Clay v. Lakeview Farms, Inc. , 2010 Ohio 603 ( 2010 )

[Cite as Clay v. Lakeview Farms, Inc., 2010-Ohio-603.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
DEREK CLAY,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v. CASE NO. 1-09-55
LAKEVIEW FARMS, INC.,
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
-and- OPINION
MARSHA P. RYAN, ADMINISTRATOR,
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CV2008 1753
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 22, 2010
APPEARANCES:
James C. Ayers for Appellant, Derek Clay
Andrew J. Alatis for Appellee, Adm., OBWC
Peter N. Lavalette for Appellee, Lakeview Farms, Inc.
Case No. 1-09-55
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Derek Clay, appeals from the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Allen County denying his motion for a continuance of
the trial and dismissing his claim, with prejudice, to receive workers’
compensation benefits. On appeal, Clay argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a continuance and subsequently dismissing his case with
prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) where the dismissal
resulted in extreme prejudice to him, producing a reversal of his workers’
compensation benefits. Based on the following, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
{¶2} In November 2007, Clay filed an application for workers’
compensation benefits with the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
(“BWC”), claiming eligibility to benefits due to a back injury suffered while
lifting boxes at his place of employment with Lakeview Farms (“Lakeview”).
Subsequently, the BWC granted his claim as to a sprain in his lumbar region, but
denied his claims for spondylolisthesis, sacrum disorder, and sacroilitis, and Clay
appealed the decision to the Industrial Commission of Ohio (“Industrial
Commission”).
{¶3} In April 2008, the Industrial Commission vacated the BWC’s order
and granted benefits for a “fracture to the pars interarticular at L5 level resulting in
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an anterolisthesis at L5-S1,” with temporary total compensation awarded from
January 11, 2007, through January 4, 2008, and April 18, 2008, through April 22,
2008. (April 2008 Record of Proceedings, pp. 1-2). Subsequently, Lakeview
appealed the Industrial Commission’s decision.
{¶4} In June 2008, the Industrial Commission modified its April 2008
award, granting temporary total disability compensation benefits from November
1, 2007, through the present, and continuing upon the submission of medical
evidence. In its decision, the Industrial Commission stated the following:
This finding is based upon the medical records of Dr. Fumich,
specifically those dated 6/3/2008, which indicates [sic] that the
condition would not show on an MRI, but rather be shown on a
CT-scan or x-ray; his report of 4/08/2008, 2/12/2008, 1/18/2008
and 11/1/2007. Dr. Fumich is aware of Injured Worker’s
specific work activity and opines that Injured Worker sustained
an acute incident from his lifting activities.
Therefore, the weight of the evidence supports that the condition
arose in the course and scope of Injured Worker’s employment
and the claim is allowed as indicated.
(June 2008 Record of Proceedings, p. 1).
{¶5} In September 2008, Lakeview appealed the Industrial Commission’s
June 2008 decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County pursuant
to R.C. 4123.512.
{¶6} In December 2008, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the case
was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County.
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{¶7} On September 10, 2009, Clay filed a motion for relief from Loc.R.
3.08, requesting that he be permitted to file the deposition of his medical expert,
Dr. Frank Fumich, only three days prior to trial. In the motion, Clay explained
that the normal procedure for workers’ compensation cases is to delay spending
money on the case before there is an attempt to resolve the matter; that a
conference was held on August 12, 2009, but no resolution was reached; and, that
he then attempted to schedule Dr. Fumich for a deposition, but Dr. Fumich
notified him he would only be available on September 24, 2009. Subsequently,
the trial court granted the motion.
{¶8} On September 24, 2009, Dr. Fumich testified via deposition that he
is licensed to practice medicine in the state of Ohio; that he practices with the
Orthopedic Institute of Ohio and is board certified as a specialist in orthopedic
surgery; that he first treated Clay in November 2007; that Clay complained of
lower back pain and bilateral leg pain; that Clay stated that he began experiencing
the pain after an incident at work in October 2007 where he was lifting forty-
pound boxes; that Clay related that the pain made it difficult for him to walk and
stand; that Clay informed him that he received chiropractic treatment from
October 16, 2007, up until October 23, 2007; and, that, based upon an x-ray of
Clay’s back, he diagnosed him with “a grade one spondylolisthesis and a pars
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defect of the L5-S1 level.” (Fumich Dep., p. 10). The following discussion then
took place between Clay’s trial counsel and Dr. Fumich:
Clay’s Trial Counsel: * * * I want you to assume as it was told,
as you were told in your history, that he lifted a box that
weighed approximately forty pounds and felt the pain in his low
back, he continued to work about four hours or so that day
continuing to lift boxes, and when he got home he had trouble
getting out of his truck and he felt the back pain, which he then
went to see the chiropractor for, eventually ending up in your
care. I want you to assume your findings, diagnoses, testing that
you’ve all discussed here today, and I want you to assume that
on April 9, 2005, he had a motor vehicle accident in which he did
see a chiropractor, and he did have some low back pain. I want
you to assume that in February 7, 2007, or thereabout, he also
had low back pain and he was treated by a chiropractor, even
going back as far as back as [sic] the year 2000 he had
chiropractic treatment for his low back. But I also want you to
assume that when he reported to work that day he was able to
perform his services, he was not on any restriction, and he was
able to lift boxes until he lifted this particular box. I want you to
also assume that he had had treatment as late as 2007, as I said
in February 7, 2007, for his low back by a chiropractor. Now,
Doctor, accepting those factors as true and accepting your
findings and your diagnoses, I ask you if you have an opinion to
a reasonable degree of medical probability and certainty as to
whether that lifting incident on October 16, 2007, as was
described by you, proximately caused the conditions that you
diagnosed and discussed with us in your deposition here today.
Do you have an opinion?
Dr. Fumich: Well, you’ve offered a lot of new information to me
that I wasn’t aware of beforehand.
Clay’s Trial Counsel: Yes, sir.
Dr. Fumich: Different treatments for different incidences which
I’ve had no ability to review records of until you’ve said this just
now very succinctly in the matter of two minutes. So, that offers
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a whole lot of more information I can consider, that I have to
take a look at to be able to say with absolute certainty what my
judgment is. I can’t say without looking at that, now that I
know that that existed, that this is direct causation of that lifting
injury. If none of those radiologic studies showed that a pars
fracture or spondylolisthesis existed, I would be led to believe
that this lifting injury caused this new fracture and this new
spondylolisthesis which would be this work injury. But without
knowing what those records show, I would have to see those to
confirm that this isolated injury was the cause of that problem.
So to answer you, I really can’t just summarize and say that I
agree everything falls on a work injury on that date now that
you’ve introduced this new information to me without me
reviewing it.
Clay’s Trial Counsel: All right. Let me add to that, that there is
no radiological evidence that he had these two conditions prior
to coming to see or prior to this October 16, 2007 incident.
Adding that to the evidence that’s been given to you here today,
do you have an opinion then as to whether the conditions were
caused by the lifting incident?
Dr. Fumich: I would still like to see those radiographic studies
myself. * * * I can’t give you a definitive answer on that. I
didn’t have any other studies that Derek brought with him
except the ones that I took in the office, so I have not seen the
chiropractic studies or anything prior to the year in [sic] 2007. *
**
***
Clay’s trial counsel: Let’s go off the record a moment, please. *
* * Dr. Fumich, you’ve had an opportunity to review Plaintiff’s
exhibit 1, which is the office records of Dr. Holman
Chiropractic.
Dr. Fumich: Yes.
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Clay’s Trial Counsel: Was there anything in those records that
would assist you here today in arriving at a conclusion to a
reasonable degree of medical probability?
***
Dr. Fumich: Prior to me learning of this, I knew of no other
incident that affected his back. And I’ve been introduced to new
information today that leads me to believe he had something else
going on before I met him.
Clay’s Trial Counsel: Would the x-ray pictures assist you in
arriving at a conclusion in this case if we had Dr. Holman’s x-
rays taken?
Dr. Fumich: To review an x-ray to confirm whether or not there
was this spondylolisthesis or pars fracture that would give me
more information to know if there was a fracture sustained on
the date of the stated injury.
(Id. at pp. 13-17).
{¶9} On cross-examination, Dr. Fumich further stated that Clay’s mother,
who helped Clay complete the medical history questionnaire provided to new
patients, failed to disclose that Clay had suffered two previous back injuries prior
to the injury he sustained while lifting boxes at his place of employment, and that
she failed to disclose his previous history of treatments for back injuries dating
back to 2000.
{¶10} On September 25, 2009, Clay filed a motion for continuance of the
trial date, requesting a thirty-day continuance to give Dr. Fumich an opportunity to
review his prior treatment records so that Dr. Fumich may be able to form an
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opinion as to whether his back injury was the proximate result of his lifting boxes
while employed by Lakeview. In the motion, Clay stated that Dr. Fumich
expressed a prior opinion in his reports that his “fracture to the pars interarticular
at L5 level resulting in an anterolisthesis at L5-S1” was sustained as a result of
lifting boxes at Lakeview in October 2007 (motion for continuance, p. 1); that,
subsequent to the deposition of Mary Eix, Clay’s mother, on September 24, 2009,
it was discovered that Dr. Fumich had not been given a history of his prior
chiropractic treatments in 2000, 2005, and February 2007; that, when Dr. Fumich
was presented with a hypothetical question at the deposition that included
information pertaining to his prior treatments, Dr. Fumich was not able to state an
opinion as to the exact cause of the diagnosis based upon this new information
relating to his prior back problems; and, that Dr. Fumich responded that he could
give an opinion as to the causation of the back injury if he was able to review the
prior radiological findings of the chiropractors to rule out pre-existing conditions.
{¶11} Subsequently, the trial court denied Clay’s motion for a continuance,
stating the following in its judgment entry:
Plaintiff wants a continuance due to what he calls “unexpected
problems…with Dr. Fumich’s testimony…” Dr. Fumich has
been identified as plaintiff’s sole expert witness. Defendant
contends the “unexpected problems” are that Dr. Fumich was
unable to render the necessary opinion for plaintiff’s case
because he did not have records of plaintiff’s prior medical
history. * * *
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***
This is a case where, three business days before trial * * *, after
counsel have [sic] waited practically until the last minute to
learn what the expert would say, an “unexpected problem”
arises with the plaintiff’s expert testimony – a problem that is
ostensibly damaging to plaintiff’s case. Based on the motion * *
*, it appears the “unexpected problem” is due to the fact that
plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Fumich, was never provided with an
accurate and complete history of plaintiff’s medical condition
before he was asked to render trial testimony via his video
deposition. * * * Is the problem one that could have been
avoided with an accurate history or perhaps earlier or better
preparation? Any damage to the plaintiff’s case in this instance
was self-inflicted by waiting until the last minute to arrange for
the expert’s deposition. * * *
(Sept. 2009 Judgment Entry on Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance, pp. 2-4).
{¶12} On September 29, 2009, the trial court filed a notice of its intention
to dismiss the case with prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for Clay’s failure to
appear on the date of trial, and requested that both parties brief the issue of
whether the case should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
{¶13} In October 2009, subsequent to briefing by Clay and Lakeview, the
trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, stating the following in its judgment
entry:
This decision is necessitated by plaintiff, who, during a telephone
conference call on September 29, 2009, represented to the court
that plaintiff could not proceed with presentation of this case on
September 29, 2009, the date previously scheduled for jury trial.
The jury was canceled and plaintiff did not appear for trial on
September 29, 2009.
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Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(D), plaintiff cannot unilaterally
voluntarily dismiss his case without the consent of the defendant.
Defendant did not consent to a voluntary dismissal. The
plaintiff was given notice that his failure to proceed at trial
would result in the case being dismissed pursuant to Civ.R.
41(B)(1). Plaintiff requested the Court dismiss the matter for
failure to prosecute “without prejudice.”
***
The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to prosecute this case by
not going forward at trial with evidence in support of his case.
In his response * * *, plaintiff explains that the reason he did not
go forward with the prosecution of his case was because he was
surprised by the deposition testimony of Dr. Fumich, plaintiff’s
expert.
***
In spite of the heightened scrutiny to which dismissals with
prejudice are subjected, a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1)
is appropriate in cases where the conduct of a party is so
negligent or irresponsible, as to merit such a harsh sanction. It
is within the sound discretion of the trial court to dismiss an
action for lack of prosecution. * * * In the careful exercise of
this discretion, this Court considers the following:
1. The fact that plaintiff did not appear for or proceed with
trial;
2. the reasons plaintiff did not proceed with presenting his
case, including all evidence disclosed by Dr. Fumich’s deposition
(Dr. Fumich testified, “…I’ve been introduced to new
information today that leads me to believe he had something else
going on before I met him.” (Fumich Dep. p. 17));
3. the fact that plaintiff (or his mother) denied a prior history
to Dr. Fumich; * * *
4. the timing of the alleged “surprise,” (Fumich’s deposition
was not arranged until a few days before trial) and the fact that
the element of surprise could have been avoided had plaintiff not
been so dilatory in: a) arranging the deposition, and b) making
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sure Dr. Fumich had all the prior medical evidence before he
rendered an opinion[.]
** *
The Court finds that plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this case was
the result of things that plaintiff could have prevented, and so,
dismissal for lack of prosecution is warranted. * * * Dismissal
with prejudice is also warranted and consistent with the dilatory
conduct of plaintiff and the reasons SB 7 ended employee-
claimants’, like plaintiff’s, unilateral ability to voluntarily
dismiss a complaint.
(Emphasis in original). (Oct. 2009 Judgment Entry of Dismissal, pp. 1-5).
{¶14} It is from the trial court’s dismissal of his case with prejudice that
Clay appeals, presenting the following assignment of error for our review.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
OVERRULED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL DATE BASED UPON
STRANGE AND UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
PREVENTED APPELLANT FOR [SIC] HAVING
SUFFICIENT TIME TO INVESTIGATE AND WHEN THE
COURT SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE THE
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED TO THE EXTENT THAT
HIS PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED WORKERS’
COMPENSATION CLAIM WAS REVERSED.
{¶15} In his sole assignment of error, Clay argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance and dismissing his
claim with prejudice. Specifically, Clay contends that a continuance of the trial
date should have been granted to give him additional time to provide Dr. Fumich
with all prior medical records so that he could make a determination as to the
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cause of his back injury, where Dr. Fumich had previously linked his diagnosis to
the injury he sustained while employed at Lakeview, where there was no prior
indication Dr. Fumich would testify that he needed to review further records to
determine the exact cause of the back injury, and where a denial of the
continuance resulted in an extreme detriment by effectively causing a dismissal of
the case with prejudice. We disagree.
{¶16} The trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for continuance is within
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of
that discretion. In re Arms, 3d Dist. No. 14-07-24, 2007-Ohio-6717, ¶13, citing
State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67. See, also, Beard v. Rodriguez, 3d
Dist. No. 13-04-26, 2005-Ohio-1916, ¶5. An abuse of discretion “connotes more
than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing
court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id.{¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has formulated a balancing test of all
competing interests to determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion in
its decision on a motion for continuance:
In evaluating a motion for a continuance, a court should note,
inter alia: the length of the delay requested; whether other
continuances have been requested and received; the
inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the
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court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or
whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the
defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to
the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors,
depending on the unique facts of each case.
Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d at 67-68. See, also, In re T.C., 140 Ohio App.3d 409, 417,
2000-Ohio-1769.
{¶18} Additionally, Civ.R. 41(B) provides for the involuntary dismissal of
actions, and states as follows:
(B) Involuntary dismissal: effect thereof
(1) Failure to prosecute. Where the plaintiff fails to prosecute,
or comply with these rules or any court order, the court upon
motion of a defendant or on its own motion may, after notice to
the plaintiff’s counsel, dismiss an action or claim.
***
(3) Adjudication on the merits; exception. A dismissal under
division (B) of this rule and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule, except as provided in division (B)(4) of this rule,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless the court, in
its order for dismissal, otherwise specifies.
{¶19} An involuntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Dray v. General Motors Corp., 3d Dist. No. 1-
05-35, 2006-Ohio-347, ¶23, citing Pembaur v. Leis (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 89, 91.
Furthermore, an involuntary dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for failure to
prosecute or for failure to follow court orders is a harsh sanction and contrary to
the fundamental preference for deciding a case on its merits. Jones v. Hartranft,
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78 Ohio St.3d 368, 371, 1997-Ohio-203, citing Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern
Indemn. Co. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 632. Consequently, a trial court should
not dismiss a case with prejudice unless the plaintiff’s conduct is “negligent,
irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for a
dismissal with prejudice * * *[.]” Schreiner v. Karson (1977), 52 Ohio App.3d
219, 223. Before a trial court may dismiss an action with prejudice, it must
provide notice to the plaintiff of its intention to dismiss. Civ.R. 41(B)(1). See,
also, Dray, 2006-Ohio-347, at ¶21. “Notice is an absolute prerequisite for
dismissal * * *.” FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Salmon, 180 Ohio App.3d 548, 2009-
Ohio-80, ¶12, citing Perotti v. Ferguson (1983), 7 Ohio St.3d 1, 2-3.
{¶20} Moreover, where the employer in a workers’ compensation case files
a notice of appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission, the claimant may
not dismiss the appeal without the employer’s consent. R.C. 4123.512(D);
Thorton v. Montville Plastics and Rubber, Inc., 11th Dist. No. 2006-G-2744,
2007-Ohio-3475, ¶¶14-15.
{¶21} In the case sub judice, Clay scheduled a deposition with Dr. Fumich
only days before the start of trial; while the delayed deposition may have been
partly due to Dr. Fumich’s busy schedule, the deposition was taken a full year
after Lakeview filed its notice of appeal, and Clay should have anticipated the
need for Dr. Fumich’s testimony and attempted to schedule the deposition much
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sooner. Additionally, Clay did not provide Dr. Fumich with all of the information
relating to his previous back problems prior to the deposition, but introduced him
to this information at the time of the deposition. Although Clay’s trial counsel
may not have been aware that Clay failed to disclose his full back history to Dr.
Fumich, Clay knew of this concealment, and he and his trial counsel should have
been vigilant to make sure Dr. Fumich had all needed information and records
prior to the deposition in order to form an expert opinion on the relation of Clay’s
back injury to his work at Lakeview.
{¶22} Even though the length of the continuance requested, thirty days,
was reasonable, no other continuances had been requested, and the inconvenience
to the parties would have likely been minimal, the circumstances giving rise to the
request were clearly the result of Clay’s reprehensible actions in concealing his
prior back problems from Dr. Fumich and Clay’s trial counsel’s neglect in
assuring a timely deposition and that Dr. Fumich had all necessary information
and records prior to the deposition. Accordingly, although this Court might have
reached a different conclusion regarding the continuance if the standard of review
was de novo, the denial of the motion for continuance was within the trial court’s
discretion, and we do not find an abuse of that discretion, as the trial court gave
thorough consideration to all necessary factors before exercising judgment.
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{¶23} Turning now to Clay’s argument that the trial court erred in
dismissing his case with prejudice, we first note that Clay purposely failed to
appear for the scheduled trial date despite the trial court’s denial of his motion for
a continuance. Although Clay may not have possessed the necessary expert
testimony to connect his back injury to actions he performed within the course of
his employment with Lakeview, he could have presented other evidence
establishing a link between the injury and his employment, including the evidence
he presented to the BWC and Industrial Commission to secure workers’
compensation benefits. Furthermore, even if Clay would have proceeded to trial
and lost, he could have appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for a
continuance. Additionally, the trial court properly informed Clay of its intention
to dismiss his case with prejudice, and the trial court was also correct in denying
his request to dismiss the case without prejudice because Lakeview did not
consent to the dismissal.
{¶24} Consequently, due to Clay’s actions necessitating the need for the
continuance, and Clay’s purposeful absence at trial, we find his actions to be
“negligent, irresponsible, [and] contumacious” Schreiner, 52 Ohio App.3d at 223,
such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with
prejudice.
{¶25} Accordingly, we overrule Clay’s assignment of error.
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{¶26} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW and PRESTON, J.J., concur in Judgment Only.
/jlr
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