State v. Matheny ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Matheny, 2022-Ohio-3447.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 21CA0088
:
DANIEL MATHENY :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 21CR00315
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 28, 2022
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
BILL HAYES OWEN D. KALIS
LICKING CO. PROSECUTOR 6605 Longshore St.
CLIFFORD J. MURPHY Suite 240
20 North Second St., 4th Floor Dublin, OH 43017
Newark, OH 43055
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Daniel Matheny appeals from judgment entry of conviction and
sentence of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, incorporating the trial court’s
Judgment Entry of September 22, 2021, overruling his motion to suppress. Appellee is
the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} The following evidence is adduced from the record of appellant’s
suppression hearing.
{¶3} This case arose on May 29, 2021, when Ptl. Nicholas Potter of the Utica
Police Department observed Michelle Byas operating a 2005 Cadillac around 5:49 p.m.
Potter believed Byas did not have a valid driver’s license and followed the Cadillac as he
checked the driver’s status. He confirmed Byas was driving under suspension.
{¶4} Potter completed a traffic stop of the vehicle; Byas was driving and appellant
was the front-seat passenger. Byas told Potter she had driving privileges from Delaware
Municipal Court, but he eventually confirmed that this statement was false. Byas’s
license was suspended and she had no operating privileges.
{¶5} Potter testified that it is departmental policy of the Utica Police Department
to impound a vehicle if the driver does not have a valid license. The written departmental
policy was entered into evidence by appellee as State’s Exhibit 2. Further, any vehicle
subject to impound must be inventoried before it is towed. The purpose of the vehicle
inventory search is to document its contents to protect the vehicle owner, police, and tow
company from claims later. State’s Exhibit 1 is the inventory sheet of the Cadillac.
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 3
{¶6} As the traffic stop progressed, Potter radioed for assistance because he
could not safely process paperwork and secure both individuals on scene. Chief Batross
of the St. Louisville Police Department arrived to assist Potter, and Ptl. Campbell
accompanied Batross.
{¶7} During the vehicle inventory, officers found a partially-open red LL Bean
“sports bag” in the trunk. Inside the bag was a Crown Royale bag containing electronic
scales, suspected methamphetamine, and a Glock handgun. Appellant told police the
sports bag and its contents were his.
{¶8} The traffic stop was recorded on Potter’s bodycam, and the video was
entered into evidence as State’s Exhibit 5. Potter testified, and the bodycam video
corroborated, that the stop was initiated at 5:49 p.m.; he confirmed Byas’s lack of
occupational privileges at 5:55 p.m.; he called for assistance at 6:00 p.m.; he filled out the
BMV 2255 form for a D.U.S arrest from 6:06 to 6:18 p.m.; and he completed the DUS
paperwork between 6:24 and 6:28 p.m. The duration of the stop was approximately 38
minutes from initial contact until the contraband was found in the trunk of the Cadillac.
Potter testified this is a “normal” time frame for a DUS traffic stop.
{¶9} Potter described his interaction with appellant in further detail upon cross-
examination. Appellant responded to Potter’s questions, volunteering that he was on
post-release control and wearing an ankle monitor. Appellant and Byas both identified
themselves and their identities were confirmed through LEADS. Appellant’s operator’s
license was also suspended, foreclosing the possibility that he could have driven the
Cadillac from the scene. Appellant and Byas were placed in the backseat of Batross’
cruiser during the vehicle inventory for safety so they weren’t standing at the roadside.
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 4
Appellant and Byas each had cell phones, which they were allowed to keep while seated
in the cruiser.
{¶10} Potter and Batross testified that appellant was not under arrest and was
free to leave throughout the encounter, until officers found the contraband in the trunk.
The officers did not suggest that appellant leave the scene, but testified that they would
have remained at the scene with Byas if appellant left.
{¶11} Appellant’s mother arrived at the scene in a vehicle and Batross testified
appellant could have left with her until discovery of the contraband, but appellant didn’t
ask to leave and the officers didn’t suggest that he do so.
{¶12} Appellant was charged by superseding indictment as follows: Count I,
aggravated possession of methamphetamine pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(b), a
felony of the third degree; Count II, aggravated trafficking in methamphetamine pursuant
to R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(c), a felony of the third degree; Count III, having weapons
while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree, and
Count IV, having weapons while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a felony
of the third degree. The indictment also contains a forfeiture specification pursuant to
R.C. 2981.02(A)(1)(C) and R.C. 2941.1417(A) and a firearm specification pursuant to
R.C. 2941.141(A). Appellant entered pleas of not guilty.
{¶13} On August 2, 2021, appellant filed a motion to suppress his statements
during the traffic stop, arguing police had no basis to detain him during the traffic stop
because he was a passenger in the vehicle. Appellant further moved to suppress the
evidence seized, including the methamphetamine and firearm, arguing that the vehicle
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 5
inventory of the Cadillac was “pretextual.” Appellee responded with a memorandum in
opposition.
{¶14} The matter proceeded to evidentiary hearing on September 21, 2021. On
September 22, 2021, the trial court overruled appellant’s motion to suppress via
Judgment Entry.
{¶15} On November 9, 2021, appellant changed his pleas to ones of guilty as
charged. The trial court found Counts I and II merge for purposes of sentencing, and
appellee elected to sentence upon Count II. The trial court further found that Counts III
and IV merged for purposes of sentencing, and appellee elected to sentence upon Count
III. Appellant was sentenced to a total aggregate prison term of 6 years.
{¶16} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entry of his convictions and
sentence, incorporating the trial court’s decision overruling his motion to suppress.
{¶17} Appellant raises three assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶18} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WHEN IT DID NOT APPLY THE CORRECT
LEGAL STANDARD TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE.”
{¶19} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT WAS UNLAWFUL.”
{¶20} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS A PRETEXT TO A
WARRANTLESS INVESTIGATORY SEARCH.”
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 6
ANALYSIS
I., II., III.
{¶21} Appellant’s three assignments of error are related and will be considered
together. Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress
because it failed to apply the correct legal standard to the facts, he was unlawfully
detained during the traffic stop, and the vehicle inventory was unreasonable. We
disagree.
{¶22} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress
involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713
N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role
of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030(1996). A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 145,
675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must
independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s
conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State
v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other
grounds.
{¶23} There are three methods of challenging a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s finding of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v.
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 7
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486,
597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed
to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, supra.
Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate
court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion,
whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994).
{¶24} In the case instant case, the trial court overruled appellant’s motion to
suppress, finding that Potter had reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop; the vehicle
inventory was performed pursuant to departmental policy; and the officers were not
obligated to advise appellant he was free to leave the scene.
{¶25} Appellant first argues the trial court should have applied the Fourth
Amendment’s standard of reasonableness to the vehicle inventory. “Inventory searches
involve administrative procedures conducted by law enforcement officials and are
intended to (1) protect an individual's property while it is in police custody, (2) protect
police against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property, and (3) protect police from
dangerous instrumentalities.” State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 108, 1999-Ohio-253, 717
N.E.2d 329, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49
L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). “Because inventory searches are administrative caretaking
functions unrelated to criminal investigations, the policies underlying the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, including the standard of probable cause, are not
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 8
implicated.” Mesa at 108, citing Opperman at 370, 96 S.Ct. 3092. “Rather, the validity of
an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is judged by the Fourth Amendment's
standard of reasonableness.” Mesa at 108; State v. Fawcett, 5th Dist. Knox No.
19CA000027, 2020-Ohio-1004, ¶ 18.
{¶26} In Ohio, a standard inventory search of a lawfully impounded automobile is
permissible. State v. Robinson, 58 Ohio St.2d 478, 391 N.E.2d 317 (1979), syllabus. In
the instant case, appellant does not dispute that Byas was driving under suspension,
therefore the vehicle was subject to impound. Appellant could not have driven the vehicle
from the scene because he also did not have a valid license. There is no suggestion in
the record that Potter initiated the DUS traffic stop as a pretextual means of searching the
vehicle.
{¶27} As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio
St.3d 67, 2007-Ohio-1103, 810 N.E.2d 810 at ¶ 11:
While focusing primarily on inventory searches rather than
impoundment, South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 96
S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, is instructive. The United States
Supreme Court concluded that a routine inventory search of a
lawfully impounded vehicle is not unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment when performed pursuant to standard
police practice and when the evidence does not demonstrate that the
procedure involved is merely a pretext for an evidentiary search of
the impounded vehicle. The court held that “[i]n the interests of public
safety and as part of what the Court has called ‘community
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 9
caretaking functions,’ * * * automobiles are frequently taken into
police custody. * * * The authority of police to seize and remove from
the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and
convenience is beyond challenge.” Id. at 368–369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49
L.Ed.2d 1000, quoting Cady v. Dombrowski (1973), 413 U.S. 433,
441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. See, also, State v. Robinson
(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 478, 480, 12 O.O.3d 394, 391 N.E.2d 317.
{¶28} The evidence at the suppression hearing demonstrated that neither
appellant nor Byas had valid operator’s licenses or driving privileges at the time of the
stop; no licensed driver was present to drive the vehicle. The written policy of the Utica
Police Department required impoundment of the Cadillac. See, Fawcett, supra, 2020-
Ohio-1004, ¶ 20-21. The written policy was admitted into evidence; if a driver is found to
be operating a vehicle while suspended or revoked, the officer shall tow the vehicle. T.
18. Potter testified he had no discretion under the circumstances to decline to tow the
vehicle, nor was there any reason not to. Id. Further, all impounded vehicles must be
inventoried to prevent claims against loss.
{¶29} The trial court implicitly found the vehicle inventory to be reasonable, and
we agree. Appellant argues the trial court failed to consider whether the inventory was
“conducted in good faith,” Brief 10, but points to no evidence demonstrating otherwise.
The simple facts of this case indicate the vehicle was subject to impoundment because it
was operated by an unlicensed driver, and the vehicle inventory was reasonable.
{¶30} Appellant further argues the vehicle inventory was “pretextual.” Having
found the inventory reasonable, we disagree with this characterization. Appellant also
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 10
asserts that Potter testified that he “converted” the inventory search into an investigatory
search after he located the methamphetamine. Brief, 12. Appellant does not cite to the
location of this statement in the record, and we are unable to find it upon our review. The
evidence at the suppression hearing focused on the justification for the vehicle inventory
and the rationale for detaining appellant at the scene. The discovery of the contraband
in the trunk of the Cadillac was not discussed in detail, other than to describe evidentiary
photos of the contraband. T. 27-28. We find no evidence was presented, and no
argument was raised, that the vehicle inventory was a converted into a “warrantless
evidentiary search.” Brief, 12. Appellant’s first and third assignments of error are
overruled.
{¶31} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues he was illegally
detained as a passenger in the Cadillac when there was no reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity in the vehicle. Potter observed Byas driving and confirmed
she had no license or privileges to do so.
{¶32} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain an individual if the
officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that
criminal activity “may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968); see, also, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d
740 (2002). To justify an investigative stop, the officer must be able to articulate specific
facts that would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 11
stopped has committed or is committing a crime. See, Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. In this case, the trial court found, and we agree, that Potter made
a valid stop of the Cadillac.
{¶33} Once an officer lawfully stops an individual, the officer must carefully tailor
the scope of the stop “to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500,
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Additionally, the length of the stop must “last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500,
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229. As documented by his bodycam, this traffic stop took
approximately 38 minutes from initial contact to discovery of the contraband during the
vehicle inventory.
{¶34} When the sports bag was discovered, the officers recognized suspected
methamphetamine, electronic scales, and a firearm. An officer may expand the scope of
the stop and may continue to detain the individual without conflicting with Royer if the
officer discovers further facts, which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that additional
criminal activity is afoot. See, e.g., Terry, supra; State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234,
240, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). As the court stated in Robinette, paragraph one of the
syllabus:
When a police officer's objective justification to continue
detention of a person * * * is not related to the purpose of the original
stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any
articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity
justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention to
conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure.
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 12
{¶35} Thus, if a law enforcement officer, during a valid investigative stop,
ascertains “reasonably articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity, the
officer may then further detain and implement a more in-depth investigation of the
individual.” Id., 80 Ohio St.3d at 241, 685 N.E.2d at 768. In the instant case, discovery of
the sports bag justified extended detention of the vehicle’s occupants.
{¶36} “For the duration of a traffic stop, * * * a police officer effectively seizes
‘everyone in the vehicle,’ the driver and all passengers.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
323, 327, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009), quoting Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S.
249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007).
{¶37} We find appellant’s detention at the scene was not unlawful. During a
legitimate traffic stop, a request for identification from a passenger, followed by a
computer check of that information, does not constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure, so long as the traffic stop is not extended in duration beyond the time reasonably
necessary to effectuate its purpose. State v. Morgan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18985,
2002 WL 63196, *2 (Jan. 19, 2002), citing State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 556–
557, 669 N.E.2d 92 (9th Dist.1995). “A request for identification, in and of itself, is not
unconstitutional, and is ordinarily characterized as a consensual encounter, not a
custodial search.” Id., citing State v. Osborne, 2d Dist. Montgomery No 15151, 1995 WL
737913 (Dec. 13, 1995); Brown at ¶ 15. However, a passenger, unlike the driver of a
vehicle, is not legally obligated to carry identification or to produce it for a police officer.
Morgan at *2; Brown at ¶ 15. An officer “making a traffic stop may order passengers to
get out of the car pending completion of the stop” due to the added danger to an officer
when a passenger is present and the minimal additional intrusion on the passenger. State
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 13
v. Ross, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16135, 1997 WL 531217, *2 (Aug. 29, 1997), citing
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997).
{¶38} In the instant case, appellant argues his detention was unlawful and that
“[o]nce it was determined that [appellant] had no warrants out for his arrest, and there
were no other reasons to detain him, he should have been allowed to leave;” moreover,
appellant contends he “should have been able to grab his backpack and leave.” Brief,
11.
{¶39} In the instant case, the initial purpose of the traffic stop was effectuated in
approximately 38 minutes: Potter observed a driver operating with a suspended license,
stopped the vehicle, questioned the occupants, researched the driver’s claim of driving
privileges, and initiated the impoundment of the vehicle and the necessary vehicle
inventory. Potter and Batross both testified that throughout this period, appellant was
free to leave and did not request to do so. For a portion of this time, appellant was seated
in the rear of Batross’ cruiser, at which time he was still free to leave, although Batross
acknowledged he could not have exited the cruiser on his own. Appellant was not under
arrest at that point and even had use of his cell phone; eventually his mother arrived on
the scene. The officers did not encourage appellant to leave or volunteer that he was
free to do so, but there is no evidence in the record that appellant sought to leave the
scene. Appellant’s brief states, “[he] arguably expressed his desire to leave by calling
his mother to come pick him up * * *.” Brief,11. There is no evidence, though, that this
occurred. The officers were under no obligation to release appellant to his mother on
their own initiative, especially when the sports bag was found 38 minutes into the
encounter.
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 14
{¶40} During the vehicle inventory, the sports bag and contraband were found, a
criminal investigation ensued, and the officers were justified in further detaining the
vehicle’s occupants. Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶41} Potter lawfully stopped the Cadillac for a traffic violation. The temporary
seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the
duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to
control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. See, State
v. Roseberry, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2009-CA-78, 2010-Ohio-1112, ¶ 24, citing Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 248, 263, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132. In the instant case, there
is no evidence to suggest that appellant's detention while the officers investigated the
traffic violation was of sufficient length to make it constitutionally dubious. Before the
vehicle inventory, Potter prepared the paperwork necessary to cite Byas for driving under
suspension. When the bag containing contraband was found in the trunk, the traffic stop
was lawfully extended in order to further investigate the possible criminal activity.
{¶42} The trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress, and
his three assignments of error are overruled.
Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 15
CONCLUSION
{¶43} Appellant’s three assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of
the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.,
Wise, Earle, P.J. and
Wise, John, J., concur.