State v. Sarge , 2021 Ohio 4379 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Sarge, 2021-Ohio-4379.]
COURT OF APPEALS
KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 21CA000014
:
CALEB SARGE :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Knox County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 19CR12-324
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 9, 2021
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
CHARLES T. MCCONVILLE TODD W. BARSTOW
KNOX COUNTY PROSECUTOR 261 W. Johnstown Rd., Suite 204
117 E. High St., Suite 234 Columbus, OH 43230
Mount Vernon, OH 43050
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Caleb Sarge appeals from the April 12, 2021
sentencing entry of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On December 2, 2019, the Knox County Grand Jury indicted Defendant-
Appellant Caleb Sarge on one count of murder (with a firearm specification), an
unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), and one count of tampering with
evidence, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). Sarge entered a plea
of not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded to a jury trial on March 9, 2021.
{¶3} We recite the facts adduced at trial but note that on appeal, Sarge does not
dispute that he shot and killed the victim, John Serio. The issue in this case is whether
Sarge acted in self-defense when he shot Serio.
{¶4} On November 25, 2019 at approximately 7:30 p.m., the Knox County dispatch
received a call on its non-emergency line. The female caller said she had information
of a dead body in the area of Calhoun Street and North Sandusky Drive in Mount
Vernon, Ohio. The female caller told the dispatch that Sarge had called her, told her he
had cut John Serio’s wrist, and Serio was lying on the floor of Sarge’s residence. Police
officers with the Mount Vernon Police Department were dispatched to search the area.
During their search, they observed Sarge standing outside 608 North Sandusky Street,
where he called out to them. The officers told Sarge they were there because of a
complaint about John Serio. Sarge told the officers that Serio was laying on the floor
inside his house. When asked why he was on his floor, Sarge responded, “He came at
me so I shot him.” (T. 215).
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 3
{¶5} Sarge was detained and read his Miranda rights. The officers entered the
house and found Serio laying on the floor in the rear of the residence. He was cold to the
touch and not breathing. An officer asked Sarge where he shot Serio because he could
not see a gunshot wound and there was no blood; Sarge said it was in Serio’s left side,
up high. Serio was declared dead at the scene. Sarge told the police the gun he used to
shoot John Serio was located on the kitchen table, upon which the officers found a .22
caliber, single action revolver.
{¶6} After a search warrant was obtained, the premises were searched. In the
kitchen, the officers discovered a cell phone belonging to Serio sitting in a cooking pot full
of water. Two cell phones that belonged to Sarge were discovered in the foyer and under
a dining room table.
{¶7} Sarge was taken into custody and interviewed by the police on two
occasions. Sarge was asked how he came to know Serio. Sarge was an admitted drug
dealer and Serio had issues with substance abuse. Sarge said he had known Serio for a
couple of weeks and recently, Serio was staying in Sarge’s basement. When the detective
asked Sarge if he was scared of Serio, Sarge said he really wasn’t, but something just
snapped.
{¶8} Serio made a written statement during the first interview, where he admitted
to shooting Serio. According to Sarge’s statement, on the evening on November 25, 2019,
Sarge said Serio had not used drugs all day and wanted some Adderall, but he did not
have any money to get it. Serio asked Sarge for the money, but Sarge would not give it
to him. They began to argue about it. Sarge claimed he was seated in a chair in the front
living room and had the .22 caliber revolver at his side. Sarge said he usually carried the
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 4
gun with him for his protection. Serio confronted Sarge, Sarge got out of the chair and
said they were neck and neck, but Sarge’s arm was fully stretched. Serio allegedly told
Sarge he was going to beat his ass. Sarge was six foot, three inches tall and weighed
over 500 pounds. Serio was five feet, eight inches tall and weighed 170 pounds. Sarge
said he knew that Serio usually carried a knife and there were knives on the kitchen table.
Serio grabbed for the gun and Sarge thought he touched the barrel. Sarge believed Serio
was going for the gun and the gun went off. A witness from the BCI firearms section
testified that a functioning single action revolver, which Sarge’s gun was, will not
discharge unless the hammer is cocked and then the trigger pulled.
{¶9} Serio was shot once in the left chest and the coroner found the bullet passed
through both lungs and the heart, grazed the aorta, and caused significant internal
hemorrhaging. Serio collapsed after he was shot. After he was shot, Serio said, “Help,
911,” but Sarge stood over Serio for a few minutes. Sarge made phone calls to his mother
and friends, after which one of his friends called 911. Another friend testified that Sarge
called her after he shot Serio. When she asked how it happened, Sarge told her they had
gotten into an argument over money and drugs that Serio supposedly had not gotten.
Sarge told her he did not know whether to shoot Serio again or get rid of his body. He
sent her a message on Facebook asking if she knew anywhere to get rid of Serio’s body.
He asked her to come to Mount Vernon to help him take care of it. The friend thought
Sarge was asking her to “help him get rid of John’s body or help him talk to the cops
pleading self-defense, because he was on the fence of either calling the cops or getting
rid of John’s body.” (T. 514). When asked if Sarge told her it was self-defense, she replied,
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 5
“He told me that if he was gonna call the cops that he was going to try to tell them that it
was self-defense.” (T. 517).
{¶10} Sarge said he moved Serio’s body from the front living room area to the
rear of the residence. He admitted to putting Serio’s cell phone in a pot of water in the
kitchen.
{¶11} Sarge said there was a glass bubble pipe in Serio’s hand when he was shot,
which the police located during the search. The toxicology report showed that Serio had
a significant amount of methamphetamine and amphetamine in his system at the time of
his death, but it was unknown when Serio took the drugs.
{¶12} Serio’s clothes were sent to the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s
Office to determine the muzzle to target distance. At the time he was shot, Serio was
wearing four shirts. Based on the medical examiner’s analysis, it was determined the
muzzle to target distance was greater than 21 inches and less than 36 inches from the
end of the barrel of the .22 caliber revolver to the fabric of the outermost layer of clothing.
The barrel of the revolver was 6.5 inches in length.
{¶13} The .22 caliber revolver was also analyzed for DNA evidence by the Bureau
of Criminal Investigation. The major contributor of DNA on the weapon was determined
to be Sarge. Female DNA was found on the front sight of the gun, but there was no
standard to compare the DNA to. Other male DNA was also found on the weapon but
there was insufficient quantity or quality to compare to a standard. The DNA analysis did
not show, however, that Serio did not touch the end of the gun barrel.
{¶14} While Sarge put Serio’s cell phone in a pot of water, BCI was able to dry
the phone and retrieve messages on the phone. On November 25, 2019, Serio was
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 6
messaging with a person who asked Serio, “Can you do me a favor. We have this Jones
shit. It’s about a 20 I believe. Can you get rid of it for us, please. And do you know anyone
who fucks with Addies.” Serio responded, “Yes. What mg. Addy, no capsules.” At 4:28
p.m., Serio sent a message that says, “NVM, he’s being a bitch.” He sent another
message that says, “I’m – I’m bout to whoop his fat ass.”
{¶15} The defense presented one witness, Det. Terry Wolfe of the Knox County
Sheriff’s Office. Det. Wolfe testified that on November 20, 2019, he and Serio’s probation
officer detained Serio. Det. Wolfe, with Serio’s permission, searched his cell phone
and Det. Wolfe observed a conversation between Sarge and Serio regarding a hit on
Sarge.
{¶16} At the conclusion of his case, Sarge moved for a dismissal pursuant to
Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied. The trial court then charged the jury including
instructions as to self-defense. After deliberation, the jury found Sarge guilty of murder,
tampering with evidence, and the firearm specification.
{¶17} The trial court ordered a presentence investigation prior to sentencing. A
sentencing hearing was held on April 8, 2021, and the sentencing entry was journalized
on April 12, 2021. The trial court sentenced Sarge as follows:
It is the sentence of the Court that the Defendant serve an indefinite term
of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years to life on Count One pursuant to
Revised Code Section 2929.02(B)(1). The Court sentences the Defendant
to a term of three (3) years on the firearm specification as to Count One, to
be served consecutive and prior to the indefinite term on Count One,
pursuant to Revised Code Section 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii). The Court
sentences the Defendant to a definite term of imprisonment of thirty-six
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 7
months on Count Two, to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed
in Count One. The Defendant is given 499 days jail time credit, along with
future days while awaiting transportation to the appropriate institution. The
Defendant is Ordered to pay $6,404.88 in restitution to the family of John
Serio.
{¶18} It is from this sentencing entry that Sarge now appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶19} Sarge raises two Assignments of Error:
{¶20} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION BY FINDING HIM GUILTY OF MURDER AND TAMPERING WITH
EVIDENCE AS THOSE VERDICTS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE AND WERE ALSO AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
{¶21} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY
SENTENCING HIM IN CONTRAVENTION OF OHIO’S SENTENCING STATUTES.”
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶22} In Sarge’s first Assignment of Error, he contends his convictions for one
count of murder and one count of tampering with evidence were not supported by
sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 8
Standard of Review
{¶23} The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained in
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), in which the Court
distinguished between “sufficiency of the evidence” and “manifest weight of the evidence,”
finding that these concepts differ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 386. The
Court held that sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, but weight of the
evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief. Id. at 386–387. “In other
words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive—the state's or the
defendant's?” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶
25. The Court noted that although there may be sufficient evidence to support a judgment,
it could nevertheless be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins, supra
at 387. “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’
and disagrees with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Id., citing Tibbs
v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).
{¶24} In a test for sufficiency, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after reviewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis
sic.) State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 289, 731 N.E.2d 159, quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A sufficiency challenge
asks whether the evidence adduced at trial “is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict
as a matter of law.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596,
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 9
at ¶ 219. Evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is not relevant to a sufficiency analysis.
State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, at ¶ 79.
{¶25} By contrast, to evaluate a manifest-weight claim, a court must review the
entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the
credibility of witnesses. State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70
N.E.3d 508, at ¶ 328. The court must decide whether “ ‘the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed.’ ” Id.,quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
Murder and Self-Defense
{¶26} Sarge argues his conviction for murder was against the sufficiency of the
evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense when he shot Serio.
{¶27} Under Ohio law, a person is permitted to act in self-defense. Effective March
28, 2019, R.C. 2901.05 was amended so that self-defense was no longer an affirmative
defense and the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused did not use force in self-defense. State v. Rengert, 5th Dist. Delaware
No. 19 CAA 10 0056, 2021-Ohio-2561, 2021 WL 3161194, ¶ 23. R.C. 2901.05(A), as
amended, states, in relevant part:
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements
of the offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the
evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a
preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense other than self-
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 10
defense * * * as described in division (B)(1) of this section, is upon the
accused.
{¶28} R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) further states:
A person is allowed to act in self-defense, defense of another, or defense
of that person's residence. If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an
offense that involved the person's use of force against another, there is
evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the
force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person's
residence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused person did not use the force in self-defense, defense of another,
or defense of that person's residence, as the case may be.
{¶29} The elements of self-defense differ depending upon whether the defendant,
in defending themselves, used deadly or non-deadly force. “Deadly force” is defined as
“any force that carries a substantial risk that it will proximately result in the death of any
person.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(2). A “substantial risk” means “a strong possibility, as
contrasted with a remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or that
certain circumstances may exist.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(8). In re N.K., 6th Dist. Sandusky No.
S-21-001, 2021-Ohio-3858, 2021 WL 5029661, ¶ 12. In this case, Sarge used deadly
force by using the .22 caliber revolver to shoot Serio. See State v. Dale, 2nd Dist.
Montgomery No. 2012 CA 20, 2013-Ohio-2229, 2013 WL 2406261, ¶ 15 (“The use of a
gun constitutes the use of deadly force.”); See also State v. Estelle, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-
20-50, 2021-Ohio-2636, 2021 WL 3284988, ¶ 20.
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 11
{¶30} Regarding the elements of “deadly force” self-defense, the Supreme Court
of Ohio has held:
To establish [deadly force] self-defense, a defendant must prove the
following elements: (1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the
situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide
belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that
his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force;
and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the
danger.
(Emphasis added.) State v. Garner, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2009CA00286, 2010-Ohio-3891,
2010 WL 3278670, ¶¶ 18-19 quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d
1240 (2002), citing State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979), paragraph
two of the syllabus. Prior to the amendment of R.C. 2901.05, the above-stated elements
of self-defense were for the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Carney, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-402, 2020-Ohio-2691, 2020 WL 2042924,
¶ 31 citing State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986). The revision to R.C. 2901.05,
however, has placed the burden on the prosecution to disprove at least one of the
elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. citing R.C. 2901.05(B)(1); 2019
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228.2. The Tenth District Court of Appeals determined in State v.
Carney, supra, that pursuant to the amended statute of self-defense, the prosecution is
required to disprove deadly force self-defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant “(1) was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, OR (2) did
not have a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 12
for which the use of deadly force was his only means of escape, OR (3) did violate a duty
to retreat or avoid the danger.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 31 citing R.C. 2901.05(B)(1);
Robbins, supra at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶31} In the case sub judice, the State argues it proved at trial that Sarge did not
have a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm for
which the use of deadly force was his only means of escape. We look to the record to
determine if the State met its burden to disprove self-defense and the verdict of murder
was supported by the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence.
{¶32} Before the shooting, Serio and his friend exchanged messages which
confirmed Sarge’s statement that Serio wanted to get Adderall and/or money from Sarge.
Serio stated in the message that he was going to “whoop his fat ass,” although the
message did not state who Serio wanted to “whoop” or when. Sarge told the police that
Serio came up from the basement and confronted Sarge, who was sitting in his chair. The
toxicology report showed that Serio had methamphetamine and amphetamine in his
system when he died.
{¶33} Sarge told the police in his interview that before the shooting, he and Serio
were “neck and neck,” but Sarge’s arm was fully stretched. Sarge was six foot, three
inches tall and weighed over 500 pounds. Serio was five foot, eight inches tall and
weighed 170 pounds. Sarge had his gun with him and at some point he cocked the
hammer because a single action revolver does not discharge unless the hammer is
cocked and the trigger pulled. Sarge stated he knew Serio usually carried a knife, but he
did not tell the police that he saw Serio with a knife when they were “neck and neck,” and
the police did not find a knife on Serio’s body. There were knives on the kitchen table, but
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 13
Sarge did not tell the police that Serio had grabbed or attempted to grab one during the
fight. In contrast, Sarge told the police that Serio was carrying a glass bubble pipe, which
was found near his body.
{¶34} Sarge brandished his gun at Serio and Sarge said Serio grabbed for the
gun, may have touched the barrel, and the gun went off. The State’s evidence showed,
however, the muzzle to target distance was 21 to 36 inches and the barrel of the gun
was
6.5 inches long. The muzzle to target distance contradicts Sarge’s statement that Serio
was close to Sarge and his weapon when he was shot.
{¶35} After Serio was shot and lay dying on the floor, Sarge did not call the police.
He moved Serio’s body to the rear of the house. He put Serio’s cell phone in a pot of
water. He called multiple people, including a friend who testified Sarge told her that he
was not sure if he was going to call the police or get her help to hide Serio’s body. He
also asked for her support if he called the police because he was going to try to tell them
it was self-defense.
{¶36} “[T]the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
are primarily for the trier of the facts[,]” who is “free to believe all, part, or none of the
testimony of each witness.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one
of the syllabus; Prince v. Jordan, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008423, 2004-Ohio-7184, ¶
35. “This Court will not overturn the trial court's verdict on a manifest weight of the
evidence challenge only because the trier of fact chose to believe certain witness
testimony over the testimony of others.” State v. Pittman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29705,
2021-Ohio-1051, 2021 WL 1230546, ¶ 16 citing State v. Hill, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26519,
2013-Ohio-4022, ¶ 15. This includes instances when a jury rejects a defendant's self-
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 14
serving testimony that he or she acted in self-defense. See State v. Johnson, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 13CA010496, 2015-Ohio-1689, ¶ 15 (acknowledging that a jury is free to reject
a defendant's self-serving testimony, and that doing so does not render a conviction
against the manifest weight of the evidence); State v. Miller, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-18-
02, 2018-Ohio-3433, ¶ 41 (noting that the defendant's “self-defense claim rested
essentially entirely on her own self-serving testimony[,]” and concluding that the jury could
have found that testimony not credible).
{¶37} The only issue in this appeal is whether Sarge, armed with a gun and
significantly larger in size than Serio, held a bona fide belief that he was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm from Serio such that the use of deadly force was his
only means of escape. The jury heard the evidence that Serio was known to carry a knife,
was near knives during the fight, had methamphetamine and amphetamine in his system,
and had threatened to “whoop” Sarge’s ass, but the jury did not find that evidence
outweighed the other evidence in the record showing Sarge was armed with a gun, the
muzzle of Sarge’s gun was 21 to 36 inches away from Serio when he was shot, Serio
was unarmed, and he was significantly smaller in size than Sarge. The jury concluded
that Sarge did not believe he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from
Serio such that the use of deadly force was his only means of escape.
{¶38} We review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, which
we have done in our review. Accordingly, we cannot reach the conclusion that the jury
clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. We can determine from
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 15
our review that the jury could have found that the prosecution had proved Sarge was not
genuinely in fear for his life when he shot an unarmed Serio from 21 to 36 inches away.
{¶39} From a sufficiency of evidence standpoint on the prosecution's statutory
duty to disprove one of the elements of self-defense, we further find that, “viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found” that the prosecution disproved at least one of the “essential elements” of self-
defense “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶40} As to the claim of self-defense, we find no error and the Assignment of Error
is overruled.
Tampering with Evidence
{¶41} In his first Assignment of Error, Sarge also argues his conviction for
tampering with evidence was against the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶42} The Ohio Revised Code defines the offense of tampering with evidence in
relevant part as follows:
(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in
progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall do any of the
following:
(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with
purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or
investigation.
R.C. 2921.12(A)(1).
{¶43} There is no dispute in this case that after he shot Serio, Sarge placed
Serio’s cell phone in a pot of water on the kitchen stove. (T. 281). During opening
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 16
arguments, defense counsel stated, “The phone was, John Serio’s phone was then found
in the water on the stove. I don’t really have a lot of good explanations for that other than
he was clearly trying to destroy the contents of the phone.” (T. 187).
{¶44} After he shot Serio, Sarge moved Serio’s body so it would not be seen. He
called his friend and asked about hiding Serio’s body. Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State, it can be inferred that Sarge was seeking to destroy Serio’s cell
phone with purpose to impair its availability as evidence in the investigation as to Serio’s
death. We find the manifest weight of the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that
Sarge acted with purpose to destroy the cell phone to impair its availability for an
investigation into Serio’s death.
{¶45} As to tampering with evidence, we no error and the Assignment of Error is
overruled.
II.
{¶46} The trial court sentenced Sarge to a definite term of imprisonment of 36
months on Count Two (tampering with evidence), to be served consecutive to the
sentence imposed in Count One (murder). In his second Assignment of Error, Sarge
argues that by imposing the maximum sentence for tampering with evidence, his
sentence is contrary to law.
{¶47} R.C. 2953.08 governs appeals based on felony sentencing guidelines.
Subsection (G)(2) sets forth this Court's standard of review as follows:
(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section
shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or
modification given by the sentencing court.
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 17
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court's
standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following: (a) That
the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division
(B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14,
or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is
relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶48} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is
more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty
as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three
of the syllabus.
{¶49} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial
court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed
in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant
within the permissible statutory range.” State v. Morris, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 20-COA-
015, ¶ 90 quoting State v. Dinka, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 and CA2019-
03-026, 2019-Ohio-4209, ¶ 36.
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 18
{¶50} Tampering with evidence is a third-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2921.12(A)(1). The felony sentencing guidelines state as to third-degree felonies:
(3)(a) For a felony of the third degree that is a violation of section 2903.06,
2903.08, 2907.03, 2907.04, 2907.05, 2907.321, 2907.322, 2907.323, or
3795.04 of the Revised Code or that is a violation of section 2911.02 or
2911.12 of the Revised Code if the offender previously has been convicted
of or pleaded guilty in two or more separate proceedings to two or more
violations of section 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, or 2911.12 of the Revised
Code, the prison term shall be a definite term of twelve, eighteen, twenty-
four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty months.
(b) For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which division
(A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall be a definite term of
nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.
R.C. 2929.14(A)(3). The trial court imposed the maximum sentence, 36 months, pursuant
to R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Sarge does not dispute the 36-month sentence is within the
permissible statutory range.
{¶51} Because the sentence is within the permissible statutory range, for the
sentence to be contrary to law, this Court must determine whether the trial court
considered the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in
R.C. 2929.12 and properly imposed post release control. Sarge has made no argument
on appeal that the trial court improperly imposed post release control. As such, we will
examine the trial court’s consideration of the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as
well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12.
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 19
{¶52} R.C. 2929.11(A) governs the purposes and principles of felony sentencing
and provides that a sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to
achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which are (1) to protect the
public from future crime by the offender and others, and (2) to punish the offender using
the minimum sanctions that the court determines will accomplish those purposes. Further,
the sentence imposed shall be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the
seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with
sentences imposed for similar crimes by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).
{¶53} R.C. 2929.12 sets forth the seriousness and recidivism factors for the
sentencing court to consider in determining the most effective way to comply with the
purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. The statute provides a
non-exhaustive list of factors a trial court must consider when determining the
seriousness of the offense and the likelihood that the offender will commit future offenses.
{¶54} In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, the
Ohio Supreme Court discussed the effect of State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-
856, 845 N.E.2d 470, on felony sentencing. The Foster Court severed the judicial-fact-
finding portions of R.C. 2929.14, holding that “trial courts have full discretion to impose a
prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or
give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum
sentences.” State v. Kinser, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 00032, 2020-Ohio-5308, 2020
WL 6737507, ¶ 31 quoting Kalish, supra at ¶ 1 and ¶ 11, citing Foster at ¶ 100, See also,
State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306.
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 20
{¶55} “Thus, a record after Foster may be silent as to the judicial findings that
appellate courts were originally meant to review under 2953.08(G)(2).” Kinser, supra at ¶
32 quoting Kalish, supra at ¶ 12. However, although Foster eliminated mandatory judicial
fact-finding, it left intact R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and the trial court must still consider
these statutes. Id. citing Kalish, supra at ¶ 13. See also State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d
54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1. Accordingly, post-Foster, “there is no mandate for
judicial fact-finding in the general guidance statutes. The court is merely to ‘consider’ the
statutory factors.” Foster, supra at ¶ 42; State v. Rutter, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. 2006-
CA-0025, 2006-Ohio-4061. Trial courts, however, are still required to consider the general
guidance factors in their sentencing decisions.
{¶56} There is no requirement in R.C. 2929.12 that the trial court state on the
record that it considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and recidivism or
even discussed them. Kinser, supra at ¶ 34 citing State v. Polick, 101 Ohio App.3d 428,
431, 655 N.E.2d 820(4th Dist. 1995); State v. Woods, 5th Dist. Richland No. 05 CA 46,
2006-Ohio-1342, ¶ 19 (“... R.C. 2929.12 does not require specific language or specific
findings on the record in order to show that the trial court considered the applicable
seriousness and recidivism factors”). (Citations omitted).
{¶57} When it imposed the sentence for tampering with evidence, the trial court
stated:
* * * The Court has considered the purposes and principles contained in
Revised Code Section 2929.11, and I’ve considered the seriousness factors
in Revised Code Section 2929.12. And I’ve considered the recidivism factors
in Section 2929.12. And I do find that a prison term is consistent with
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 21
the purposes of Revised Code Section 2929.11, and the defendant’s not
amenable to an available community control sanction.
***
And the Court finds that, that the Count 3, the tampering with evidence, was
committed as a course of conduct, and that the seriousness factors under
Section 2929.12, your relationship with the victim under 2929.12(B)(2) – or
(B)(6). And that I do not see any genuine remorse, Mr. Sarge, and based
upon the video interview, the tampering and communications with others
after the offense was committed, and so it will be consecutive under Counts
1, 2 and 3.
(T. 16-17).
{¶58} We find the trial court considered and applied the factors set forth in R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 when it imposed the maximum sentence for tampering with
evidence. The record supports the trial court’s findings. The sentence, therefore, is not
contrary to law.
{¶59} Sarge’s second Assignment of Error is overruled.
Knox County, Case No. 21CA000014 22
CONCLUSION
{¶60} The judgment of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.,
Gwin, P.J. and
Wise, Earle, J., concur.