State v. Hogan , 2011 Ohio 5811 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Hogan, 2011-Ohio-5811.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GREENE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2010CA61
vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 2010CR0174
MARCUS L. HOGAN : (Criminal Appeal from
Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
. . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 10th day of November, 2011.
. . . . . . . . .
Stephen K. Haller, Pros. Attorney; Stephanie R. Hayden, Asst. Pros.
Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0082881, 61 Greene Street, Xenia, OH 45385
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
Gregory K. Lind, Atty. Reg. No. 0055227, One S. Limestone Street,
Ground Floor, Suite D, Springfield, OH 45502
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . .
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant, Marcus Hogan, appeals from his conviction for
two counts of non-support of dependents, R.C. 2919.21(B), (G)(1),
felonies of the fifth degree, and from the trial court’s denial
of Hogan’s Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his pleas of no contest.
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{¶ 2} Defendant entered his no contest pleas in exchange for
the State’s agreement to recommend community control sanctions.
At a hearing held on June 17, 2010, on the pleas Defendant offered,
the following colloquies between Defendant and the court occurred:
{¶ 3} “THE COURT: Now, before you made your decision today to
change your plea, do you feel you’ve had enough time to fully
consider the right to have this case resolved by a jury trial or
a Court trial?
{¶ 4} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Would you repeat that?
{¶ 5} “THE COURT: Sure. Do you understand that you have the
right to have the case against you resolved by a jury trial or a
Court trial?
{¶ 6} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.
{¶ 7} “THE COURT: Do you understand you have that right?
{¶ 8} * * *
{¶ 9} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.
{¶ 10} “THE COURT: And you’ve chosen not to pursue that route?
{¶ 11} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes, sir.” (T. 6-7).1
{¶ 12} * * *
{¶ 13} “THE COURT: And, Mr. Hogan, since you are pleading no
1
Omitted portions include responses by a defendant in
another case who entered a guilty plea in the same plea
proceeding.
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contest, I want you to understand that a no contest plea is one
in which you are not making an admission to the charge itself, you’re
simply not contesting the facts. The significance of a no contest
plea is one in which it cannot be used against you in any subsequent
criminal or civil proceeding, but, by the same token, you should
expect that based upon your plea of no contest the Court will make
a finding of guilty as to every count that you enter a plea to.
Do you understand that?
{¶ 14} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: I understand.
{¶ 15} * * *
{¶ 16} “THE COURT: Okay. Now I have in each of your cases a
Rule 11 Waiver Form which appears to have your signature on the
document. Did you sign those documents?
{¶ 17} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes, I did.
{¶ 18} * * *
{¶ 19} “THE COURT: Okay. And did you understand everything in
the document?
{¶ 20} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.
{¶ 21} * * *
{¶ 22} “THE COURT: You went over it with your attorney?
{¶ 23} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.
{¶ 24} * * *
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{¶ 25} “THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hogan, this document indicates
you will be pleading no contest to two counts of Nonsupport of
Dependents, both felonies of the fifth degree.
{¶ 26} “The specification, Chris, is what makes it a felony,
is that correct?
{¶ 27} “MR. MURRAY: That is correct.
{¶ 28} “THE COURT: That doesn’t enhance it beyond a fifth degree?
{¶ 29} “MR. MURRAY: No.
{¶ 30} “THE COURT: Is that your understanding of those two counts
that you will be entering a plea to?
{¶ 31} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.
{¶ 32} “THE COURT: Okay. Do you appreciate that the maximum
punishment the law provides in your case is a two year sentence
of imprisonment, a $5,000 fine, or both?
{¶ 33} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.” (T. 8-10.)
{¶ 34} * * *
{¶ 35} “THE COURT: Okay. Now, one final matter before we
conclude this. I want you to be aware that when you plead guilty
you are giving up the right to use certain very important
Constitutional rights. You give up the right to a speedy and public
trial to a jury or to the Court. That’s the most significant one.
{¶ 36} “During the trial you give up the Constitutional right
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of compulsory process to have witnesses testify on your behalf;
you give up the right to require the State to prove your guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, which means you don’t have to prove you’re
not guilty at trial, the State carries the entire burden; you give
up the right not to be compelled to be a witness against yourself
at trial, which means if you don’t want to testify no one can force
you to testify or use that decision against in anyway; and you give
up the right to confront witnesses who testify against you by cross
examining those witnesses.
{¶ 37} “Now, my first question is, do you understand what all
those rights are about?
{¶ 38} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.
{¶ 39} * * *
{¶ 40} “THE COURT: Are you willing to waive the use of those
rights or give them up totally for the purpose of entering a plea
in this case?
{¶ 41} “Do you want to give up your Constitutional rights in
order to make a plea of no contest, Mr. Hogan?
{¶ 42} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: Yes.
{¶ 43} * * *
{¶ 44} “THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hogan, as to the two counts
we discussed, how do yo wish to plead?
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{¶ 45} “DEFENDANT HOGAN: No contest.” (T. 17-18).
{¶ 46} Defendant signed a written waiver of rights and a plea
(Dkt. 17), in which he acknowledged, by separate initials:
{¶ 47} “ I am advised that by pleading No Contest I am waiving
my right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses against me, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in my favor, to require
the State of Ohio to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at
a trial at which I cannot be compelled to testify against myself
and I voluntarily give up those rights by pleading No Contest.”
{¶ 48} The waiver also states that the maximum punishment
Defendant faced “is 2 years of imprisonment” . . .”and a fine of
$5,000.00. . .,” plus “court costs, restitution, or other financial
sanctions.”
{¶ 49} The court accepted Defendant’s no contest plea, found
Defendant guilty, and ordered a presentence investigation report.
The court set the matter for sentencing on August 14, 2010. The
court released Defendant on his own recognizance pending imposition
of sentence.
{¶ 50} On July 23, 2010, Defendant, now represented by different
counsel, filed a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his no contest
pleas. (Dkt. 24). The motion argued that Defendant’s pleas were
not voluntary. In an attached affidavit, Defendant averred:
{¶ 51} “1. I, MARCUS L. HOGAN, am the Defendant in case number
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2010CR0174;
{¶ 52} “2. I entered a guilty plea on Thursday June 17, 2010;
{¶ 53} “3. I had been in custody for the previous twenty one
(21) days.
{¶ 54} “4. My lawyer told me the only way I could get out on
bond was entering a plea;
{¶ 55} “5. That once I entered a plea and was released from
jail we would be able to fight my felony charges;
{¶ 56} “6. My attorney and I spoke and I believe I have a valid
defenses;
{¶ 57} “7. I believe I am innocent of my charges;
{¶ 58} “8. Therefore, I am requesting to withdraw from my
guilty plea.”
{¶ 59} The trial court held a hearing on August 4, 2010.
Following that hearing, the trial court overruled Defendant’s
motion to withdraw his pleas, sentenced Defendant to five years
of community control sanctions, and ordered Defendant to pay
restitution in the form of back child support in the amount of
$15,631.65.
{¶ 60} Defendant timely appealed to this court.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 61} “THE PROCEEDINGS WERE DEFECTIVE IN THAT THE COURT ERRED
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IN ACCEPTING A PLEA WHICH WAS NEITHER KNOWINGLY, WILLINGLY, NOR
INTELLIGENTLY MADE IN VIOLATION OF CRIM.R. 11 AND THE DEFENDANT’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.”
{¶ 62} Defendant argues that his no contest pleas were not entered
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily because, in accepting his
pleas, the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in
two respects: (1) the court failed to determine that Defendant
understood the nature of the charges: (2) the court failed to inform
Defendant about and determine that Defendant understood the effect
of his pleas of no contest. The record of the plea hearing refutes
Defendant’s claims.
{¶ 63} Crim. R. 11(C)(2) provides:
{¶ 64} “In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of
guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant
personally and doing all of the following:
{¶ 65} “(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
{¶ 66} “(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest,
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and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with
judgment and sentence.
{¶ 67} “(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving
the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her,
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the
defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”
{¶ 68} In State v. Russell, Clark App. No. 10CA54,
2011-Ohio-1738, we stated:
{¶ 69} “¶7. The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts
to literally comply with Crim.R. 11. Clark at ¶ 29. The trial court
must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), as it pertains to
the waiver of constitutional rights. Clark at ¶ 31. The failure
to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional rights would
invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered
involuntarily and unknowingly. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85,
2004–Ohio–4415, ¶ 12.
{¶ 70} “¶8. However, because Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) involve
non-constitutional rights, the trial court need only substantially
comply with those requirements. State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d
106, 108; Greene at ¶ 9. Substantial compliance means that, under
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the totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively
understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is
waiving. State v. Miller, Clark App. No. 08 CA 90, 2010–Ohio–4760,
¶ 8, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008–Ohio–5200,
¶ 15. A defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the ground that
the trial court did not substantially comply with Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a) and (b) must show a prejudicial effect, which requires
the defendant to show that the plea would otherwise not have been
entered. Griggs at ¶ 12.”
{¶ 71} With respect to the requirement in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)
that the trial court advise Defendant about and determine that
Defendant understands the effect of his guilty or no contest
plea(s), Defendant argues that statements that he made at the
hearing on his motion to withdraw his pleas demonstrate that he
did not understand the effect of his pleas. Defendant claims that
he mistakenly thought that his no contest plea would enable him
to get of jail on bond so he could then prove his innocence or have
his day in court. That claim is refuted by the discussion held
between the court and Defendant during the plea hearing, in which
Defendant acknowledged his understanding of the court’s explanation
that the Defendant’s plea would result in a waiver of his right
to trial and a finding of guilty to the charges against him.
{¶ 72} The record of the plea hearing in this case demonstrates
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that the trial court thoroughly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in
accepting Defendant’s pleas and was justified in determining that
Defendant understood the nature of the charges and the effect of
his no contest pleas. On this record, Defendant’s pleas were
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
{¶ 73} Defendant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 74} “THE COURT ERRED IN VIOLATION OF CRIM.R. 32.1 BY FAILING
TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.”
{¶ 75} Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his no
contest pleas.
{¶ 76} In State v. Flowers, Montgomery App.No. 22751,
2009-Ohio-1945, this court stated:
{¶ 77} “{¶ 11} In State v. Minkner, Champaign App. No.2006CA32,
2007-Ohio-5574, at ¶ 7-9, this court stated:
{¶ 78} “{¶ 12} ‘A defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
made before sentencing, should be freely and liberally granted,
provided the movant demonstrates a reasonable and legitimate basis
for the withdrawal. State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 584
N.E.2d 715. However, a defendant does not have an absolute right
to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. Id. A trial court must
hold a hearing on the motion to determine if a reasonable and
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legitimate basis exists for the withdrawal. Id.’
{¶ 79} “{¶ 13} ‘The decision whether to grant or deny a
presentence request to withdraw a guilty plea is a matter resting
within the trial court's sound discretion. Id. Such decisions will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court
abused its discretion; that is, acted in an unreasonable, arbitrary,
unconscionable manner. Id.{¶ 80} “{¶ 14} ‘No abuse of discretion in denying a presentence
motion to withdraw a plea is demonstrated where: (1) the accused
is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) the accused was
afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before entering
the plea, (3) after the motion to withdraw is filed the accused
is given a complete and impartial hearing on the motion, and (4)
the record reveals that the trial court gave full and fair
consideration to the plea withdrawal request. State v. Peterseim
(1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863. A “change of heart”
is not sufficient justification to permit withdrawal of a guilty
plea. State v. Lambrose (1988), 44 Ohio App.3d 102, 541 N.E.2d 632;
State v. Landis (Dec. 6, 1995), Montgomery App. No. 15099.’”
{¶ 81} An examination of this record demonstrates that Defendant
was represented by an experienced, competent counsel during the
trial/plea proceedings. Defendant was afforded a full hearing
before entering his no contest pleas, at which the trial court
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meticulously complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in accepting
Defendant’s pleas, including determining that Defendant understood
the nature of the charges and the effect of his no contest pleas.
Defendant was also afforded a complete and impartial hearing on
his motion to withdraw his no contest pleas. The trial court gave
full and fair consideration to Defendant’s plea withdrawal request,
but rejected it because Defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable
and legitimate basis for the withdrawal.
{¶ 82} The reason Defendant gave for wanting to withdraw his
no contest pleas was that he mistakenly believed that after entering
those pleas he would be released from jail and then have the chance
to go into court and fight the charges by proving his defense, which
would be that he was never properly served in 1999 with notice
that he was obligated by court order to pay child support in Greene
County. In other words, Defendant claimed that he did not
understand that his no contest pleas concluded the issue of his
failure to pay child support charges against him.
{¶ 83} The trial court properly concluded that Defendant’s
reason for wanting to withdraw his no contest pleas was not credible
in light of the fact that Defendant had previously made child support
payments, and more importantly, the advice the trial court gave
Defendant at the time he entered his pleas: that following entry
of his no contest pleas the court would make a finding of guilty.
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Defendant indicated at the time of his plea that he understood
that, as well as the maximum penalties that then applied.
{¶ 84} As for Defendant’s claim that he has a defense to these
charges, that he was never properly served with legal notice of
the 1999 Order by the Greene County Domestic Relations Court that
obligated him to pay child support in Greene County, that claim
is not credible and not supported by the record.
{¶ 85} This case began in 1996, in Greene County Juvenile Court,
as a paternity case. Defendant left Ohio and went to Mississippi.
The Greene County Child Support Enforcement Agency completed
paperwork pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support
Act to establish paternity and Defendant’s obligation to pay child
support and forwarded those papers to Mississippi. Defendant was
personally served in Mississippi with notice of proceedings on the
support claim, but he failed to appear or otherwise respond. As
a result, a Mississippi court found Defendant to be the father of
the child and ordered him to pay child support. Defendant
subsequently paid some amount of child support while in Mississippi.
{¶ 86} When Defendant returned to Ohio, the Greene County Child
Support Enforcement Agency filed an action in Greene County Domestic
Relations Court to register the Mississippi child support orders
with the court in Greene County. The record demonstrates that
Defendant was personally served with that process, on November 8,
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1999, at 326 West Main Street in Trotwood, Ohio, which is his
sister’s residence and where Defendant stayed. Defendant concedes
that his sister would have given him any court papers she received.
{¶ 87} Defendant does not argue that he was unaware of the court
ordered obligation to pay child support in Greene County, inasmuch
as payments were withheld from his paycheck. Further, Defendant
did not at that time contest the withholding order. Under these
facts and circumstances, Defendant’s claim that he wanted to
withdraw his no contest pleas because he has a valid defense to
the charges because he was never properly served with the 1999
court order is not credible. No abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his
no contest pleas is demonstrated.
{¶ 88} Defendant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
FAIN, J., And KLINE, J., concur.
(Hon. Roger L. Kline, Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting
by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.)
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Copies mailed to:
Stephanie R. Hayden, Esq.
Gregory K. Lind, Esq.
Hon. Stephen A. Wolaver