State v. Black ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Black, 
    2011-Ohio-3127
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    HARDIN COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 6-10-15
    v.
    SHAWN MARK STEVEN BLACK,                                  OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 20052025 CRI
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision:   June 27, 2011
    APPEARANCES:
    Nicole M. Winget for Appellant
    Bradford W. Bailey for Appellee
    Case No. 6-10-15
    WILLAMOWSKI, J.
    {¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Shawn Mark Steven Black (“Black” or
    “Defendant”), appeals the judgment of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas
    after he was granted a new sentencing hearing to correct an error in the imposition
    of postrelease control (“PRC”) for his 2006 convictions for rape and gross sexual
    imposition. In this appeal, Black contends that the trial court erred when it failed
    to provide the reasoning behind its decision to impose consecutive sentences. For
    the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
    {¶2} In May of 2006, a jury found Black guilty of one count of rape of a
    child under age 10, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a felony of the first
    degree, and six counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
    2907.05(A)(4), felonies of the third degree. On August 1, 2006, the trial court
    classified Black as a sexual predator and sentenced him to a mandatory life prison
    term for his rape conviction and to a two-year prison term for each of his gross-
    sexual-imposition convictions, all to be served consecutively for a total sentence
    of life plus twelve years.     On June 25, 2007, this Court affirmed Black’s
    conviction on appeal. See State v. Black, 
    172 Ohio App.3d 716
    , 
    2007-Ohio-3133
    ,
    
    876 N.E.2d 1255
    .
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    Case No. 6-10-15
    {¶3} In August of 2010, the State requested a resentencing hearing “solely
    to impose the five year mandatory postrelease control.”1 A resentencing hearing
    was held for the “limited purpose” to “re-sentence Mr. Black, to state on the
    record that he basically is going to receive five years of post release control ***.”
    (Oct. 25, 2010 Sentencing Tr., p. 2.) On November 1, 2010, the trial court filed
    the corrected Entry of Sentence, imposing the same sentence as in his original
    sentence for each of the seven counts, but also adding the notification that PRC is
    mandatory for five years.
    {¶4} Black now appeals from this new sentencing entry, raising the
    following assignment of error for our review.
    Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred as a matter of law, and in prejudice of
    [Black], when it failed to give reasons in support of its findings
    when it imposed consecutive sentences.
    {¶5} Black argues that the trial court erred by failing to make findings,
    pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), prior to imposing consecutive sentences. We find
    that his argument is without merit for several reasons.
    1
    The original August 1, 2006 Entry of Sentencing notified Defendant about his parole eligibility after ten
    years on count one, pursuant to R.C. 2967.13. The judgment then stated that if Defendant was ever paroled
    and then found to have violated any term of his parole, the Adult Parole Authority could impose a more
    restrictive sanction and he could face being returned to prison until his death. The judgment entry further
    stated that, “Defendant is Ordered to serve as part of this sentence any term of post release control imposed
    by the Parole Board, and any prison term for violation of that parole.” However, the trial court did not
    specify a definitive mandatory term of five years of postrelease control. See State ex rel. Carnail v.
    McCormick, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 124
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2671
    , 
    931 N.E.2d 110
    ; R.C. 2967.28(B).
    -3-
    Case No. 6-10-15
    {¶6} As a preliminary matter, Black’s resentencing was only for the narrow
    purpose of imposing the correct PRC. Black’s limited sentencing hearing to
    correct the portion of his sentence pertaining to PRC “cannot be used as a vehicle
    to reopen all other aspects of his case.” See State v. Griffin, 3d Dist. No. 1-10-27,
    
    2011-Ohio-1462
    , ¶9.
    {¶7} R.C. 2929.191, enacted as part of H.B. 137, establishes a procedure to
    remedy sentences that fail to properly impose a term of PRC for defendants, like
    Black, who were sentenced on or after its July 11, 2006 effective date. See State
    v. Singleton, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 173
    , 
    2009-Ohio-6434
    , 
    920 N.E.2d 958
    , paragraph
    two of the syllabus.
    The hearing contemplated by R.C. 2929.191(C) and the
    correction contemplated by R.C. 2929.191(A) and (B) pertain
    only to the flawed imposition of postrelease control. R.C. 2929.191
    does not address the remainder of an offender's sentence. Thus,
    the General Assembly appears to have intended to leave
    undisturbed the sanctions imposed upon the offender which are
    unaffected by the court's failure to properly impose postrelease
    control at the original sentencing.
    (Emphasis added.) Singleton at ¶24.
    {¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court recently affirmed that it is only the PRC
    aspect of a sentence that must be rectified, and the remainder of the sentence
    remains valid under the principles of res judicata. State v. Fischer, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 
    2010-Ohio-6238
    , 
    942 N.E.2d 332
    , ¶17.           Although the issue in Fischer
    -4-
    Case No. 6-10-15
    pertained to the imposition of PRC in a case where the defendant was sentenced
    before the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, its reasoning is equally applicable to
    the facts in any case where a court has not properly imposed PRC. See id. at ¶31
    (stating that “[o]ur decision today is limited to a discrete vein of cases; those in
    which a court does not properly impose a statutorily mandated period of
    postrelease control.”) “[R]es judicata still applies to other aspects of the merits of
    a conviction, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the
    ensuing sentence.” Id., at paragraph three of the syllabus.
    {¶9} And, even if other portions of Black’s sentence would have been
    subject to review, Black’s argument has no basis in the current law. In State v.
    Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court declared unconstitutional those portions of the
    felony sentencing statutes that required judicial fact-finding before the trial court
    could impose a prison sentence, specifically including R.C. 2929.14(E)(4). 
    109 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2006-Ohio-856
    , 
    845 N.E.2d 470
    , ¶97. The Ohio Supreme Court
    held that, “[t]rial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the
    statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons
    for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.”
    (Emphasis added.) 
    Id.
     at paragraph seven of the syllabus. This reasoning was
    recently reaffirmed in State v. Hodge, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2010-Ohio-6320
    , 
    941 N.E.2d 768
    , at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.
    -5-
    Case No. 6-10-15
    {¶10} Based on the above, Black’s assignment of error is overruled.
    Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant herein in the particulars
    assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Judgment Affirmed
    ROGERS, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
    /jlr
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 6-10-15

Judges: Willamowski

Filed Date: 6/27/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014