State v. Williams , 2016 Ohio 2838 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Williams, 
    2016-Ohio-2838
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 103325
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    ALEX WILLIAMS
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-15-592311-A
    BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Keough, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 5, 2016
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    David L. Doughten
    David L. Doughten Co., L.P.A.
    4403 St. Clair Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44103
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: David Schwark
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Justice Center - 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1} Alex Williams (“Alex”) appeals from his conviction for felonious assault
    and aggravated menacing, claiming that his conviction is against the manifest weight of
    the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
    {¶2} In October 2014, Alex attacked his upstairs neighbor with a machete. Alex,
    his brother Kurtis, and a friend had been fighting with the victim (“Sherman”) and
    Sherman’s brother and niece all day. The feuding neighbors were unable to ever coexist.
    Police had responded to the ongoing fight earlier in the day, but witnesses were reluctant
    to cooperate, and the agitators, Alex and Kurtis, left the area. After the police officers
    left, thinking tempers had cooled, Alex and Kurtis returned, evidently to finish what was
    started. As the physical altercation escalated, Sherman’s brother was accosted by Alex
    and Kurtis. Sherman, unarmed, charged at both brothers. Alex pulled a machete and
    swung at Sherman, who defended himself by putting his hand out to stop the blow. Cut
    and badly bleeding, Sherman retreated to a nearby gas station to await medical help.
    {¶3} Sherman knew the Williams brothers and could distinguish between the two.
    He remembered seeing Alex, and not Kurtis, swing the machete at him. Sherman’s niece
    saw the attack and knew the Williams brothers. She also testified that Alex was the
    attacker. At trial, Alex called his mother and another witness. His mother testified that
    Alex and Kurtis looked different: Alex was more manicured, and Kurtis was unkept.
    Alex’s mother did not see the actual attack, but did tell Alex to leave the area after the
    attack. The other witness, who had been drinking all day, did not know anyone, but
    claimed the more unkept Williams brother, therefore Kurtis, was the attacker.           The
    witness did not speak to the police officers who responded.
    {¶4} After the jury trial, Alex was found guilty of felonious assault and aggravated
    menacing and sentenced to an aggregate three-year term of imprisonment. He now
    appeals, advancing a sole assignment of error claiming his conviction is against the
    manifest weight of the evidence. We find no merit to his claim.
    {¶5} When reviewing a claim challenging the manifest weight of the evidence, the
    court, reviewing the entire record, must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
    consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
    the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
    of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.           State v.
    Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    1997-Ohio-52
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    .               Reversing a
    conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence should be reserved for
    only the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.
    
    Id.
    {¶6} The weight of the testimony must still be considered by the trier of fact with
    the ability to view and hear firsthand the witnesses’ testimony. State v. DeHass, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    , 
    227 N.E.2d 212
     (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Although appellate
    courts are tasked with sitting as a “thirteenth” juror, “the demeanor of witnesses, the
    manner of their responses, and many other factors observable by [a trier of fact] * * *
    simply are not available to an appellate court on review.” State v. Bailey, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 97754, 
    2012-Ohio-3955
    , ¶ 12. “‘A conviction is not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence solely because the jury heard inconsistent testimony.’” State v.
    Hill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99819, 
    2014-Ohio-387
    , ¶ 37, quoting State v. Wade, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90029, 
    2008-Ohio-4574
    , ¶ 38. It is for this reason that reversing a
    conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence is only reserved for
    instances in which a miscarriage of justice would result. State v. Torres, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 99596, 
    2013-Ohio-5030
    , ¶ 93, citing State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin
    No. 02AP-604, 
    2003-Ohio-958
    , ¶ 21.
    {¶7} Alex’s sole argument rests with the fact that a single witness claimed to have
    seen Kurtis swing the machete at Sherman and the fact that Alex’s mother claimed her
    sons wore different clothing than was described by Sherman. Although the mother
    attempted to shift blame to Kurtis, she did not witness the actual attack. Further, Alex
    makes no attempt to question the credibility of the state’s witnesses who universally and
    unequivocally identified him as the attacker. Both witnesses were familiar with both
    Alex and Kurtis, and could identify each, thus rendering any inconsistencies in the color
    of Alex’s clothing less compelling. As a result, we find no reason to circumvent the
    jury’s resolution of the inconsistent testimony heard at trial.
    {¶8} Finally, and within the manifest weight of the evidence challenge, Alex
    summarily concludes that he should have been convicted of a violation of R.C. 2903.12,
    which provides in pertinent part that “no person, while under the influence of sudden
    passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation
    occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using
    deadly force, shall knowingly cause serious physical harm to another,” because the victim
    was the aggressor. The evidence unequivocally established that all parties engaged in a
    mutual fight and Alex escalated that nondeadly fight with the use of a weapon. It is
    undisputed that Sherman was unarmed. There was no serious provocation for the use of
    force. State v. McDuffie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100826, 
    2014-Ohio-4924
    , ¶ 26. His
    argument is without merit.
    {¶9} The sole assignment of error is overruled, and the conviction is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.       The
    court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
    for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 103325

Citation Numbers: 2016 Ohio 2838

Judges: Gallagher

Filed Date: 5/5/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/5/2016