State ex rel. Parma Cty. Gen. Hosp. v. O'Donnell ( 2013 )

[Cite as State ex rel. Parma Cty. Gen. Hosp. v. O'Donnell, 2013-Ohio-2923.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100005
STATE EX REL., PARMA
COMMUNITY GENERAL HOSPITAL
RELATOR
vs.
JUDGE DEANNA O’DONNELL, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT:
WRIT DENIED
Writ of Prohibition
Sua Sponte Order No. 466029
RELEASE DATE: July 1, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR RELATOR
Michael P. Cassidy
Cassidy & Associates
11221 Pearl Road
Strongsville, OH 44136
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS
Timothy G. Dobeck
Director of Law
City of Parma
6611 Ridge Road
Parma, OH 44129
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} On June 17, 2013, the petitioner, Parma Community General Hospital,
commenced this prohibition action against the respondent, Parma Municipal Court Judge
Deanna O’Donnell and the Chief of the City of Parma Police Department, to prohibit the
judge from enforcing a search warrant and to enjoin the police department from engaging
in the search. For the following reasons, this court sua sponte denies the application for
a writ of prohibition.
{¶2} The affidavit supporting the search warrant stated that on May 4, 2013,
Parma police investigated the possible homicide of a resident of Parma. The
investigation indicated that the perpetrator may have also been injured, evidenced by
blood droplets on the decedent and a blood trail leading away from the crime scene and
toward the entrance of a condominium close to the victim’s residence. DNA
examination of the blood evidence confirmed that the blood from the trail was not that of
the victim. The police obtained DNA samples from Edward and Aaron Davies,
residents of a neighboring condominium. Further testing showed that Edward’s DNA
matched the blood recovered from the crime scene. The Parma police arrested both
Edward and Aaron Davies on May 10, 2013. Aaron Davies had visible injuries on his
right forearm and admitted to having a stab wound on his right leg. Parma police
transported Aaron to Parma Community Hospital for treatment for these injuries.
{¶3} On May 22, 2013, Parma police obtained a search warrant from the
respondent judge for the medical records, test results, medical bills and any other
documents from Parma Community Hospital for the treatment of Aaron Davies on May
10, 2013. The hospital commenced this prohibition action to stop the enforcement of
the search warrant. The hospital argues that R.C. Chapter 2933, which governs search
warrants, does not provide a basis for searches and seizures of hospital records, and that
the subject search warrant violates R.C. 2317.02, privileged communications, and the
Fourth Amendment.
{¶4} A writ of prohibition, however, is not the proper remedy to pursue. The
principles governing prohibition are well established. Its requisites are (1) the respondent
against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of such
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel.
Largent v. Fisher, 43 Ohio St. 3d 160, 540 N.E.2d 239 (1989). Prohibition will not lie
unless it clearly appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the cause that it is
attempting to adjudicate or the court is about to exceed its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Ellis
v. McCabe, 138 Ohio St. 417, 35 N.E.2d 571 (1941), paragraph three of the syllabus.
“The writ will not issue to prevent an erroneous judgment, or to serve the purpose of
appeal, or to correct mistakes of the lower court in deciding questions within its
jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Sparto v. Juvenile Court of Darke Cty., 153 Ohio St. 64, 65,
90 N.E.2d 598 (1950). Furthermore, it should be used with great caution and not issue
in a doubtful case. State ex rel. Merion v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
137 Ohio St. 273, 28 N.E.2d 641 (1940); and Reiss v. Columbus Mun. Court, 76 Ohio
Law Abs. 141, 145 N.E.2d 447 (10th Dist.1956). Nevertheless, when a court is patently
and unambiguously without jurisdiction to act whatsoever, the availability or adequacy of
a remedy is immaterial to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Tilford v.
Crush, 39 Ohio St. 3d 174, 529 N.E.2d 1245 (1988); and State ex rel. Csank v. Jaffe, 107
Ohio App. 3d 387, 668 N.E.2d 996 (8th Dist.1995). Absent such a patent and
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter
of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rootstown
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 78 Ohio St. 3d
489, 678 N.E.2d 1365 (1997). Moreover, the court has discretion in issuing the writ of
prohibition. State ex rel. Gilligan v. Hoddinott, 36 Ohio St. 2d 127, 304 N.E.2d 382
(1973).
{¶5} In the present case, Crim.R. 41(B) granted the respondent judge the
authority to issue the warrant. State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Williams, 63 Ohio St. 2d
51, 407 N.E.2d 2 (1980). Furthermore, “trial courts have the requisite jurisdiction to
decide issues of privilege; thus extraordinary relief in prohibition will not lie to correct
any errors in decisions of these issues.” State ex rel. Abner v. Elliot, 85 Ohio St. 3d 11,
16, 1999-Ohio-199, 706 N.E.2d 765, quoting State ex rel. Herdman v. Watson, 83 Ohio
St.3d 537, 538, 700 N.E.2d 1270 (1998). At the very least, the trial judge has sufficient
jurisdiction to determine her own jurisdiction, and prohibition will not lie.
{¶6} Nor has the petitioner convinced this court that there is no adequate remedy
at law. In State ex rel. Satow v. Gausse-Milliken, 98 Ohio St. 3d 479, 2003-Ohio-2074,
786 N.E.2d 1289, the Supreme Court of Ohio indicated that an action for declaratory
judgment and prohibitory injunction may be an adequate remedy at law precluding an
extraordinary writ. The court further notes that trial courts have often entertained
motions to quash search warrants.
{¶7} The court further finds that the Chief of the City of Parma Police
Department is not a proper party to this prohibition. The execution of the search warrant
is not an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power; searches are executive in nature.
Moreover, an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Thus,
“prohibition is not available to forbid searches.” State ex rel. Hensley v. Nowak, 52
Ohio St. 3d 98, 556 N.E.2d 171 (1990).
{¶8} Accordingly, this court, sua sponte, denies the application for a writ of
prohibition. Petitioner to pay costs. This court directs the clerk of court to serve all
parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal as required by Civ.R.
58(B).
{¶9} Writ denied.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR