State v. Montgomery ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Montgomery, 
    2014-Ohio-1789
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    PUTNAM COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                              CASE NO. 12-13-11
    v.
    ROBERT M. MONTGOMERY,                                    OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Putnam County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 13-CR-24
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: April 28, 2014
    APPEARANCE:
    Esteban R. Callejas for Appellant
    Case No. 12-13-11
    PRESTON, J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert M. Montgomery, appeals the Putnam
    County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment entry of sentence. We affirm.
    {¶2} On May 13, 2013, the Putnam County Grand Jury indicted
    Montgomery on Count One of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the
    manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.041(A), a third-degree felony;
    Count Two of illegal manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A) &
    (C)(3), a second-degree felony; and, Count Three of possession of drugs in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) & (C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree felony. (Doc. No. 1).
    {¶3} On May 15, 2013, Montgomery entered pleas of not guilty to all three
    counts in the indictment. (See Doc. Nos. 5, 8, 11).
    {¶4} On August 28, 2013, the trial court held a change-of-plea hearing
    wherein Montgomery withdrew his previously tendered plea of not guilty to Count
    One and entered a plea of guilty, whereupon the State agreed to dismiss Counts
    Two and Three of the indictment and to remain silent at sentencing. (Aug. 28,
    2013 Tr. at 2). Montgomery signed a written plea agreement reflecting these
    terms. (Doc. No. 29). The trial court accepted Montgomery’s plea, found him
    guilty of Count One, and ordered a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report.
    (Aug. 28, 2013 Tr. at 8-9). The trial court dismissed Counts Two and Three of the
    indictment. (See Nov. 19, 2013 Entry).
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    Case No. 12-13-11
    {¶5} On October 3, 2013, the trial court sentenced Montgomery to 30
    months imprisonment. (Oct. 3, 2013 Tr. at 6). On October 9, 2013, the trial court
    filed its judgment entry of sentence. (Doc. No. 35).
    {¶6} On October 16, 2013, Montgomery filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No.
    41).   He raises three assignments of error on appeal.      We elect to combine
    Montgomery’s first and second assignments of error.
    Assignment of Error No. I
    The trial court erred when it accepted the guilty plea which was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the
    evidence.
    Assignment of Error No. II
    The trial court erred when it accepted the guilty plea as that plea
    was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given.
    {¶7} In his first assignment of error, Montgomery argues that, during the
    Criminal Rule 11 colloquy, the State failed to present any evidence that the
    criminal actions occurred in Ottawa, Putnam County, Ohio.
    {¶8} In his second assignment of error, Montgomery argues that he did not
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his guilty plea.    Specifically,
    Montgomery argues that the trial court failed to inform him of all of his rights
    prior to accepting his plea. Montgomery also argues that the plea is invalid
    because the State failed to allege and prove venue.
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    Case No. 12-13-11
    {¶9} As an initial, procedural matter, we note that the State failed to file an
    appellee’s brief. Under these circumstances, App.R. 18(C) provides that this
    Court “may accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues as correct and
    reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain such
    action.” After reviewing the record, we conclude that appellant’s brief does not
    reasonably appear to sustain a reversal.
    {¶10} “‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be
    made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points
    renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States
    Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Veney, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 176
    ,
    
    2008-Ohio-5200
    , ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 525
    , 527 (1996). To
    that end, Crim.R. 11(C)(2), governing guilty pleas for felony-level offenses,
    provides:
    In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a
    plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
    without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the
    following:
    (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,
    with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
    penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
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    for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
    the sentencing hearing.
    (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
    understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
    court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
    sentence.
    (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
    understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to
    jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
    compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor,
    and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be
    compelled to testify against himself or herself.
    {¶11} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and
    orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives the
    defendant’s constitutional rights. Veney at ¶ 31. “When a trial court fails to
    strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s plea is invalid.” 
    Id.
     A trial court,
    however, is required to only substantially comply with the non-constitutional
    notifications in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Id. at ¶ 14-17.
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    Case No. 12-13-11
    {¶12} An appellate court reviews the substantial-compliance standard based
    upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s plea and
    determines whether he subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the
    rights he waived. State v. Sarkozy, 
    117 Ohio St.3d 86
    , 
    2008-Ohio-509
    , ¶ 20.
    “Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was
    not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect.
    * * * The test is whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” State v.
    Nero, 
    56 Ohio St.3d 106
    , 108 (1990).
    {¶13} Contrary to Montgomery’s arguments on appeal, the trial court
    strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) at the change-of-plea hearing. (Aug.
    28, 2013 Tr. at 5-6). Furthermore, the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) notifications were also
    contained within the written plea agreement that Montgomery read and signed in
    open court. (Id. at 8); (Doc. No. 29). The trial court also substantially complied
    with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) notifications. (Aug. 28, 2013 Tr. at 2-6).
    During the colloquy, Montgomery indicated that he understood the nature of the
    charges against him and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. (Id. at
    passim).   Consequently, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred by
    accepting Montgomery’s guilty plea. Notably, Montgomery has also failed to
    argue—much less establish—prejudice in this case, i.e. that he would not have
    pled guilty but for the trial court’s alleged errors. Nero at 108.
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    {¶14} Montgomery also argues that his guilty plea was invalid because the
    State failed to indicate, at the change-of-plea hearing, that Putnam County, Ohio
    was the proper venue.          We summarily reject that argument.      To begin,
    Montgomery has waived this issue by failing to raise it below. State v. Wheat,
    10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-30, 
    2005-Ohio-6958
    , ¶ 10, citing State v. Loucks, 
    28 Ohio App.2d 77
    , 78 (4th Dist.1971); Crim.R. 12(C)(2).           Aside from that,
    Montgomery admitted to venue when he pled guilty to Count One of the
    indictment, which specifically alleged that the criminal act occurred in Putnam
    County, Ohio. United States v. Broce, 
    488 U.S. 563
    , 569-570, 
    109 S.Ct. 757
    (1989) (A guilty plea admits to committing the crime charged, as described in the
    indictment.). Proper venue was also provided in the bill of particulars. (Doc. No.
    17). Quite simply, Montgomery’s guilty plea precludes the venue argument on
    appeal. State v. McCartney, 
    55 Ohio App.3d 170
     (9th Dist.1988), syllabus.
    {¶15} For the aforementioned reasons, we overrule Montgomery’s first and
    second assignments of error.
    Assignment of Error No. III
    The trial court erred when it failed to allow Appellant to exercise
    his right to make a statement before sentencing.
    {¶16} In his third assignment of error, Montgomery argues that the trial
    court erred by failing to permit him to make a statement before sentencing
    requiring a resentencing.
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    Case No. 12-13-11
    {¶17} Crim.R. 32(A)(1) provides that “[a]t the time of imposing sentence,
    the court shall * * * address the defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes
    to make a statement in his or her own behalf or present any information in
    mitigation of punishment.” When a trial court imposes sentence “without first
    asking the defendant whether he or she wishes to exercise the right of allocution
    created by Crim.R. 32(A), resentencing is required unless the error is invited error
    or harmless error.” State v. Campbell, 
    90 Ohio St.3d 320
     (2000), paragraph three
    of the syllabus. See also State v. Reynolds, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 670
    , 684 (1998).
    {¶18} In this case, the trial court asked Montgomery if he wanted to make a
    statement, and Montgomery testified, “No, sir.”         (Oct. 3, 2013 Tr. at 4).
    Consequently, the trial court did not violate Montgomery’s right of allocution in
    this case, despite his allegation on appeal.
    {¶19} Montgomery’s third assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    {¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
    particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Judgment Affirmed
    ROGERS and SHAW, J.J., concur.
    /jlr
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