State v. Rognon ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Rognon, 2021-Ohio-4564.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-21-24
v.
CAMERON ROGNON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 18 08 0242
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 27, 2021
APPEARANCES:
Cameron Rognon, Appellant
Alice Robinson-Bond for Appellee
Case No. 8-21-24
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Cameron Rognon, appeals the June 21, 2021
judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for
postconviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Background
{¶2} We have previously recited much of the factual and procedural
background of this case, and we will not duplicate those efforts here. State v.
Rognon, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-14, 2019-Ohio-4222, ¶ 1-6. Relevant to this
appeal, on October 9, 2018, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted Rognon on
eleven counts in a superseding indictment, including Count Five of gross sexual
imposition against K.H. in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a third-degree felony
and Count Ten of gross sexual imposition against D.R. in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony. Id. at ¶ 3. On January 25, 2019, pursuant to
a negotiated plea agreement, Rognon withdrew his previously entered pleas of not
guilty and entered pleas of guilty to Counts Five and Ten of the superseding
indictment. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court accepted Rognon’s guilty pleas and found
him guilty. Id. At the request of the State, the trial court dismissed the remaining
counts in the superseding indictment. Id. On February 28, 2019, the trial court
sentenced Rognon to 60 months in prison on Count Five and 12 months in prison
on Count Ten to be served consecutively. Id. at ¶ 5.
-2-
Case No. 8-21-24
{¶3} On March 27, 2019, Rognon filed a notice of appeal. In his direct
appeal, Rognon raised three assignments of error. First, he alleged that Logan
County was not the proper venue to litigate Count Ten. Next, Rognon argued that
the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Finally, Rognon alleged
the trial court erred with respect to his sentence for Count Five because it was not
consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by similar offenders. This
court rejected Rognon’s arguments and affirmed the judgment and sentence of the
trial court. Rognon at ¶ 34.
{¶4} On June 1, 2021, Rognon filed a motion to vacate a void sentence. In
the motion, Rognon alleged that his sentence was void because the trial court
disregarded the applicable statute when pronouncing a “mandatory” sentence and
lacked the statutory authority to pronounce a “mandatory” sentence. Further,
Rognon argued that his claims were not barred by res judicata because his sentence
is void. On June 11, 2021, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Rognon’s
motion to vacate a void sentence.
{¶5} On June 21, 2021, the trial court filed its judgment entry denying
Rognon’s motion. The trial court considered Rognon’s motion as a petition for
postconviction relief and held that Rognon’s petition was not timely and was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata.
-3-
Case No. 8-21-24
{¶6} Rognon filed his notice of appeal on July 20, 2021. He raises two
assignments of error which we address together.
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court abused its discretion when it misconstrued the
appellant’s motion to vacate void sentence as a post-conviction
motion.
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court erred when it pronounced a mandatory sentence
with disregard for the statute that would have precluded that
pronouncement.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Rognon argues the trial court erred by
treating his filing titled “Motion to Vacate Void Sentence” as a petition for
postconviction relief. Specifically, Rognon argues that because his sentence is void,
the trial court erred by construing his motion as a petition for postconviction relief
and determining that his petition was untimely and barred by res judicata.
{¶8} We first address Rognon’s contention that his sentence is void. As an
initial matter, we note that Rognon’s motion to vacate void sentence, as well as his
appellate brief, rely on outdated case law. The Supreme Court of Ohio recently
realigned its jurisprudence regarding void and voidable sentencing and held that “[a]
judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” State
v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 43. Even if a sentence
-4-
Case No. 8-21-24
imposed is not authorized by law, the sentence would only be voidable as long as
the trial court possessed both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Id.{¶9} Here, Rognon argues his sentence is void because the trial court
allegedly disregarded the applicable statute when it pronounced a mandatory
sentence. However, the error Rognon alleges, even if true, is not jurisdictional in
nature so as to be capable of rendering his conviction and sentence void. See State
ex rel. Davis v. Turner, 164 Ohio St.3d 395, 2021-Ohio-1771, ¶ 11 (“[S]entencing
errors are not jurisdictional * * *.”) Because Rognon does not identify any defect
that would have deprived the trial court of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction,
the trial court correctly determined that Rognon’s conviction and sentence are not
void.
{¶10} Having determined that Rognon’s sentence is not void, we next turn
to his contention that the trial court erred by characterizing his filing titled “Motion
to Vacate Void Sentence” as a petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court
of Ohio has stated that “[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category
necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be
judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, ¶ 12. Additionally,
in State v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that a motion styled as
“Motion to Correct or Vacate Sentence” was properly classified as a petition for
postconviction relief because it “(1) was filed subsequent to [the defendant’s] direct
-5-
Case No. 8-21-24
appeal, (2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights, (3) sought to render the
judgment void, and (4) asked for vacation of the judgment and sentence.” State v.
Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160 (1997). Rognon’s “Motion to Vacate Void
Sentence” fits each of the criteria outlined in Reynolds. Therefore, the trial court
did not err by treating Rognon’s motion to vacate his sentence as a petition for
postconviction relief. See State v. Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶
16-17 (finding that the trial court properly recast Parker’s filing styled “motion to
vacate” as a petition for postconviction relief); State v. Bender, 3d Dist. Logan No.
8-20-64, 2021-Ohio-1933, ¶ 13 (holding that the trial court did not err by treating
Bender’s motion to vacate his conviction and sentence as a petition for
postconviction relief).
{¶11} Consequently, Rognon’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶12} In Rognon’s second assignment of error, he argues the trial court erred
by pronouncing a mandatory sentence that is contrary to law. Specifically, Rognon
argues that the trial court erred by imposing a “mandatory” sentence. For the
reasons that follow, we disagree.
{¶13} “R.C. 2953.21 governs petitions for post-conviction relief.” State v.
Wine, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-15-07, 2015-Ohio-4726, ¶ 10. The statute sets forth
who may petition for postconviction relief and specifies, in relevant part, that “[a]ny
person who has been convicted of a criminal offense * * * and who claims that there
-6-
Case No. 8-21-24
was such a denial or infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment
void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United
States” “may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds
for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or
sentence or to grant other appropriate relief.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(1).
{¶14} “We review the trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction petition
without a hearing for abuse of discretion.” State v. Jeffers, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
10AP-1112, 2011-Ohio-3555, ¶ 23. An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s
decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When the abuse of discretion standard applies, an
appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State v.
Thompson, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-16-10, 2017-Ohio-792, ¶ 11.
{¶15} The trial court dismissed Rognon’s petition after concluding, in part,
that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “Although a defendant may
challenge his conviction and sentence by either a direct appeal or a petition for
postconviction relief, any claims raised in a postconviction relief petition will be
barred by res judicata where the claim was or could have been raised on direct
appeal.” State v. Schwieterman, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-09-12, 2010-Ohio-102, ¶
23. “‘[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a
convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in
-7-
Case No. 8-21-24
any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed
lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant * *
* on an appeal from that judgment.’” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Troglin, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-09-04, 2009-Ohio-5276, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d
175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. The doctrine “promotes the principles
of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on
which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” State
v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Willys-
Overland Co. v. Clark, 112 Ohio St. 263, 268 (1925). Thus, the doctrine
of res judicata bars all claims except those that were not available at trial or on
appeal because they are based on evidence outside the record. See State v. Jones, 3d
Dist. Defiance No. 4-07-02, 2007-Ohio-5624, ¶ 19.
{¶16} Here, Rognon asserts the trial court erred by erroneously stating that
his sentence with respect to Count Five was mandatory. Specifically, Rognon
alleges that the conditions outlined in R.C. 2907.05(C)(2) that must be met in order
for the trial court to impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to a violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4) were not present. Therefore, Rognon reasons that the trial court erred
by stating at the sentencing hearing that his sentence with respect to Count Five was
mandatory.
-8-
Case No. 8-21-24
{¶17} However, Rognon’s claim that the trial court erred by imposing a
mandatory prison term, which is not based on any evidence outside the record, is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it could have been raised on direct
appeal. See Troglin at ¶ 13; Jones at ¶ 19. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
by denying his petition for postconviction relief on the basis of res judicata.
Moreover, because the claims raised in Rognon’s petition are barred by res judicata,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his petition for
postconviction relief without a hearing. State v. Lewis, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-08,
2019-Ohio-3031, ¶ 13 (“If res judicata applies to a claim raised in a petition for
postconviction relief, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted on the matter.”)
{¶18} Further, even if his claim was not barred by res judicata, his claim is
without merit. Indeed, the trial court stated at the sentencing hearing that Rognon’s
sentence with respect to Count Five was mandatory. (Feb. 28, 2019 Tr. at 14-15).
However, in the judgment entry of sentence, the trial court does not state that any
portion of Rognon’s sentence is mandatory. (Doc. No. 123). “[T]he axiomatic rule
is that a court speaks through its journal entries.” State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d
407, 2010-Ohio-5705, ¶ 12. “When statements made at the sentencing hearing are
inconsistent with the sentence stated in the journal entry, the entry will control.”
State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-06-66, 2007-Ohio-1761, ¶ 3. Consequently,
because the judgment entry of sentence does not state that any portion of Rognon’s
-9-
Case No. 8-21-24
sentence is mandatory, he was not sentenced to a mandatory prison term. Thus,
Rognon’s argument that the trial court erred by erroneously imposing a mandatory
prison term is without merit.
{¶19} Rognon’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶20} For the foregoing reasons, Rognon’s assignments of error are
overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Logan County Court
of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
-10-