State v. Mullins , 2021 Ohio 3683 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Mullins, 
    2021-Ohio-3683
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JUDGES:
    STATE OF OHIO                                  :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee   :       Hon. Earle E. Wise, J.
    :
    -vs-                                           :
    :       Case No. 2021 CA 00024
    MICHAEL MULLINS                                :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant       :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                           Criminal appeal from the Licking County
    Municipal Court, Case No. 20-TRC-05636
    JUDGMENT:                                          Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                            October 13, 2021
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                             For Defendant-Appellant
    DOUGLAS E. SASSEN                                  ROBERT E. CALESARIC
    LAW DIRECTOR                                       35 South Park Place, Suite 150
    BY: J. MICHAEL KING                                Newark, OH 43055
    40 West Main Street
    Newark, OH 43055
    Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00024                                                      2
    Gwin, P.J.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Michael Mullins [“Mullins”] appeals from the February
    1, 2021 Judgment Entry of the Licking County Municipal Court overruling his Motion to
    Suppress evidence.
    Facts and Procedural History
    {¶2}   On September 5, 2020, National Trail Raceway near Kirkersville, Licking
    County, Ohio, was open to the public for an "SFG" drag racing event. A ticket booth was
    selling tickets for admission to the event. There was no separate parking fee. The main
    entrance was open, with two lanes going in and two lanes for exit.
    {¶3}   Deputy Ben Martens testified that he was dispatched to National Trail
    Raceway for an auto accident. When he arrived he observed two damaged golf carts.
    The golf carts had been damaged when Mullins backed up his vehicle and struck them.
    Deputy Martens stated he found an opened bottle of Crown Royal, Red Bull, and White
    Claw in Mullins’s vehicle. Deputy Martens detected an odor of alcohol from Mullins which
    he described as "pretty strong." Deputy Martens stated Mullins had bloodshot eyes.
    Mullins repeatedly declined field sobriety tests, admitted he had "two adult beverages,"
    and stated he didn't feel safe to drive. Deputy Mullins testified that Mullins did not exhibit
    slurred speech or difficulty standing or walking. Much of the foregoing was captured on
    the Deputy's dash camera. It was played during the suppression hearing, and admitted
    into evidence.
    {¶4}   Kimberly Barnhill witnessed the incident. She stated she believed the
    accident occurred sometime between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. She also testified that
    someone called law enforcement almost immediately and that law enforcement arrived in
    Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00024                                                   3
    less than five minutes. Deputy Martens testified that he was dispatched to the raceway
    at about 10:56 p.m., and he arrived at the raceway within four or five minutes.
    {¶5}   Mullins was arrested at 11:17 p.m. Deputy Martens read Mullins BMV form
    2255 at 11:57 p.m. After being read the BMV 2255 form Mullins indicated he would
    provide a breath sample. He was transported to the Hebron Police Department, where
    his first sample registered as invalid. A second test was completed at 12:35 a.m. That test
    indicated .096 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of his breath. Mullins was charged with OVI
    in violation of RC 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (“under the influence”) and Improper Backing in
    violation of R.C. 4511.38. The state filed a motion to amend the citation to a “per se”
    breath test case pursuant to RC 4511.19(A)(1)(d). The trial court granted the motion by
    Judgment Entry filed November 24, 2020. On December 1, 2020, Mullins filed a motion
    to suppress. On January 5, 2021, the court took evidence on the motion.
    {¶6}   Mullins testified at the suppression hearing. On direct examination he
    testified that he took the test because he was in fear of losing his license for a year. On
    cross-examination, he admitted he took the test because he thought he would pass it.
    {¶7}   By Judgment Entry filed February 1, 2021 the trial court overruled the
    motion.
    Assignment of Error
    {¶8}   Mullins raises one Assignment of Error,
    {¶9}   “I. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
    TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE THREAT OF A LICENSE SUSPENSION WAS
    UNLAWFUL.”
    Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00024                                                       4
    STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW – MOTION TO SUPPRESS
    {¶10} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
    and fact. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    , 154-155, 
    2003-Ohio-5372
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
    fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness
    credibility. See, State v. Dunlap, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 308
    , 314, 
    652 N.E.2d 988
     (1995); State v.
    Fanning, 
    1 Ohio St.3d 19
    , 20, 
    437 N.E.2d 583
     (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must
    defer to the trial court’s factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support
    those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 
    127 Ohio App.3d 328
    ,
    332, 
    713 N.E.2d 1
     (4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 
    111 Ohio App.3d 142
    , 
    675 N.E.2d 1268
     (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true, it must
    independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal
    standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 
    124 Ohio App.3d 706
    , 
    707 N.E.2d 539
     (4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 
    122 S.Ct. 744
    , 
    151 L.Ed.2d 740
     (2002); Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 
    116 S.Ct. 1657
    , 
    134 L.Ed.2d 911
     (1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial court’s findings
    of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, 
    supra.
     Moreover, due weight
    should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
    enforcement officers.” Ornelas, 
    supra at 698
    , 
    116 S.Ct. at 1663
    .
    Law and Analysis
    {¶11} In his sole Assignment of Error Mullins contends that the trial court erred by
    denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Mullins contends that because the raceway
    was private property is was error for Deputy Martens to read Mullins the BMV form 2255.
    Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00024                                                                      5
    Mullins argues that he only s u b m i t t e d to the B A C test because he was in fear of
    losing his license for a year if he refused. Mullins contends that because the property
    where the operation took place was "private property," the reading of BMV form 2255
    form was "coercive."1
    ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW: Whether Deputy Martens was required to
    read BMV form 2255 to Mullins.
    {¶12} The Ohio Legislature has adopted a statutory scheme whereby anyone who
    operates a motor vehicle on a public roadway is presumed to have given consent to
    chemical testing pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(A)(2):
    Any person who operates a vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley
    upon a highway or any public or private property used by the public for
    vehicular travel or parking within this state or who is in physical control of a
    vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley shall be deemed to have given
    consent to a chemical test or tests of the person’s whole blood, blood serum
    or plasma, breath, or urine to determine the alcohol, drug of abuse,
    controlled substance, metabolite of a controlled substance, or combination
    content of the person’s whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine
    if arrested for a violation of division (A) or (B) of section 4511.19 of the
    Revised Code, section 4511.194 of the Revised Code or a substantially
    equivalent municipal ordinance, or a municipal OVI ordinance.
    {¶13} Pursuant to R.C. 4511.192 a person who is arrested for OVI must be
    informed,
    1   Additional issues were raised in the motion to suppress which are not assigned as errors in this
    appeal.
    Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00024                                                  6
    “You now are under arrest for (specifically state the offense under
    state law or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance for which the
    person was arrested--operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a
    drug, or a combination of them; operating a vehicle while under the
    influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a
    controlled substance; operating a vehicle after underage alcohol
    consumption; or having physical control of a vehicle while under the
    influence).
    If you refuse to take any chemical test required by law, your Ohio
    driving privileges will be suspended immediately, and you will have to pay
    a fee to have the privileges reinstated. If you have a prior conviction of OVI,
    OVUAC, or operating a vehicle while under the influence of a listed
    controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance under
    state or municipal law within the preceding twenty years, you now are under
    arrest for state OVI, and, if you refuse to take a chemical test, you will face
    increased penalties if you subsequently are convicted of the state OVI.
    (Read this part unless the person is under arrest for solely having
    physical control of a vehicle while under the influence.) If you take any
    chemical test required by law and are found to be at or over the prohibited
    amount of alcohol, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled
    substance in your whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine as
    set by law, your Ohio driving privileges will be suspended immediately, and
    you will have to pay a fee to have the privileges reinstated.
    Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00024                                                    7
    If you take a chemical test, you may have an independent chemical test
    taken at your own expense.”
    R.C. 4511.192(B). That information is contained in BMV form 2255.
    {¶14} In the case at bar, the racetrack was holding what could be described as a
    sporting event. Members of the public were invited to attend and were charged an
    admission fee for attending. For purposes of the event, therefore, the property was open
    to the public, and the public was invited to enter the property to attend the event.
    {¶15} In any event, whether the property can be classified as “public” or “private”
    is somewhat a moot point. It should be noted that the cases relied upon by Mullins to
    support his argument, State v. Szalai, 
    13 Ohio Misc.2d 6
    , 13 OBR 142, 
    468 N.E.2d 396
    (1983) and State v. Chard, 6th Dist. Lucas L–83–308, 
    1984 WL 7788
    (Feb. 24, 1984),
    “ were decided at a time when the implied consent statute applied only to public highways.
    The legislature later amended the statute to make it applicable to “a highway or any public
    or private property used by the public for * * * vehicular travel or parking.”         R.C.
    4511.191(A).” State v. Gottfried, 
    86 Ohio App.3d 106
    , 109, 
    619 N.E.2d 1185
    (6th Dist.
    1993).     Further in State v. Decroce, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 93-G-1816, 
    1994 WL 102252
    (Mar. 18, 1994), also relied upon by Mullins, the appellant had been stopped and
    arrested in the private driveway of his home. Clearly, in the case at bar the property was
    “used by the public for vehicular travel or parking”, at the time Mullins was stopped and
    arrested and therefore it fell within the purview of R.C. 4511.191.
    {¶16} Deputy Martens was required by law to read Mullins BMV form 2255.
    Informing the accused of the consequences of both refusing to take a chemical test or
    taking a test and testing over the prohibited amount can hardly be coercive. The
    Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00024                                                    8
    information given in BMV form 2255 simply states the law in Ohio and allows one arrested
    for OVI to make an intelligent choice of whether to consent to the test or refuse the test.
    {¶17} Mullins’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
    {¶18} The judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is affirmed.
    By Gwin, P.J.,
    Wise, John, and
    Wise, Earle, J., concur