State v. Sellers ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Sellers, 2017-Ohio-4020.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio/City of Maumee                            Court of Appeals No. L-16-1134
    Appellee                                        Trial Court No. 16TRD01594
    v.
    Brook C. Sellers                                        DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                       Decided: May 26, 2017
    *****
    Douglas A. Wilkins, for appellant.
    *****
    JENSEN, P.J.
    I. Introduction
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Brook Sellers, appeals the judgment of the Maumee Municipal
    Court, sentencing her to 180 days in jail, imposing a $400 fine, and suspending her
    driver’s license following her plea of no contest to one count of failure to stop.
    A. Facts and Procedural Background
    {¶ 2} On March 14, 2016, appellant was backing her white Jeep out of a parking
    space at a restaurant in Maumee, Ohio, when she hit a parked automobile. Appellant fled
    the scene without stopping, but a bystander was able to record her license plate number,
    which was then forwarded to Maumee police. Eventually, appellant was cited for leaving
    the scene of an accident on private property in violation of R.C. 4549.021.
    {¶ 3} Approximately three months later, appellant appeared before the trial court
    and entered a plea of no contest to an amended charge of failure to stop in violation of
    R.C. 4549.03, a misdemeanor of the first degree. Following a Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the
    court accepted appellant’s no contest plea, and found her guilty of the amended charge.
    The court immediately proceeded to sentencing, at which point appellant was ordered to
    serve 180 days in prison, with 174 of those days suspended on the condition that she not
    commit any alcohol related offenses for a period of three years. Appellant was directed
    to serve three of her remaining six days in a drivers’ intervention program, with the final
    three days to be spent on electronic house monitoring. In addition to the foregoing, the
    trial court ordered appellant to pay a $400 fine, plus court costs, and suspended
    appellant’s license for a period of 365 days.
    {¶ 4} Thereafter, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
    2.
    B. Assignment of Error
    {¶ 5} On appeal, appellant raises the following assignment of error for our review:
    The lower court erred in imposing a one year license suspension as
    part of appellant’s sentence for failing to stop under R.C. 4549.03.
    II. Analysis
    {¶ 6} In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court was
    without authority to suspend her license at sentencing upon its finding her guilty of
    violating R.C. 4549.03.
    {¶ 7} The standard of review for a misdemeanor sentence is whether the trial court
    abused its discretion. City of Cleveland v. Meehan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100202,
    2014-Ohio-2265, ¶ 7. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that the trial court’s
    attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Adams, 
    62 Ohio St. 2d 151
    , 157, 
    404 N.E.2d 144
    (1980).
    {¶ 8} When sentencing on a misdemeanor, a trial court “shall be guided by the
    overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing.” R.C. 2929.21(A). These purposes
    include protecting the public from future crime and punishing the offender. 
    Id. Included in
    the trial court’s range of sentencing options is the authority to suspend the offender’s
    driver’s license. R.C. 2929.27(A)(13). “However, a court may only suspend this
    privilege ‘[i]f authorized by law[.]’” State v. Ledley, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-09-39, 2010-
    Ohio-1260, ¶ 9, quoting R.C. 2929.27(A)(13).
    3.
    {¶ 9} R.C. 4549.03(B) states: “Whoever violates division (A) of this section is
    guilty of failure to stop after an accident involving the property of others, a misdemeanor
    of the first degree.” Nothing in R.C. 4549.03 authorizes a court to suspend the driver’s
    license of a person who violates this section. Notably, similar offenses do contain such
    language. See R.C. 4549.02(B)(4) (“In all cases, the court, in addition to any other
    penalties provided by law, shall impose upon the offender a class five suspension of the
    offender’s driver’s license * * *.”); R.C. 4549.021(B)(4) (“In all cases, the court, in
    addition to any other penalties provided by law, shall impose upon the offender a class
    five suspension of the offender’s driver’s license * * *.); R.C. 4511.75(F)(2) (“In addition
    to and independent of any other penalty provided by law, the court or mayor may impose
    upon an offender who violates this section a class seven suspension of the offender’s
    driver’s license * * *.”).
    {¶ 10} Upon consideration of the foregoing statutes, the court in 
    Ledley, supra
    ,
    reasoned:
    Given the General Assembly’s decision to designate which offenses
    it renders worthy of a license suspension and its specific language in R.C.
    2929.27(A)(13) that a license suspension for misdemeanors is allowed if
    authorized by law, we find that a license suspension for a violation of R.C.
    4549.03(A) is not authorized. Therefore, the trial court did not have
    authority to suspend [the offender’s] license in the case sub judice.
    (Emphasis sic.) Ledley at ¶ 11; see also State v. Knowlton, 4th Dist.
    4.
    Washington No. 10CA31, 2012-Ohio-2350, ¶ 33 (adopting the Third
    District’s reasoning in Ledley and holding that the trial court did not have
    the authority to suspend the offender’s driver’s license pursuant to a failure-
    to-stop conviction).
    {¶ 11} Having examined the rationale behind the decisions in Ledley and
    Knowlton, we agree with appellant that the trial court did not possess the authority to
    suspend her driver’s license upon its acceptance of her no contest plea for failure to stop
    under R.C. 4549.03. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in suspending
    appellant’s license, and we find that appellant’s sole assignment of error is well-taken.
    {¶ 12} Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(a) and (B), we modify appellant’s sentence by
    vacating the driver’s license suspension. The remainder of appellant’s sentence is
    undisturbed.
    III. Conclusion
    {¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Maumee Municipal Court is
    reversed and its suspension of appellant’s driver’s license is hereby vacated. Appellee is
    ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment reversed.
    5.
    Maumee v. Sellers
    C.A. No. L-16-1134
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                       _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Arlene Singer, J.
    _______________________________
    James D. Jensen, P.J.                                      JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    6.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-16-1134

Judges: Jensen

Filed Date: 5/26/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/26/2017