State v. Schriml ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Schriml, 2013-Ohio-2845.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 9-12-32
v.
MICHAEL D. SCHRIML, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TRC 11 7448A
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: July 1, 2013
APPEARANCES:
Jeff Ratliff for Appellant
Steven E. Chaffin for Appellee
Case No. 9-12-32
PRESTON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Michael D. Schriml (“Schriml”), appeals from
the judgment of the Marion Municipal Court finding him guilty of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”) after his motion to
suppress was denied and he entered a plea of no contest. We affirm.
{¶2} On September 16, 2011, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Schriml was
stopped for a marked lanes violation when he made a right turn onto a one-way
street. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 17-18). Following field sobriety tests, Schriml was
placed under arrest and charged with an OVI in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor, operating a vehicle with a
prohibited breath-alcohol concentration of .095 grams by weight of alcohol per
210 liters of breath in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), a first-degree
misdemeanor, and failure to drive within the marked lanes, a second moving
violation, in violation of R.C. 4511.33 and a fourth-degree misdemeanor. (Doc.
No. 1). The two alcohol-related offenses were assigned trial court case no. TRC
11 7448A, and the marked lanes violation was assigned trial court case no. TRC
11 7448B. (Id.).
{¶3} Schriml entered a written plea of not guilty and filed a motion to
suppress. (Doc. Nos. 3, 12). In his suppression motion, Schriml claimed
numerous errors and improprieties requiring the suppression of all evidence
-2-
Case No. 9-12-32
obtained, including that the officer did not have a lawful reason to stop him; that
there was no basis to detain and request field sobriety testing; that the field
sobriety tests were not done in compliance with applicable rules and regulations;
and, that the breath test was unconstitutionally coerced. (Doc. No. 12).
{¶4} Schriml also challenged whether the breath test was administered in
substantial compliance with the Ohio Director of Health’s rules and regulations
and whether the equipment was in proper working order. More specifically,
Schriml alleged that the State could not show: that the officer substantially
complied with the operator’s checklist instructions; that the test was conducted
free of RFI; that the machine was in proper working order; that an instrument
check had been done in accordance with the rules and regulations; that the solution
used to perform the instrument check was valid and properly maintained; that the
record of the instrument checks and records of maintenance and repairs were not
retained as required by law; that the operator was licensed to operate the machine;
and, that the persons performing the instrument check were currently licensed.
(Id.).
{¶5} A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on March 1, 2012, at
which time the trial court heard the testimony of State Trooper Tawana Young and
-3-
Case No. 9-12-32
Schriml. The trial court also viewed the video of the traffic stop and field sobriety
tests, and several exhibits were admitted into evidence.1
{¶6} Trooper Young testified that she observed Schriml make a right turn
from Main Street into the far left lane of Church Street (which was a one-way
street), rather than turning into the right lane closest to the curb and then use his
turn signal to move to the left. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 17). Trooper Young also
testified that “[Schriml] went over the white dotted line by a full tire width,”
which was a violation of the marked lanes statute, R.C. 4511.33. (Id. at 17-18).
Trooper Young waited for the traffic light to turn green, eventually caught up with
Schriml, and followed him for a while after activating her camera, but she did not
see any other traffic violations. (Id. at 18). Trooper Young testified that she
activated her lights and made a traffic stop for the marked lanes violation. (Id.).
She testified that she asked Schriml for his driver’s license, registration, and proof
of insurance. (Id. at 19). Trooper Young testified that, after Schriml handed her
these items, she “asked [Schriml] if he would come back so [she] could check his
driving record.” (Id. at 20).2 She testified that Schriml did not state that he did not
want to comply, and that she would have said it was fine if Schriml did not want to
accompany her to her vehicle. (Id.). Trooper Young testified that she stated to
1
Testimony and exhibits concerning the BAC DataMaster testing and Schriml’s medical records were also
proffered, after the trial court sustained the State’s objections as to their admission. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 83-
88).
2
Although Trooper Young testified that Schriml handed her his registration and proof of insurance,
Schriml indicated during the traffic stop that he did not have those items in his possession. (D’s Ex. A).
-4-
Case No. 9-12-32
Schriml “hey, would you come back so I can check your driving record,” and there
was no hesitation on his part to do so. (Id. at 20-21). Trooper Young testified that
she really should have said “do you mind” exiting the vehicle or coming back to
the vehicle, and, if the driver refuses, she cannot force them to accompany her.
(Id. at 21). Trooper Young testified that, prior to Schriml entering her cruiser, she
patted him down for officer safety. (Id.). Trooper Young testified that Schriml
never objected to the pat down. (Id. at 22).
{¶7} Trooper Young testified that law enforcement officers invite drivers to
their vehicle to check their driving record and to observe any odors of alcoholic
beverage upon the driver’s breath. (Id. at 22). Trooper Young then testified that,
after Schriml was in her vehicle, she detected a “strong odor of alcoholic
beverage” about his breath and observed that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot.
(Id. at 23). She then asked Schriml whether he had consumed any alcoholic
beverages, and he responded that he had a couple drinks during the evening. (Id.).
Trooper Young then proceeded to conduct a horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”)
test and observed five out of six clues for impairment. (Id. at 24, 31). Trooper
Young testified that she then asked Schriml to perform the walk and turn test,
which revealed three of eight possible clues for impairment. (Id. at 34, 40).
Trooper Young testified that Schriml also performed the one-leg stand, which
revealed two out of four possible clues for impairment. (Id. at 41, 44). Trooper
-5-
Case No. 9-12-32
Young testified that Schriml was subsequently tested with results of .095 grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath, which is over the legal limit. (Id. at 47).
{¶8} On cross-examination, Trooper Young testified that, beyond the initial
traffic violations, she did not observe any clues while Schriml was driving that
would have indicated possible impairment. (Id. at 50-51). She testified that
Schriml pulled straight into a parking lot when she pulled him over, not into a
particular parking spot, and she pulled her cruiser approximately six feet directly
behind his vehicle. (Id. at 56-57). Trooper Young testified that she did not detect
an odor of alcoholic beverage when she first contacted Schriml or when he exited
the vehicle. (Id. at 59). She testified that she asked Schriml to exit the vehicle so
she could check his driving record, and he exited the vehicle with no problems.
(Id.). Trooper Young did not inform Schriml that he was not required to exit his
vehicle or to come back to her cruiser. (Id. at 60). She testified that she was
checking Schriml’s driving record to determine if he had any previous moving
violations. (Id. at 61). Trooper Young testified that Schriml’s speech was fine.
(Id.). She further testified that some drivers do not agree to exit the vehicle, but
more drivers comply than do not. (Id. at 62-63). Trooper Young testified that she
ran Schriml’s driving record prior to beginning the HGN test. (Id. at 63). Trooper
Schriml testified that she did not read Schriml his Miranda rights prior to asking
him to sit in the front seat of her cruiser. (Id. at 64). She testified that the stop
-6-
Case No. 9-12-32
was a routine traffic stop for a marked lanes violation, and Schriml was not
twitching, agitated, or nervous. (Id.). Trooper Young testified that it was possible
that Schriml had a strong odor of alcoholic beverage because he had just
consumed his last drink. (Id. at 66). Trooper Young testified that, prior to
performing the field sobriety tests, Schriml informed her that he was overweight
and had poor balance. (Id. at 68). She testified that Schriml twice indicated that
he had two vodka and cranberry drinks that evening. (Id. at 68-69). Trooper
Young testified that Schriml could not perform the one leg stand and put his one
foot down more than three times. (Id. at 71). She testified that she asked Schriml
again about what he was drinking so he would indicate the size of the drinks, and
Trooper Young testified that Schriml indicated that his last drink was about 20
minutes prior to his arrest. (Id. at 75-76).
{¶9} Schriml testified that he was at the Someplace Else bar immediately
prior to the traffic stop, and he had one vodka cranberry drink. (Id. at 96-97). He
testified that he exited the parking lot of the bar, turned right onto Main Street, and
stopped at a traffic light. (Id. at 97). Schriml testified that he then turned right
heading east on Church Street, turning into the first available lane to the right.
(Id.). Schriml testified that Church Street is a three-lane, one-way street, and he
turned into the first lane, not the third lane. (Id. at 97-98). He testified that he did
not notice Trooper Young behind him until he heard the sound of an engine
-7-
Case No. 9-12-32
accelerating, and he was already on Sergeant Street just coming out of the curve
on the road. (Id. at 98-99). Schriml testified that he proceeded to park in a well-lit
parking lot for safety reasons. (Id. at 99). He testified that, when Trooper Young
asked him how many drinks he consumed, he stated two drinks. (Id.). He also
testified that he weighs close to 300 pounds, is 6’ 1” to 6’ 2” tall, and is more than
50 pounds overweight. (Id. at 100). Schriml also testified that he has curvature of
the spine, which causes his hips to be out of alignment, one leg is about an inch
and a half longer than the other, and he has torticollis of the neck, all of which
cause balance issues. (Id. at 100-101). He testified that he thought Trooper
Young ordered him to exit his vehicle, and he did not have an option. (Id. at 101).
He testified that Trooper Young was “in charge and [he] had to do what she said,”
and he felt like he was being detained when she patted him down for weapons.
(Id.). Schriml testified that he felt obligated to answer Trooper Young’s questions,
and she did not Mirandize him. (Id. at 101-102). He testified that he was
uncomfortable sitting on the ledge of her cruiser when she performed the HGN
test, and that Trooper Young performed the test faster than reflected by her
testimony. (Id. at 102). Schriml testified that he did not feel impaired while
driving. (Id.). Defense counsel also proffered several exhibits, which were
medical records concerning Schriml’s back conditions. (Id. at 102-108).
-8-
Case No. 9-12-32
{¶10} On cross-examination, Schriml testified that he started drinking after
11:00 p.m., and he had two drinks. (Id. at 109). He testified that he did not object
to exiting his vehicle, but he did not want to give Trooper Young the impression
that he was resisting arrest, either. (Id. at 109-110). He testified that he was
familiar with the HGN test and had one before. (Id. at 110). Schriml testified that
he could not perform either the one leg stand or the walk and turn tests, because he
is overweight and his thighs rub together. (Id. at 112). He also testified that his
Lasik eye surgery and frequent sinus surgeries may have affected the results of his
HGN test, though he could say for sure. (Id. at 113).
{¶11} The trial court would not permit defense counsel to present any
evidence or raise any questions regarding issues with the breath test and the BAC
DataMaster. The trial court found that the defense had failed to provide sufficient
fact-specific allegations in the motion to suppress that would put the State on
notice of defense counsel’s challenges to the breath test. (Id. at 7-14, 76-89).
{¶12} After hearing the testimony that was permitted, the trial court denied
the motion to suppress and made the following findings:
[T]he Court finds the charging officer to have probable cause and
reasonable suspicion to stop [Schriml] and request [Schriml] to sit
with her while checking his driving record, reasonable, articulable
suspicion to prolong the stop, reasonable grounds to request
[Schriml] to submit to the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, and
probable cause to arrest [Schriml]. Further, the Court finds, as stated
on the record, the following: the standardized field sobriety tests
and the BAC were administered in substantial compliance of
-9-
Case No. 9-12-32
NHTSA regulations; the BAC test was not unconstitutionally
coerced; the individual administering the alcohol test held the
necessary credentials; the operator of the breath test assured that the
test was free of any radio transmissions; the BAC was in proper
working order, properly maintained and not in need of repairs at the
time of the test; the solution is valid; and the breath testing
procedure is not unconstitutional. (Doc. No. 20).
{¶13} The matter was scheduled for a jury trial, but Schriml subsequently
entered a plea of no contest. On May 7, 2012, he was found guilty of OVI in
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first offense in six years.3 The trial court
sentenced Schriml to 90 days in jail, with 87 days suspended; ordered that he pay a
fine of $1,000, with $450 suspended; and, suspended his operator’s license for six
months. (Doc. No. 50).
{¶14} On May 29, 2012, Schriml filed his notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 52).
Schriml raises four assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
The stop of [Schriml’s] vehicle was not supported by probable
cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion that [Schriml]
had committed a traffic violation and the officer’s continued
detention of [Schriml] for the purpose of administering field
sobriety tests was not supported by a reasonable and articulable
suspicion separate from the initial stop of [Schriml’s] vehicle.
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Schriml asserts that there was no
basis for the initial traffic stop, and therefore, it was unlawful. He further
3
The marked lanes violation, assigned case no. TRC 11 7448B, was dismissed as part of the plea
negotiation.
-10-
Case No. 9-12-32
maintains that there was no basis to continue to detain him, to remove him from
his vehicle, and to conduct field sobriety tests.
{¶16} Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress evidence
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the
credibility of witnesses. Burnside at ¶ 8; State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552
(1995). When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, an
appellate court must uphold the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported
by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8. With respect to the trial court’s
conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo and we must
independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s
conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard.
State v. Wolfe, 3d Dist. No. 11-11-01, 2011-Ohio-5081, ¶ 10; State v. McNamara,
124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶17} First, Schriml claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because Trooper Young lacked probable cause or a reasonable,
articulable suspicion justifying the stop of his vehicle. At the suppression hearing,
Trooper Young testified that she effectuated the traffic stop because she witnessed
Schriml drive outside of the marked lanes in violation of R.C. 4511.33. (Mar. 1,
-11-
Case No. 9-12-32
2012 Tr. at 18). “Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause
that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer
had some ulterior motive for making the stop * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio
St.3d 3 (1996), syllabus, following U.S. v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir.1993).
Schriml contends that the Trooper’s testimony is not credible because she was a
block away from his vehicle when the violation occurred and could not have seen
the violation from her vantage point. Credibility is best left to the trier of fact,
however, and we will not second-guess the trial court’s determination. Carter, 72
Ohio St.3d at 552. Since the trial court had competent, credible evidence that
Schriml violated the law, the traffic stop was constitutionally permissible.
Erickson at syllabus. Schriml also contends that the trooper stopped him to
conduct a fishing expedition for suspected operation of a motor vehicle while
under the influence. However, the law enforcement officer’s ulterior motive, if
any, is irrelevant once he has probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred,
which is the case here. Id.
{¶18} Next, Schriml argues that the Trooper did not have any evidence that
he was impaired from which she could direct him from his vehicle. He argues
that, in order to remove an individual from a vehicle for purposes of conducting
field sobriety tests, the officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to
-12-
Case No. 9-12-32
believe the person was operating the motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs. Schriml further argues that Trooper Young lacked any
justification to detain him beyond the original scope and purpose of the initial
traffic stop for field sobriety tests.
{¶19} The State contends that it was reasonable for Trooper Young to
continue the detention because she observed an odor of alcoholic beverage from
the vehicle, and Schriml admitted he had consumed alcohol immediately upon
stopping him. In particular, the State represented that the following occurred:
Upon initial contact with the Defendant, Trooper Young noticed an
odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. Further,
Trooper Young approached the passenger and explained the reason
for the stop. Trooper Young asked the driver whether he had
consumed alcohol that evening and he admitted that he had. Trooper
Young asked the Defendant to step out of the car and he complied.
(Appellee’s Brief at Statement of Facts).
{¶20} The State’s brief has misrepresented the facts in this case. According
to Trooper Young, she did not smell any odor of alcoholic beverage when she
approached the vehicle, when she asked Schriml if he would exit the vehicle, or
when she patted him down for weapons. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 19-20, 59). Trooper
Young did not smell the odor of alcoholic beverage upon Schriml until he was
seated in her cruiser. (Id. at 22-23, 62). Furthermore, Schriml never admitted he
consumed alcohol that evening until after Trooper Young smelled the odor of
alcoholic beverage upon his breath while he was seated in the cruiser. (Id. at 23,
-13-
Case No. 9-12-32
64). Despite the State’s incorrect representations of fact, Trooper Young was
permitted to request that Schriml exit his vehicle and further justified in detaining
Schriml for field sobriety tests.
{¶21} Trooper Young did not “remove” Schriml from his vehicle for the
purpose of conducting field sobriety tests. When Trooper Young asked Schriml
for his registration and proof of insurance, Schriml indicated that he did not have
them in the vehicle. (D’s Ex. A). Trooper Young then stated, “Why don’t you
come on out so I can check your driving record.” (Id.). Schriml responded,
“Sure” and stepped out of the vehicle, at which point Trooper Young stated,
“Alright, come on back, follow me.” (Id.). Trooper Young then checked Schriml
for weapons and asked him to “[h]ave a seat in the front,” pointing toward the
cruiser. (Id.). Based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that
Trooper Young “removed” Schriml from his vehicle for the purpose of conducting
field sobriety tests; rather, she asked Schriml to exit the vehicle as a result of his
traffic violation to check his driving record/status, which was permissible.
Pennsylvania v. Minns, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1977); State v. Evans, 67
Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993).
{¶22} Schriml next argues that his placement in the front seat was
unreasonable since there was no concern for officer safety, citing State v. Lozada,
92 Ohio St.3d 74 (2001). The issue presented in Lozada was “whether it was
-14-
Case No. 9-12-32
reasonable to search the defendant for weapons before placing him in [the]
Trooper[’s] patrol car.” Id. at 75. Lozada thus concerned whether or not an
officer may search a person for weapons and place them into a patrol car even
when the officer did not have any reason to believe that the driver was armed and
dangerous. Id. at 76. The Trooper in Lozada testified that it was his standard
practice during routine traffic stops to remove drivers from their vehicles, pat them
down for weapons, and place them into his cruiser. Id. at 75, 77. The Ohio
Supreme Court was concerned that such a practice would effectively eviscerate the
Terry standard. Id. at 75-76. Consequently, the Court held that that “during a
routine traffic stop, it is unreasonable for an officer to search the driver for
weapons before placing him or her in a patrol car, if the sole reason for placing the
driver in the patrol car during the investigation is for the convenience of the
officer.” Id. at 77. In reaching this conclusion, though, the Court acknowledged
that the mere placement of a driver into a cruiser may be constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 76, citing State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585 (9th
Dist.1995). The case at bar does not concern the constitutionality of the pat-down
search since no evidence was discovered as a result of that search, and Schriml’s
reliance upon Lozada is misplaced. State v. Serafin, 11th Dist. No. 2011-P-0036,
2012-Ohio-1456, ¶ 25.
-15-
Case No. 9-12-32
{¶23} Furthermore, in viewing the video of the traffic stop and evaluating
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Schriml voluntarily exited his
vehicle and sat in the cruiser. Aside from that, we believe that Trooper Young’s
decision to ask Schriml to sit in the front of her cruiser was reasonable in this case
since Schriml was unable to provide her with his registration and proof of
insurance. Under these circumstances, Trooper Young could have reasonably
believed that Schriml was engaged in criminal activity, which would have
separately justified placing him into her cruiser. State v. McCaulley, 161 Ohio
App.3d 568, 2005-Ohio-2864, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶24} Schriml next argues that his continued detention for field sobriety
tests violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.
{¶25} Once an officer stops a vehicle for a minor traffic offense and begins
the process of obtaining the offender’s license and registration, the officer may
then proceed to investigate the offender for OVI if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts separate from the facts that
served as the impetus for the traffic stop, that the detainee is under the influence.
State v. Evans, 127 Ohio App.3d 56, 62-63 (3d Dist.1998), citing State v. Yemma,
11th Dist. No. 95-P-0156 (Aug. 9, 1996).
{¶26} Whether a law enforcement officer possessed reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to continue to detain an individual must also be examined in light
-16-
Case No. 9-12-32
of the “totality of the circumstances.” State v. Cromes, 3d Dist. No. 17-06-07,
2006-Ohio-6924, ¶ 38, citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct.
744 (2002). Circumstances from which an officer may derive a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the detained driver was operating the vehicle while under
the influence include, but are not limited to:
(1) the time and day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as
opposed to, e.g., Tuesday morning); (2) the location of the stop (e.g.,
whether near establishments selling alcohol); (3) any indicia of
erratic driving before the stop that may indicate a lack of
coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual braking, etc.); (4) whether
there is a cognizable report that the driver may be intoxicated; (5)
the condition of the suspect’s eyes (bloodshot, glassy, glazed, etc.);
(6) impairments of the suspect’s ability to speak (slurred speech,
overly deliberate speech, etc.); (7) the odor of alcohol coming from
the interior of the car, or, more significantly, on the suspect’s person
or breath; (8) the intensity of that odor, as described by the officer
(“very strong,” “strong,” “moderate,” “slight,” etc.); (9) the suspect’s
demeanor (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.); (10) any actions by the
suspect after the stop that might indicate a lack of coordination
(dropping keys, falling over, fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and (11)
-17-
Case No. 9-12-32
the suspect’s admission of alcohol consumption, the number of
drinks had, and the amount of time in which they were consumed, if
given. Evans, 127 Ohio App.3d at 63, fn. 2.
“All of these factors, together with the officer’s previous experience in dealing
with [impaired] drivers, may be taken into account by a reviewing court in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably. No single factor is
determinative.” Id.
{¶27} Trooper Young testified that she has worked as an Ohio State
Highway Patrol Officer for over nine years and has participated in hundreds of
OVI cases. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 15-16). In this case, Trooper Young observed
Schriml travel over the marked traffic lanes around 2:00 a.m. Friday morning, not
very far from a local bar. (Id. at 17-18). After Schriml was in the front passenger
seat of the cruiser, Trooper Young observed a strong odor of alcoholic beverage,
and then Schriml subsequently admitted to having two drinks. (Id. at 23); (D’s Ex.
A). Trooper Young also observed that Schriml’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot.
(Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 23). After observing all these things, Trooper Young began
administering the HGN test. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Trooper Young had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue
the traffic stop for purposes of conducting field sobriety testing.
{¶28} Schriml’s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
-18-
Case No. 9-12-32
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court erred in refusing to permit [Schriml] to introduce
evidence regarding the administration of the chemical test and
finding the chemical test was done in substantial compliance
with the Ohio Department of Health rules and regulations.
{¶29} In his second assignment of error, Schriml argues that the trial court
erred by forbidding him from introducing evidence regarding the administration of
the chemical test finding that he failed to give the State sufficient notice of these
claims.
{¶30} When seeking to suppress breath test results, the defendant must first
set forth an adequate basis for the motion. State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58
(1994). The motion must state the “legal and factual bases with sufficient
particularity to place the prosecutor and court on notice [as to] the issues
[contested].” Id. at 58; Crim.R. 47. On the other hand, a mere technical
challenge to a breath test is sufficient even without case-specific allegations. State
v. Yeaples, 180 Ohio App.3d 720, 2009-Ohio-184, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.) (citations
omitted).
{¶31} Once the defendant has established an adequate basis for the motion,
the State must then demonstrate substantial compliance with the Ohio Department
of Health regulations. Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 220 (1988).
However, the extent of the state’s burden to show substantial compliance varies
with the degree of specificity of the violation alleged by the defendant. Yeaples at
-19-
Case No. 9-12-32
¶ 23. “When a defendant’s motion to suppress raises only general claims, along
with the Administrative Code sections, the burden imposed on the state is fairly
slight.” State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 851 (12th Dist.2000). In
particular, if the defendant’s motion fails to allege a fact-specific way in which a
violation has occurred, the State must offer only basic testimony evidencing
compliance with the code section. Yeaples at ¶ 23, citing State v. Bissaillon, 2d
Dist. No. 06-CA-130, 2007-Ohio-2349, ¶ 15.
{¶32} The motion to suppress in this case stated several alleged violations
of the Ohio Administrative Code with respect to the breath test; however, the
memorandum attached did not specifically allege any fact-specific way in which
the violation occurred. (Doc. No. 12). Under these circumstances, the trial court
did not err by excluding evidence relevant to particular violations of which the
State did not have sufficient notice. Furthermore, the State was required to have
only basic testimonial evidence of compliance, which was done through Trooper
Young’s testimony in this case. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 45-49); Yeaples at ¶ 23.
{¶33} Schriml’s second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
Assignment of Error No. III
The trial court erred in finding the field sobriety tests were done
in substantial compliance with NHTSA or its equivalent.
{¶34} In his third assignment of error, Schriml argues that the trial court
erred in finding that the field sobriety tests were done in substantial compliance
-20-
Case No. 9-12-32
with the NHTSA manual. In particular, Schriml argues that the State failed to
introduce the manual or, alternatively ADAP guidelines, at the hearing.
{¶35} In response to a motion to suppress regarding OVI field sobriety
tests, the State must show the requisite level of compliance with accepted testing
standards, typically the NHSTA. State v. Loveridge, 3d Dist. No. 9-06-46, 2007-
Ohio-4493, ¶ 11 (citations omitted). Consequently, part of the State’s burden
“‘includes demonstrating what the NHTSA requirements are, through competent
testimony and/or introducing the applicable portions of the NHTSA manual.’” Id.,quoting State v. Djisheff, 11th Dist. No.2004-T-0123, 2006-Ohio-6201, citing
State v. Brown, 166 Ohio App.3d 638, 2006-Ohio-1172. “HGN test results are
admissible absent expert testimony so long as the proper foundation has been
shown as to the administering officer’s training and ability to administer the test
and as to the actual technique used by the officer in administering the test.” State
v. Boczar, 113 Ohio St.3d 148, 2007-Ohio-1251, ¶ 27.
{¶36} Trooper Young testified that she has been employed with the Ohio
State Highway Patrol for over nine years, and she had been trained in the
techniques and procedures involving the apprehension and detection of persons
suspected of alcohol use, including ADAP training and yearly refresher courses.
(Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 14-15). Trooper Young testified that she was also trained in
field sobriety testing and testified concerning the requirements for HGN testing,
-21-
Case No. 9-12-32
according to her training. (Id. at 15, 27-28). Trooper Young also testified that if
she detected all six clues in the eyes during an HGN test, there was a 77% chance
that a person is over the legal limit of .08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath,
according to the NHTSA manual. (Id. at 33). She further testified that “[d]ue to
training, the NHTSA manual, with the walk and turn test, two clues shows that
there’s a 68 percent chance that the person could be over the legal limit, and
[Schriml] had a total of three.” (Id. at 41). (See also Id. at 44). Consequently, the
State produced sufficient evidence that the field sobriety tests were conducted in
compliance with the NHSTA manual or ADAP guidelines. State v. Powers, 6th
Dist. No. L-04-1210, 2005-Ohio-5737, ¶ 21.
{¶37} Schriml’s third assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
Assignment of Error No. IV
The trial court erred in finding the officer possessed probable
cause to arrest [Schriml].
{¶38} In his fourth assignment of error, Schriml argues that the trial court
erred in finding that Trooper Young had probable cause to arrest him for OVI. In
particular, Schriml contends that the field sobriety tests were not done in
substantial compliance with the NHTSA manual; and therefore, the only “valid”
evidence available to the Trooper was an odor of alcoholic beverage and his
admission to consuming two alcoholic drinks.
-22-
Case No. 9-12-32
{¶39} “In determining whether the police had probable cause to arrest an
individual for [OVI], we must consider whether, at the moment of arrest, the
police had information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and
circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was
driving under the influence.” State v. Thompson, 3d Dist. Nos. 14-04-34 and 14-
04-35, 2005-Ohio-2053, ¶ 18, citing State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421 (2000),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Bozcar, 2007-Ohio-1251. The
existence of probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances. Cromes,
2006-Ohio-6924, at ¶ 38, citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.
{¶40} Since we have determined that the State presented sufficient
evidence to demonstrate substantial compliance with the NHSTA manual, the
clues observed by Trooper Young during the field sobriety tests are relevant for a
determination of probable cause for arrest here. Prior to the arrest, Trooper Young
observed Schriml travel over the marked traffic lanes around 2:00 a.m. Friday
morning, not very far from a local bar. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 17-18). After Schriml
was in the front passenger seat of the cruiser, Trooper Young observed a strong
odor of alcoholic beverage, and then Schriml subsequently admitted to having two
drinks. (Id. at 23); (D’s Ex. A). Trooper Young also testified that Schriml’s eyes
were glassy and bloodshot. (Mar. 1, 2012 Tr. at 23). Thereafter, Trooper Young
observed five out of six clues on the HGN test, three out of eight clues on the walk
-23-
Case No. 9-12-32
and turn test, and two out of four clues on the one-leg stand. (Id. at 31, 40, 44). In
light of all of those circumstances, Trooper Young had sufficient cause to believe
that Schriml was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding that Trooper Young had probable
cause to arrest Schriml.
{¶41} Schriml’s fourth assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, J., concurs.
/jlr
WILLAMOWSKI, J., dissents.
{¶43} I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision in the first
assignment of error, which attempts to justify the Trooper’s actions in ordering
Schriml out of his car, frisking him, and placing him in the police cruiser for
further custodial interrogation for the admitted purpose of placing him in close
quarters so that she could attempt to detect an odor of alcohol on his breath. This
type of infringement on Schriml’s rights in order to conduct a “fishing expedition”
is not permissible.
-24-
Case No. 9-12-32
{¶44} It is well-established that once an officer lawfully stops an
individual, the officer must carefully tailor the scope of the stop “to its underlying
justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see, also, State v.
Gonyou, 108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 (6th Dist.1995). Additionally, the length of
the stop must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. Furthermore, the investigative methods employed should
be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in as short a period of time. State v. Duran, 9th Dist. No. 11CA009969,
2012-Ohio-2114, ¶ 14, quoting Royer; see also United States v. Brignoni–Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 881–882 (1975).
{¶45} “The rule set forth in Royer is designed to prevent law enforcement
officers from conducting ‘fishing expeditions’ for evidence of a crime.” State v.
Cromes, 3d Dist. No. 17-06-07, 2006-Ohio-6924, ¶ 35, citing Gonyou, supra.
Various activities, including following a script, prolonging a traffic stop in order to
“fish” for evidence, separating an individual from his car and engaging in “casual
conversation” in order to observe “body language” and “nervousness,” have been
deemed (depending on the overall facts of the case) to be manipulative practices
which are beyond the scope of “the fulfillment of the purpose for which the stop
was made.” State v. Correa, 108 Ohio App.3d 362, 368 (6th Dist.1995).
-25-
Case No. 9-12-32
{¶46} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “[w]e do not take lightly
the encroachment into one’s personal liberty by allowing a driver to be placed in a
patrol car and subjecting him or her to a pat-down search for weapons.”4 State v.
Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 79, 2001-Ohio-149. The Supreme Court of Ohio
further stated:
Placing a driver in a patrol car during a routine traffic stop increases
the intrusive nature of the detention. Goss v. State (Fla.App.1999),
744 So.2d 1167, 1168. Subjecting a driver to a pat-down search for
weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car further increases
the level of intrusion because “[e]ven a limited search of the outer
clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion
upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at
24–25, 88 S.Ct. at 1881–1882, 20 L.Ed.2d at 908.
Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d at 78-79. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[d]uring a
routine traffic stop, it is unreasonable for an officer to search the driver for
weapons before placing him or her in a patrol car, if the sole reason for placing the
driver in a patrol car during the investigation is for the convenience of the officer.”
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. See also State v. McCaulley, 161 Ohio
App.3d 568, ¶ 11 (2d Dist. 2005).
4
The Court did find such action to be justified if it protects the officers or the driver from a dangerous
condition during the traffic stop. However, that exception is inapplicable in this case as there was
absolutely no evidence in the record that the Trooper believed there was any danger in this situation. To
the contrary, the testimony of both the Trooper and Schriml was uncontroverted that this was not a
dangerous situation. Schriml was alone, appeared non-threatening, was polite and cooperative, and told the
Trooper that he did not have any weapons when she inquired. He pulled over as soon as it was safe, and
parked in a well-lit parking lot right by the road. The Trooper’s vehicle prevented Schriml from leaving,
and she was clearly in charge of the entire situation, while Schriml politely and meekly complied with the
Trooper’s orders and instructions.
-26-
Case No. 9-12-32
{¶47} In spite of the fact that this was a de minimus traffic violation and the
Trooper had not observed any signs of impairment, either in his driving while she
followed him, or upon initiating the traffic stop, Trooper Young told Schriml to
get out of his car, brusquely directed him where to stand, demanded that he
remove his hands from his pockets, frisked him, and then ordered him to go sit in
the patrol car.5 Without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of impaired driving or
another crime, Trooper Young’s actions were unwarranted according to law. The
Trooper’s own testimony verified the fact that the purpose in doing this was what
she had been taught to do (i.e., “following a script”) in order to “fish” for evidence
unrelated to the original traffic stop. Trooper Young testified:
Q. What was the purpose of getting [him] into the car, other than
checking the license and everything?
A. The driving record? We bring people back to our vehicles
because we’re in close contact, there’s no alcohol in our patrol car,
and while we’re checking the driving record, and also within that
close contact we want to see if we observe any odor of an alcoholic
beverage emanating about their breath.
Q. Is that something you’ve been trained in to observe and
consider as part of the clues in the investigation?
A. Yes.
(Emphasis added. Tr. 22)
5
Although Trooper Young testified that she “asked” him if he would “accompany” her back to her vehicle
(Tr. 20), the video clearly indicates that he was told to get out of his car, and then she proceeded to abruptly
order him around, and then she told him to sit in her car. Schriml testified that he felt like he was being
detained, that she was in charge, and that he did not have any choice but to obey her directions. (Tr. 101-
102)
-27-
Case No. 9-12-32
{¶48} It is true that a police officer may order a driver to get out of a car
which has been properly stopped for a traffic violation, even without suspicion of
criminal activity. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). “The police
have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only
question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver's seat of his car
or standing alongside it.” State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408, 1993-Ohio-186.
While the Majority claims that the Trooper “asked” Schriml to exit the vehicle
(see ¶ 8), the video of the traffic stop clearly indicates that she told him to step out.
The tone of her voice when she stated “Why don’t you come on out so I can check
your driving record,” clearly conveyed a command – not a question, and her
testimony confirms that she really did not give him any choice in the matter. (Tr.
60). However, that is not an issue, since it was proper for her to request that he
exit the vehicle. Schriml willingly complied, and told her “sure.” However, that
was the last and only time that Schriml willingly gave his consent to comply with
the Trooper’s orders before he was ordered into the patrol vehicle. From that
point forward, the video recording demonstrates that the Trooper abruptly
commanded that he: “Come on back!”; “Keep your hands out of your pocket!
Face that way!”; “Over here! Over here!” [directing him where to stand]; and,
“Have a seat in the front,” which was also a clear command, not an invitation.
Schriml testified that he felt like he was being detained, that the Trooper was in
-28-
Case No. 9-12-32
charge, and that he did not have an option other than to do what she said. (Tr.
101)
{¶49} If Trooper Young had any probable cause to proceed to administer
the field sobriety tests,6 it did not arise until after he was in the patrol car when
she claimed that she smelled “a strong odor of alcohol” and he acknowledged that
he had a couple of drinks.7 However, the investigative stop should have never
gotten to that point, and therefore, any evidence gathered as a result should have
been suppressed. There was no valid reason for the Trooper to have done
anything beyond verifying Schriml’s driving record and issuing the traffic ticket.
It was not necessary for Schriml to be placed in the patrol car while she radioed in
to check his record.
{¶50} The Majority tries to justify the Trooper’s actions by speculating that
the Trooper “could have reasonably believed that Schriml was engaged in criminal
activity.” This was because of the fact that, after Schriml produced his driver’s
6
Even the odor of alcohol and Schriml’s admission that he had had a couple of drinks may not have been
sufficient. See, State v. Stricklin, 6th Dist. No. L-10-1277, 2012-Ohio-1877, ¶ 15 (a slight odor of alcohol,
glassy, bloodshot eyes, and admission of having consumed a “couple” of beers, were not sufficient factors
to support a reasonable articulable suspicion of DUI when stopped for a de minimus traffic violation
without any erratic driving or other behaviors which would indicate intoxication); State v. Spillers, 2d Dist.
No. 1504, 2000 WL 299550 (Mar. 24, 2000) (Traffic violations of a de minimus nature, combined with a
slight odor of an alcoholic beverage, and an admission of having consumed a “couple” beers, are not
sufficient to support a reasonable and articulable suspicion of DUI); State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. No.2000–CA–
30, 2000 WL 1760664 (Dec. 1, 2000) (mere detection of odor of alcohol and glassy, bloodshot eyes at 2:20
a.m., unaccompanied by any basis to correlate the odor with a level of intoxication which would impair
driving ability, did not justify administration of field sobriety tests).
7
However, it seems somewhat unusual that there was suddenly such a “strong odor of alcohol” after he was
in the patrol car; yet, the Trooper did not testify that she smelled any alcohol when she approached the car,
when she told him to get out of the car, or when she was in close proximity to him while she patted him
down for weapons.
-29-
Case No. 9-12-32
license, he explained to her that he had just cleaned out his glove compartment and
he did not have his insurance and registration with him. Trooper Young seemed to
accept this explanation and did not question Schriml any further concerning this
matter, nor did she testify or indicate on her report at any time that she had any
concerns about further criminal activity. Without any evidence in the record, it is
not for this Court to resort to speculation in order to create an excuse for an
officer’s actions when the Trooper herself gives no indication of the existence of
such reasoning. Nor does the Majority cite to any authority whereby the lack of an
insurance or registration card is considered an indicator of “criminal activity” in a
situation such as this. Compare, State v. Dozier, 187 Ohio App.3d 804, 2010-
Ohio-2918 (2d Dist.) (even when a traffic offender is not able to produce any
identification or driver’s license, it is not proper to justify a patdown for weapons).
{¶51} The authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio as set forth in Lozada is
very clear. Yet, the Majority claims that reliance upon Lozada is “misplaced”
because this case “does not concern the constitutionality of the pat-down search
since no evidence was discovered as a result of that search.” Just because no
contraband was found does not excuse the Trooper’s improper actions. That
would be comparable to saying that it is not unconstituional for police officers to
break down your door, enter your home, and conduct a warrantless search of your
premises, as long as no evidence was found! Schriml’s rights to be free from
-30-
Case No. 9-12-32
unreasonable search and seizure were infringed upon. The police do not have the
authority to stop anyone for a de minimus traffic offense and frisk them merely
because they might be “guilty” of the “crime” of driving at 2:00 a.m.
{¶52} In this case, the Trooper’s protocol clearly qualified as an improper
fishing expedition in that she went far beyond what was necessary to complete the
original purpose for which the initial stop was made. Trooper Young was
admittedly searching for evidence of an additional crime, even though she was not
able to articulate any facts in support of her continued search. This was improper.
When a police officer's objective justification to continue detention
of a person * * * is not related to the purpose of the original stop,
and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable
facts giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an
extension of the detention, the continued detention to conduct a
search constitutes an illegal seizure.
State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 1997-Ohio-343, paragraph one of the
syllabus
{¶53} According to the Trooper’s own testimony, Schriml had done
nothing more than make a slightly improper, or imprecise, right-hand turn at 2:00
a.m. (when there were no other cars on the road, according to the video recording).
His behavior, his demeanor, and his interactions with the Trooper were
appropriate, polite, completely respectful, and gave no indication of impairment.
The Trooper testified that his speech was completely normal. And yet, Schriml
found himself being frisked down by the side of the road, made to sit inside a
-31-
Case No. 9-12-32
police cruiser, and subjected to further questioning concerning his activities that
evening. The Trooper’s own testimony indicated that it was routine practice to
place drivers in the patrol vehicle to try to detect whether the driver may have
consumed any alcohol.
{¶54} Accordingly, I would have found that the Trooper’s actions went
beyond the bounds of what was permitted by law, and therefore, the motion to
suppress should have been granted. There was also some validity to several of the
issues Schriml raised concerning the implementation of field sobriety tests,
especially concerning his inability to perform some of the tasks due to his obesity
and other serious physical limitations that likely had an impact on the results.
However, as stated above, I believe the case should not have even proceeded to the
point of administering the field sobriety tests, if the Trooper had not conducted an
investigation far beyond what was permissible under the law, and would reverse
on those grounds.
-32-