State v. Williams ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Williams, 
    2011-Ohio-3290
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO                                      :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                         :   C.A. CASE NO. 10CA28
    vs.                                                :   T.C. CASE NO. 10CR68
    BOBBY A. WILLIAMS                                  :   (Criminal Appeal from
    Common Pleas Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                        :
    . . . . . . . . .
    O P I N I O N
    Rendered on the 30th day of June, 2011.
    . . . . . . . . .
    James Bennett, Prosecutor, 201 West Main Street, Troy, OH 45373
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Stephanie A. Gunter. Atty. Reg. No.0070436, 429 N. Main Street,
    Piqua, OH 45356
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    . . . . . . . . .
    GRADY, P.J.:
    {¶ 1} On March 10, 2010, M.S. was standing on the back patio
    of her home in Piqua, Ohio, smoking a cigarette, when Defendant
    Bobby Williams walked up and asked M.S. to come over to him.                   When
    M.S. approached Defendant, he extended his hand and introduced
    himself as her neighbor.                       When M.S. shook Defendant’s hand, he
    2
    grabbed her and forcibly restrained her while touching her breast
    underneath her shirt.
    {¶ 2} Defendant was indicted on one count of gross sexual
    imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a felony of the
    fourth degree.   Defendant was found guilty following a jury trial.
    The trial court sentenced Defendant to eighteen months in prison
    and classified him as a Tier I sexual offender.
    {¶ 3} Defendant appealed to this court from his conviction
    and sentence.     Defendant’s appellate counsel filed an Anders
    brief, Anders v. California (1967), 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    ,
    
    19 L.Ed.2d 493
    , stating that she could find no meritorious issues
    for appellate review.    We notified Defendant of his appellate
    counsel’s representations and afforded him ample time to file a
    pro se brief.    None has been received.   This case is now before
    us for our independent review of the record.   Penson v. Ohio (1988),
    
    488 U.S. 75
    , 
    109 S.Ct. 346
    , 
    102 L.Ed.2d 300
    .
    {¶ 4} Defendant’s   appellate   counsel   has   identified   two
    possible issues for appeal, the first of which raises an issue
    concerning the validity of Defendant’s sentence.
    {¶ 5} In State v. Jeffrey Barker, Montgomery App. No. 22779,
    
    2009-Ohio-3511
    , at ¶36-37, we wrote:
    {¶ 6} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any
    sentence within the authorized statutory range, and the court is
    3
    not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing
    maximum, consecutive, or more than minimum sentences.      State v.
    Foster, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2006-Ohio-856
    , at paragraph 7 of the
    syllabus.    Nevertheless, in exercising its discretion the trial
    court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every
    felony offense, including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
    State v. Mathis, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 54
    , 
    2006-Ohio-855
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 1
    , at ¶37.
    {¶ 7} “When reviewing felony sentences, an appellate court
    must first determine whether the sentencing court complied with
    all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence,
    including R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, in order to find whether the
    sentence is contrary to law.    State v. Kalish, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 23
    ,
    
    2008-Ohio-4912
    .     If the sentence is not clearly and convincingly
    contrary to law, the trial court’s decision in imposing the term
    of imprisonment must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
    standard.    Id.”
    {¶ 8} The transcript of the sentencing hearing demonstrates
    that the trial court considered the purposes and principles      of
    felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism
    factors, R.C. 2929.12, in imposing its sentence.     The court also
    considered oral statements of counsel and Defendant.   The eighteen
    month sentence the court imposed on the gross sexual imposition
    4
    charge, while the maximum sentence, is nevertheless within the
    authorized range of available punishments for a felony of the fourth
    degree, which is six to eighteen months.            R.C. 2929.14(A)(4).
    The court also informed Defendant about post release control
    requirements and the consequences for violating post release
    control.    Defendant’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly
    contrary to law.    Kalish.
    {¶ 9} Furthermore, the court’s eighteen month sentence is not
    an abuse of discretion because the record supports that sentence.
    Defendant touched the victim’s breast underneath her clothing
    while forcibly restraining her.         As a result, the victim suffered
    psychological harm.       When he committed this offense, Defendant
    had been released from prison on parole for only three months after
    serving    thirty   one   years   for    murder.     That   circumstance
    demonstrates a high likelihood for recidivism.       Finally, Defendant
    denied any culpability and expressed no remorse.         We see no abuse
    of discretion in imposing the maximum eighteen month sentence.
    This assignment of error lacks arguable merit.
    {¶ 10} Appellate counsel additionally raises as a possible
    issue for appeal trial counsel’s performance.
    {¶ 11} Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective
    unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen
    below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in
    5
    addition,    prejudice    arose    from      counsel's      performance.
    Strickland v. Washington (1984), 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    ,
    
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
    .   To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by
    counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant must affirmatively
    demonstrate to a reasonable probability that were it not for
    counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.
    
    Id.,
     State v. Bradley (1989), 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    .
    {¶ 12} Appellate counsel does not identify any instances of
    deficient   performance   by   trial    counsel.    To    the   contrary,
    appellate counsel states that in reviewing this record she can
    find no evidence of trial counsel rendering ineffective assistance.
    Our independent review of the record has likewise not turned up
    any instances of deficient performance by trial counsel, much less
    resulting prejudice as defined by Strickland.            This assignment
    of error lacks arguable merit.
    {¶ 13} In addition to reviewing the possible issues for appeal
    raised by Defendant’s appellate counsel, we have conducted an
    independent review of the trial court’s proceedings and have found
    no error having arguable merit.        Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal
    is without merit and the judgment of the trial court will be
    affirmed.
    FROELICH, J. And HALL, J., concur.
    6
    Copies mailed to:
    James Bennett, Esq.
    Stephanie A. Gunter, Esq.
    Bobby Williams
    Hon. Robert J. Lindeman
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10CA28

Judges: Grady

Filed Date: 6/30/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014