Woolley v. Woolley , 190 Ohio App. 3d 18 ( 2010 )

[Cite as Woolley v. Woolley, 190 Ohio App.3d 18, 2010-Ohio-4177.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
WOOLLEY, CASE NO. 17-10-07
APPELLANT,
v.
WOOLLEY, OPINION
APPELLEE, et al.
Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 08CV000521
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 7, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Breann M. Zickafoos, for appellant.
Stanley R. Evans, for appellee.
SHAW, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Steven Woolley, appeals the February 24, 2010 judgment
of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas finding that appellee, Scott
Case No. 17-10-07
Woolley, was granted a devise of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent in
a certain parcel of real estate.
{¶2} The parties stipulated to the following facts. Alfred B. Woolley
(also known as “Sam”) owned real estate located at 105 East Russell Road in
Sidney, Ohio. Alfred had two sons, Wayne Woolley and appellant, Steven
Woolley. Appellee, Scott Woolley, is Wayne’s son. Scott is also Alfred’s
grandson and Steven’s nephew.
{¶3} Alfred died on September 15, 1998. Alfred’s last will and testament
specified the following transfers of real and personal property:
Item VI
I give and bequeath all of my interests including my common
shares in Sam’s Skating Club, Inc. to my Grandson, SCOTT
WOOLLEY, absolutely.
I give, devise and bequeath the real property and
improvements thereon located at 105 East Russell Road, Sidney,
Ohio which is occupied by Sam’s Skating Club, Inc. to my
Grandson, SCOTT WOOLLEY, absolutely and in fee simple on the
condition that he pays to my sons, WAYNE WOOLLEY and
STEVEN WOOLLEY, Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) per month
($1,000 to each) for twenty (20) years without interest. (Interest
discounted if prepaid). For valuations purposes, the payments shall
be discounted by an amount equal to the Applicable Federal Rate in
effect as of the date of my death.
Item VII
All the rest, residue and remainder of my property real,
personal and mixed, I give, devise, and bequeath to my sons,
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WAYNE WOOLLEY and STEVEN WOOLLEY in equal shares
absolutely and in fee simple.
{¶4} After Alfred’s death, the property located at 105 East Russell Road
was transferred to Scott. The certificate of transfer reflecting the transfer of the
property from Alfred’s estate to Scott contained verbatim the same conditional
language stated in Alfred’s will. Specifically, the certificate of transfer stated:
The devise of decedent’s fee simple interest is subject to the
terms and conditions contained in Item VI of the Last Will and
Testament of Alfred B. Woolley, deceased, Shelby County Probate
Court, case number 1988-EST-224, which states in relevant part:
“I give, devise and bequeath the real property and
improvements thereon located at 105 East Russell Road, Sidney,
Ohio which is occupied by Sam’s Skating Club, Inc. to my
Grandson, SCOTT WOOLLEY, absolutely and in fee simple on the
condition that he pays to my sons, WAYNE WOOLLEY and
STEVEN WOOLLEY, Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) per month
($1,000 to each) for twenty (20) years without interest. (Interest
discounted if prepaid). For valuations purposes, the payments shall
be discounted by an amount equal to the Applicable Federal Rate in
effect as of the date of my death.”
{¶5} On January 31, 2000, Scott transferred his interest in 105 East
Russell Road to his wife, Becca Woolley, via a quitclaim deed. The deed stated,
“This conveyance is subject to the terms and conditions contained in Item VI of
the Last Will and Testament of Alfred B. Woolley * * * as set forth in that certain
Certificate of Transfer No. 2 filed in the office of the Shelby County Recorder on
the 7th day of October, 1999.”
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{¶6} For 103 months, Scott paid $1,000 to Steven pursuant to Item VI of
Alfred’s will. In April 2008, Scott ceased to make any further payments to
Steven. On December 29, 2008, Steven filed a complaint against Scott, Becca,
and Wayne as defendants. The complaint alleged that Scott had failed to satisfy
the “condition of transfer” stated in Item VI of Alfred’s will, the certificate of
transfer, and the quitclaim deed, because Scott stopped making the $1,000
monthly payments to Steven in April 2008.
{¶7} The complaint sought the following remedies for Scott’s breach of
the condition. First, the complaint requested that the court declare that due to
Scott’s failure to satisfy the condition, title to the real estate vested absolutely in
Wayne and Steven as the beneficiaries under the residuary clause. Second, the
complaint requested declaratory relief stating that the transfers of the real estate to
Scott and Becca, via the certificate of transfer and quitclaim deed, now failed
because Scott did not satisfy the condition. Third, Steven also requested that Scott
and Becca be held personally liable for the remaining $137,000 that Steven
alleged was owed to him under Item VI of Alfred’s will.
{¶8} On March 9, 2009, Scott and Becca filed their answers to Steven’s
complaint. Wayne failed to file an answer or to participate in the action in any
way. No evidentiary hearing was held. Rather, upon stipulating to the relevant
facts, the trial court requested the parties to submit their written arguments.
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{¶9} In his brief to the trial court, Steven argued that the conditional
language in Alfred’s will granted a legacy1 to both Steven and Wayne in the
amount of $240,000 each—$1,000 per month for 20 years. According to Steven’s
argument, Alfred’s will granted Scott a fee-simple interest in the real estate subject
to the payment of Steven and Wayne’s legacies. Steven now argued that as a
holder of a legacy, he was entitled to enforce his right to receive the remaining
payment of $137,000 from Scott and Becca personally. Specifically Steven
requested that the court grant him the following: (1) a judgment finding that a lien
exists on the property for the purpose of enforcement of his legacy rights, (2) a
judgment of joint and several liability against Scott and Becca personally for
damages in the amount of $137,000, and (3) a finding that Wayne Woolley waived
his rights under the legacy.
{¶10} Notably, Steven’s argument now exclusively focused on the third
claim of relief stated in his complaint—holding Scott and Becca personally liable
for the remaining $137,000 that Steven alleged remained due to him. Steven no
longer appeared to argue that he and Wayne were entitled to the real estate as co-
beneficiaries under the residuary clause in Alfred’s will and for the court to
declare Scott and Becca’s interests in the premises void, despite the statements in
1
A legacy is simply a gift by will, especially of personal property and often money. Black’s Law
Dictionary 974 (9th Ed.2009).
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Case No. 17-10-07
his first and second claims for relief in his complaint, in which he requested the
court to grant these remedies.
{¶11} On the contrary, Scott and Becca argued that the language contained
in Alfred’s will granted Scott a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
Specifically, Scott argued that his interest in the land was conditioned on his
making the $1,000 monthly payment to Steven and Wayne for 20 years. Scott
maintained that upon his failure to meet this condition, Steven’s exclusive remedy
was to exercise his “right of re-entry” to effectuate the reversion of the property
back to Alfred’s estate, giving Steven and Wayne absolute title to the property as
co-beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause. Thus, Scott contended that there
was no provision in Alfred’s will that granted Steven a legacy holding Scott and
Becca personally liable for payment due to Scott’s breach of the condition.
{¶12} On January 29, 2010, the trial court issued its decision, which was
subsequently journalized in its February 24, 2010 judgment entry. The trial court
found that the language contained in Item VI of Alfred’s will granted Scott a fee
simple subject to condition subsequent. Accordingly, the court ruled that Scott
and Becca incurred no personal liability upon Scott’s failure to make the $1,000
monthly payments to Steven. Rather, the court found the following:
A review of the language of the Will of Testator as repeated
in the Certificate of Transfer of October 1999, suggests that the
intent of the Testator was to convey the property to Scott if he paid
the monthly installments. Since Scott has failed to make the
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Case No. 17-10-07
payments, the proper remedy is to void the conveyance and return
the real property to the estate of the testator.
{¶13} The court then ordered Alfred’s estate to be reopened to allow the
property to be placed back into the estate. The court further ordered the property
to be transferred from Alfred’s estate to Wayne and Steven, in equal shares, as co-
beneficiaries under the residuary clause stated in Item VII of Alfred’s will.
{¶14} Steven filed this appeal, asserting the following assignments of
error.2
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that the
testator granted to Scott Woolley a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent instead of a legacy.
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that Scott
Woolley is not personally liable for the non-payment of the accepted
devise.
Assignment of Error No. III
The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that Steven
Woolley’s only recourse against Scott Woolley for the failure to
comply with the provisions of the devise is to take ownership of the
property.
{¶15} Initially, we note that Steven’s assignments of error are interrelated
because they are dependent on our review of the trial court’s conclusion that
2
Because Steven appeals the judgment of the trial court only as it relates to Scott, we will not discuss the
trial court’s ruling regarding Becca on appeal.
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Alfred’s will granted Scott a devise of the property in fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent. Therefore, we elect to discuss Steven’s assignments of
error together.
{¶16} In making its final determination in this case, the trial court noted
that Alfred’s will failed to provide any guidance in the event that Scott did not
satisfy the condition stated in Item VI of the will. Specifically, the trial court
noted that Alfred’s will contained no provision for re-entry, which is typically
included in a grant of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent and specifies
that the grantor retains a right of re-entry upon the failure of the stated condition.
However, Alfred’s will also does not provide for the acceleration of the full
$240,000 payment upon Scott’s failure to satisfy the condition, as Steven now
argues that he is entitled to under Item VI of the will. Therefore, the trial court
was required to construe Alfred’s testamentary intent in drafting his will in order
to resolve the issue at hand.
{¶17} An appellate court independently reviews the interpretation of a will
under a de novo standard of review. Dunkel v. Hilyard (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d
414, 418, 766 N.E.2d 603, citing McCulloch v. Yost (1947), 148 Ohio St. 675, 677,
36 O.O. 274, 76 N.E.2d 707. Upon our review, we are reminded that the most
fundamental tenet for the construction of a will requires that the court ascertain
and carry out, within the bounds of the law, the intent of the testator. Domo v.
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McCarthy (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 612 N.E.2d 706. That intention must
be determined from the words contained in the will. Oliver v. Bank One, Dayton,
N.A. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 32, 34, 573 N.E.2d 55. “These words, ‘if technical,
must be taken in their technical sense, and if not technical, in their ordinary sense,
unless it appear[s] from the context that they were used by the testator in some
secondary sense.’ ” Polen v. Baker (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 563, 565, 752 N.E.2d
258, quoting Townsend’s Exrs. v. Townsend (1874), 25 Ohio St. 477, paragraph
three of the syllabus.
{¶18} Because Alfred’s will omits any provision discussing the occurrence
of Scott’s failure to satisfy the condition, we must glean Alfred’s intent in
addressing this situation from the four corners of his will. At the core of the
parties’ dispute is the characterization of the devises that Alfred intended to give
his beneficiaries — specifically, whether Alfred intended to grant Scott a fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent in the 105 East Russell Road property or
whether Alfred intended to grant Steven a legacy—i.e., an unconditional and
outright gift of $240,000 to be paid by Scott in $1,000 monthly installments over a
period of 20 years.
{¶19} In reviewing the provisions in Alfred’s will, we find no indication
that Alfred intended to give Steven a gift in the definite sum of $240,000.
Moreover, as noted by the trial court, there is no provision in Alfred’s will that
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holds Scott personally responsible for the entire $240,000 payment to Steven upon
Scott’s failure to satisfy the condition.3 Rather, the language of the devise to Scott
focuses on Scott’s conditional ownership and possession of the property. As
stated above, the pertinent language in Alfred’s will provides:
I give, devise and bequeath the real property and
improvements thereon located at 105 East Russell Road, Sidney,
Ohio which is occupied by Sam’s Skating Club, Inc. to my
Grandson, SCOTT WOOLLEY, absolutely and in fee simple on the
condition that he pays to my sons, WAYNE WOOLLEY and
STEVEN WOOLLEY, Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) per month
($1,000 to each) for twenty (20) years without interest.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶20} We believe that the trial court correctly surmised that this language
indicated that it was Alfred’s intention to grant Scott a fee-simple interest in 105
East Russell Road contingent upon Scott making the $1,000 monthly payments to
Steven over a 20-year period. Therefore, similar to a land-installment contract,
Alfred’s will gave Scott the right to possess the property in exchange for Scott’s
paying $1,000 monthly installments to Steven and Wayne for a period of 20 years.
Upon Scott’s completion of making these payments for the 20-year period, he
would then own the real estate absolutely in fee simple.
3
Since, by the terms of the will, Scott was entitled to a discount if he paid in advance, were Steven to be
correct in his argument that Alfred intended to grant him a legacy, he would be entitled to only a
discounted judgment, and not the full $137,000.
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{¶21} Based on the foregoing, we find that characterizing Alfred’s devise
to Scott as a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is more consistent with
Alfred’s testamentary intent than finding that Alfred granted Steven a $240,000
legacy to be paid by Scott. Therefore, we conclude that it was Alfred’s intention
that in the event that Scott failed to satisfy the condition of transfer stated in Item
VI of Alfred’s will, Scott’s interest in the land would cease, and the right to
possess and own the property would pass to Wayne and Scott as co-beneficiaries
under the residuary clause in Alfred’s will.
{¶22} Accordingly, it is our conclusion that the trial court correctly found
that Alfred intended to grant Scott a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent
when it interpreted Item VI in Alfred’s will. Thus, we find no error in the trial
court’s decision on this matter, and Steven’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Furthermore, because Steven’s remaining two assignments of error hinge on our
finding error in the trial court’s ruling as to his first assignment of error, and
because we have found no such error in the trial court’s ruling, Steven’s second
and third assignments of error are hereby overruled. Additionally, for the reasons
stated in the foregoing opinion, the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of
standing is denied via a separate judgment entry of this court.
{¶23} For all these reasons, the judgment of the Shelby County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
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Judgment affirmed.
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and PRESTON, J., concur.
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