicle; 3)
the nature of the violation and the date upon which the offense occurred; 4) the amount
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of the civil penalty imposed; and 5) a signed statement by a Springfield Police Officer
stating that a violation had occurred based upon review of the recorded images. The
recorded images and speed measurement readings taken from the ATCPS device are
considered under the ordinance to be prima facie evidence of a violation. The ordinance
further provides a means by which the owner of a vehicle can dispute a violation if he or
she was not driving the vehicle at the time that the ATCPS recorded a violation. Owners
choosing to appeal must send a written request to the Springfield Police Department
within fifteen days of receiving the notice of liability. If an administrative hearing is held,
the standard of proof utilized by the hearing officer is preponderance of the evidence.
Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 342
{¶ 11} Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was signed into law on December 19, 2014, and
became effective shortly thereafter on March 23, 2015. The following Revised Code
sections were enacted as a result of Am.Sub. S.B. No. 342’s passage: 4511.092;
4511.093; 4511.095; 4511.096; 4511.097; 4511.098; 4511.099; 4511.0910; 4511.0911;
4511.0912; 4511.0913; 4511.0914; and 4511.204(C)(2). Viewed collectively, the new
sections provide a comprehensive definition section (R.C. 4511.092) and expand upon
existing requirements for municipalities who employ the use of traffic photo-monitoring
systems. We note that R.C. 4511.094 was already in existence prior to the passage of
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342, but parts of the section were updated by the new law including
requirements for signs informing drivers that traffic law photo-monitoring devices are
being operated in a particular area.
{¶ 12} R.C. 4511.093(A) begins by stating that “[a] local authority may utilize a
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traffic law photo-monitoring device for the purpose of detecting traffic law violations.”
Clearly, the initial decision whether to implement the use of traffic cameras is left to the
individual municipality. Once the decision is made to install traffic cameras, their
continued use becomes subject to the statewide conditions enunciated in the remainder
of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342. Specifically, R.C. 4511.093(B)(1) provides that if a municipality
implements the use of a traffic law photo-monitoring device, a law enforcement officer
must be present at the location of the device while it is being operated. R.C.
4511.093(B)(2) simply states that a law enforcement officer who is present while the
photo-monitoring device is operating can issue a ticket for any violation he or she
personally witnesses. Alternatively, if the officer who is present did not issue a ticket for
the observed violation, the municipality may issue a ticket for a civil violation if it was
recorded by the photo-monitoring device. R.C. 4511.093(B)(3).
{¶ 13} R.C. 4511.095 requires municipalities to perform certain pre-
implementation procedures before deploying a traffic law photo-monitoring device that
was not in existence at the time that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 became effective.
Specifically, R.C. 4511.095(A)(1) requires a municipality to conduct a safety study of
intersections or locations under consideration for placement of a traffic camera. The
municipality is also required to conduct a public information campaign to inform drivers
about the use of traffic cameras at new system locations prior to their implementation at
the new location. R.C. 4511.095(A)(2). Municipalities are also required to publish at
least one notice in a local newspaper of general circulation regarding their intent to use
traffic cameras at new locations, the locations of the traffic cameras, and the date on
which the first traffic camera will become operational. R.C. 4511.095(A)(3). Additionally,
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when a new traffic camera is deployed, the municipality must “refrain from levying any
civil fines” for violations detected by the device for at least thirty days after it becomes
operational. R.C. 4511.095(A)(4). During the thirty day interim after the traffic camera
becomes operational, the municipality may send a warning notice to drivers who have
committed recorded traffic violations. Id.
{¶ 14} R.C. 4511.0912(A) states that a civil ticket may not be issued for a violation
recorded by a traffic camera located in a school zone or local park unless the vehicle in
question is captured traveling at a speed that exceeds the posted speed limit by at least
six miles per hour. In all other locations, the vehicle must be recorded by the traffic
camera traveling at least ten miles over the posted speed limit for a civil ticket to issue.
R.C. 4511.0912(B).
{¶ 15} Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 also enacted the following additional regulations:
R.C. 3937.411 – This section instructs insurers that they may not deny
coverage and/or raise the insurance premium of any individual who receives
a civil ticket based on a violation recorded by a traffic camera.
R.C. 4511.096(A) – This section contains a requirement that a law
enforcement officer examine the evidence of an alleged violation recorded
by a traffic camera in order to determine whether a violation has in fact
occurred. If a violation is found to have occurred, the officer may use the
vehicle’s license plate number to identify the registered owner.
R.C. 4511.096(B) – This section states that the fact that a person is found
to be the registered owner of the vehicle is prima facie evidence that the
person was operating the vehicle at the time the traffic violation occurred.
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R.C. 4511.096(C) and (D) – These sections contain updated requirements
for the standards with respect to the issuance of civil tickets for violations
recorded by traffic cameras.
R.C. 4511.097 – This section explains what information should be included
in the civil ticket issued to an offender for a violation recorded by a traffic
camera and states that the local authority is required to send the ticket no
later than thirty days after the violation. Significantly, this section mandates
that the officer, required to be present by R.C. 4511.093(B)(1) whenever
traffic cameras are in use, must include his name and badge number in the
ticket sent to the offender. R.C. 4511.097(B)(7).
R.C. 4511.098 – This section sets out the options for paying or challenging
the civil ticket issued to a person for a violation recorded by a traffic camera.
R.C. 4511.099 – This section sets forth the procedure for a hearing, the
standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence), and affirmative
defenses that apply if an alleged offender chooses to challenge a ticket
issued based on the recorded image of a violation from a traffic camera.
R.C. 4511.0911 – This section contains requirements for the manufacturer
of the traffic camera to provide to the local authority the maintenance record
for each traffic camera used in the municipality, and an annual certificate of
proper operation for each traffic camera.
Standard of Review
{¶ 16} As this Court has previously noted:
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When reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court conducts
a de novo review. Village of Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St. 3d 102,
105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). “De Novo review means that this court uses
the same standard that the trial court should have used, and we examine
the evidence to determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues
exist for trial.” Harris v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
25636, 2013–Ohio–5234, ¶ 11 (quoting Brewer v. Cleveland City Schools
Bd. [o]f Edn., 122 Ohio App. 3d 378, 383, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997)
(citing Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co ., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187
(1980)). Therefore, the trial court's decision is not granted any deference by
the reviewing appellate court. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 87 Ohio
App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993).
Civ. R. 56 defines the standard to be applied when determining
whether a summary judgment should be granted. Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v.
Morgan, 116 Ohio St. 3d 461, 463, 880 N.E.2d 88 (2008). Summary
judgment is proper when the trial court finds: “(1) that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the
Motion for Summary Judgment is made, who is entitled to have the
evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” Fortune v. Fortune, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 90–CA–96, 1991 WL 70721, *1 (May 3, 1991) (quoting Harless
v. Willis Day Warehous[ing] Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 64, 67, 375 N.E.2d 45
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(1978)). The initial burden is on the moving party to show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St. 3d 280, 292–93,
662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). Once a moving party satisfies its burden, the
nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
party's pleadings. Dotson v. Freight Rite, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
25495, 2013–Ohio–3272, ¶ 41 (citation omitted).
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Greenmont Mut. Hous. Corp., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25830,
2014-Ohio-1973, ¶ 17-18.
{¶ 17} Because they are interrelated, Springfield’s first and second assignments
of error will be discussed together as follows:
{¶ 18} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE CITY’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.”
{¶ 19} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.”
{¶ 20} In its first and second assignments, Springfield contends that the trial court
erred by denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the State summary
judgment on its claims regarding the constitutionality of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342.
Specifically, Springfield argues that several provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 are
unconstitutional because they violate its power of self-government. Springfield also
argues that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is not a general law because it does not prescribe a
rule of conduct for citizens generally and is not an exercise of the police power of the
State. Lastly, Springfield argues that the only sections of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 that can
be severed are R.C. 3937.411 and R.C. 4511.010 because the remainder of the sections
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are unconstitutional.
{¶ 21} Initially, we recognize the “fundamental principle that a court must ‘presume
the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.’ ” Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St. 3d
135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, ¶ 6, citing Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35,
38, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). Therefore, we begin with the presumption that Am.Sub.S.B.
No. 342 (specifically, R.C. 4511.093(B)(1) & (3), 4511.095, and 4511.0912) is
constitutional. Accordingly, the statute “will not be invalidated unless the challenger
establishes that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 6.
{¶ 22} Under the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, “[m]unicipalities
shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are
not in conflict with general laws.” Article XVIII, Section 3. This amendment provides
municipalities with the “broadest possible powers of self-government in connection with
all matters which are strictly local and do not impinge upon matters which are of a state-
wide nature or interest.” State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corporation, 143 Ohio
St.3d 271, 2015-Ohio-485, 37 N.E.3d 128, ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Hackley v. Edmonds,
150 Ohio St. 203, 212, 80 N.E.2d 769 (1948). Therefore, a municipal ordinance must
yield to a state statute if 1) the ordinance is an exercise of police power, rather than of
local self-government; 2) that statute is a general law; and 3) the ordinance is in conflict
with the statute.
{¶ 23} Neither party disputes that Springfield Ordinance No. 05-41, enacting an
automated photo-enforcement program, was lawfully enacted pursuant to its
constitutionally protected home rule powers. Recently, in Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio
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St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 3, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its
holding in Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St. 3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, that
municipalities, such as Springfield, have home rule authority under Article XVIII of the
Ohio Constitution to impose civil liability on traffic violators through the use of a photo
enforcement system for red light violations. We note that Springfield does not utilize
speed-monitoring cameras or mobile photo-monitoring devices. To the extent
Springfield challenges Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 regarding its provisions implementing the
use of speed cameras and mobile photo-monitoring devices, it lacks standing to do so
since its cameras are only designed to detect red-light violations and nothing more.
Exercise of Police Power or Exercise of Local Self-Government
{¶ 24} In Dayton v. State, 2015-Ohio-3160, 36 N.E.3d 235 (2d Dist.), we recently
found that the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to the City of
Dayton, finding that certain provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 unconstitutionally violated
its home rule powers. We concluded that when properly analyzed in its entirety,
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 constitutes a comprehensive, uniform, statewide regulatory
scheme which clearly prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. Therefore,
we found that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is a general law that does not violate the “Home Rule
Amendment” in the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 25} In Dayton, however, the only issue before this Court was whether
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was a general law. Dayton acknowledged that its traffic camera
ordinance was an exercise of police power. Additionally, Dayton acknowledged that its
traffic camera ordinance was in conflict with Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342. In the instant case,
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Springfield argues that its traffic camera ordinance is not an exercise of police power, but
is instead, an exercise of local self-government. Accordingly, that is where our analysis
begins.
{¶ 26} “If an allegedly conflicting city ordinance relates solely to self-government,
the analysis stops, because the Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all
powers of local self-government within its jurisdiction.” Am. Financial Servs. Assn. v.
Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 23. An ordinance
created under the power of local self-government must relate “solely to the government
and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality.” Beachwood v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958), paragraph one of the
syllabus. Conversely, the police power allows municipalities to enact regulations only to
protect the public health, safety, or morals, or the general welfare of the public.
See Downing v. Cook, 69 Ohio St. 2d 149, 150, 431 N.E.2d 995 (1982). While local self-
government ordinances are protected under the Home Rule Amendment, police-power
ordinances “must yield in the face of a general state law.” Am. Financial Servs. Assn., 112
Ohio St. 3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 23.
{¶ 27} In Tolliver v. Newark , 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357 (1945), overruled in
part on other grounds in Fankhauser v. Mansfield , 19 Ohio St. 2d 102, 110, 249 N.E.2d
789 (1969), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the regulation of traffic by the placement
of stop signs was an exercise of the police power. Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.
The court came to the same conclusion for an ordinance regulating truck routes
throughout a city, Niles v. Dean, 25 Ohio St. 2d 284, 268 N.E.2d 275 (1971), paragraph
one of the syllabus, and a zoning ordinance regulating the accessibility of off-street
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parking because it was directed at the “protection of pedestrians and drivers, elimination
of traffic congestion and reduction of air and noise pollution,” Brown v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio
St.2d 93, 96, 420 N.E.2d 103 (1981). The Ohio Supreme Court eventually concluded
that traffic ordinances in general arise from the police power. See Linndale v. State, 85
Ohio St. 3d 52, 53–54, 706 N.E.2d 1227 (1999), citing Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 67
Ohio St. 3d 579, 583, 621 N.E.2d 696 (1993). “It is now clear that the regulation of traffic
is an exercise of police power that relates to public health and safety as well as the
general welfare of the public.” Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 553,
2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 14.
{¶ 28} Upon review, we conclude that Springfield’s traffic camera ordinance is
clearly an exercise of its police power. Springfield’s ordinance does not “relate solely to
the government and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality,” but rather
enacts regulations that affect public safety. Marich, ¶ 11. Springfield acknowledges that
the ordinance was enacted “to address that public danger occasioned by motorists
running red lights. *** The Commission declared its purpose of significantly reducing red
light violations and related accidents.” It is also important to note that in its ordinance,
Springfield labels the red-light cameras as its “Automated Traffic Control Photographic
System.” According to Springfield’s City Manager, James Bodenmiller, the “prime
motivation” in enacting the traffic camera ordinance was to improve safety. The goal of
improving safety is repeated in the preamble of Springfield’s traffic camera ordinance.
{¶ 29} Springfield’s traffic camera ordinance was designed to regulate individuals
who violate the city’s red-light traffic laws at its busiest intersections. These
requirements serve to protect drivers and pedestrians who might be traveling on those
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roads and generally affect traffic flow in the municipality. Thus the ordinance is
an exercise of that jurisdiction's police power that may be invalidated if it conflicts with the
general laws of this state.
General Law
{¶ 30} As previously noted, we have recently held that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is a
general law in Dayton v. State, 2015-Ohio-3160, 36 N.E.3d 235 (2d Dist.), wherein we
stated in pertinent part:
*** “A general law has been described as one which promotes
statewide uniformity.” Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N.
Olmstead, 65 Ohio St. 3d 242, 244, 602 N.E.2d 1147 (1965). Furthermore,
general laws are those “enact[ed] to safeguard the peace, health, morals,
and safety, and to protect the property of the people of the state.”
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 83, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
“Once a matter has become of such general interest that it is necessary to
make it subject to statewide control as to require uniform statewide
regulation, the municipality can no longer legislate in the field so as to
conflict with the state.” State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 3d 189,
194, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962).
A statute qualifies as a general law if it satisfies four criteria. The
statute must: 1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative
enactment; 2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly
throughout the state; 3) set forth police, sanitary or similar regulations,
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rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal
corporation to prescribe those regulations; and 4) prescribe a rule of
conduct upon citizens generally. Mendenhall [v. Akron, 117 Ohio St. 3d 33,
2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255], at ¶ 20; Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St. 3d
149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus.
***
The third element of the Canton test requires that for a statute to be
considered a general law, it must set forth police, sanitary, or similar
regulations, instead of merely granting or limiting a municipality’s power to
create such regulations. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 regulates the statewide use
of traffic cameras to record red light/speeding violations. The statute is a
comprehensive legislative enactment which applies to all parts of the state
and is operated uniformly throughout.
***
R.C. 4511.093, 4511.095, and 4511.0912 undoubtedly regulate the
requirements and implementation procedures to which a municipality must
adhere if it chooses to use traffic cameras to record red light/speeding
violations. However, as is clear from the other provisions listed above,
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 has “extensive scope and does more than grant or
limit state powers.” Mendenhall, at ¶ 24. In addition to regulating municipal
authority, the other provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 also establish laws
and procedures for motorists to follow if they are recorded by the traffic
cameras committing a red light or speeding violation. Moreover, the
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statute establishes requirements for the manufacturer of the traffic camera
regarding maintenance and annual upkeep of the device. Finally,
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 addresses insurers and restricts them from raising
premiums or denying insurance coverage based on a violation recorded by
a traffic camera.
In Mendenhall, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the speed limit
statute enacted in portions of R.C. 4511.21 was a general law even though
the statute contained language that clearly limits municipal authority. R.C.
4511.21(I) limits the ability of municipalities to establish their own speed
limits. Pursuant to the statute, local authorities must follow specific
procedures if they wish to deviate from the speed limits codified by the
statute. Id. Additionally, R.C. 4511.21(J) specifically provides that “local
authorities shall not modify or alter the basic rule set forth in division (A) of
this section or in any event authorize by ordinance a speed in excess of fifty
miles per hour.” Thus, if the State can constitutionally limit a municipality’s
ability to set its own speed limit in the interest of creating a comprehensive,
statewide uniform statute regulating the speed of motor vehicles, it can also
create a similar statewide uniform regulatory scheme governing traffic law
photo-monitoring devices. While Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 may contain
provisions which limit municipal authority, the overriding statewide, uniform
purpose of the statute clearly sets forth comprehensive “police, sanitary or
similar regulations.”
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that when considering
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whether a statute prohibiting regulation of properly licensed hazardous
waste disposal facilities by a political subdivision was a valid general law,
“[t]he section of law questioned *** should not be read and interpreted in
isolation from the other sections [of the Revised Code Chapter] dealing with
the state’s control of the disposal of hazardous wastes. All such sections
read in pari materia do not merely prohibit subdivisions of the state from
regulation of these facilities. Conversely, the statutory scheme contained
in this chapter is a comprehensive one enacted to insure that such facilities
are designed, sited, and operated in the manner which best serves the
statewide public interest.” Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v.
Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St. 3d 44, 48, 442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).
***
The Ohio Supreme Court has unequivocally held that “sections within
a chapter will not be considered in isolation when determining whether a
general law exists.” Mendenhall, at ¶ 27. Read in pari material,
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 creates a uniform, comprehensive, statewide
statutory scheme regulating the use and implementation of traffic law photo-
monitoring devices in Ohio. Similar to Ohio’s speed statute, R.C. 4511.21,
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 has “extensive scope and does more than grant or
limit state powers.” Id. at ¶ 24. Contrary to Dayton’s assertion,
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was clearly not enacted to limit municipal legislative
powers. In the instant case, the trial court erred when it considered R.C.
4511.093, 4511.095, and 4511.0912 in isolation from the remainder of the
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statutory provisions in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342.
We note that in support of its finding that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 merely
acts to limit municipal power in derogation of the third element of the Canton
test, the trial court relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Linndale
v. State, 85 Ohio St. 3d 52, 706 N.E.2d 1227 (1999). In Linndale, the Court
addressed a state statute prohibiting local authorities from issuing speeding
and excess weight citations when the municipality has less than 880 yards
of the freeway within its jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held
that the state statute was not a general law because it “impermissibly
infringed on the right of affected municipalities to enact or enforce traffic
regulations,” in violation of the home rule.
However, unlike the statute in question in Linndale which prohibited
the local authorities from issuing certain traffic citations, Am.Sub.S.B. No.
342 permits a municipality to operate a traffic law photo-enforcement
system. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 merely sets forth certain uniform statewide
procedures and regulations to be followed if a municipality voluntarily
decides to implement the use of traffic cameras. Moreover, the Linndale
court stated that the statute in question was “not part of a uniform statewide
regulation on the subject of traffic law enforcement.” Id. at 55. The statute
in Linndale was found to only specifically affect “certain” municipalities in
Ohio; as a result, the statute had no uniform statewide application and was
therefore unconstitutional. Id. Conversely, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 does not
target the enforcement of traffic laws in only certain select municipalities.
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Simply put, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 uniformly applies to all municipalities in
Ohio who voluntarily choose to implement traffic cameras. Accordingly,
Linndale is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
In light of the foregoing analysis, we find that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342
provides for a uniform, comprehensive, statewide statutory scheme
regulating the use and implementation of traffic law photo-monitoring
devices in Ohio, and was clearly not enacted to limit municipal legislative
powers.
***
The final issue we must address is whether Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342
“prescribe[s] a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton, 95 Ohio
St.3d 149, syllabus. As we have emphasized, the statute in question
cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. Upon review, we conclude and reiterate
that the statutory scheme contained in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is a
comprehensive one enacted to insure that traffic law photo-enforcement is
implemented and regulated in the manner which best serves the statewide
public interest and its citizenry. See Clermont Environmental Reclamation
Co., 2 Ohio St. 3d 44, at 48.
R.C. 4511.093, 4511.095, and 4511.0912 undoubtedly regulate the
requirements and implementation procedures to which a municipality must
adhere if it chooses to utilize traffic cameras to record red light/speeding
violations. However, as is clear from all of the other provisions in the
statute, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 has “extensive scope and does more than
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grant or limit state powers.” Mendenhall, at ¶ 24. In its decision, the trial
court acknowledged that “certain provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 are
directed at the conduct of citizens.” The trial court ignored those provisions
which directly and uniformly applied to all motor vehicle operators in Ohio,
and instead, narrowly focused on R.C. 4511.093, 4511.095, and 4511.0912
in isolation. The fourth element of the Canton test does not require that the
statute in question prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens specifically, but
rather upon citizens generally. Significantly, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 not only
addresses the responsibilities of drivers and the municipalities in which they
live, but also the responsibilities of motor vehicle insurers and the
manufacturers of the traffic cameras. With respect to all operators of motor
vehicles in Ohio, the statute outlines the procedures to be followed by a
driver who is issued a ticket, how to pay or dispute the violation, and finally,
the procedures and rules an individual is subject to if he or she chooses to
challenge the violation before an administrative body. Sections within a
chapter will not be considered in isolation when determining whether a
general law exists. Mendenhall, 117 Ohio St. 3d 33, at ¶ 27. When properly
analyzed in its entirety, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 therefore constitutes a
comprehensive, uniform, statewide regulatory scheme which clearly
prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.
Thus, having satisfied the Canton test, we find that Am.Sub.S.B. No.
342 constitutes a “general law” and does not violate the Home Rule
Amendment of the Ohio Constitution. Dayton has failed to meet its burden
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of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 in any
way offends the Ohio Constitution.
Dayton v. State, 2015-Ohio-3160, at ¶s 22-39.
{¶ 31} In light of our previous holding in Dayton, we find no merit to Springfield’s
argument that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is not a general law. Contrary to Springfield’s
assertions, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was not enacted to limit municipal powers, and the
statute constitutes a comprehensive, uniform, statewide regulatory scheme which clearly
prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. Like the City of Dayton before it,
Springfield has failed to meet its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 in any way offends the Ohio Constitution.
Severance
{¶ 32} Lastly, Springfield argues that the only provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342
that can be severed are R.C. 3937.411 and R.C. 4511.010 because the remainder of the
sections are unconstitutional. R.C. 1.50 provides that statutory provisions are
presumptively severable: “If any provision of a section of the Revised Code or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not
affect other provisions or applications of the section or related sections which can be
given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end are severable.”
{¶ 33} Determining whether a provision is severable requires application of the
following three-part inquiry:
(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of
separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the
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unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as
to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the
Legislature if the clause is taken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms
necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the
unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?
State ex rel. Sunset Estate Properties, L.L.C. v. Lodi, 142 Ohio St. 3d 351, 2015-
Ohio-790, 30 N.E.3d 934, ¶ 17.
{¶ 34} Here, we have found Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 to be constitutional in its entirety.
Therefore, we need not determine whether any provision of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is
subject to severability because the issue is moot. Upon review, we conclude that the
trial court did not err when it granted the State’s motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 35} Springfield’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 36} Both of Springfield’s assignments of error having been overruled, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
..........
FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Jerome M. Strozdas
Halli Brownfield Watson
Nicole M. Koppitch
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter