State v. Kidd ( 2021 )


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  •          [Cite as State v. Kidd, 
    2021-Ohio-3838
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                                      :   APPEAL NO. C-200356
    TRIAL NO. B-1900139
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                         :
    vs.                                               :
    O P I N I O N.
    JOSEPH KIDD,                                        :
    Defendant-Appellant.                            :
    Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
    Remanded
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 29, 2021
    Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummins,
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Michael J. Trapp, for Defendant-Appellant.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}    Joseph Kidd appeals his convictions following a jury trial for six counts
    of rape of a child under ten years old. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgment in part, reverse the judgment in part, and remand the cause to the
    trial court.
    Procedural and Factual Background
    {¶2}    On February 14, 2019, Joseph Kidd was indicted on two counts of rape
    for engaging in fellatio with A.O., a child under ten years old, two counts of rape for
    inserting his penis in A.O.’s anus, a child under ten years old, and two counts of rape
    for engaging in fellatio with A.O., a child under ten years old. All of the offenses
    occurred between November 21, 2015, and May 11, 2016.
    {¶3}    At the time of the offenses, Kidd was living with his girlfriend K.O. in a
    trailer on Compton Road. They lived with K.O.’s two sons, A.O. and M.O., and their
    daughter S.O.
    {¶4}    In June 2016, A.O. and M.O. lived in a foster home. A child in the
    foster home was being investigated for possible sexual abuse. At that time, A.O. was
    interviewed at the Mayerson Center. A.O. stated that a foster child named Poppy had
    sexually abused his brother M.O. At the interview, A.O. denied that anyone had hurt
    him or had touched him on his body.
    {¶5}     In July 2016, both boys were moved to another foster home with
    Rachel Dyson. Dyson testified that she saw A.O. masturbating under a blanket three
    days after he arrived. When she asked him what he was doing, he responded,
    “Joseph.” She questioned both boys, and based on their responses, she contacted
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    social worker LaShawn Nelson.
    {¶6}   Nelson, a caseworker for 21 years for the Hamilton County
    Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”), became A.O.’s caseworker in July
    2016. She was contacted by Dyson in 2016 regarding sexual statements and behavior
    by A.O. Typically, when reports of sexual allegations surfaced, Nelson would speak
    with the child about the allegations, refer the child to the Mayerson Center, and
    contact the police. However, she did not do so at the time.
    {¶7}   In March 2017, A.O. was moved to a foster home with Luz Santiago.
    Nelson met with Santiago and A.O. regarding an allegation of sexual abuse and
    referred A.O. to the Mayerson Center based upon that conversation. Nelson also
    spoke with M.O. regarding the allegation.
    {¶8}   Cecilia Friehofer, a social worker and forensic interviewer at the
    Mayerson Center, was qualified as an expert in forensic interviewing, suspected child
    abuse victims, and delayed disclosures. She interviewed A.O. in November 2018 due
    to a disclosure that Kidd had touched A.O.’s penis. The summary and recording of
    the interview were admitted into evidence.
    {¶9}   At the time of the interview, Friehofer was unaware that the abuse was
    alleged to have happened in 2016. A.O. spontaneously disclosed that his dad put his
    dad’s mouth on his penis, his dad had him put his mouth on his dad’s penis, and his
    dad put his penis in A.O.’s “butt.” A.O. also described that his dad ejaculated in his
    mouth and “butt.” A.O. stated that he was six years old when these bad things
    happened.     The video was played, and the jurors received a transcript of the
    interview. After the interview, Friehofer referred A.O. for a medical examination
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    with a physician.
    {¶10} Friehofer explained that delayed disclosures are either purposeful or
    accidental. Purposeful is when the child decides to tell, and accidental is when the
    abuse is discovered by accident. A.O. purposefully disclosed. According to Friehofer,
    99.9 percent of the children she has interviewed have delayed disclosures. Friehofer
    discussed numerous reasons why children have delayed disclosures.
    {¶11} On cross-examination, the defense played the Mayerson Center
    interview of A.O. conducted in June 2016. In that interview, A.O. had disclosed an
    incident with his dad that happened in the bathroom. He did not discuss that
    incident with Friehofer.
    {¶12} Although A.O. stated in his 2016 interview that Joseph had not hurt or
    touched him, Friehofer discounted the statement because the question was a
    compound question and A.O. was unwilling to disclose at that time.          Friehofer
    admitted that she had concerns regarding A.O.’s mental capacity, but she initially
    described him as age and developmentally appropriate because he had not been
    diagnosed with any delays.
    {¶13} A.O. told Friehofer that one of the incidents happened while his
    mother was at work at a Chinese restaurant. A.O. also stated that one incident
    occurred in the car while they were driving to the restaurant to pick up his mom from
    work. When asked for Joseph’s last name, A.O. responded “Barger.” Friehofer
    believed that A.O. was unsure of Joseph’s last name because his inflection went up
    when he stated “Barger” as if he were questioning if his dad’s last name was Barger.
    {¶14} At the end of the interview, A.O. said that he had seen Joseph do
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    similar things with his mom’s mom and his mom’s sister. When Friehofer asked for
    clarification, A.O. admitted that he did not see Joseph with his grandmother and his
    aunt.
    {¶15} M.O., A.O.’s younger brother, was the next witness. Prior to testifying,
    M.O. was questioned to determine his competence as a witness because he was nine
    years old. Although he initially was unable to explain the difference between the
    truth and a lie, when given examples, he could differentiate the truth from a lie.
    When the court found him competent to testify, Kidd did not object.
    {¶16} M.O. described Joseph as a “bad man” who was not nice to him or his
    brother. He testified that he had seen Kidd touch A.O.’s private parts when he was
    exiting from the bathroom. Joseph and A.O. were sitting on the couch, and Joseph
    made A.O. suck his penis. A.O. asked for help, so M.O. tried to get Joseph off of him,
    but he was too small. M.O. did not know where his mom or his sister were during
    that incident. When asked to identify Joseph in the courtroom, M.O. was unable to
    do so.
    {¶17} On cross-examination, M.O. was asked if he remembered speaking
    with Detective McBride and telling him that he saw Joseph and A.O. in the
    bathroom. M.O. responded that he saw them outside of the bathroom. When the
    video of the interview was played, M.O. initially exclaimed that he never said that.
    When asked if he was telling the truth on the video or telling the truth now, he said,
    “that time.”
    {¶18} In the video, he told McBride that he asked his sister S.O. to help, but
    he testified that it was A.O. who asked S.O. for help. He had also told McBride that
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    his mother was sitting on the couch while on her phone. When confronted with
    these inconsistencies, M.O. blurted, “Everything’s a lie.”           He reaffirmed that
    everything was a lie. On redirect examination, he again stated, “Everything’s a lie.”
    After several questions to clarify what he meant, M.O. was asked if he was lying when
    he said he saw Joseph’s penis in A.O.’s mouth, he responded, “No.” M.O. responded,
    “Yes” when asked if he saw it with his own eyes.
    {¶19} A.O., who was ten years old, was the next witness. He did not know his
    right hand from his left hand, and did not know what year he was born. A.O.
    testified that Joseph was mean. When asked what he meant by Joseph was being
    mean, A.O. replied, “He was being mean to us.”
    {¶20} A.O. testified that Joseph touched his penis with his hand. When
    asked what Joseph did when he touched his penis, A.O. explained that “he played
    with it.” A.O. also testified that “he put his mouth on [his penis]” in a room in the
    trailer.     Although A.O. initially responded “nothing” when asked if Joseph said
    anything before putting his mouth on his penis, he later testified that Joseph said
    “don’t bite it.” When asked if that happened one time or more than one, he stated,
    “more than one.” A.O. further stated, “he made me put my mouth on his penis and
    he peed.” When that happened, A.O. washed his mouth. A.O. testified that it felt,
    “nasty.” A.O. testified that on one occasion, he called his brother to help him, and
    M.O. pulled him out.
    {¶21} A.O. said that when he and his siblings were in the truck, his dad called
    him up to the front while he was driving and put his penis in A.O.’s mouth. A.O.
    further explained that “slobber” came out and got on his mouth. His mother was at
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    home when this happened. A.O. also testified that, “My dad was touching his dick
    and his penis inside * * * my behind.” When asked if that happened one time or
    more than one time, he responded “more than.” A.O. identified Joseph in court.
    {¶22} Detective Sean McBride, a criminal investigator with the Springfield
    Township Police Department, testified that he investigates all sex offenses involving
    juveniles. He had been an investigator for seven years. McBride was trained to
    conduct interviews at the Reid School of Interview and Interrogation. Typically, he
    does not interview children unless Mayerson Center declines to do the interview. In
    this case, he interviewed M.O. because Mayerson Center would not do the interview.
    He did not interview A.O.
    {¶23} McBride interviewed A.O.’s mother and his grandmother. McBride
    also interviewed Kidd at the jail for approximately an hour. The audio recording of
    the interview was played for the jury. Kidd denied any sexual contact with A.O., but
    admitted that it was possible that A.O. saw him masturbate once.
    {¶24} McBride was contacted by HCJFS caseworker Nelson. He reviewed
    A.O.’s Mayerson Center interview. During the interview, A.O. had stated that when
    the incident in the truck occurred, his mother had called and they were going to pick
    her up from work at a Chinese restaurant. McBride determined that his mother had
    been unemployed for years.
    {¶25} After McBride’s testimony, the state rested.
    {¶26} The defense called S.O. to testify, and the court asked her questions to
    determine her competency. S.O., who was seven years old, lived with her paternal
    grandmother. S.O. was able to give examples of lies. The court determined that S.O.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    was competent to testify, knew the difference between right and wrong, and a lie and
    the truth.
    {¶27} S.O. testified that she never saw Joseph do any “adult things” with
    A.O. S.O. was three years old when they lived in the trailer. S.O. further stated that
    A.O. never asked for help, and she and M.O. never pulled him off of her father when
    her father was doing “adult things” to A.O. After S.O.’s testimony, the defense
    rested, and the state called a rebuttal witness, Dr. Kathi Makoroff.
    {¶28} Dr. Makoroff is a child-abuse pediatrician at Children’s Hospital. The
    parties stipulated that she was an expert in child abuse.         Both brothers were
    physically examined, which revealed a normal physical exam with no evidence of
    trauma. The most common finding on a child who has been sexually abused is a
    normal exam, especially when the abuse occurred more than three days prior to the
    exam.
    {¶29} The jury found Kidd guilty of all of the charges.        The trial court
    sentenced Kidd to life without parole on every count to run consecutively based on
    its findings that Kidd showed no remorse, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    offenses was so great and unusual that no single prison term would reflect the
    seriousness, Kidd’s criminal history and the need to protect the public.    Kidd was
    also ordered to have no contact with the victims.
    {¶30} Kidd now appeals, raising ten assignments of error.
    A.O.’s Competency to Testify
    {¶31} In his first assignment of error, Kidd argues that the trial court erred
    by failing to determine whether A.O., a child of unsound mind, was competent to
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    testify.
    {¶32} Evid.R. 601(A) and R.C. 2317.01 state that a person is competent to
    testify “except those of unsound mind and children under ten years of age who
    appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions
    respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.”            A person “of
    unsound mind” includes “all forms of derangement or intellectual disability.” R.C.
    1.02(C). “In order for the trial court to have a sua sponte duty to inquire into a
    witness’s competency, that competency must have been clearly called into question
    by the time the witness was called to the stand.” State v. Cooper, 
    139 Ohio App.3d 149
    , 164, 
    743 N.E.2d 427
     (12th Dist.2000), citing State v. Kinney, 
    35 Ohio App.3d 84
    , 86, 
    519 N.E.2d 1386
     (1st Dist.1987).
    {¶33} Kidd asserts that the trial court committed plain error by allowing A.O.
    to testify without determining his competency where his intellectual limitations had
    been noted by the state in its opening remarks and by the testimony of his
    caseworker Nelson who believed his IQ was 58.
    {¶34} Relying on State v. Kinney, Kidd argues that A.O.’s competency was
    clearly called into question due solely to his low IQ. In Kinney, this court concluded
    that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte determine the ten-year-old witness’s
    competence was plain error. Kinney at 86. Before the child testified, her mother
    explained that the child was “mentally retarded, that her mental age level was four or
    five years old, that her I.Q. was lower than 58, and that she would sometimes make
    things up as a way of reaching out for help.” 
    Id.
     A second witness, a police officer
    who interviewed the child, testified that he knew she was mentally retarded and had
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    “confused the incident in question with a separate incident involving appellant.” 
    Id.
    Both witnesses questioned the child’s ability to accurately and truthfully perceive
    facts and communicate them. See 
    id.
    {¶35} Here, A.O.’s ability to observe, recollect, and communicate the facts
    was not questioned by any of the witnesses, and Kidd did not challenge A.O.’s
    competency to testify truthfully. Our thorough review of the testimony indicates that
    A.O. did not testify in such a way as to undermine his ability to accurately relay the
    facts. Therefore, the trial court had no compelling reason to sua sponte determine
    A.O.’s competence to testify. See Cooper, 139 Ohio App.3d at 165, 
    743 N.E.2d 1427
    .
    {¶36} We overrule the first assignment of error.
    Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
    {¶37} In his second assignment of error, Kidd contends that he did not
    receive the effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to object to A.O.’s
    testimony due to his incompetence to testify.
    {¶38} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an accused must
    demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
    performance prejudiced the accused. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687,
    
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984). The failure to make either showing is fatal to
    the claim. 
    Id. at 697
    . A defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s performance if there is
    a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
    different but for the complained-of conduct. 
    Id. at 694
    . “A reasonable probability is
    a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
    Id.
    {¶39} As previously discussed, our review of the record indicates that A.O.’s
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    testimony did not place his competence into question.             Therefore, we cannot
    conclude that Kidd’s trial counsel was deficient in failing to challenge A.O.’s
    competency. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.
    M.O.’s Competency to Testify
    {¶40} Next Kidd argues that the trial court erred by finding M.O. competent
    to testify.
    {¶41} Ordinarily, a trial court’s finding that a child under the age of ten is
    competent to testify shall not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion. State v.
    Frazier, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 247
    , 250, 
    574 N.E.2d 483
     (1991). Here, Kidd did not object to
    the trial court’s determination that M.O. was competent to testify, so we review for
    plain error. See Kinney, 35 OhioApp.3d at 86, 
    519 N.E.2d 1386
    .
    {¶42} In determining whether a child under ten years old is competent to
    testify, the trial court must take into consideration: “(1) the child’s ability to receive
    accurate impressions of fact or to observe acts about which he or she will testify, (2)
    the child’s ability to recollect those impressions or observations, (3) the child’s ability
    to communicate what was observed, (4) the child’s understanding of truth and falsity
    and (5) the child’s appreciation of his or her responsibility to be truthful.” Frazier at
    251. A trial court’s determination that a witness is competent to testify must be
    granted great deference because the trial judge has the opportunity to observe the
    person’s appearance, his or her manner of responding to the questions, general
    demeanor and any indicia of ability to relate the facts accurately and truthfully. See
    
    id.
    {¶43} At the competency hearing, M.O. was able to provide the court with his
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    name, age, birthday, the names of his siblings and mother, the city he lived in, and
    the name of the home where he lived. Although he could not articulate the difference
    between a lie and the truth, he correctly distinguished between truthful and false
    statements when questioned by the court. He also understood that lying was bad,
    and if a person tells the truth, that person will not get in trouble. Notably, Kidd did
    not wish to ask M.O. any additional questions and did not object to the court’s
    finding that M.O. was competent.
    {¶44} M.O. understood the difference between telling the truth and lying,
    and that it was important to tell the truth. Based on this record, M.O. was competent
    under the Frazier factors. The third assignment of error is overruled.
    Kidd’s Competence to Stand Trial
    {¶45} In his fourth assignment of error, Kidd asserts that the trial court erred
    by trying him without determining whether he was competent to stand trial.
    {¶46} On August 12, 2019, during a pretrial hearing, Kidd informed the trial
    court that he wished to fire his two appointed attorneys because he believed each
    attorney was telling him something different, and he had not seen any paperwork
    regarding his case. Kidd’s counsel informed the court that he had filed a suggestion
    of incompetency at the request of Kidd and based on his own concerns as they were
    preparing for trial. Trial counsel was unsure if Kidd wanted to fire his attorneys
    because they requested a competency evaluation.
    {¶47} Kidd explained to the trial court that he did not understand the
    proceedings due in part to a lack of communication by his lawyers.          Kidd also
    complained that he was not read his Miranda rights when he received his
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    indictment, he was being held for ransom, and he did not wish to accept a plea. The
    court noted Kidd’s confusion and ordered a competency evaluation, and the case was
    continued.
    {¶48} At the next hearing, the trial court informed Kidd that it had received a
    Court Clinic report stating that Kidd refused to participate in the evaluation. Kidd’s
    counsel explained that Kidd refused to participate until he had new attorneys. Kidd
    confirmed that he wanted new counsel for the same communication issues he had
    previously expressed. Kidd further explained that he understood the proceedings,
    but his attorneys had not provided him with discovery or discussed the trial with
    him. His attorneys confirmed that the relationship had broken down due primarily
    to Kidd’s family, and counsel asked to be removed from the case. Kidd told the trial
    court that he had previously been found competent, and he did not wish to speak
    with the doctor. The case was continued for the trial court to appoint new counsel.
    {¶49} Eleven months later, Kidd’s new counsel withdrew the suggestion of
    incompetency and explained that based on his contact with Kidd, he had no concerns
    with Kidd’s competency and expressed his belief that Kidd was competent. Counsel
    filed an entry withdrawing the suggestion of incompetency, and the case proceeded
    to trial.
    {¶50} Under Ohio law, “a person whose mental condition is such that he
    lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
    him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
    subjected to a trial. The conviction of an accused while he is not legally competent to
    stand trial violates due process of law.” (Internal citations omitted.)       State v.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Rubenstein, 
    40 Ohio App.3d 57
    , 60, 
    531 N.E.2d 732
     (8th Dist.1987).
    {¶51} R.C. 2945.37 provides that if the defendant raises the issue of
    competency before trial, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine, upon
    the evidence submitted, whether the defendant is competent. “The competency issue
    is one that can be waived by the parties. A hearing is not required in all situations,
    only those where the competency issue is raised and maintained.” State v. Smith,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95505, 
    2011-Ohio-2400
    , ¶ 5.
    {¶52} Here, Kidd withdrew the suggestion of incompetence filed by his
    previous attorneys. Kidd’s current trial counsel, who had been representing Kidd for
    almost a year, assured the court that Kidd was competent based on his interactions
    and communications with Kidd. Moreover, the record does not indicate that Kidd
    exhibited any signs of incompetency. Although Kidd was initially confused about the
    court process, the record indicates that his confusion was based primarily on the
    miscommunication between Kidd and his former lawyers.
    {¶53} Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
    accepting Kidd’s waiver of the competency issue. See 
    id.
     This assignment of error is
    not well taken and is overruled.
    Proof of Venue
    {¶54} For ease of discussion, we next address the sixth assignment of error.
    Kidd challenges his conviction on count four, engaging in fellatio with A.O., asserting
    that the state failed to prove the offense occurred in Hamilton County.
    {¶55} “[V]enue must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal
    case.” State v. Gardner, 
    42 Ohio App.3d 157
    , 
    536 N.E.2d 1187
     (1st Dist.1987). Kidd
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    did not raise the issue of venue in the trial court, but the failure to prove venue is
    plain error. Id. at 158. Venue can be established “by the evidence as a whole or by
    circumstantial evidence.” State v. Tapke, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060494, 2007-
    Ohio-5124, ¶ 59. To prove venue, the state must submit sufficient evidence to justify
    a reasonable inference that the violation occurred in the county alleged in the
    indictment. Id.
    {¶56} Here, the state was required to prove that the offense occurred in
    Hamilton County. Count four charged Kidd with engaging in fellatio with A.O. A.O.
    testified that Kidd put his penis in A.O.’s mouth while Kidd was driving. A.O.
    testified that his mother was home at the time of this offense, but during the
    Mayerson Center interview, he stated the offense occurred after his mother called
    and asked to be picked up from her job at a Chinese restaurant. However, McBride
    determined that A.O.’s mother had not been employed for years, so no Chinese
    restaurant was ever identified.
    {¶57} A.O. could not identify any street names, cities, or counties to establish
    where the offense occurred. A.O. did not provide any details that would allow the
    factfinder to conclude that the offense occurred in Hamilton County. Therefore, the
    evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. See Gardner at 157-158.
    {¶58} We sustain the sixth assignment of error.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    {¶59} Next, Kidd argues that the judgment was not supported by sufficient
    evidence with respect to counts five and six. Counts two and five alleged that Kidd
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    engaged in fellatio with A.O. by placing A.O.’s penis in his mouth. Counts three and
    six alleged that Kidd placed his penis in A.O.’s anal opening.
    {¶60} “In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is
    whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any
    rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the crime proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ham, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170043, 2017-
    Ohio-9189, ¶ 19, citing State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 273, 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991),
    paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶61} A.O. described a specific incident where Kidd put his mouth on A.O.’s
    penis and testified it happened “more than one time.” A.O. also testified that Kidd
    put his penis in A.O.’s “butt” and did so “more than” one time. Kidd contends that
    the testimony that each incident occurred more than once is insufficient to support
    those convictions.
    {¶62} A.O.’s testimony that it happened more than once is sufficient to
    support the guilty findings. See State v. Dean, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 07CA013, 2008-
    Ohio-2146, ¶ 21 (concluding that the victim’s testimony that it happened more than
    once was “sufficient to support the findings of guilt as to the rape charges.”); State v.
    Mosely, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-701, 
    2006-Ohio-3102
    , ¶ 23 (determining that
    the victim’s testimony that vaginal penetration occurred three or four times
    “sufficiently satisfies each element of the crime charged for the specified number of
    occurrences.”); State v. Langston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 71578, 
    1998 WL 57152
    , *4
    (February 12, 1998) (explaining that the child’s testimony that it happened “more
    than once” was sufficient to support two counts of rape).
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶63} Because A.O.’s testimony was sufficient to support the guilty findings
    on both counts, we overrule the fifth assignment of error.
    Manifest Weight of the Evidence
    {¶64} In the seventh assignment of error, Kidd contends that the judgment
    was against the weight of the evidence because A.O.’s IQ was only 58. In essence,
    Kidd argues that the jury should have disregarded A.O.’s testimony on the basis of
    his low IQ.
    {¶65} When considering a challenge to the weight of the evidence, an
    appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
    inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in
    resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a
    manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997). Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of
    the evidence should be reserved for only the most “ ‘exceptional case in which the
    evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st Dist.1983), paragraph three of the syllabus.
    {¶66} Generally, credibility is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. See
    State v. Issa, 
    93 Ohio St.3d 49
    , 67, 
    752 N.E.2d 904
     (2001). “Because the trier of fact
    sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to decide ‘whether, and to
    what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses,’ we must afford
    substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.” Barberton v. Jenney, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 5
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2420
    , 
    929 N.E.2d 1047
    ,¶ 20, citing State v. Konya, 2d Dist.
    Montgomery No. 21434, 
    2006-Ohio-6312
    , ¶ 6, quoting State v. Lawson, 2d Dist.
    17
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Montgomery No. 16288, 
    1997 WL 476684
    , *4 (Aug. 22, 1997).
    {¶67} As previously discussed, A.O. was competent to testify, and the jury
    was in the best position to determine A.O.’s credibility and rationally could have
    believed his testimony. Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the jury
    clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. We overrule the
    seventh assignment of error.
    Sentences of Life Imprisonment
    {¶68} Next Kidd challenges his sentences of life without parole as
    disproportionate to the offenses committed, constituting cruel and unusual
    punishment.
    {¶69} Generally, if a sentence falls within the terms of a valid statute, it
    cannot amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See McDougle v. Maxwell, 
    1 Ohio St.2d 68
    , 69, 
    203 N.E.2d 334
     (1964). “Outside the death penalty context, the Eighth
    Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but
    forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.”
    Harmelin v. Michigan, 
    501 U.S. 957
    , 1001, 
    111 S.Ct. 2680
    , 
    115 L.Ed.2d 836
     (1991).
    {¶70} Although Kidd did not challenge the constitutionality of his sentence
    in the trial court, he now contends that life without parole is so disproportionate to
    the crime of rape of a child under ten, as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
    {¶71} This argument has been repeatedly rejected by Ohio appellate courts.
    In State v. Driscoll, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2008 CA 93, 
    2009-Ohio-6134
    , ¶ 29, the court
    held that “[defendant’s] sentence of life without parole for raping [a] four year old * *
    * in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), does not constitute cruel and unusual
    18
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    punishment, because it is not disproportionate or shocking to the moral sense of the
    community, in view of the heinous nature of the crime.” (Internal quotations
    omitted.)   The Eleventh District Court of Appeals similarly concluded that
    “considering the heinousness of the crime of raping a nine-year-old child, it cannot
    be said that appellant’s [life] sentence was disproportionate or shocking to the moral
    sense of the community.” State v. Gladding, 
    66 Ohio App.3d 502
    , 513, 
    585 N.E.2d 838
     (11th Dist.1990). In State v. Glaze, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1269, 2019-Ohio-
    53, ¶ 26, the court concluded that a sentence of life without parole for the rape of a
    child under the age of ten was not disproportionate to the conduct involved.
    {¶72} We agree with our sister courts that a sentence of life without parole
    for the rape of a child under the age of ten is not so disproportionate to shock the
    moral sense of the community, and overrule Kidd’s eighth assignment of error.
    Consecutive Sentences
    {¶73} In his ninth assignment of error, Kidd contends that the aggregate
    sentence is contrary to law because the trial court did not make the requisite findings
    to impose consecutive sentences.
    {¶74} When reviewing felony sentences, a reviewing court may overturn the
    imposition of consecutive sentences where the court “clearly and convincingly” finds
    that (1) “the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4),” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” The imposition of
    consecutive sentences is contrary to law if a trial court fails to make the findings
    mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 2014-Ohio-
    3177, 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , ¶ 37.
    19
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶75} The trial court must make the statutory findings at the sentencing
    hearing, which means that “ ‘the [trial] court must note that it engaged in the
    analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and specifie[d] which of the
    given bases warrants its decision.’ ” Bonnell at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 324
    , 326, 
    715 N.E.2d 131
     (1999). A trial court is not, however, required to
    state its reasons to support its findings, nor is it required to precisely recite the
    statutory language, “provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record
    and are incorporated in the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
    {¶76} In this case, when making the requisite finding under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4), the trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to
    protect the public and not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct, the
    harm caused by two or more of the offenses was so great and unusual that no single
    prison term would reflect the seriousness, and based upon his criminal history and
    the need to protect the public, consecutive sentences were warranted. And a review
    of the record supports the court’s finding.
    {¶77} However, as the state concedes, the trial court did not incorporate the
    findings in the sentencing entry as required by Bonnell at syllabus.      Therefore, we
    sustain the ninth assignment of error, in part, and overrule it in part, and remand the
    cause to the trial court for a nunc pro tunc entry to incorporate the findings in the
    entry of conviction.
    No-contact Order
    {¶78} In his final assignment of error, Kidd contends that the trial court
    erred by imposing a no-contact order along with the sentence of life in prison
    20
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    without parole. The state concedes the error and joins Kidd in asking this court to
    vacate the no-contact order.
    {¶79} Accordingly, we sustain the tenth assignment of error and remand the
    cause to the trial court with instruction to vacate the no-contact order.
    Conclusion
    {¶80} We sustain Kidd’s sixth and tenth assignments of error, and we sustain
    the ninth assignment of error, in part. We reverse the conviction on count four and
    remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to vacate the conviction on
    count four, enter a nunc pro tunc order correcting the omission of the consecutive-
    sentences findings from the sentencing entry, and to vacate the no-contact order in
    the sentencing entry. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.
    Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
    BERGERON and WINKLER, JJ., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry this date.
    21
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-200356

Judges: Zayas

Filed Date: 10/29/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/29/2021