In re Estate of Gaskill , 2019 Ohio 4936 ( 2019 )

[Cite as In re Estate of Gaskill, 2019-Ohio-4936.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
IN RE:
ESTATE OF CASE NO. 1-19-15
FRANK BENJAMIN GASKILL,
DECEASED
OPINION
[RITA WILLIAMS ET AL. - APPELLANTS]
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Probate Division
Trial Court No. 2017 ES 432
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 2, 2019
APPEARANCES:
John C. Huffman for Appellants
Case No. 1-19-15
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Appellants, Rita Williams (“Williams”) and Harry C. Crisp (“Crisp”),
in his individual capacity, appeal the March 4, 2019 judgment of the Allen County
Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} Frank B. Gaskill (“Gaskill”), Williams and Crisp’s stepfather, died
testate on May 27, 2017. (See Doc. No. 2). On November 3, 2017, Crisp applied
to admit Gaskill’s will to probate and for authority to administer Gaskill’s estate.1
(Doc. Nos. 2, 4). On November 13, 2017, Gaskill’s will was admitted to probate,
and Crisp was appointed the executor of Gaskill’s estate. (Doc. Nos. 2, 6). As
relevant to this case, Gaskill’s will provides:
ITEM II
I give, devise and bequeath my entire estate, whether real, personal or
mixed, of every kind, nature and description whatsoever, and
wheresoever situated, which I may now own or hereafter acquire, or
have the right to dispose of at the time of my decease, by power of
appointment or otherwise, unto my three step-children, SHARON
JOHNSON, RITA WILLIAMS and HARRY C. CRISP, absolutely
and in fee simple. If any one of the aforenamed predeceases the
1
A suggestion of death was filed in this court on November 18, 2019 informing this court that Crisp died on
October 13, 2019.
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others, his or her share shall be divided equally by the other two. If
any two of the aforenamed predecease leaving only one, their shares
shall go to the survivor.
(Capitalization sic.) (Doc. No. 2). Although Williams, Crisp, and Sharon Johnson
(“Johnson”) each survived Gaskill, Johnson subsequently died on March 4, 2018.
(See Doc. Nos. 24, 26, 27).
{¶3} On August 24, 2018, Crisp, as executor of Gaskill’s estate, filed a
complaint in the trial court requesting a construction of Gaskill’s will. (Doc. No.
38). In the complaint, Crisp noted that some of the “legatees and devisees named
in the Will have said that they believe that [Gaskill] intended Item II of the Will to
mean that if one of the three legatees and devisees predeceases the others, his or her
share shall be divided equally by the other two, notwithstanding the fact that the
deceased legatee and devisee survived the testator.” (Id.). Crisp also maintained
that there was a belief among the beneficiaries of Gaskill’s estate that Gaskill
“intended Item II of the Will to mean that if any two of the three legatees and
devisees predecease the other, leaving only one, their shares shall go to the survivor,
notwithstanding the fact that the deceased legatees and devisees survived the
testator.” (Id.).
{¶4} On October 9, 2018, Williams filed her answer to the complaint. (Doc.
No. 41). On January 9, 2019, Williams filed a “Motion to Construe Will” and a
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memorandum in support thereof. (Doc. No. 52). In addition, on January 28, 2019,
Williams filed a supplemental memorandum in support of her “Motion to Construe
Will.” (Doc. No. 53). In her memoranda, Williams argued that Gaskill likely
intended that only his stepchildren, and not their heirs or devisees, share in his estate.
(Doc. Nos. 52, 53). According to Williams, if the trial court determined that
Johnson’s interest in Gaskill’s estate vested at the time of Gaskill’s death, Johnson’s
heirs or devisees would be entitled to Johnson’s share of Gaskill’s estate, thus
contravening Gaskill’s supposed intent. (Doc. Nos. 52, 53). She therefore urged
the trial court to conclude that Johnson’s interest in Gaskill’s estate did not vest prior
to her death, which would require Johnson’s share to be divided equally between
Crisp and herself by operation of the survivorship language in Item II—a result
consistent with Gaskill’s alleged intent. (Doc. Nos. 52, 53). In addition, Williams
argued in the alternative that even if Johnson’s interest vested at Gaskill’s death, the
survivorship language in Item II of the will evidenced Gaskill’s intention that
Williams, Crisp, and Johnson take title to Gaskill’s property concurrently and with
rights of survivorship. (Doc. No. 53). She argued that Johnson’s heirs or devisees
were not entitled to Johnson’s share of Gaskill’s estate because upon Johnson’s
death, Johnson’s interest in the property passing under Gaskill’s will vested
proportionately in Crisp and Williams. (Id.).
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{¶5} A hearing on the complaint was held on January 16, 2019. (See Doc.
No. 54). On March 4, 2019, the trial court issued its judgment, concluding that
“upon the death of Frank B. Gaskill, each of the three beneficiaries set forth in the
will received an undivided one third in the estate of Frank B. Gaskill and the
subsequent death of Sharon Johnson did not result in extinguishment of the bequest
made to her[.]” (Id.). The trial court further held that Johnson’s “heirs pursuant to
her estate should receive her portion of [Gaskill’s] estate.” (Id.).
{¶6} On April 3, 2019, Williams and Crisp filed a notice of appeal. (Doc.
No. 55). They raise two assignments of error for our review, which we will address
together.
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court erred by construing the will of Frank Gaskill in a
manner that contravened the testator’s intent to limit his devise
to his step-children.
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court erred in finding that the survivorship language in
the will of Frank Gaskill did not create a joint tenancy with rights
of survivorship.
{¶7} In their first and second assignments of error, Williams and Crisp argue
that the trial court erroneously construed Gaskill’s will. In their first assignment of
error, Williams and Crisp argue that the trial court erred by determining that
Johnson’s interest in Gaskill’s estate vested at the time of Gaskill’s death and that,
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consequently, Johnson’s heirs or devisees are entitled to Johnson’s share of
Gaskill’s estate. (Appellants’ Brief at 3-9). While they acknowledge that the law
“favors the vesting of estates at the earliest possible moment,” they argue that this
principle must yield to Gaskill’s supposed intention to include only his stepchildren,
and not his stepchildren’s heirs or devisees, in his estate plan. (Id. at 3, 8-9). In
their second assignment of error, Williams and Crisp argue that the trial court should
have construed the survivorship language in Item II of the will as expressing
Gaskill’s intention that Williams, Crisp, and Johnson take title to his property as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (Id. at 10-14). Williams and Crisp argue
that because Gaskill’s will must be read as giving them rights of survivorship to the
property passing under the will, the trial court erred by determining that Johnson’s
heirs or devisees should receive Johnson’s share of Gaskill’s estate, rather than
determining that Johnson’s share vested proportionately in Williams and Crisp at
Johnson’s death. (Id. at 10-14).
{¶8} “It is well settled that the construction of a will is a question of law, and
thus, we will apply a de novo standard of review.” In re Estate of Stockmaster, 3d
Dist. Seneca No. 13-10-43, 2011-Ohio-3006, ¶ 13, citing Woolley v. Woolley, 190
Ohio App.3d 18, 2010-Ohio-4177, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.), citing Dunkel v. Hilyard, 146
Ohio App.3d 414, 418 (4th Dist.), citing McCulloch v. Yost, 148 Ohio St. 675, 677
(1947). “[T]he most fundamental tenet for the construction of a will requires that
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the court ascertain and carry out, within the bounds of the law, the intent of the
testator.” Woolley at ¶ 17, citing Domo v. McCarthy, 66 Ohio St.3d 312, 314 (1993).
“Such intention must be ascertained from the words contained in the will.”
Stockmaster at ¶ 13, citing Oliver v. Bank One, Dayton, N.A., 60 Ohio St.3d 32, 34
(1991). The words in a will, “‘“if technical, must be taken in their technical sense,
and if not technical, in their ordinary sense, unless it appear(s) from the context that
they were used by the testator in some secondary sense.”’” Polen v. Baker, 92 Ohio
St.3d 563, 565 (2001), quoting Ohio Natl. Bank of Columbus v. Adair, 54 Ohio St.2d
26, 30 (1978), quoting Townsend’s Exrs. v. Townsend, 25 Ohio St. 477 (1874),
paragraph three of the syllabus. “All the parts of the will must be construed together,
and effect, if possible, given to every word contained in the will.” Bogar v. Baker,
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0138, 2017-Ohio-7766, ¶ 14, citing Townsend’s
Exrs. at paragraph four of the syllabus.
{¶9} We begin with Williams and Crisp’s first assignment of error, in which
they contend that the trial court erred by concluding that Johnson’s interest in
Gaskill’s estate vested at the time of Gaskill’s death. As Williams and Crisp
acknowledge, it is well settled that “‘the law strongly favors the immediate vesting
of estates.’” Stevens v. Radey, 117 Ohio St.3d 65, 2008-Ohio-291, ¶ 11, quoting
Ohio Natl. Bank of Columbus v. Boone, 139 Ohio St. 361, 370 (1942). “The rights
of the beneficiaries become fixed and certain at the death of the testator unless a
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contrary intent is manifested.” Id., citing Boone at paragraph two of the syllabus
and Tax Comm. v. Oswald, 109 Ohio St. 36, 52 (1923). Therefore, “[u]nless a
testator manifests a contrary intent in a will, the preference for the immediate vesting
of estates requires interests to be assigned at the testator’s death, not held in
abeyance until a future uncertain date.” Id. at syllabus; Boone at paragraph two of
the syllabus (holding that to prevent the immediate vesting of estates, there must be
a “clearly expressed intention to postpone the vesting to some future time”)
(Emphasis added.).
{¶10} After reviewing the entirety of Gaskill’s will and giving effect, where
possible, to every term in the will, we cannot conclude that Gaskill clearly expressed
an intention to postpone the vesting of Johnson’s interest in his estate until some
later date. There are no references in Gaskill’s will to any specific date to which the
vesting of Johnson’s interest was or is to be postponed. (See Doc. No. 2).
Furthermore, there is no language in the will explicitly linking the vesting of
Johnson’s interest in Gaskill’s estate to the occurrence of some future event. (See
id.). Thus, as far as can be ascertained from the plain language of Gaskill’s will,
Gaskill did not explicitly communicate an intention to delay the vesting of
Johnson’s interest in his estate.
{¶11} Moreover, in ascertaining a testator’s intent, “there are certain well
recognized rules of construction and interpretation which are presumptively known
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to all testators,” including the preference for the immediate vesting of estates.
Everhard v. Brown, 75 Ohio App. 451, 457-458 (9th Dist.1945). See Summers v.
Summers, 121 Ohio App.3d 263, 268 (4th Dist.1997) (“A will must be read ‘with
the presumption that the testator was knowledgeable of the law.’”), quoting Wendell
v. AmeriTrust Co., N.A., 69 Ohio St.3d 74, 76 (1994). Thus, we presume that Gaskill
was aware of the law’s preference for early vesting. Considering that Gaskill is
charged with knowledge of the law’s preference for early vesting, the fact that his
will is silent as to the time of the vesting of Johnson’s interest suggests that he did
not intend to delay vesting. See Everhard at 458 (“The intention of a testator may
be ascertained from what he has forborne to say as well as from what he has said.”).
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Johnson’s
interest in Gaskill’s estate vested at Gaskill’s death.
{¶12} Nevertheless, Williams and Crisp argue that there is an “exception
subordinating this principle of construction to another prevailing principle in the
law of estates, which is the will of the testator.” (Appellants’ Brief at 5). They
speculate that Gaskill’s overriding intention was to limit his devise exclusively to
his stepchildren, arguing that “[t]he words of survivorship in Item II of the * * * will
are the sole manifestation of * * * Gaskill’s intent, and those words express the
intent that Gaskill’s surviving step-children should be those who divide the share of
their deceased co-devisee.” (Id. at 8). Williams and Crisp claim that if Item II of
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Gaskill’s will “is read as immediately effective at the time of [Gaskill’s] death, the
likely intent of [Gaskill] to limit his devise to his step-children would be frustrated
simply because his will did not account for the death of one of the step-children
after the testator’s death but before the proceeds of the will had been divided.” (Id.
at 4).
{¶13} Williams and Crisp’s argument is without merit. In evaluating
Williams and Crisp’s argument, one case, Renner v. Williams, is particularly
instructive. In Renner, the Supreme Court of Ohio was tasked with construing a
will that contained survivorship language similar to the survivorship language used
in Item II of Gaskill’s will. There, the testator provided, “In case of the death of
either one or more of [three named beneficiaries], the survivor or survivors shall
inherit the property bequeathed to them * * *; if more than one survivor, to be
divided equally, share and share alike.” 71 Ohio St. 340, 356 (1905). The issue in
Renner was whether the survivorship language “relate[d] to the time of the death of
the testator, or to the time of distribution, or to the time of the death of any of the
devisees there named[.]” Id. at 356-357. The court held that “[w]ords of
survivorship in a will prima facie refer to the time of the testator’s death, because
that is the time at which the property to be divided usually comes into enjoyment.”
Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. The court noted, however, that “if the time of
payment or distribution * * *, or the time of vesting an estate, be postponed in the
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will to a time later than the death of the testator, the words of survivorship will relate
to such later period.” Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the will did
not clearly specify that the survivorship was to take effect later than the testator’s
death, the “words ‘survivor or survivors’ * * * mean[t] survivor or survivors at the
time of the testator’s death.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Therefore, the
three beneficiaries’ interests in the testator’s estate “vested immediately on the death
of the testator, so that on the death of [two of the beneficiaries] after the death of the
testator, their interest in the * * * estate passed by descent to their respective heirs,
and not to [the third beneficiary] as survivor.” Id.
{¶14} As discussed above, Gaskill’s will does not evince an intention to
postpone the vesting of the interests in his estate or to defer payment or distribution
of the interests created thereunder. Consequently, the words of survivorship in Item
II refer to the time of Gaskill’s death. Renner at paragraphs one and two of the
syllabus. Because the survivorship language in Item II refers to the time of Gaskill’s
death, Gaskill’s intent to limit his devise to his stepchildren, as expressed through
the survivorship language, must also relate to the time of his death. In other words,
while the survivorship language in Item II of Gaskill’s will may express Gaskill’s
intention to limit his devise to his stepchildren who survived him at the time of his
death, it does not necessarily evidence his intention to cut off the heirs or devisees
of his stepchildren who survived him but died before his estate could be fully
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distributed. Indeed, nothing in Gaskill’s will clearly establishes that Gaskill
intended to limit his devise to his stepchildren surviving at the time of the
distribution of his estate. Although Williams and Crisp theorize that Gaskill would
have intended for them to evenly divide Johnson’s share if he had anticipated that
Johnson would die before his estate was fully distributed, “‘“[c]onjecture is not
permitted to supply what the testator has failed to indicate * * *.”’” Demeraski v.
Bailey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102304, 2015-Ohio-2162, ¶ 30, quoting Crane v.
Doty’s Exrs., 1 Ohio St. 279, 284 (1853), quoting 1 Jarman, Wills, 315. Moreover,
Williams and Crisp’s argument does not account for the possibility that Gaskill may
have considered that one or more of his stepchildren might survive him but die
before his estate was fully distributed and that he consciously chose not to make a
special provision for that scenario. Because the will is silent on the issue, this
explanation is no less plausible than Williams and Crisp’s supposition.
{¶15} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
holding that Johnson’s interest in Gaskill’s estate vested at Gaskill’s death.
Furthermore, we conclude that Gaskill’s will does not demonstrate that Gaskill
intended to limit his devise to his stepchildren surviving at the time of the
distribution of his estate. As a result, we conclude that Gaskill’s will does not bar
Johnson’s heirs or devisees from receiving Johnson’s vested share of Gaskill’s
estate solely because Johnson died before Gaskill’s estate was fully distributed.
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Therefore, we conclude that unless Gaskill intended to give Williams, Crisp, and
Johnson rights of survivorship in the property passing under the will, the trial court
did not err by determining that Johnson’s heirs or devisees are entitled to receive
her share of Gaskill’s estate. See Renner at paragraph two of the syllabus. Having
so concluded, we now consider whether Gaskill intended to give Williams, Crisp,
and Johnson rights of survivorship in his property—the subject of Williams and
Crisp’s second assignment of error.
{¶16} In their second assignment of error, Williams and Crisp argue that “[i]t
is clear from the language of the * * * will that * * * Gaskill intended for his
[step]children to own his real property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship
because of the words of survivorship included in the will.” (Appellants’ Brief at
12). They argue that even if Gaskill’s “real property actually did vest upon his death
in equal shares to the three step-children named in the will, it did so as a joint
tenancy” and that upon Johnson’s death, “the survivorship language of the will
would have vested the real property in [Williams and Crisp].” (Emphasis sic.) (Id.
at 13-14).
{¶17} Initially, we note that Williams and Crisp apparently do not argue that
Gaskill intended to give rights of survivorship with respect to his personal property.
Instead, they argue that the joint tenancy with rights of survivorship supposedly
created by Gaskill’s will is limited to the real property passing under the will.
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However, such a limitation is not supported by the language of Gaskill’s will. To
the extent that the survivorship language directly modifies Gaskill’s devise to
Williams, Crisp, and Johnson, the language applies, without qualification, to
Gaskill’s gift of his “entire estate, whether real, personal or mixed, of every kind,
nature and description whatsoever, and wheresoever situated.” (Doc. No. 2). There
is no indication in Item II or elsewhere in Gaskill’s will that Gaskill intended for
ownership of his personal property to pass in a different manner than his real
property. (See id.). Thus, if the survivorship language in Item II of Gaskill’s will
is read as an expression of Gaskill’s intention for Williams, Crisp, and Johnson to
take title to his real property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, this
intention should extend to Gaskill’s personal property as well. Ohio law recognizes
joint ownership with rights of survivorship in certain types of personal property.
See Wright v. Bloom, 69 Ohio St.3d 596 (1994) (joint and survivorship bank
accounts); In re Hutchison’s Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542 (1929) (joint ownership of
stock certificates with rights of survivorship); Wetli v. Denny, 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-13-1043, 2014-Ohio-1009, ¶ 8, 10-13 (joint ownership with rights of survivorship
in two oil paintings); R.C. 2131.12 (joint ownership with rights of survivorship in
motor vehicles, watercraft, or outboard motors). As a result, were we to conclude
that Gaskill intended for Williams, Crisp, and Johnson to take title to his real
property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, we would likely be required to
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conclude that Gaskill also intended for Williams, Crisp, and Johnson to jointly own
his 2000 Lincoln Continental, savings account, 12 shares of stock in the Ford Motor
Company, and the rest of his personal property with rights of survivorship. (See
Doc. No. 23).
{¶18} However, after reviewing the entirety of Gaskill’s will, we conclude
that Gaskill did not clearly articulate an intention for Williams, Crisp, and Johnson
to take title to his real, or for that matter personal, property as joint tenants with
rights of survivorship. The common-law joint tenancy with incidental right of
survivorship is not recognized in Ohio. Hutchison at 550; In re Estate of Shelton,
154 Ohio App.3d 188, 2003-Ohio-4593, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.); Spitz v. Rapport, 78 Ohio
App.3d 330, 333 (8th Dist.1992) (“[T]here is no common-law joint tenancy with
right of survivorship in Ohio.”); Huntington Natl. Bank v. Hebeka, 6th Dist. Lucas
No. L-90-318, 1992 WL 173276, *4 (July 24, 1992) (“Ohio had never recognized
joint tenancies * * * until the Legislature, in 1972, enacted former R.C. 5302.17.”).
In early cases, the Supreme Court of Ohio held, for example, that the right of
survivorship was “not founded in principles of natural justice, nor in any reasons of
policy applicable to our society or institutions,” but was instead “adverse to the
understandings, habits, and feelings of the people.” Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio
305, 306 (1826); Wilson v. Fleming, 13 Ohio 68, 74 (1844) (“We entertain no doubt
that such estates, and their concomitant incident, the right of survivorship, are utterly
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inconsistent with the genius and spirit of our laws.”). Thus, when confronted with
wills that could have been plausibly interpreted as expressing intentions to create
joint tenancies, the Supreme Court of Ohio consistently determined that such wills
created tenancies in common rather than joint tenancies. E.g., Penn v. Cox, 16 Ohio
30, 30-32 (1847); Sergeant at 305-307. See 19 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Cotenancy
and Partition, Section 9 (2019) (“American courts * * * are inclined to import an
intention in favor of a tenancy in common whenever the expressions in a
conveyance or the acts of the parties permit such a construction. * * * Accordingly,
in Ohio, wherever * * * undivided parts of real property are acquired by two or more
persons, with right of possession at the same time, such persons are tenants in
common,” unless the “circumstances * * * expressly * * * call for some other form
of cotenancy.”), quoting Kuehnle, Levey & Bower, Ohio Real Estate Law, Section
6:4 (3d Ed.).
{¶19} Nevertheless, while Ohio has never embraced the common-law joint
tenancy with its incidental right of survivorship, it is well established that “parties
may * * * contract for a joint ownership with the right of survivorship.” Hutchison
at paragraph two of the syllabus; Shelton at ¶ 18. If “a donor or grantor, by the
operative words of the gift or grant, clearly expresses an intention to give the right
of survivorship, such words will not be disregarded.” (Emphasis added.) Hutchison
at 552. Therefore, “at the death of one of the joint owners the survivor succeeds to
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the title to the entire interest, not upon the principle of survivorship, as an incident
to the joint tenancy, but by the operative provisions of the contract.” Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus. See Lewis v. Baldwin, 11 Ohio 352, 354 (1842). “This is an
express right of survivorship.” (Emphasis sic.) Shelton at ¶ 20.
{¶20} This principle—that a grantor, donor, or testator may expressly
provide for rights of survivorship in his grantees, donees, or beneficiaries—serves
as the foundation for the “survivorship tenancy,” a creation of Ohio statutory law
that shares some features with the common-law joint tenancy. Under R.C.
5302.20(A), “if any interest in real property is conveyed or devised to two or more
persons for their joint lives and then to the survivor or survivors of them, those
persons hold title as survivorship tenants, and the joint interest created is a
survivorship tenancy.” “Any deed or will containing language that shows a clear
intent to create a survivorship tenancy shall be liberally construed to do so.”
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 5302.20(A). If two or more persons take title to real
property as survivorship tenants, “each survivorship tenant holds an equal share of
the title during their joint lives unless otherwise provided in the instrument creating
the survivorship tenancy” and “[u]pon the death of any of them, the title of the
decedent vests proportionately in the surviving tenants as survivorship tenants * * *
until only one survivorship tenant remains alive, at which time the survivor is fully
vested with title to the real property as the sole title holder.” R.C. 5302.20(B). Thus,
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the survivorship tenancy resembles the common-law joint tenancy in many
important respects. Yet, when it created the survivorship tenancy, the Ohio
legislature made clear that the tenancy in common remains the favored form of
cotenancy in Ohio. See R.C. 5302.19 (“Except as provided in * * * [R.C. 5302.20]
* * *, if any interest in real property is conveyed or devised to two or more persons,
such persons hold title as tenants in common and the joint interest created is a
tenancy in common.”). Thus, when real property is conveyed or devised to two or
more persons without a clear expression of intent to create a survivorship tenancy,
such persons take title to the real property as tenants in common without rights of
survivorship. See Reif v. Reif, 86 Ohio App.3d 804, 807-808 (2d Dist.1993) (“[A]
deed or will creating a survivorship tenancy must include language evidencing a
clear intent to create this type of tenancy. * * * In the absence of words of
survivorship, property owned by two or more persons is held as a tenancy in
common.”), citing R.C. 5302.19 and 5302.20.
{¶21} In this case, the survivorship language contained in Item II of Gaskill’s
will does not evidence a clear intention to create a survivorship tenancy in Williams,
Crisp, and Johnson. Instead, even assuming that this language can conceivably be
read as expressing an intention to create a survivorship tenancy in Williams, Crisp,
and Johnson, it can also be reasonably interpreted as evidencing Gaskill’s desire to
avoid operation of R.C. 2107.52, one of Ohio’s anti-lapse statutes.
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{¶22} R.C. 2107.52 is Ohio’s anti-lapse statute pertaining to wills.2 R.C.
2107.52 provides, in relevant part:
Unless a contrary intent appears in the will, if a devisee fails to survive
the testator and is a * * * stepchild of * * * the testator * * * [and] [i]f
the devise is not in the form of a class gift and the deceased devisee
leaves surviving descendants, a substitute gift is created in the
devisee’s surviving descendants. The surviving descendants take, per
stirpes, the property to which the devisee would have been entitled
had the devisee survived the testator.
R.C. 2107.52(B)(2)(a) (Mar. 22, 2012) (current version at R.C. 2107.52(B)(2)(a)
(Mar. 22, 2019)). Through R.C. 2107.52, “[t]he legislature presumed that a testator
would want the [surviving descendants] of a predeceased relative to inherit the
relative’s share rather than have the devise lapse.” Belardo v. Belardo, 187 Ohio
App.3d 9, 2010-Ohio-1758, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). “To overcome this presumption and
avoid application of the statute, the will must specifically provide otherwise.” Id.However, “[t]here are no certain or exact words of survivorship needed to indicate
intent to avoid the statute.” Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶23} Various formulations of survivorship language have been found
sufficient to indicate an intent to avoid the anti-lapse statute. For example, one court
2
R.C. 2107.52 is to be distinguished from R.C. 5808.19, Ohio’s anti-lapse statute pertaining to trusts.
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interpreted a devise to the testator’s three children “if they survive me, to be theirs
in equal shares, share and share alike, and in fee simple” as an adequate expression
of intent to avoid application of the anti-lapse statute. (Emphasis sic.) Rumberg v.
Rumberg, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 96 CA 156, 1998 WL 896334, *1 (Dec. 16,
1998). Another court held that the “phrase ‘members of the Weaver family living
at the time of my death’ convey[ed] words of survivorship that preclude[d]
operation of the Anti-Lapse Statute.” Nurre v. Weaver-Kuhl, 1st Dist. Hamilton
Nos. C-990611 and C-990626, 2000 WL 492055, *4 (Apr. 28, 2000). This court
and numerous others have reached identical conclusions from wills employing
similar language. E.g., Knepper v. Hahn, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-95-1, 1995 WL
431891, *1-2 (July 21, 1995) (“To my niece, * * * if she survives me. If she should
die before my death such share to go to [a second niece].”); Day v. Brooks, 10 Ohio
Misc. 273, 283-284 (P.C.1967) (“I hereby give and devise to all of my brothers who
shall be living at the time of my decease, the sum of Three Hundred Dollars
($300.00) each.”). In fact, in one case, the Supreme Court of Ohio found an
intention to avoid operation of the anti-lapse statute where the will did not plainly
state that the beneficiaries’ devises were conditioned on surviving the testator.
Polen, 92 Ohio St.3d at 564, 567, 569 (“The will directed [the executor] ‘to
distribute the net proceeds [from the residue of the estate] to [five named
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beneficiaries], equally share and share alike, the same to be theirs absolutely, or to
survivors thereof.’”) (Emphasis sic.).3
{¶24} Whether the survivorship language in Item II of Gaskill’s will
adequately expresses an intention to avoid application of the anti-lapse statute is not
at issue in this case. Thus, we do not decide whether the survivorship language in
Item II is sufficient to escape operation of the anti-lapse statute. Instead, we
introduce the above-cited authority merely to illustrate that the survivorship
language in Item II of Gaskill’s will can be reasonably interpreted as evidencing
Gaskill’s desire to avoid operation of the anti-lapse statute, rather than as indicating
Gaskill’s intent to create a survivorship tenancy in Williams, Crisp, and Johnson.
In fact, the anti-lapse-statute-avoidance interpretation is perhaps the more natural
interpretation because the method of distributing Gaskill’s property provided for by
the survivorship language is consistent with how one would expect Gaskill’s
property to be distributed if Williams, Crisp, or Johnson predeceased Gaskill and
the anti-lapse statute did not apply. That is, assuming that the anti-lapse statute does
not apply to Gaskill’s will, if any one or more of Gaskill’s stepchildren predeceased
Gaskill, leaving one or more of them alive, the share or shares of the predeceasing
3
Polen was decided under a former version of R.C. 2107.52. See R.C. 2107.52 (Oct. 8, 1992). Under the
current version of R.C. 2107.52, “[a]ttaching the word ‘surviving’ or ‘living’ to a devise, such as a gift ‘to
my surviving (or living) children,’ is not, in the absence of other language in the will or other evidence to the
contrary, a sufficient indication of an intent to negate the application of [R.C. 2107.52(B)].” R.C.
2107.52(C)(1) (Mar. 22, 2019). In light of R.C. 2107.52(C)(1), it may be debatable whether the survivorship
language in Polen remains a sufficient expression of intent to avoid operation of the anti-lapse statute.
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stepchild or stepchildren would have been distributed to the surviving stepchild or
between the surviving stepchildren in equal proportion, to the exclusion of the heirs
or devisees of the predeceasing stepchild or stepchildren. This is precisely the
manner of distribution called for by the survivorship language in Item II of Gaskill’s
will.
{¶25} Accordingly, although we do not determine whether the survivorship
language in Item II is sufficient to express an intention to avoid operation of the
anti-lapse statute, we believe that it is susceptible of such an interpretation. Given
this second plausible interpretation, we cannot conclude that Item II of Gaskill’s
will contains language showing a clear intent to create a survivorship tenancy with
respect to the real property devised to Williams, Crisp, and Johnson. See Hutchison,
120 Ohio St. at 551-552; Reif, 86 Ohio App.3d at 807-808; R.C. 5302.20.
Therefore, we conclude that Williams, Crisp, and Johnson take title to the real
property passing under Gaskill’s will as tenants in common. See R.C. 5302.19.
Likewise, we conclude that Gaskill’s will does not give Williams, Crisp, and
Johnson rights of survivorship in Gaskill’s personal property. As a result, we
conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that Johnson received an
undivided one-third share of Gaskill’s estate, that Johnson’s interest was not
extinguished by her death, and that Johnson’s heirs or devisees are thus entitled to
receive her share.
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{¶26} Williams and Crisp’s first and second assignments of error are
overruled.
{¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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