State v. Jack , 2012 Ohio 2131 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Jack, 
    2012-Ohio-2131
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MARION COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                              CASE NO. 9-11-59
    v.
    TAKISHA M. JACK,                                         OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Marion Municipal Court
    Trial Court No. CRB 1102517
    Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
    Date of Decision: May 14, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    Kevin P. Collins for Appellant
    Steven E. Chaffin for Appellee
    Case No. 9-11-59
    SHAW, P.J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Takisha M. Jack (“Jack”) appeals the November
    15, 2011 judgment of the Marion Municipal Court in Marion County, Ohio finding
    her guilty following a bench trial on charges of Possession of a Schedule III
    Substance in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(2), a misdemeanor of the first
    degree, and Possession of Marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(3), a
    minor misdemeanor.
    {¶2} The charges arose out of an incident occurring September 3, 2011
    wherein Jack and her passenger, Darthaniel Hamilton (“Hamilton”), were
    traveling south from Detroit toward Columbus on U.S. Route 23 in Marion
    County. While in Marion County, Jack was pulled over by Trooper David G.
    Shockey (“Shockey”) for driving 87 mph in a 65 mph zone.
    {¶3} Upon pulling Jack over, Shockey approached Jack’s vehicle from the
    passenger side. After asking some preliminary questions, Shockey asked if there
    were any weapons in the vehicle. Hamilton, Jack’s passenger, said that he had a
    permit, then when Shockey asked Hamilton specifically if he had a weapon on
    him, Hamilton responded that he did.
    {¶4} During Shockey’s questioning of Jack and Hamilton, Shockey
    detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage from inside Jack’s vehicle. Due to
    Hamilton having a weapon and the odor of the alcoholic beverage, Shockey called
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    for support. Sergeant Rosario came to the scene to assist with Hamilton. Shockey
    then took Jack and placed Jack in his patrol car, and Sergeant Rosario took
    Hamilton and placed Hamilton in his patrol car.
    {¶5} Shockey administered a portable breath test to Jack with the result
    coming back as .0467.        Meanwhile, Hamilton was placed under arrest for a
    concealed carry violation. During a search of Jack’s vehicle, Shockey located a
    cup with alcohol in it inside the car, alcohol containers in the driver’s side door
    and a small amount of purported marijuana located in the driver’s side console. In
    the middle console Shockey found a prescription bottle for Hydrocodone that
    contained 185 pills. According to Shockey the label on the bottle indicated there
    should have been 120 pills and there were also two different types of pills in the
    bottle.
    {¶6} Jack was subsequently arrested and charged with Possession of a
    Schedule III Substance in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(2), a misdemeanor of
    the first degree, and Possession of Marijuana in violation of R.C.
    2925.11(A)/(C)(3), a minor misdemeanor.
    {¶7} On September 13, 2011, Jack was arraigned and pled “not guilty” to
    the charges.
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    Case No. 9-11-59
    {¶8} On November 10, 2011, a bench trial was held wherein Jack
    proceeded pro se. At trial, the State called Trooper Shockey as its sole witness.
    Shockey testified to the events as described above, and then the State rested.
    {¶9} Jack called Hamilton in her defense who testified that Jack was
    unaware that the medication or the marijuana was in the car as Hamilton had used
    the car earlier that day and acquired both things during that time. Jack then
    testified, stating that she had no knowledge that the substances were in her car.
    {¶10} After the defense rested, the court found Jack guilty on both
    possession charges. On the marijuana possession charge Jack was sentenced to
    pay a $100 fine and court costs and her license was ordered suspended for six
    months. On the possession of a Schedule III Controlled Substance charge Jack
    was sentenced to 90 days in jail with 87 days suspended, and a $400 fine with
    $250 suspended. Jack was also ordered to undergo an alcohol and drug screen
    through the Municipal Court Probation Department and to attend any counseling
    or programs that might be ordered.
    {¶11} It is from this judgment that Jack appeals, asserting the following
    assignments of error for our review.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
    THE RECORD CONTAINED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
    TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION
    FOR POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE III SUBSTANCE IN
    VIOLATION OF R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(2).
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    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S          CONVICTION      FOR
    POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE III SUBSTANCE IN
    VIOLATION OF R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(2) IS CONTRARY TO
    THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
    THE RECORD CONTAINED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
    TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION
    FOR POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF
    R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(3).
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S        CONVICTION   FOR
    POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF R.C.
    2925.11(A)/(C)(3) IS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST
    WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BY FAILING TO GIVE NOTICE
    OF TRIAL IN CASE NO. CRB 1102517B.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BY FAILING TO PROPERLY
    EXPLAIN HER RIGHTS AT HER INITIAL APPEARANCE.
    {¶12} As Jack’s first four assignments of error are interrelated, we elect to
    address them together. Moreover, as these assignments of error are dispositive of
    this case, the remaining assignments of error are rendered moot.
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    First, Second, Third, and Fourth Assignments of Error
    {¶13} In her first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Jack
    argues that there was not sufficient evidence to support her convictions for
    Possession of a Schedule III Substance in violation of R.C. 2925.11 (A)/(C)(2) and
    Possession of Marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(3), and that her
    convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically Jack
    argues that the “possession” element of each charge was lacking as Jack claims
    she was unaware the substances were in her car.
    {¶14} Reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires this
    court to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The
    Ohio Supreme Court has set forth the sufficiency of the evidence test as follows:
    An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the
    evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence,
    if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
    whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
    the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
     (1991), at syllabus, superseded by state
    constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
     (1997).
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    Case No. 9-11-59
    {¶15} Unlike our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate
    court’s function when reviewing the weight of the evidence is to determine
    whether the greater amount of credible evidence supports the verdict. State v.
    Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387 (1997). In reviewing whether the trial court’s
    judgment was against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a
    “thirteenth juror” and examines the conflicting testimony. 
    Id.
     In doing so, this
    Court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable
    inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in
    resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way and created
    such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
    new trial ordered. State v. Andrews, 3d Dist. No. 1-05-70, 
    2006-Ohio-3764
    , ¶ 30,
    citing State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175 (1st Dist. 1983); Thompkins, 78
    Ohio St.3d at 387.
    {¶16} In the case sub judice, Jack argues specifically that the State failed to
    prove the element of “possession”; however, a challenge to sufficiency of the
    evidence merits a review of all the essential elements of a crime. Moreover,
    “‘Crim.R. 52(B) allows us to notice plain errors or defects when an accused’s
    substantial rights have been violated. The appellee was required by law to present
    sufficient evidence as to each element of the offense. * * * When a necessary
    element has not been shown, we are allowed to notice that omission when the
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    Case No. 9-11-59
    appellant’s rights are violated.’” State v. Adkisson, 8th Dist. No. 81329, 2003-
    Ohio-3322, ¶ 6, quoting In the Matter of: Theonne Mason, 8th Dist. No. 73259
    (1999), at * 5.
    {¶17} Jack was charged with two counts of possession in violation of R.C.
    2925.11. The charges on Jack’s complaint read:
    Takisha M. Jack
    AT CITY OF MARION/MARION COUNTY, OHIO ON OR
    ABOUT THE 3rd DAY OF September 2011 DID knowingly
    obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance, to wit:
    Hydrocodone (Schedule III).
    IN VIOLATION OF O.R.C.# 2925.11
    ***
    Takisha M. Jack
    AT CITY OF MARION/MARION COUNTY, OHIO ON OR
    ABOUT THE 3rd DAY OF September 2011 DID knowingly
    obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance, to wit:
    Marijuana[.]
    IN VIOLATION OF O.R.C.# 2925.11
    (Doc. No. 1).
    {¶18} In order to convict Jack of Possession of a Schedule III Substance, or
    for Possession of Marijuana, the State is required to prove all the elements of R.C.
    2925.11(A).       Penalties for violating R.C. 2925.11 differ depending on the
    -8-
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    “controlled substance” proven to have been possessed. The provisions of R.C.
    2925.11 relevant to this case read,
    (A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a
    controlled substance.
    ***
    (C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one
    of the following
    (2) If the drug involved in the violation is a compound,
    mixture, preparation, or substance included in schedule III, IV,
    or V., whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of
    possession of drugs. The penalty for the offense shall be
    determined as follows:
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(2)(b), (c), or
    (d) of this section, possession of drugs is a misdemeanor of the
    first degree or, if the offender previously has been convicted of a
    drug abuse offense, a felony of the fifth degree.
    ***
    (3) If the drug involved in the violation is marihuana or a
    compound mixture, preparation, or substance containing
    marihuana other than hashish, whoever violates division (A) of
    this section is guilty of possession of marihuana. The penalty for
    the offense shall be determined as follows:
    (b) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(3)(b), (c), (d),
    (e), (f), or (g) of this section, possession of marihuana is a minor
    misdemeanor.
    {¶19} In order for Jack to be convicted of these charges, the State has to
    show that the substances Jack “knowingly possessed” for each conviction were the
    controlled substances as defined in the complaint, i.e. a Schedule III Substance
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    and Marijuana. Failure to prove that the substance is a “controlled substance” is
    fatal to the prosecution. See In Re D.F., No. 7th Dist. No. 10 NO 374, 
    193 Ohio App.3d 78
    , 2011-Ohio 1004, ¶ 81-87 (holding testimony merely that drug was a
    “prescription drug” was insufficient to prove it was a controlled substance).
    {¶20} Pursuant to R.C. 2925.51, the State may establish prima facie
    evidence of the content, identity and weight of a substance through lab testing.1
    But, courts in Ohio have held that lab testing is not always necessary to prove the
    contents of a substance. For example, courts have held that police officers trained
    and qualified may identify marijuana without a laboratory test as long as there is a
    sufficient foundation laid to establish familiarity. State v. Maupin, 
    42 Ohio St.2d 473
     (1975), paragraph two of the syllabus. In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court
    has gone so far as to hold that a drug user lay witness can establish his or her
    competence to express an opinion on the identity of a controlled substance if a
    sufficient foundation for the testimony is established. State v. McKee, 
    91 Ohio St.3d 292
     (2001), at syllabus.
    {¶21} However, failure to establish either a foundation for a witness’
    identification or a lab test proving the contents of controlled substances has been
    found fatal to a conviction warranting reversal. See McKee, supra, at 297-98; see
    also State v. Adkisson, supra at ¶ 7 (holding that absent lab test results, rock of
    1
    See R.C. 2925.51 for requirements that must be met before the prima facie showing is established.
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    crack cocaine introduced into evidence was insufficient to prove substance was
    cocaine for the purposes of possession charge); State v. Bullitt, 8th Dist. No.
    86738, 
    166 Ohio App.3d 365
    , 
    2006-Ohio-2304
    , ¶ 17 (holding failure to introduce
    any analysis of purported cocaine residue insufficient to prove possession); In Re
    D.F., supra at ¶ 81-87 (holding testimony that drug was a prescription drug was
    insufficient to prove it was a controlled substance); State v. Osler, 5th Dist. No.
    10-CA-31, 
    2011-Ohio-3219
    , ¶ 45 (holding officer’s testimony that he “believed”
    substance found tested positive for marijuana not sufficient to support conviction);
    State v. Blevins, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3353, 
    2011-Ohio-3367
    , ¶ 21 (holding
    insufficient evidence to support conviction for possession where a syringe
    purportedly containing methamphetamine was never tested and there was no other
    testimony to substantiate that the substance was a controlled substance).
    {¶22} In order to prove that Jack was in possession of a Schedule III
    controlled substance in this case, the State called one witness, Shockey, who
    offered the following testimony.
    We found the alcohol containers obviously in the driver’s side
    door, the console of the driver’s side door there was a small
    amount of marijuana located there. In the middle console was a
    prescription bottle that contained 185 Hydrocodone-related
    pills, the bottle was indicated [sic] there should have been 120 in
    it, there were two different types of medication, but basically the
    same chemically.
    (Tr. at 14).
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    {¶23} The foregoing testimony is the sum total of all the evidence
    purporting to establish that the pills found in Jack’s vehicle constituted a Schedule
    III Substance.
    {¶24} At no other time in the State’s case are the pills explicitly identified.
    Similarly, nothing was elicited on cross-examination during Jack’s defense to
    identify the pills.   When Hamilton, Jack’s witness, was testifying, he never
    specifically identified the pills, referring to the pills only as “medication.” (Tr. at
    22, 27, 31). Jack also never identified the pills in her testimony, claiming to have
    no knowledge of them being in the car.
    {¶25} Although Shockey makes the statement that the two pills inside the
    bottle were “basically the same chemically” there was no evidence presented at
    trial by the State that the pills were tested and found to be Hydrocodone. In fact,
    there is no evidence anywhere in the record that the pills were taken and analyzed
    by a lab and found to be Hydrocodone as they were alleged to be in the complaint.
    Furthermore, neither the pills themselves nor the pill bottle were introduced into
    evidence to give any indication as to what the bottle contained.           Moreover,
    Shockey offers no testimony as to any familiarity with the pills to lay a foundation
    for his identification. In fact, Shockey’s testimony does not establish that the pills
    even were Hydrocodone as alleged in the complaint. His only testimony regarding
    the pills is that they were “Hydrocodone-related.”
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    Case No. 9-11-59
    {¶26} Based on the utter lack of proof that any pills found in Jack’s car
    were, in fact, Hydrocodone or any other Schedule III Substance, we cannot find
    that there is sufficient evidence to convict Jack on this charge. Under these
    circumstances, the conviction is also against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Therefore, we sustain Jack’s first and second assignments of error.
    {¶27} With regard to Jack’s conviction for Possession of Marijuana, unlike
    his testimony regarding the pills, Shockey did explicitly testify that he found a
    “small amount of marijuana.” (Tr. at 14). While courts in Ohio have held that an
    experienced narcotics officer could field test or identify marijuana sufficiently for
    a conviction of Possession in violation of R.C. 2925.11, no testimony was
    presented as to Shockey’s experience with marijuana or other narcotics. The only
    testimony relative to Shockey’s experience was a claim that he had worked as a
    State Trooper for 12 years and was familiar with the protocols for the enforcement
    of traffic laws. (Tr. at 6).
    {¶28} Furthermore, Shockey did not testify as to how he identified the
    marijuana.    He also did not establish that he had any expertise to identify
    marijuana. At trial, no lab results or field tests were mentioned and nothing was
    introduced into evidence to prove the contents of the marijuana. The purported
    marijuana was also not introduced into evidence.
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    {¶29} Although lab tests may not be necessary to prove a substance is
    marijuana and a lay witness may be able to testify as to what a substance is for the
    purposes of a possession conviction if a sufficient foundation is laid, a conclusory
    statement that a bag of marijuana was found inside of Jack’s car is simply
    insufficient to prove that any substance found was actually marijuana.2 Based on
    the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the evidence in this case is sufficient to
    establish that the substance found was marijuana. The conviction on this charge is
    also against the manifest weight of the evidence. We therefore sustain Jack’s third
    and fourth assignments of error.
    {¶30} Accordingly, Jack’s first, second, third, and fourth assignments of
    error are sustained. Assignments of error five and six are rendered moot.
    {¶31} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed
    and the cause is remanded to the Marion Municipal court to discharge Jack on all
    claims.
    Judgment Reversed and
    Cause Remanded
    PRESTON and ROGERS, J.J., concur.
    /jlr
    2
    We note here that Hamilton, Jack’s witness, specifically mentions marijuana in his testimony. (Tr. at 30).
    However, the State did not establish a sufficient familiarity through Hamilton for lay-witness identification
    of marijuana to support a conviction of possession. Conclusory statements made by a lay witness without a
    foundation are insufficient to prove the contents of a substance.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 9-11-59

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 2131

Judges: Shaw

Filed Date: 5/14/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014