Roberts v. Roberts ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as Roberts v. Roberts, 
    2021-Ohio-3857
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    SANDUSKY COUNTY
    Estella Roberts                                     Court of Appeals No. S-19-050
    Appellant                                   Trial Court No. 15 CV 903
    v.
    Roy C. Roberts                                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellee                                    Decided: October 29, 2021
    *****
    W. Evan Price, II, for appellant.
    Corey J. Speweik, for appellee.
    *****
    PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
    {¶ 1} This is an appeal from the judgment of the Sandusky County Court of
    Common Pleas, awarding summary judgment to appellee, Roy Roberts, and against
    appellant, Estella Roberts, on their competing claims for declaratory judgment. For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.
    I. Facts and Procedural Background
    {¶ 2} The facts in this case are undisputed, and concern the enforcement of an oil
    and gas interest related to appellant’s property (“the property”). On July 9, 1895, an oil
    and gas lease (“1895 interest”) was executed that granted to the lessee, his heirs, or
    assigns, “all the oil and gas in and under [the property] together with the exclusive right
    to enter thereon for the purpose of drilling or operating for oil and gas, to erect, maintain
    and remove all structures, pipe lines and machinery necessary for the production and
    storage of oil, gas or water.” The 1895 interest also included the following terms:
    Should oil be found in paying quantities [on] the premises, second
    party agrees to deliver to the first party in the pipe line with which he may
    connect the well or wells, the One Sixth part of all the oil saved from said
    premises.
    If gas only is found, second party agrees to pay One Hundred
    Dollars each year for the product of each well while the same is being used
    off the premises, and the first party shall have gas free of expense to light
    and heat the dwellings on the premises.
    2.
    The second party shall have the right to use sufficient gas, oil, or
    water to run all machinery used by him in carrying on his operation [on]
    said premises, and the right to remove all his property at any time.
    If no well is drilled within Sixty days from this date unavoidable
    delays excepted then this grant shall become null and void.
    The second party to pay to 1st party Fifty Dollars $50.00 per
    location, for each location, and if oil is found in paying quantities Four
    wells to be drilled each year, until eight wells are completed. Two wells to
    be drilled every six months until the place is all drilled in and should the
    party of the second part think that any part of said place would not pay to
    drill he is to cancel the lease on that part.
    It is agreed by the parties to this contract that a failure on the part of
    the second party to comply with the terms of this contract renders this grant
    null and void and neither party to be held for any liability.
    The 1895 interest was recorded on August 26, 1895. At least seven oil wells were drilled
    on the property under the interest.
    {¶ 3} Eventually, the 1895 interest was assigned to appellee’s predecessor in
    interest, Otto Semlow. Appellee assisted Semlow in drilling for oil on the property and
    maintaining the equipment. In 1979, Semlow assigned the 1895 interest to appellee. The
    3.
    assignment was recorded on December 12, 1979. Sometime thereafter, oil production on
    the property stopped.
    {¶ 4} However, in 2013, after approximately 30 years, appellee resumed oil
    production. Consistent with the terms of the 1895 interest, appellee began sending
    royalty checks to appellant. On November 18, 2013, he sent two checks, one for
    $295.00, and the other for $98.50. On May 7, 2014, appellee sent a check for $400.00.
    On October 19, 2014, appellee sent a check for $414.41. On November 22, 2014,
    appellee sent a check for $271.26. On June 5, 2015, appellee sent a check for $197.03.
    Appellant accepted and deposited all of the royalty checks.
    {¶ 5} Notwithstanding her prior acceptance of the royalty checks, on June 9, 2015,
    appellant sent a demand letter to appellee, asserting that appellee was operating the oil
    and gas wells without a valid lease. Appellant demanded that appellee either plug the
    wells within 30 days or negotiate a new lease.
    {¶ 6} On September 16, 2015, appellant initiated the present matter by filing a
    complaint and a request for a preliminary and permanent injunction. In her complaint,
    appellant brought claims to quiet title, for slander of title, for conversion and trespass,
    and for a declaratory judgment that the 1895 interest had expired and was therefore null
    and void. On September 22, 2015, the trial court granted appellant a temporary
    restraining order.
    4.
    {¶ 7} On November 25, 2015, appellee filed his answer, and included a
    counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that his oil and gas lease was valid and
    enforceable.
    {¶ 8} The trial court held a hearing, and on August 29, 2016, issued a preliminary
    injunction prohibiting appellee from entering the property. Notably, the record contains
    no evidence that the court ordered the execution of a bond to secure to appellee the
    damages he may sustain by virtue of the preliminary injunction, as set forth in Civ.R.
    65(C) (“No temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is operative until the
    party obtaining it gives a bond executed by sufficient surety, approved by the clerk of the
    court granting the order or injunction, in an amount fixed by the court or judge allowing
    it, to secure to the party enjoined the damages he may sustain, if it is finally decided that
    the order or injunction should not have been granted.”).1
    {¶ 9} The matter then proceeded to competing motions for summary judgment.
    The legal dispute centered on whether the 1895 interest was in actuality a lease or a fee
    interest, and whether the 1895 interest expired by operation of law due to a lack of
    production, or whether it was saved under Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56.
    On April 12, 2018, the trial court entered its judgment in favor of appellee, holding that
    1
    We recognize that the trial court had the option “to set bond at a nominal amount or at
    zero.” Skiles v. Bellevue Hosp., 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-06-002, 
    2006-Ohio-5361
    , ¶ 16,
    citing Vanguard Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Edwards Transfer & Storage Co., Gen.
    Commodities Div., 
    109 Ohio App.3d 786
    , 793, 
    673 N.E.2d 182
     (10th Dist.1996).
    5.
    regardless of whether the 1895 interest was in actuality a lease or a fee interest, the
    Dormant Mineral Act applied and saved the interest.2
    {¶ 10} Following the award of summary judgment, the trial court held a hearing
    on damages. On November 5, 2019, the trial court entered its judgment awarding
    appellee $14,114.48 in lost profits, and $21,442.00 in attorney fees.
    II. Assignments of Error
    {¶ 11} Appellant has appealed the trial court’s award of summary judgment and
    damages, and now asserts two assignments of error for our review:
    1. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor
    of Appellee and denied Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment
    based on its determination that the 1895 Oil and Gas Lease on Appellant’s
    property that was assigned to Appellee in 1979 was a fee interest subject to
    Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act in Section 5301.56 of the Ohio Revised Code.
    2. The trial court erred when it awarded Appellee his attorney’s fees
    as damages based on its determination that Appellant’s Application for a
    Preliminary Injunction should not have been granted.
    2
    The trial court entered its April 12, 2018 judgment before allowing the parties the
    opportunity to respond to the opposing motions for summary judgment. Subsequently,
    the trial court permitted the parties to file such oppositions, and on May 21, 2018, the
    court entered an order maintaining its prior judgment.
    6.
    III. Analysis
    A. Summary Judgment
    {¶ 12} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
    when it declared that the 1895 interest was subject to Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act and
    awarded summary judgment to appellee.
    {¶ 13} We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo,
    applying the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 
    61 Ohio App.3d 127
    , 129, 
    572 N.E.2d 198
     (9th Dist.1989); Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 
    77 Ohio St.3d 102
    , 105, 
    671 N.E.2d 241
     (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is
    appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one
    conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that
    conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.,
    
    54 Ohio St.2d 64
    , 66, 
    375 N.E.2d 46
     (1978).
    {¶ 14} “In 1989, Ohio enacted the Dormant Mineral Act, codified in R.C. 5301.56,
    to address stale or abandoned mineral rights. Commonly, the mineral rights are severed
    from the surface rights of a parcel of land, and over time, sometimes repeatedly, the
    mineral rights may be further divided and transferred through various business and family
    transactions.” Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, 
    144 Ohio St.3d 490
    , 2015-Ohio-
    4551, 
    45 N.E.3d 185
    , ¶ 25. “The General Assembly devised the Dormant Mineral Act as
    7.
    part of the Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq., to provide a mechanism to reunite
    abandoned mineral interests with the surface property interest in order to clear title and
    promote the use of the mineral rights for development and production.” 
    Id.
    {¶ 15} Relevant here, R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(b) of the Dormant Mineral Act provides
    that upon the landowner’s compliance with certain requirements, “(B) Any mineral
    interest held by any person * * * shall be deemed abandoned and vested in the owner of
    the surface of the lands subject to the interest” unless “(3) Within the twenty years
    immediately preceding * * * (b) There has been actual production or withdrawal of
    minerals by the holder from the lands.”
    {¶ 16} Notably, it is uncontested that there was actual production or withdrawal of
    minerals in the 20 years immediately preceding when appellant sought to have appellee’s
    interest deemed abandoned. Instead, the issue presented by appellant is whether the 1895
    interest is a “mineral interest,” entitling it to be saved under R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(b). To
    that end, R.C. 5301.56(A)(3) defines “mineral interest” as “a fee interest in at least one
    mineral regardless of how the interest is created and of the form of the interest, which
    may be absolute or fractional or divided or undivided.”
    {¶ 17} Appellant argues that the 1895 interest is a lease, not a fee interest, and thus
    the savings provision R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(b) does not apply. Furthermore, appellant
    argues that the process for removing a forfeited lease is directly provided for in R.C.
    5301.332, which states that a surface property owner on whose lands there are no
    8.
    producing or drilling oil or gas wells can gain clear title where the lessee has failed “to
    abide by specifically described covenants provided for in the lease, or because the term of
    the lease has expired.” Appellant argues that it would be absurd to apply the savings
    provisions in R.C. 5301.56 to leases, and thus require a property to be dormant for 20
    years before declaring that an expired lease has been forfeited.
    {¶ 18} Appellee, on the other hand, argues that the 1895 interest is a fee interest
    subject to the provisions of R.C. 5301.56, citing several cases as support, which we will
    discuss below.
    {¶ 19} In Kramer v. PAC Drilling Oil & Gas, L.L.C., 
    197 Ohio App.3d 554
    , 2011-
    Ohio-6750, 
    968 N.E.2d 64
     (9th Dist.), the Ninth District considered a lease similar to the
    one here. In Kramer, the Kocsises leased all of the oil and gas rights from the 149 acre
    property that they owned exclusively to McClanahan Oil. In exchange, McClanahan Oil
    agreed to pay the Kocsises one-eighth of the revenue it generated from selling gas
    produced on the property. The lease also provided that the Kocsises could take an
    unlimited amount of gas from any producing well for domestic purposes. Finally, the
    lease provided that “[a]t any time, Lessee, its successors or assigns, shall have the right to
    surrender this lease or any part thereof for cancelation, after which all payments and
    liabilities hereunder thereafter shall cease and determine, and if the whole is surrendered,
    then this lease shall become absolutely null and void.” Id. at ¶ 2. On appeal, the Ninth
    District examined the lease, and found that it “separated the surface estate of the
    9.
    Kocsises’ land from its oil and gas estates and conveyed ownership of the oil and gas
    estates to McClanahan Oil.” Id. at ¶ 11. Thus, the Ninth District determined that
    McClanahan Oil “became the fee-simple owner of the conveyed oil and gas estates while
    the Kocsises retained a possibility of reverter as provided in the lease. Because of the
    possibility of reverter, McClanahan Oil’s fee-simple estate in the oil and gas was a fee-
    simple determinable rather than a fee-simple absolute.” Id.
    {¶ 20} In Buell, the Ohio Supreme Court cited Kramer approvingly when it
    considered the nature of the oil and gas lease before it. Buell, 
    144 Ohio St.3d 490
    , 2015-
    Ohio-4551, 
    45 N.E.3d 185
    , at ¶ 52. In Buell, the issue was whether the recording of an
    oil and gas lease was a “title transaction” such that the interest would be saved by R.C.
    5301.56(B)(3)(a), which provides that an interest would not be deemed abandoned if,
    within the past 20 years, “[t]he mineral interest has been the subject of a title transaction
    that has been filed or recorded in the office of the county recorder of the county in which
    the lands are located.” In discussing oil and gas leases generally, the Ohio Supreme
    Court commented:
    There is no question that oil and gas leases are unique, as they
    “seemingly straddle the line between property and contract: they are
    neither residential leases nor commercial contracts for the sale of goods.”
    Keeling & Gillespie, The First Marketable Product Doctrine: Just What Is
    the “Product”?, 37 St. Mary’s L.J. 1, 6 (2005). “Oil and gas leases are
    10.
    unusual in that they are not technically leases at all.” Richardson, [Hite v.
    Falcon Partners: A Model Rule for Marcellus and Utica Shale States
    Precluding the Use of Delay Rental Payments to Extend the Primary Term
    in an Oil and Gas Lease, 46 Akron L.Rev. 1133, 1144 (2013)].
    There is general consensus among the states that an oil and gas lease
    creates a property interest, but there is disagreement about the nature of that
    property interest. Keeling & Gillespie, 37 St. Mary’s L.J. at 7. Some states
    have held that it is a fee simple determinable “in which the lessee enjoys
    title to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals * * * as long as the lease
    remain (sic) in effect,” while others have concluded that it is an incorporeal
    interest in the minerals “in which the lessee enjoys the exclusive right to
    take all of the oil, gas, and other minerals.” 
    Id.
    Buell at ¶ 41-42. In discussing the specific oil and gas lease before it, the Ohio
    Supreme Court reasoned:
    The lease in this case grants the lessee an unequivocal and exclusive
    right to the mineral estate for a fixed term plus an indefinite extended term
    upon the happening of certain conditions, such as actual production of oil
    and gas or a prescribed payment to the lessor. Based on the vested nature
    of this grant, the oil and gas lease has been construed as transferring to the
    lessee a fee simple determinable in the mineral estate with a reversionary
    11.
    interest retained by the lessor that can be triggered by events or conditions
    specified in the lease. [Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 
    57 Ohio St. 118
    , 129-130,
    
    48 N.E. 502
     (1897)].
    Id. at ¶ 61. However, the Ohio Supreme Court did note that it was not deciding the
    nature of the oil and gas lease, and that the result would be the same “[e]ven if the lease
    transfers to the lessee something less than a determinable fee, * * * when the instrument
    grants the exclusive right to the mineral estate, i.e., the exclusive right and privilege to
    possess, use, and alter the estate to explore, develop, and produce oil and gas resources
    found therein.” Id. at ¶ 65.
    {¶ 21} Finally, in DeVitis v. Draper, 
    2017-Ohio-1136
    , 
    87 N.E.3d 656
    , ¶ 19 (7th
    Dist.), the Seventh District held that an oil and gas royalty interest was a “mineral
    interest” as defined in R.C. 5301.56(A)(3), and thus was subject to abandonment. In
    reaching that conclusion, the Seventh District reasoned that the Ohio Marketable Title
    Act, Chapter 5301, uses broad language such as “all interests, claims, or charges
    whatsoever,” and “[a]ll such interests * * * however denominated,” to indicate that the
    Marketable Title Act does not differentiate between types of interest but rather applies to
    all interests. DeVitis at ¶ 16. Expanding on that rationale, the court determined that the
    phrase “regardless of how the interest is created and of the form of the interest” in R.C.
    5301.56(A)(3) likewise indicated the Dormant Mineral Act—which is part of the
    12.
    Marketable Title Act—was intended to apply to the oil and gas royalty interest before the
    court. DeVitis at ¶ 17.
    {¶ 22} Upon review, we find that the conclusions of Kramer, Buell, and DeVitis,
    are in line with longstanding Ohio precedent that
    there may be a complete severance of the ownership of the surface of land
    from the ownership of the different strata of mineral which may underlie
    the surface; and that the creation of a separate interest in the mineral with
    the right to remove the same, whether by deed, grant, lease, reservation, or
    exception, unless expressly restricted, confers upon the owner of the
    mineral a fee-simple estate, which is, of course, determinable upon the
    exhaustion of the mine.
    (Emphasis added.) Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 
    75 Ohio St. 493
    , 499, 80 N.E.6
    (1907). Here, the 1895 interest grants to appellee the exclusive right for an indefinite
    period of time to all of the oil and gas under the property. Therefore, consistent with the
    reasoning in Kramer, Buell, and DeVitis, we hold that the 1895 interest granted to
    appellee a fee interest in the mineral rights, and thus constitutes a “mineral interest” as
    defined in R.C. 5301.56(A)(3). See Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 
    57 Ohio St. 118
    , 129, 
    48 N.E. 502
     (1897) (“The rights and remedies of the parties to an oil or gas lease must be
    determined by the terms of the written instrument.”). Consequently, the trial court did
    13.
    not err when it determined that appellee’s interest had not been abandoned or forfeited in
    light of the savings provision in R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(b).
    {¶ 23} Furthermore, we reject appellant’s argument that the application of R.C.
    5301.56(B)(3)(b) in this instance conflicts with or frustrates the purpose of R.C.
    5301.332. R.C. 5301.332 applies to leases that have “become forfeited for failure of the
    lessee or the lessee’s successors or assigns to abide by specifically described covenants
    provided for in the lease, or because the term of the lease has expired.” Here, there is no
    allegation that appellee failed to abide by a specific covenant of the 1895 interest, nor
    does the 1895 interest contain a provision regarding the length of the duration of the
    lease. Thus, the 1895 interest by its terms could last in perpetuity, and for that reason is
    the precise type of interest that the legislature sought to address through Section 5301.56
    of the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act.
    {¶ 24} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
    B. Attorney Fees
    {¶ 25} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
    when it awarded $21,442.00 in attorney fees to appellee as damages for defending against
    the preliminary injunction. Notably, appellant does not contest the specific amount, but
    limits her argument to whether appellee is entitled to attorney fees at all.
    {¶ 26} “Ohio has long adhered to the ‘American rule’ with respect to recovery of
    attorney fees: a prevailing party in a civil action may not recover attorney fees as a part
    14.
    of the costs of litigation.” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 
    121 Ohio St.3d 546
    , 2009-Ohio-
    306, 
    906 N.E.2d 396
    , ¶ 7, citing Nottingdale Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Darby, 
    33 Ohio St.3d 32
    , 33-34, 
    514 N.E.2d 702
     (1987). However, attorney fees may be awarded when
    provided for by statute, an enforceable contract, or when the prevailing party
    demonstrates bad faith on the part of the unsuccessful litigant. 
    Id.
    {¶ 27} Appellee argues that an additional circumstance in which attorney fees may
    be awarded is where the attorney fees were incurred during efforts to dissolve a
    preliminary injunction that is later determined should not have been granted. In support,
    appellee cites Wumer v. Lake, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-88-053, 
    1989 WL 108759
     (Sept.
    22, 1989), in which we held that the trial court erred in refusing to award attorney fees to
    the defendant for his efforts to file a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and
    participate in a hearing on that motion, and remanded the matter to the trial court to
    determine the proper amount.
    {¶ 28} Our decision in Wumer relied upon a line of cases beginning with Noble v.
    Arnold, 
    23 Ohio St. 264
     (1872). In Noble, a preliminary injunction was granted upon the
    petitioner posting a bond, one of the conditions of which required the petitioner to pay to
    the defendant “the damages he may sustain by reason of the injunction in this action, if it
    be finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted.” Id. at 264. The
    court held that “attorney fees and expenses necessarily incurred in obtaining a dissolution
    of an injunction, may be recovered as damages secured by the undertaking, when it is
    15.
    finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted.” Id. at paragraph one
    of the syllabus. However, the court cautioned “[b]ut where the attorney fees and
    expenses are incurred in defeating the action, and the dissolution of the injunction is only
    incidental to the result, such fees and expenses are not damages sustained by reason of
    the injunction, and no recovery therefor can be had upon the undertaking.” Id. at
    paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶ 29} A few years later, in Riddle v. Cheadle, 
    25 Ohio St. 278
    , 279 (1874), the
    Ohio Supreme Court reinforced the caution expressed in Noble, and reversed an award of
    attorney fees because “No additional attorney’s fees were rendered necessary by the
    allowance of the injunction. All such fees paid would have been paid if the injunction
    had never been allowed. They can not, therefore, be said, in the language of the bond, to
    have been ‘occasioned by the injunction.’”
    {¶ 30} Subsequent cases applying the rules of Noble and Riddle, and which were
    relied upon by this court in Wumer, have likewise involved an injunction bond which
    included a term requiring the petitioner to pay to the defendant costs that may accrue on
    account of the injunction if it should ultimately be decided that the injunction should not
    have been granted. See Hatch v. Newark Tel. Co., 2d Dist. Franklin No. 2117, 
    1932 WL 1787
     (Mar. 23, 1932); Allen v. Cole, 
    88 Ohio App. 399
    , 
    100 N.E.2d 84
     (1st Dist.1950).
    {¶ 31} In Wumer, however, our decision makes no reference to an injunction
    bond. See also Chillicothe Restoration Foundation v. Chillicothe Design Bd. of Review,
    16.
    
    55 Ohio App.3d 114
    , 
    563 N.E.2d 34
     (4th Dist.1988) (holding, without reference to an
    injunction bond, that the trial court erred by failing to award attorney fees necessarily
    incurred in obtaining a dissolution of a temporary restraining order). Upon review of the
    cases relied upon by Wumer, we find that our earlier decision was in error, and we
    overrule Wumer to the extent that it holds that attorney fees incurred in obtaining a
    dissolution of a preliminary injunction are recoverable in the absence of an injunction
    bond that requires the petitioner to pay damages that may be accrued on account of the
    injunction if it is finally decided that the injunction should not have been granted. See
    WKBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Levin, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 91 C.A. 83, 
    1992 WL 73591
    , *3 (Mar. 30, 1992) (“[A]lthough in certain cases attorney fees can be awarded as
    damages in the case of a wrongfully obtained injunction, such can only be awarded under
    the bond and cannot go beyond it.”).
    {¶ 32} Here, appellee does not point to an injunction bond that was executed, and
    our review of the record does not reveal that one was ever ordered. Therefore, we hold
    that the trial court had no basis upon which to award attorney fees to appellee for his
    efforts to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
    {¶ 33} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is well-taken.
    17.
    IV. Conclusion
    {¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, we find that substantial justice has not been done
    the party complaining, and the judgment of the Sandusky County Court of Common
    Pleas is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. The trial court’s award of summary
    judgment to appellee on his counterclaim for declaratory judgment that the 1895 interest
    is valid and in full force and effect, is affirmed. The trial court’s award of $21,442.00 to
    appellee for attorney fees is reversed, and is hereby vacated. The parties are ordered to
    split the costs of this appeal evenly pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed, in part,
    and reversed, in part.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                        ____________________________
    JUDGE
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.
    ____________________________
    Christine E. Mayle, J.                                  JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    ____________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    18.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S-19-050

Judges: Pietrykowski

Filed Date: 10/29/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/29/2021