State v. Czaplicki ( 2013 )


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  •  [Cite as State v. Czaplicki, 
    2013-Ohio-1366
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                       :
    :     Appellate Case No. 25252
    Plaintiff-Appellee                          :
    :     Trial Court Case No. 1990-CR-744/1
    v.                                                  :
    :
    ANTHONY CZAPLICKI                                   :     (Criminal Appeal from
    :     (Common Pleas Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 5th day of April, 2013.
    ...........
    MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHELE D. PHIPPS, Atty. Reg. #0069829, Montgomery
    County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O.
    Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    ANTHONY CZAPLICKI, #226-644, Chillicothe Correctional Institution, Post Office Box
    5500, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
    Defendant-Appellant, pro se
    .............
    HALL, J.
    {¶ 1}       Anthony Czaplicki appeals pro se from the trial court’s decision, entry, and
    order overruling his “motion to vacate registration and classification.”
    {¶ 2}     The record reflects that Czaplicki was convicted of rape in 1990, and he
    remains incarcerated. He filed the foregoing motion in May 2012, arguing that retroactively
    subjecting him to sex-offender-registration-and-notification requirements violated the Ohio
    Constitution and State v. Williams, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 344
    , 
    2011-Ohio-3374
    , 
    952 N.E.2d 1108
    .
    He      asked      the       trial    court        to    re-sentence       him     under       the
    sex-offender-registration-and-classification scheme as it existed in 1990. (Doc. #14).
    {¶ 3}     The trial court overruled Czaplicki’s motion. It noted that he had been
    classified as a sexual predator, that this Court had affirmed the designation, and that “[n]o
    further action has been taken regarding Defendant’s sexual registration status.” (Doc. #15).
    {¶ 4}     On appeal, Czaplicki contends the trial court “abused its discretion by
    reopening a valid final judgment.” In essence, he appears to argue that he never should have
    been classified as a sexual predator in 2000 because that classification did not exist when he
    was convicted in 1990. By classifying him as a sexual predator, Czaplicki claims, the trial
    court   retroactively    subjected   him      to   new   registration-and-community-notification
    requirements in violation of Ohio law.
    {¶ 5}   Upon review, we find no merit in Czaplicki’s argument. We rejected a nearly
    identical claim in State v. Lay, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2012-CA-7, 
    2012-Ohio-4447
    . In that
    case, the defendant committed his sex offenses in 1993. He was convicted years later and
    designated a sexual predator under the Megan’s Law version of R.C. Chapter 2950, which did
    not exist when he committed his crimes. We found retroactive application of Megan’s Law
    permissible because that legislation was remedial rather than punitive. Id. at ¶7-8.
    {¶ 6}   We reach the same conclusion here. Czaplicki was designated a sexual
    3
    predator under the remedial Megan’s Law, and retroactive application of that legislation’s
    sex-offender-registration-and-notification requirements was permitted. Czaplicki cites
    Williams, in his reply brief for the proposition that R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive. But
    Williams does not apply because it involved the newer version of         R.C. Chapter 2950,
    commonly known as the Adam Walsh Act, not Megan’s Law, under which he was designated
    as a sexual predator. Id. We note too that res judicata bars Czaplicki from challenging his
    sexual-predator designation under Megan’s Law. Id. at ¶9. This court upheld the designation
    in 2001, and he cannot relitigate the issue.
    {¶ 7}    Finally, the State construes Czaplicki’s brief as containing an argument that
    he cannot be subjected to the more recent Adam Walsh Act version of R.C. Chapter 2950. To
    the extent that Czaplicki may be making this argument, we do not disagree, but find no error.
    Pursuant to State v. Bodyke, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 266
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2424
    , 
    933 N.E.2d 753
    , Czaplicki
    cannot be reclassified under the Adam Walsh Act. But nothing in his brief or the record before
    us indicates that he has been, or remains, improperly reclassified under that legislation. His
    only designation was under Megan’s Law.
    {¶ 8}    Based on the reasoning set forth above, we overrule Czaplicki’s assignment of
    error and affirm the judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.
    .............
    FROELICH and WELBAUM, JJ., concur.
    Copies mailed to:
    Mathias H. Heck
    Michele D. Phipps
    4
    Anthony Czaplicki
    Hon. Michael Tucker
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 25252

Judges: Hall

Filed Date: 4/5/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014