State v. Dulaney ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Dulaney, 2013-Ohio-3985.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
PAULDING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 11-12-04
v.
VARAINA C. DULANEY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Paulding County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 12 521
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: September 16, 2013
APPEARANCES:
Peter R. Seibel for Appellant
Joseph R. Burkard and Matthew A. Miller for Appellee
Case No. 11-12-04
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Varaina Dulaney, appeals the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County convicting her of aggravated
vehicular homicide and sentencing her to an 18-month prison term. On appeal,
Dulaney argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress
evidence obtained pursuant to a purportedly invalid search warrant. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} On February 10, 2012, the Paulding County Grand Jury indicted
Dulaney with aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2), a
felony of the fourth degree, and aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of
R.C. 2903.06(A)(2), a felony of the third degree. The indictment arose from a
fatal automobile accident that occurred on November 27, 2011 in Paulding
County. At approximately 2:30 a.m. that morning, Dulaney was driving an
automobile containing her, Michael Breckler, and Dustin Coil. When Dulaney
lost control of the vehicle, it rolled and Coil was ejected from the vehicle. Coil
died from his injuries while Breckler suffered a fractured pelvis. Dulaney did not
suffer any serious injuries.
{¶3} On April 23, 2012, Dulaney filed a motion to suppress any blood
alcohol test results obtained from the seizure of samples of her blood. The basis
for the motion was that the search and seizure was executed pursuant to an invalid
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warrant. The trial court subsequently conducted a suppression hearing on June 4,
2012. Due to a recording malfunction, we have no transcript from a portion of the
suppression hearing that is relevant to this appeal. Under App.R. 9(E), the parties
have filed a stipulation of facts to correct this deficiency and to supplement the
record before this court.
{¶4} The search warrant for the seizure of Dulaney’s blood samples was
signed on November 30, 2011 by a judge of the Paulding County county court.1
The warrant authorized the seizure of the samples from Defiance Regional
Medical Center in Defiance County, Ohio. Before obtaining the warrant, Ohio
State Highway Patrol Trooper Alec Coil originally asked a judge of the Defiance
Municipal Court to sign it on either November 28 or 29. However, the municipal
court judge refused to sign the warrant because the accident occurred in Paulding
County, Ohio, which is not within the territorial jurisdiction of Defiance
Municipal Court. Trooper Coil executed the search warrant on November 30,
2011 in Defiance County and Dulaney’s blood samples were tested for the
presence of alcohol and other drugs.
{¶5} On June 8, 2012, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying
Dulaney’s motion to suppress. Although the trial court found that the State failed
1
Pursuant to R.C. 1907.11(A), the proper term for the court at issue in this matter is the “Paulding County
county court.” Despite the seeming redundancy of this terminology, we have elected to use this statutory
term out of deference to the General Assembly, which is responsible for the court’s creation.
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Case No. 11-12-04
to comply with Crim.R. 41 when obtaining the search warrant, it nevertheless
found that the State’s failure did not violate Dulaney’s Fourth Amendment rights.
{¶6} After the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress, the State
dismissed the charge of aggravated vehicular assault and Dulaney entered a plea of
no contest to the remaining charge of aggravated vehicular homicide. On October
25, 2012, the trial court sentenced Dulaney to 18 months in prison.
{¶7} Dulaney filed this timely appeal, presenting the following assignment
of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SEIZED IN DEFIANCE COUNTY,
OHIO ON A WARRANT WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED BY A
JUDGE IN PAULDING COUNTY, OHIO (OHIO RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 41).
{¶8} In her sole assignment of error, Dulaney argues that the trial court
should have suppressed the blood alcohol test results obtained from the
purportedly illegal seizure of her blood samples. We find that the trial court
erroneously denied Dulaney’s motion to suppress on the basis that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation. As a result, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on the
motion to suppress insofar as it found that the State did not violate Dulaney’s
Fourth Amendment rights when it seized her blood samples pursuant to an invalid
warrant. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that suppression was the necessary
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Case No. 11-12-04
remedy for the unconstitutional seizure. Rather, we remand this matter to the trial
court for further proceedings so that it can determine whether suppression of the
blood samples is appropriate.
Standard of Review for Motions to Suppress
{¶9} “Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a
mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-
Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge
of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence
presented. State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850 (12th Dist. 2000).
Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, it must accept the trial court’s findings of facts so long as they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71,
2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100. The appellate court must then review the application of
the law to the facts de novo. Burnside at ¶ 8.
Crim.R. 41(A) and R.C. 2933.21
{¶10} Crim.R. 41(A) provides that “[a] search warrant authorized by this
rule may be issued by a judge of a court of record to search and seize property
located within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, upon the request of a prosecuting
attorney or a law enforcement officer.” R.C. 2933.21 similarly provides that “[a]
judge of a court of record may, within his jurisdiction, issue warrants to search a
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house or place.” R.C. 2933.21. “Fundamental” violations of Crim.R. 41 and R.C.
2933.21 are those that implicate constitutional concerns, State v. Jacob, 185 Ohio
App.3d 408, 2009-Ohio-7048, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), and they occur where the warrant
was either not based on probable cause or not issued by a neutral and detached
judge, State v. Ridenour, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 09CA13, 2010-Ohio-3373, ¶ 21.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue around which this matter
revolves: whether the Paulding County county court judge who issued the search
warrant was a judge for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Issuing Judge’s Authority to Issue Search Warrants
{¶11} One of the “defining features” of a constitutionally executed search
warrant is that it was “issued by a judicial officer.” United States v. Kone, 591
F.Supp.2d 593, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The United States Supreme Court
“frequently * * * employ[s] the term ‘magistrate’ to denote those public officials
who may issue warrants.”2 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348, 92
S.Ct. 2119 (1972). The Court has defined “magistrate” as “a public civil officer,
possessing such power – legislative, executive, or judicial – as the government
appointing him may ordain.” Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 7, 29 S.Ct. 605(1909). As such, a judge/magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes is an
2
This court does not engage in this practice of using “magistrate” to refer to the issuing authorities for
search warrants because Ohio law does not allow “magistrates” to issue search warrants. E.g., State v.
Commis, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2009-06-004, CA2009-06-005, 2009-Ohio-6415, ¶ 22 (finding that
search warrant signed by a magistrate was invalid because “to be valid, a search warrant must be signed by
a judge, and can only be signed by a judge, prior to the search”).
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individual who is a “public officer authorized by law to issue search warrants.”
State v. Hardy, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16964 (Aug. 2, 1998) (Fain, J.,
concurring); accord United States v. Griffin, E.D.Wis. No. 11-CA-30, 2011 WL
3348027, *6 (Aug. 2, 2011) (stating that a requirement for qualification as a judge
under the Fourth Amendment is “that the issuing official has some cognizable
authority under state law to issue warrants”); see also United States v. Bansal, 663
F.3d 634, 662 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding no constitutional violation where magistrate
in Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued warrant for search and seizure of
property located in California because federal statute authorized the magistrate to
issue warrants for disclosure of electronic communications located outside of the
court’s jurisdiction so long as the offense under investigation was within the
court’s jurisdiction); Ciano v. State, 105 Ohio St. 229, 233 (1922) (“Although [a
previous form of R.C. 2933.21] confers authority upon common pleas judges,
along with other officials therein named, to issue search warrants upon the filing
of an affidavit * * * common pleas judges were not so authorized at the time such
action was taken in this case, and in the absence of such statutory authority the
search warrant issued by the common pleas judge was unwarranted and invalid”).
Based on these principles, federal courts have previously found that both
municipal court clerks, Shadwick at 347-48, and circuit court commissioners,
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Griffin, supra, that are vested with authority under state law to issue search
warrants are judges for Fourth Amendment purposes.
{¶12} This matter is unlike Shadwick and Griffin since the Paulding County
county court judge who signed the warrant for Dulaney’s blood samples was not
authorized under Ohio law to issue warrants for searches and seizure of property
in Defiance County.3 R.C. 2933.21; Crim.R. 41(A). Rather, this matter is
analogous to the facts addressed in United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236 (6th Cir.
2010). There, the defendant’s residence was in Coffee County, Tennessee. Police
officers searched the defendant’s residence after a Franklin County, Tennessee
general sessions judge issued a warrant. Tennessee law, however, only granted
the issuing judge the authority to sign warrants for the searches of property located
in Franklin County. Id. at 238. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
since Tennessee law did not provide the issuing judge with the requisite authority
to issue the warrant at issue, the warrant was void ab initio. Consequently, the
resulting search pursuant to the invalid warrant was unconstitutional. The court
succinctly explained its reasoning as “[the issuing judge]’s authority to issue
warrants stems exclusively from Tennessee law, but that same source of law
provides that [the issuing judge] had no authority to issue a warrant for a search of
3
The State does not argue on appeal that the Paulding County county court judge had authority under Ohio
law to issue the search warrant for the blood samples. Even if the State did raise such an argument, we are
unable to find a statute or Criminal Rule that authorizes judges of a county court to issue warrants for
seizures of evidence located in a foreign county.
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Defendant’s home. The search therefore violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights.” Id. at 241; accord United States v. Youngbear, N.D.Iowa No. 11-CR-151-
LRR, 2012 WL 176247, *4 (Jan. 20, 2012) (“[I]f [the issuing judge] lacked the
authority to issue a search warrant for evidence of a federal offense and the search
warrant sought evidence solely for a federal offense, then Defendant suffered a
Fourth Amendment violation.”).
{¶13} The facts of this matter are indistinguishable from Master, which
compels us to adopt its reasoning. The Paulding County county court is a creation
of statute, Pannozzo Family Ltd. Partnership v. Italian Oven of Boardman, 7th
Dist. Mahoning No. 92 C.A. 75 (Sept. 2, 1993), and its subject matter jurisdiction
is limited as set forth in R.C. Chapter 1907, Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor
Vehicles, 67 Ohio Misc.2d 29, 34 (M.C. 1994).4 R.C. 1907.01 describes the
jurisdiction of a county court as follows:
There is hereby created in each county of the state, in which the
territorial jurisdiction of a municipal court or municipal courts is not
coextensive with the boundaries of the county, a court to be known
as the county court. The county court shall have jurisdiction
throughout a county court district that shall consist of all territory
within the county not subject to the territorial jurisdiction of any
municipal court. County courts are courts of record for all purposes
of law.
Moreover, R.C. 1907.18(A) explicitly limits county court judges’ authority and
jurisdiction to “within and coextensive with their respective counties.” Based on
4
The same statutory creation and limitation applies to municipal courts. E.g., State v. Lovelace, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-110715, 2012-Ohio-3797, ¶ 23.
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this statutory language, the Paulding County county court judge did not have
authority to sign a search warrant that authorized the seizure of Dulaney’s blood
samples in Defiance County. As such, under Master, the warrant was not
executed by a judge, as that term is used for Fourth Amendment purposes, and it
was void ab initio. This rendered the search and seizure pursuant to the invalid
warrant a violation of Dulaney’s Fourth Amendment rights.
{¶14} In finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, the trial
court relied on Ridenour. There, a Meigs County Court of Common Pleas judge
issued a search warrant for property located in Gallia County. The Fourth District
found that these facts did not produce a constitutional violation. Ridenour, 2010-
Ohio-3373, at ¶ 2. We find that Ridenour is distinguishable from this matter
because it involved the issuance of a search warrant by a Court of Commons Pleas
judge,5 which does not raise an inference of jurisdictional and constitutional
infirmity. Since the Ohio Constitution created the Court of Common Pleas, its
judges are vested with statewide jurisdiction. See Ohio Constitution, Article IV,
Section 4(A) (“There shall be a court of common pleas and such divisions thereof
as may be established by law serving each county of the state. Any judge of a
court of common pleas may temporarily hold court in any county.”); Cheap
Escape Co. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶ 7
5
The issuing judge in Ridenour was a judge of the Probate/Juvenile Division of the Meigs County Court of
Common Pleas.
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(“[C]ourts of common pleas * * * are created by the Ohio Constitution and have
statewide subject-matter jurisdiction * * *.”); Wiegand v. Deutsche Bank Natl.
Trust, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97424, 2012-Ohio-933, ¶ 4 (“The Ohio Constitution
created the several courts of common pleas and granted them statewide
jurisdiction.”); Arlington Bank v. BEE, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-41,
2010-Ohio-6040, ¶ 12 (“The Ohio Constitution created the courts of common
pleas and granted them statewide subject matter jurisdiction.”). R.C. 2933.21
authorizes judges to issue warrants for their “jurisdiction,” which, pursuant to the
Ohio Constitution, exists for judges of Courts of Common Pleas throughout the
state. Accordingly, unlike the judges in Master and this matter, the Meigs County
Court of Common Pleas judge in Ridenour was properly authorized to issue the
search warrant for the search and seizure in Gallia County. Due to this critical
difference, we find that Ridenour offers limited guidance to the disposition of this
matter.
{¶15} The State also points us to Hardy, supra in support of its argument
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for affirmance.6 There, a Dayton Municipal Court judge issued a search warrant
for the search and seizure of property located in Miamisburg. The Second District
found that the Dayton Municipal Court’s issuance of an invalid warrant for a
search outside of its jurisdiction did not result in a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Tenth District’s opinion in State v. Bowman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-
149, 2006-Ohio-6146, reached the same conclusion where the Franklin County
Municipal Court issued an invalid warrant for the search and seizure of property
located in Pickaway County. Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶16} We decline to follow Hardy’s and Bowman’s guidance here since we
find that the rule of law announced in those cases is contrary to well-settled federal
6
Although the State argues that we should adopt the majority opinion from Hardy, we approvingly note
Judge Faine’s concurring opinion in that matter, which pertinently and persuasively states as follows:
Plainly, the Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant issue from a
“neutral and detached magistrate.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367(1948). In my view, this must refer to a public officer authorized by law to issue search
warrants. No matter how neutral and detached, or generally capable, a self-appointed
“magistrate” may be, or a “magistrate” designated by General Motors, for example,
anyone other than a public officer authorized by law to issue search warrants cannot, in
my view, be considered a magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes.
A judge of a court of record in Ohio is authorized by R.C. 2933.21(A) to issue a
search warrant “within his jurisdiction.” In my view, then a judge of a court of record in
Ohio is not authorized by law to issue a search warrant outside of the judge’s jurisdiction
and can no more be considered a magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes than anyone
else lacking that authority – be that judge the finest jurist who can be found in a sister
state or a foreign country.
I would overrule the assignment of error in this case, and affirm, because the
police officer conducting the search and seizure was in good faith in believing that he had
a valid warrant, even though he in fact did not. Once we allow for reasonable police
officers within this jurisdiction to become acquainted with the territorial limits upon a
magistrate’s authority to issue search warrants, however, claims of good-faith exceptions
to the warrant requirement are likely to be unavailing.
(Emphasis added.) Hardy, supra (Fain, J., concurring).
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interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.7 It is axiomatic that “[a] search warrant
signed by a person who lacks the authority to issue it is void as a matter of law.”
United States v. Peltier, 344 F.Supp.2d 539, 548 (E.D.Mich. 2004); accord United
States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We therefore hold that when a
warrant is signed by someone who lacked the legal authority necessary to issue
search warrants, the warrant is void ab initio.”), overruled on other grounds by
Master, 614 F.3d at 242; United States v. Neering, 194 F.Supp.2d 620, 628
(E.D.Mich. 2002) (“The Court concludes, therefore, that [the magistrate]’s lack of
authority to issue the search warrant in this case rendered it void.”). Hardy and
Bowman depart from this well-established axiom handed down by the federal
courts, which are the final authority on the interpretation of the United States
Constitution, and we find that it is more appropriate in this case to follow the
federal courts’ lead. See State v. Grays, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82410, 2003-
Ohio-6889, ¶ 22 (“Although we are aware that the state can impose stricter
constitutional protections than the federal government, federal law is considered
‘very persuasive’ when dealing with search and seizure issues because Section 14
Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment have virtually
identical language.”), citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 239 (1997)
(stating that the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14
7
We also note that the courts in both Hardy and Bowman found that regardless of the warrants’ validity,
the police officers’ execution of the warrants was in good faith and consequently did not create any
constitutional infirmity. Bowman at ¶ 15-16; Hardy, surpa.
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of the Ohio Constitution should be “harmonize[d]”); State v. Barlow, 6th Dist.
Wood No. WD-83-80 (Apr. 20, 1984) (Handwork, J., dissenting) (“Of course,
state courts are free to interpret the provisions of the federal constitution, but, in
our federal system, they are not the final arbiters of what such provisions mean –
only the federal courts are.”); City of Cleveland v. Watts, 164 Ohio Misc.2d 25,
2011-Ohio-3606, ¶ 6 (M.C.) (“[D]ecisions from the Federal Court of Appeals are
entitled to due consideration and respect.”).
{¶17} Moreover, we view Hardy and Bowman as improper extensions of
the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251(1986).8 In Wilmoth, the court created a test to distinguish between “fundamental”
and “non-fundamental” violations of Crim.R. 41. Id. at 262-63. There, the court
addressed a situation where the State violated the affidavit requirements contained
in Crim.R. 41(C). Specifically, the investigating officers made unsworn oral
statements to the issuing judge and submitted their police reports to support the
issuance of the warrant. However, they did not submit written affidavits that
contained the same information, as required by the rule. Id. at 252-53. The court
concluded that the violation was merely “technical” in nature and did not implicate
questions of constitutionality. Id. at 264.
8
Both the Second and Tenth District relied on the rule announced in Wilmoth in reaching its conclusion.
See Bowman, 2006-Ohio-6146, at ¶ 14; Hardy, supra.
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{¶18} The jurisdictional violations present here, as well as in Hardy and
Bowman, are of much greater importance than the merely technical affidavit
defects in Wilmoth. Compare United States v. Beals, 698 F.3d 248, 265 (6th Cir.
2012) (finding no constitutional violation where the issuing judge failed to prepare
two exact copies of the warrant because the issuing judge “had authority under
state law to issue search warrants, and his failure to sign two copies of the search
warrant did not in any way deprive him of that authority”) with Master, 614 F.3d
at 515 (finding constitutional violation where issuing judge had no authority to
issue search warrants for search and seizure of property located in another county).
The Fourth Amendment simply requires that a warrant be supported by probable
cause and be issued by a neutral and detached judge who had authority to issue it.
As such, in Wilmoth, neither prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis was lacking
– the warrant was both supported by probable cause and issued by a judge with the
proper authority. The merely technical defects of the affidavit had zero effect on
either prong.
{¶19} The same cannot be said for the facts present in this matter or for the
facts that were addressed in Hardy and Bowman. The Paulding County county
court judge, like the Dayton Municipal Court and Franklin County Municipal
Court judges, manifestly lacked the statutory authority to issue the search warrant
for property located in a foreign county, outside of her jurisdiction. Consequently,
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the second prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis requiring issuance by a
“judge” is absent here and there is a clear constitutional violation.
{¶20} In sum, the Paulding County county court judge lacked statutory
authority to issue a search warrant for Dulaney’s blood samples located in
Defiance County. Under well-settled federal law, this lack of authority indicates
that the issuing judge was not a judge for Fourth Amendment purposes and
renders the warrant void ab initio. Accordingly, the investigating officers
executed their search pursuant to an invalid warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The trial court’s finding to the contrary was in error and requires
that we reverse its judgment.
Suppression of the Evidence
{¶21} Although we find that the search and seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment, it is well-settled that not all Fourth Amendment violations give rise
to suppression of the evidence illegally obtained. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence * * * has
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,
13, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995) (“In Whiteley [v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401
U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971)], the Court treated identification of a Fourth
Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to
evidence secured incident to that violation. Subsequent case law has rejected this
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reflexive application of the exclusionary rule.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984) (“Whether the exclusionary sanction is
appropriately imposed in a particular case * * * is an issue separate from the
question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the
rule was violated by police conduct.”). Accordingly, our finding that the seizure
of Dulaney’s blood samples violated the Fourth Amendment does not end our
inquiry. Rather, our finding mandates that we must determine whether we should
wield the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal
seizure.
{¶22} When determining whether suppression is appropriate, courts must
consider the policy consequences and goals of the exclusionary rule. On the one
hand, the exclusionary rule’s application may cause “the loss of probative
evidence and the secondary costs that arise from the ‘less accurate and more
cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.’” State ex rel. Wright v. Adult
Parole Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 82, 89 (1996), quoting Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (1984).
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he exclusionary
rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future
violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule’s general deterrent
effect.” Evans at 10. As a result of these conflicting policy considerations, courts
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are required to engage in a balancing test that weighs the benefits of applying the
rule versus its costs.9 Master, 614 F.3d at 243, citing Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 141, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009). If the benefits outweigh the costs, then
suppression is appropriate. Id.{¶23} Here, the trial court found that the State did not violate the Fourth
Amendment when it seized Dulaney’s blood samples pursuant to an invalid search
warrant. We have concluded otherwise and reversed the trial court’s decision in
that regard. Based on its erroneous decision regarding the Fourth Amendment
violation, the trial court never reached the issue of whether suppression was
appropriate. Since it never reached this issue, the appropriate disposition is to
remand this matter to the trial court so that it may consider whether suppression is
appropriate based on the principles we enunciated above. See id. (remanding
matter so that trial court could conduct the above balancing test); State v. Oliver,
112 Ohio St.3d 447, 2007-Ohio-372, ¶ 13 (same).
{¶24} In sum, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Dulaney’s motion to
suppress, which was based on that court’s finding that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation. We find that the seizure of Dulaney’s blood samples
violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, we remand this matter to the
9
Trial courts should also consider the general background of the Fourth Amendment and the precious
rights that it protects. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464, 83 S.Ct. 1381 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not technical or unreasonably strident; they
are bedrock rules without which there would be no effective protection of the right to personal liberty.”).
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trial court so that it can determine whether suppression is the appropriate remedy
for the Fourth Amendment violation based on the principles enunciated in Master
and any other relevant issues. These other relevant issues may include any
potential misconduct by Trooper Coil in procuring the search warrant, see
Bowman, 2006-Ohio-6146, at ¶ 13 (stating that evidence of police misconduct
could support suppression of evidence), and the potential applicability of
exclusionary rule exceptions, such as the good faith exception, see State v.
George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325(1989) (describing the applicable standard for the good
faith exception).
{¶25} Accordingly, we sustain Dulaney’s sole assignment of error.
{¶26} Having found error prejudicial to Dulaney, in the particulars assigned
and argued, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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