State v. Buckwald , 2010 Ohio 1268 ( 2010 )

[Cite as State v. Buckwald, 2010-Ohio-1268.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 14-09-36
v.
RALPH D. BUCKWALD, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marysville Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TRC 0205953 A&B
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 29, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Ralph D. Buckwald, Appellant
Tim M. Aslaner for Appellee
Case No. 14-09-36
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ralph D. Buckwald, pro se, (hereinafter
“Buckwald”), appeals the judgment of the Marysville Municipal Court denying his
Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
{¶2} On July 12, 2002, Buckwald was charged with operating a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol (OVI) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1),
assigned case no. 02 TR 5953 A, and failure to drive within marked lanes in
violation of Plain City, Ohio local ordinance §331.08(A), assigned case no. 02 TR
5953 B.1 (Doc. No. 2). At the time of the alleged violations, Buckwald’s silver
1987 Lincoln four-door car was towed and impounded in Plain City. (Id.); (Doc.
No. 4). After his arrest for OVI, Buckwald refused a breath test, and his license
and car were seized. (Doc. No. 4). It was subsequently discovered that Buckwald
had six (6) prior OVI convictions, and this charge was his second OVI within six
years. (Doc. Nos. 5, 10).
{¶3} On July 15, 2002, an arraignment was held wherein Buckwald pled
guilty to the OVI charge. (Doc. No. 6). The trial court sentenced Buckwald to one
hundred eighty (180) days in jail with one hundred and fifty (150) days suspended
1
Buckwald is not appealing his conviction with respect to the marked lanes violation, case no. 02 TR 5953
B. From the record, it appears that Buckwald pled guilty to that charge and was fined $25.00 and ordered
to pay court costs of $26.00. (See case no. 02 TR 5953 B, Doc. Nos. 1-3).
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upon condition that he: (1) be placed on probation for five (5) years and not
violate any federal, state, or local laws or conditions of probation; (2) pay $46.00
in court costs and $1,000.00 in fines; and (3) complete an alcohol/drug evaluation
and abide by counseling recommendations for five (5) years. (Id.). The trial court
further ordered that Buckwald’s driver’s license be suspended for five (5) years.
(Id.). The trial court, however, made no order as to Buckwald’s vehicle. (Id.).
{¶4} On July 18, 2002, Buckwald filed a motion to be given a date to
report for his thirty (30) day jail sentence and requesting work release. (Doc. No.
9). On July 22, 2002, the trial court sua sponte amended Buckwald’s sentence to
require that he serve ten (10) consecutive 24-hour days in jail commencing July
15, 2002 since this was his second OVI violation within six (6) years. (Doc. No.
10). However, the trial court allowed Buckwald to serve the remaining twenty
(20) days commencing on November 15, 2002, all without work release. (Id.).
{¶5} On July 26, 2002, Buckwald filed a petition for release of his
vehicle, which the trial court set for a hearing on August 9, 2002. (Doc. Nos. 11,
13). The trial court overruled the petition at the hearing. (Doc. No. 13).
{¶6} On August 23, 2002, Buckwald filed a request for driving privileges
for work, which the trial court denied finding that the instant case was his seventh
(7th) OVI conviction. (Doc. Nos. 16-17).
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{¶7} On November 21, 2002, Buckwald filed a motion to modify his
sentence asking to be released early from his remaining twenty-day jail term, but
no action was taken by the trial court on this motion. (Doc. No. 18).
{¶8} On May 1, 2003, a notice of probation violation was filed against
Buckwald for failing to timely pay his court costs and fines and completing his
drug/alcohol evaluation as ordered. (Doc. No. 20). Buckwald requested a
continuance of the probation violation hearing, and thereafter paid his fines and
costs in full on May 12, 2003. (Doc. Nos. 21-22). Buckwald then failed to appear
for the probation violation hearing scheduled on August 18, 2003. (Doc. No. 24).
{¶9} On March 11, 2005, Buckwald filed a motion apparently seeking a
modification of his sentence to terminate his license suspension, which motion
was denied. (Doc. Nos. 26-28, 31).
{¶10} On September 17, 2009, Buckwald filed a “Petition for Order of Car
Release” with the trial court. (Doc. No. 35). Buckwald argued that he should be
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 because his
sentence was void as his vehicle was taken from him without due process of law.
(Id.). Denying the motion, the trial court noted that Buckwald’s motion amounted
to mere allegations and did not provide any factual support for the assertions made
therein. (Doc. No. 36).
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{¶11} On September 21, 2009, Buckwald filed an addendum to his petition
for order of car release citing a violation of Traffic Rule 10 “et al” as an additional
basis of the motion. (Doc. No. 37).
{¶12} On October 1, 2009, the trial court overruled the petition again,
noting that Buckwald’s addendum added nothing substantively to his previously
filed petition. (Doc. No. 38).
{¶13} On October 5, 2009, Buckwald properly filed a notice of appeal with
the Marysville Municipal Court Clerk. (Doc. Nos. 39, 41). App.R. 3(A), (E).
{¶14} In response to Buckwald’s transcript request, the trial court filed a
Finding and Order, which provides, in pertinent part, “[a]t the time of the
07/15/2002 hearing in these cases ths [sic] court used a tape recorder to record
hearings. Further this court recycled – reused – the audio tapes. * * * The audio
tapes of the * * * hearing were recycled and thus not available.” (Doc. No. 44).
{¶15} Buckwald now appeals raising two assignments of error for our
review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN
SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO A
PERIOD OF INCARCERATION WHEN THE RECORD
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FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT EITHER APPEARED WITH COUNSEL OR
EXECUTED A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER
OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
MR. BUCKWALD WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED
BY ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION [SIC]
AND PREJUDICED THE APPELLANT BY ALLOWING
THE UNCOUSELED PLEA AT INITIAL COURT
APPEARANCE.
{¶16} As an initial matter, we note that Buckwald appears to assert
multiple errors under one assignment of error, but these arguments are interrelated.
We construe Buckwald’s arguments as his reasons that the trial court erred in
denying his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Essentially,
Buckwald argues that his guilty plea was invalid because he did not have counsel
and did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel at
the hearing. We disagree.
{¶17} Appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Nathan (1995), 99 Ohio App.3d 722, 725, 651 N.E.2d 1044, citing State v. Smith
(1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324. An abuse of discretion connotes
more than an error of law or judgment and implies that the trial court acted
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unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140. When applying an abuse of discretion standard,
a reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
Id.{¶18} Crim.R. 32.1 governs withdrawal of guilty and no contest pleas and
provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made
only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice
the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction
and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.
The party moving to withdraw his plea of guilty post-sentence bears the burden of
establishing a manifest injustice. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, at paragraph one of the
syllabus. A manifest injustice is an exceptional defect in the plea proceedings or a
“‘clear or openly unjust act.’” State v. Vogelsong, 3d Dist. No. 5-06-60, 2007-
Ohio-4935, ¶12, State v. Walling, 3d Dist. No. 17-04-12, 2005-Ohio-428, ¶6,
quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699
N.E.2d 83. Accordingly, a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is only
granted in “extraordinary cases.” Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d at 264.
{¶19} Buckwald has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a manifest
injustice such that we could find that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Buckwald has failed to provide us
with any record of the proceedings to demonstrate that he did not knowingly,
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intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. App.R. 9(C) provides an
alternative if a transcript is not available as was the case here since the audio
recording of the July 2002 hearing has since been destroyed. (Finding and Order,
Doc. No. 44). Since Buckwald had failed to provide an App.R. 9(C) statement, we
must presume regularity—namely that the trial court properly ensured that
Buckwald knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel
before entering his guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Pringle, 3d Dist. No. 2-03-12,
2003-Ohio-4235, ¶¶9-10, citations omitted. See, also, State v. Simmons, 11th Dist.
Nos. 2007-P-0046, 2007-P-0047, 2008-Ohio-1331. Aside from that, the record
affirmatively indicates that the trial court advised Buckwald of his rights prior to
accepting his guilty plea. (July 15, 2002 JE, Doc. No. 6). Furthermore, we note
that Buckwald’s motion to withdraw was filed more than seven (7) years after his
guilty plea. “An undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for
withdrawal of a guilty plea and the filing of a motion under Crim.R. 32.1 is a
factor * * * militating against the granting of the motion.” Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d
261, at paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶20} For all these reasons, Buckwald’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING
IMMOBILIZATION AND/OR FORFEITURE OF
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DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S VEHICLE SINCE THERE
WAS A FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORY
PROCEDURES NECESSARY FOR FORFEITURE AND
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT REQUESTED A “PITITION
[SIC] FOR CAR RELEASE DAYS AFTER JUDGMENT AND
SENTENCE. AT THIS DENIED HEARING OHIO REVISED
CODIFIED [SIC] SHOULD HAVE RULED: AND THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE ISSUED AN ORDER OF
IMMOBILIZATION FOR XXX DAY OR FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS CONSIDTANT [SIC] WITH OHIO REVISED
CODIFIED [SIC] 4503.233 ET AL AND 4503.234 ET AL.
RESPECTFULLY.”
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER OF
DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S VEHICLE
SINCE IT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORY
PROCEDURES NECESSARY AS TO DISPOSITION.”
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Buckwald appears to argue that
the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to withdraw because it failed to
follow the statutory procedures outlined in R.C. 4503.233 and 4503.234 for
immobilizing his vehicle and/or ordering forfeiture of his vehicle.
{¶22} As an initial matter, we again note that Buckwald has failed to
provide this court with an App.R. 9(C) statement in lieu of a transcript; and
therefore, we must presume regularity. See Pringle, 2003-Ohio-4235, at ¶¶9-10.
Additionally, the record belies Buckwald’s claim that the trial court ordered
immobilization or forfeiture of his vehicle. (July 15, 2002 JE, Doc. No. 6). As
such, Buckwald has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating manifest injustice,
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and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
{¶23} Buckwald’s second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶24} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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