State v. Osborn , 2019 Ohio 2325 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Osborn, 
    2019-Ohio-2325
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                     :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
    No. 107423
    v.                                :
    TREVON A. OSBORN,                                  :
    Defendant-Appellant.              :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 13, 2019
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-16-606185-A
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Mary M. Frey, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Paul A. Mancino, Jr., for appellant.
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
    Defendant-appellant Trevon Osborn (“Osborn”) appeals from the
    trial court’s June 2018 findings of fact and conclusions of law denying his petition
    for postconviction relief without a hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Procedural History
    In May 2016, Osborn was charged in a 12-count indictment. After
    pretrial negotiations with the state, in September 2016, Osborn pleaded guilty to the
    following amended counts of the indictment: Count 1, aggravated burglary with a
    three-year firearm specification; Count 3, aggravated robbery with a three-year
    firearm specification; Count 4, grand theft; Count 5, theft/aggravated theft; Counts
    6 and 8, kidnapping; Counts 7 and 9, aggravated robbery; Count 11, improperly
    handling firearms in a motor vehicle; and Count 12, impersonation of certain
    officers. All the counts contained a forfeiture specification for a Ruger 9 mm
    firearm. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed.
    Sentencing occurred in October 2016. The defense and state agreed
    that Counts 3 through 6 and Counts 7 and 8 merged; the state elected to proceed on
    Counts 3 and 7, aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification and
    aggravated robbery, respectively. The trial court sentenced Osborn to an aggregate
    15-year prison term that included consecutive sentences.
    Osborn filed a direct appeal, challenging his plea and sentence. This
    court affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Osborn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 105196, 
    2017-Ohio-8228
    .
    In December 2017, he filed a petition for postconviction relief,
    contending that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the charges,
    which forced him to plea. Osborn also contended that his trial counsel informed
    him that he would only receive a nine-year prison sentence. He supported his
    petition with a police incident report relative to the offenses, an indictment from
    another case, and his own affidavit. The court denied the petition, and in June 2018,
    issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal follows, with Osborn
    asserting the following two assignments of error:
    Defendant was denied due process of law when his post-conviction
    petition was denied without a hearing.
    Defendant was denied due process of law when he was not granted
    relief on his post-conviction petition.
    Law and Analysis
    Postconviction Relief
    Postconviction relief is governed by R.C. 2953.21, which provides in
    relevant part as follows:
    (A)(1)(a) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense
    * * * and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of
    the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under
    the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States * * *,
    may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the
    grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set
    aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief.
    The petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and other documentary
    evidence in support of the claim for relief.
    ***
    (D) Before granting a hearing on a petition filed under division (A) of
    this section, the court shall determine whether there are substantive
    grounds for relief. In making such a determination, the court shall
    consider, in addition to the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the
    documentary evidence, all the files and records pertaining to the
    proceedings against the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the
    indictment, the court’s journal entries, the journalized records of the
    clerk of the court, and the court reporter’s transcript. * * *
    ***
    (F) Unless the petition and the files and records of the case show the
    petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall proceed to a prompt
    hearing on the issues even if a direct appeal of the case is pending. * * *
    The postconviction relief process is a civil collateral attack on a
    criminal judgment, in which the petitioner may present constitutional issues to the
    court that would otherwise be impossible to review because the evidence supporting
    the issues is not contained in the record of the petitioner’s criminal conviction. State
    v. Calhoun, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 279
    , 281, 
    714 N.E.2d 905
     (1999); State v. Carter, 10th
    Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-4, 
    2013-Ohio-4058
    , ¶ 15. Postconviction review is not a
    constitutional right but, rather, is a narrow remedy that affords a petitioner no rights
    beyond those granted by statute. Calhoun at 281-282. A postconviction relief
    petition does not provide a petitioner a second opportunity to litigate his or her
    conviction. State v. Hessler, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1011, 
    2002-Ohio-3321
    ,
    ¶ 32.
    A petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
    a petition for postconviction relief, however. State v. Jackson, 
    64 Ohio St.2d 107
    ,
    110-113, 
    413 N.E.2d 819
     (1980). Rather, to warrant an evidentiary hearing on a
    petition for postconviction relief, a petitioner bears the initial burden of providing
    evidence that demonstrates a cognizable claim of constitutional error. R.C.
    2953.21(D); Hessler at ¶ 33.
    Thus, a trial court has a statutorily imposed duty to ensure a
    defendant presents evidence sufficient to warrant a hearing. State v. Cole, 
    2 Ohio St.3d 112
    , 113, 
    443 N.E.2d 169
     (1982). The evidence must show “there was such a
    denial or infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or
    voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States.” R.C.
    2953.21(A)(1)(a); Calhoun at 282-283. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(D), a defendant’s
    petition for postconviction relief may be denied by a trial court without holding an
    evidentiary hearing where the petition, the supporting affidavits, the documentary
    evidence, the files, and the records do not demonstrate that the petitioner set forth
    sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief. 
    Id.
     at paragraph
    two of the syllabus.
    A trial court’s decision regarding a postconviction petition filed
    pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion when the trial
    court’s finding is supported by competent and credible evidence. State v. Gandor,
    
    112 Ohio St.3d 377
    , 
    2006-Ohio-6679
    , 
    860 N.E.2d 77
    , ¶ 60.
    Osborn’s Petition
    As mentioned, Osborn contended in his petition that he was denied
    the effective assistance of trial counsel because his trial attorney “failed to properly
    investigate the case and forced [him] to enter pleas of guilty in this case of which he
    was actually innocent.” He submitted the following in support of his petition: (1)
    the narrative police incident report; (2) a May 2016 indictment of an individual
    named Terrell Osborn, that alleged offenses that occurred on the same date as
    appellant’s; and (3) his own affidavit.
    The incident report gave the following facts. On the date in question,
    a male victim, his girlfriend, and his sister were at their home on W. 71st Street in
    Cleveland. The male and his girlfriend were in a bedroom, and the sister was in
    another bedroom. The male victim told the police that he heard a loud banging on
    the front door, followed by a male’s voice screaming, “Cleveland police, open up.”
    Two males then kicked in the door and charged in the bedroom where
    the male victim and his girlfriend were. The girlfriend ran out of the room, into the
    sister’s room. One of the intruders hit the male victim over the head with a gun and
    told him to get to the ground. The intruder placed a pillow over the victim’s head
    and told him not to move or he would kill him. The victim could hear the intruders
    rummaging through his belongings. After he heard the intruders leave the house,
    the victim looked out the window and saw one of them flee in a Toyota Corolla.
    The female victims told the police that one of the intruders, who was
    masked and had a gun, came in the bedroom where they were, threw a blanket over
    them, and told them that if they opened their eyes or removed the blanket, he would
    shoot them.
    The next door neighbor is the one who called the police. According to
    him, he was “startled from his sleep [by] loud banging and screaming” coming from
    the victims’ house. He looked out his window and saw two males “donkey kicking
    the front door” of the victims’ house, and then gain entry. The neighbor also saw a
    black Chevy Cruz parked across the street, and then he saw the two intruders going
    in and out of the victims’ house with numerous bags, which they put in the Chevy
    Cruz.
    On arrival at the scene, the police saw a black Chevy Cruz in the
    middle of the street and saw Osborn running back and forth from the victims’ house
    to the car. Osborn got into the passenger seat of the car and the car was driven away.
    The police effectuated a stop of the car and ordered the occupants, Osborn and a
    female driver, out. When Osborn exited, the police saw a gun “sticking out of his
    hooded sweatshirt.” Both Osborn and the driver were arrested.
    The female driver told police the Cruz belonged to appellant, but he
    asked her to drive it because he did not have a license. Osborn told her that he
    needed her to take him to “drop off some dope and get paid.” On the way, they
    picked up an unknown male and he and Osborn were talking about something
    “going down.” She waited in the car while the males went into the victims’ house.
    According to the driver, when the police stopped the Cruz, Osborn told her to “pull
    off, pull off, I’m going to go down for this.”
    Meanwhile, the police learned that one of the victims’ cell phones had
    been stolen from the house. Approximately two hours after the home invasion, the
    phone “pinged” to the area of W. 80th and Lorain in Cleveland. The police also
    received a call for loud music coming from the area of W. 79th and Lorain, and
    responded to the area. They found a vehicle with a man “slumped at the wheel”; the
    man was identified as Terrell Osborn, who, according to the incident report, is
    appellant’s brother. A gun was found in the center console of the car. Although the
    report does not state the make or model of the car, it apparently was not a Toyota
    Corolla because the report states that an “all channels broadcast” was made for the
    Corolla.
    In his affidavit, Osborn averred that his retained attorney failed to
    properly investigate the case, file any motions on his behalf, and would not show
    him any police reports, despite him requesting to see them. According to Osborn,
    trial counsel told him that if he entered the plea that the state was offering he would
    not receive any more than a nine-year sentence. Osborn averred that the “facts” of
    the case were wrong. For example, according to Osborn he was charged with theft
    of the Cruz and possessions found in the car, but the Cruz and possessions belonged
    to him. Further, he averred that Terrell Osborn is not his brother, and that Terrell
    was in an allegedly stolen vehicle.1
    Trial Court’s Judgment
    As mentioned, the trial court denied Osborn’s petition without a
    hearing. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court noted that it engaged
    in a full and proper plea colloquy with Osborn, which included advising him of all of
    his rights. Osborn indicated that he understood those rights that he was waiving
    and that no threats or promises had been made to him to induce his plea. Osborn
    further indicated that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation of him.
    The trial court further noted that Osborn was advised at the plea
    hearing of the maximum penalty he could receive under the plea, and he indicated
    1The  indictment against Terrell charged him with one count each of carrying a
    concealed weapon, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, and having weapons
    while under disability.
    that he understood. Moreover, the court informed Osborn that there was no
    promise of any particular sentence.
    At sentencing, the merger issue was discussed and resolved. Osborn
    addressed the court, admitted that he was inside the home when the crimes
    occurred, and apologized for his actions.
    After review of the “entire record and the exhibits” offered in support
    of Osborn’s petition, the trial court found that his affidavit was “not credible.”
    Specifically, the court found that,
    [t]he affidavit submitted by Defendant-Petitioner does not rebut the
    presumption that his plea of guilty to each count was made knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily. Moreover, Defendant-Petitioner’s
    affidavit from himself in support of his position that his plea was not
    made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently due to the
    ineffectiveness of his trial counsel is self-serving and contradicted by
    the record.
    Our Review
    As mentioned, we will uphold the trial court’s decision absent an
    abuse of discretion if the trial court’s finding is supported by competent and credible
    evidence. Gandor, 
    112 Ohio St.3d 377
    , 
    2006-Ohio-6679
    , 
    860 N.E.2d 77
    , at ¶ 60.
    Upon review, we find that the decision was supported by competent and credible
    evidence.
    The trial court’s determination that Osborn’s affidavit was self-
    serving and not credible was not an abuse of discretion. Generally, self-serving
    affidavits submitted by a defendant in support of his or her claim for postconviction
    relief are insufficient to trigger the right to a hearing or to justify granting the
    petition under R.C. 2953.21. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d at 284, 
    714 N.E.2d 905
    .
    In accessing the credibility of affidavits, the Supreme Court in
    Calhoun provided the following relevant factors to be considered:
    (1) whether the judge reviewing the postconviction relief petition also
    presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly
    identical language, or otherwise appear to have been drafted by the
    same person, (3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4)
    whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner, or otherwise
    interested in the success of the petitioner’s efforts, and (5) whether
    the affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial.
    Moreover, a trial court may find sworn testimony in an affidavit to be
    contradicted by evidence in the record by the same witness, or to be
    internally inconsistent, thereby weakening the credibility of that
    testimony.
    Id. at 285, citing State v. Moore, 
    99 Ohio App.3d 748
    , 754-756, 
    651 N.E.2d 1319
     (1st
    Dist.1994).
    Here, the trial judge who considered the postconviction petition was
    the same judge who presided over the underlying proceedings, including the plea
    and sentencing. The only affidavit submitted in support of the petition was that of
    Osborn, who obviously was interested in the success of the petition. And the
    affidavit contradicted the record, including Osborn’s own admission at sentencing
    that he was involved in the crimes, accepted responsibility for his actions, and was
    remorseful.
    We note that, at sentencing, the trial court recited the facts as
    contained in the police incident report.       The assistant prosecuting attorney
    elaborated on the facts, describing the attack as “planned.” She noted that there was
    a third individual involved (a juvenile) who was not mentioned in the incident
    report, but who provided the state with a proffer of the facts. According to the
    juvenile, the intruders, including Osborn, planned the break-in. They drove past the
    house twice before going in, believing no one was home. At least one of the intruders
    knew the male victim to be a drug dealer and they had hoped to “get an easy score
    by hitting a drug dealer’s house.” As of the time of sentencing, the unknown male
    intruder had not been apprehended.
    On this record, we do not find that the trial court’s determination that
    Osborn’s affidavit was self-serving and not credible to be an abuse of discretion.
    Finally, we note that in addition to a trial court being permitted to
    deny a postconviction petition on the grounds of self-serving and incredible
    affidavits, it also may dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without holding an
    evidentiary hearing when the claims raised in the petition are barred by the doctrine
    of res judicata. State v. Szefcyk, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 93
    , 
    671 N.E.2d 233
     (1996), syllabus.
    “Res judicata is applicable in all postconviction relief proceedings.” Id. at 95. Under
    the doctrine of res judicata, a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred
    from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or
    could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal. Id. at syllabus; State v.
    Reynolds, 
    79 Ohio St.3d 158
    , 161, 
    679 N.E.2d 1131
     (1997).
    Osborn’s claims were, or could have been, raised on direct appeal.
    They, therefore, were barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
    On this record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion
    by denying Osborn’s petition without a hearing. The two assignments of error are
    overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
    into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and
    RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 107423

Citation Numbers: 2019 Ohio 2325

Judges: Jones

Filed Date: 6/13/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/13/2019