State v. Inman , 2014 Ohio 786 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Inman, 2014-Ohio-786.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
Case No. 13CA3374
vs. :
DECISION AND
WILLIAM A. INMAN, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 02/28/2014
APPEARANCES:
David A. Sams, West Jefferson, Ohio, for Appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, Thomas N. Anger, Assistant Attorney General of
Ohio, and Debra Gorrell Wehrle, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio, for
Appellee.
Hoover, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Court of Common Pleas judgment of
conviction and sentence. William A. Inman, defendant below and appellant herein, was
convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping, tampering with
evidence, and gross abuse of a corpse. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Summary of the Case
{¶ 2} On May 20, 2011, a Hocking County Grand Jury indicted appellant on aggravated
murder, with death penalty specifications, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and R.C. 2941.14;
aggravated murder, with death penalty specifications, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B) and R.C.
2941.14; murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A); kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3);
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 2
tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); and gross abuse of a corpse in
violation of R.C. 2927.01(B). Appellant’s son and co-defendant, William Inman II, was likewise
indicted, tried, and convicted on identical charges. See State v. Inman, 4th Dist. Hocking No.
12CA16, 2013-Ohio-3351, ¶ 12. Inman II was tried first, in Hocking County, and because pre-
trial publicity proved prejudicial, appellant’s case was transferred to Ross County, Ohio. A jury
found appellant guilty of all the charged crimes and, following a mitigation hearing,
recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court
accepted the jury's recommendation and imposed the life with no possibility of parole sentence.1
For her role in this tragedy, appellant’s wife, Sandra Inman, pled guilty to murder. See State v.
Sandra K. Inman, Hocking County Common Pleas Court No. 11-CR-43.
{¶ 3} The charges against appellant stemmed from the kidnapping and murder of
Summer Cook Inman. During the late evening hours of March 22, 2011, Summer was kidnapped
outside the Century National Bank in Logan, Ohio, where she worked as a janitor. Her body was
found a week later, left inside the septic tank behind the Faith Tabernacle Church in nearby
Nelsonville, Ohio. Three industrial grade zip ties had been used to bind Summer’s hands, and a
fourth zip tie had been fastened around Summer’s neck. Appellant was Summer’s father-in-law;
Sandra Inman was Summer’s mother-in-law; and William Inman II was Summer’s estranged
husband.
{¶ 4} The state's basic theory of the evidence at trial is briefly summarized as follows.
On the evening of March 22, 2011, appellant, his son William Inman II, and his wife Sandra
Inman, kidnapped Summer Cook Inman from the parking lot of the Century National Bank.
Summer and Inman II were in the midst of a contentious divorce and custody dispute involving
1
Separate sentences of imprisonment on the kidnapping, tampering with evidence, and gross abuse of a corpse
charges were ordered to be served consecutive to each other, and prior to and consecutive to the life without
possibility of parole sentence.
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 3
their children. Shortly after forcing Summer into the backseat of their vehicle, Summer was
strangled to death by the fastening of the zip tie around her neck. The Inmans then drove to the
Faith Tabernacle Church, a church that they were intimately familiar with, and disposed of
Summer’s body in the church septic tank. The Inmans then made a return trip to northeastern
Ohio, where they were living at the time, making stops along the way to clean the vehicle and to
change the physical appearance of the vehicle.
{¶ 5} The state presented three individuals who witnessed the kidnapping of Summer on
the evening of March 22, 2011. Each witness testified that a white car, which resembled an old
police cruiser, was sitting in an alley by the bank. A woman with blond hair was in the front seat
of the vehicle. Two men were beside the rear passenger door of the vehicle holding a stun-gun on
a white female victim. The victim was lying on the ground in a fetal position, and each witness
testified to hearing loud screams coming from the victim. One witness testified that he tried to
approach and help the victim. He testified that he witnessed the two men hold the stun-gun on
the victim. When he was noticed, one of the male perpetrators pepper-sprayed him, causing him
to temporarily lose his eyesight. All the witnesses confirmed that the men wore dark clothing and
two of the witnesses testified that the men wore facemasks. Two of the witnesses testified that
they saw the two men throw the victim into the back seat of the vehicle. The same witnesses
testified that the blond haired female was driving the vehicle.
{¶ 6} It was also adduced at trial that the appellant had purchased a white 2003 Ford
Crown Victoria on or about March 18, 2011, from Majestic Motors of Akron, Ohio. The
Streetsboro, Ohio Police Department, had previously owned the Crown Victoria. The rear
passenger locks had been disabled, thereby preventing the rear doors from being opened from the
inside of the vehicle.
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 4
{¶ 7} Two additional witnesses testified for the state regarding the events on the night
Summer was kidnapped. Colton Kilkenny testified that around 11:30 p.m. on the evening in
question, he was driving along Route 33 in Nelsonville, Ohio, when he observed what appeared
to be a white police cruiser parked at the Faith Tabernacle Church. Kilkenny was so convinced
that the vehicle was a police cruiser that he slowed down in hopes of avoiding a speeding ticket.
Chrystal Farris also testified for the state. Farris testified that she also saw the white vehicle,
what she thought was an older model Crown Victoria, parked at the church in the late evening
hours. Farris further testified that she saw two men standing outside the vehicle and a blond or
redheaded woman in the front seat.
{¶ 8} The Inmans were immediately identified as suspects, given the pending divorce
between Inman II and Summer and the eyewitness accounts of the abductors (Sandra Inman had
blond hair at the time of the kidnapping). Law enforcement officers questioned the Inmans in the
hours and days immediately following Summer’s disappearance. A search warrant for the house
in which the Inmans were staying in Akron, Ohio, was also obtained and executed. Among other
items, a Garmin GPS unit, as well as the cell phones of appellant and Inman II were seized upon
execution of the warrant. The white Crown Victoria was also seized and searched for evidence.
{¶ 9} The Garmin GPS unit2, along with the cell phone records of appellant and Inman
II, placed the Inmans in Logan, Ohio at 5:45 PM on March 22, 2011. The GPS unit placed the
Inmans in Logan until 8:07 PM, when the unit was turned off. The unit was turned back on at
11:46 PM in Nelsonville. From that point, the GPS traveled northbound through county township
roads, going through the city of McConnelsville, then to Zanesville, across Interstate 70, and up
Interstate 77 back to the Akron-Cleveland area. The GPS then stopped at the Blu Sonic Car
2
The Inmans had admitted to law enforcement that they were traveling together on the night of March 22, 2011, and
that they had the Garmin GPS unit with them on that night. The Inmans denied, however, that they were in Logan,
Ohio; instead the Inmans insisted that they were in Cleveland.
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 5
Wash in Seven Hills, Ohio, where video surveillance showed the Inmans cleaning out the Crown
Victoria and dismantling and removing a black spotlight that was affixed to the vehicle.
{¶ 10} After leaving the car wash, the Inmans traveled to Pearl Road Auto Parts in
Cleveland, Ohio. An employee of Pearl Road Auto Parts testified that on March 23, 2011,
appellant traded him four almost new tires that were on the Crown Victoria for four lesser quality
tires.
{¶ 11} Aaron Miller, Chief of the Logan Police Department, testified that on March 29,
2011, law enforcement, “based upon information developed during the investigation,” was able
to determine that Summer had been killed and that her body was located in the septic tank behind
the Faith Tabernacle Church. Thus, exactly one week after Summer was kidnapped, the lid of the
septic tank was removed and Summer’s body was discovered head first in the septic tank. The
only part of Summer’s body that protruded above the sewage was one of her shoeless feet.
{¶ 12} Dr. Brian Casto, a deputy coroner employed at the Montgomery County
Coroner’s Office, performed Summer’s autopsy. Dr. Casto testified that the official cause of
death was homicide by means of ligature strangulation. Casto explained that the zip tie fastened
around Summer’s neck was made so tight that he had to wedge wire cutters under it to remove
the tie. Dr. Casto also concluded that Summer was deceased prior to entering the septic tank.
{¶ 13} It was revealed during trial that upon completion of the state’s case, appellant
wished to call to the stand, former Chief Deputy Matt Speckman of the Hocking County
Sheriff’s Department, to elicit testimony regarding a portion of a statement that Sandra Inman
made to Speckman on March 29, 2011. In particular, appellant wished to elicit a statement in
which Sandra Inman told Speckman that her son, Inman II, was solely responsible for strangling
Summer with the zip tie in the backseat of the vehicle, and that appellant was driving the vehicle
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 6
when Summer was killed. When the state was made aware of appellant’s intention to introduce
Sandra’s statement, through Speckman, it raised an objection. A lengthy discussion regarding the
admissibility of the statement was conducted outside the presence of the jury. The trial court
ultimately determined that neither case law precedent nor the evidentiary rules permitted the
introduction of the statement.
{¶ 14} At trial, appellant also attempted to introduce a portion of the state’s opening
statement from the trial of Inman II. In particular, appellant wished to introduce the prosecutor’s
remarks, made during opening statements, that it was Inman II that pulled the zip tie around
Summer’s neck. Again, after a lengthy discussion of the evidentiary rules, the trial court did not
permit the appellant to introduce the statement.
{¶ 15} On February 4, 2013, the jury convicted appellant on all the counts listed in the
indictment. A mitigation hearing was held on February 6, 2013. During the mitigation hearing,
three witnesses testified on appellant’s behalf, including Dr. James P. Reardon a licensed
psychologist. The appellant also read an unsworn statement on his own behalf.
{¶ 16} At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury determined that the aggravating
circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; and the jury
recommended that appellant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. The trial court subsequently held a sentencing hearing and ordered such sentence on the
murder charges.
{¶ 17} On March 8, 2013, appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 18} On appeal, appellant asserts the following assignment of error:
Assignment of Error:
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 7
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND THE
RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE CONTRARY TO OHIO LAW AND THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
{¶ 19} In support of his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court
should have (1) permitted him to introduce Sandra’s statement, through the testimony of
Speckman; and (2) that the trial court should have allowed him to introduce the state’s comments
that were made during the opening statement of Inman II’s trial. Appellant contends that both
statements demonstrate that he was not the principal offender; and that he did not purposefully
kill Summer. The state argues here, like it did at trial, that the statements are inadmissible
hearsay. Appellant, on the other hand, contends that the statements are admissible under the rules
of evidence and established case law.
III. Law & Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 20} “The decision to admit or exclude evidence rests within the trial court's sound
discretion. Thus, a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse of
discretion. The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable,
unconscionable, or arbitrary.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Tyler, 196 Ohio App.3d 443, 2011-
Ohio-3937, 964 N.E.2d 12, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.). “Furthermore, ‘[w]hen applying the abuse of
discretion standard, a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.’ ” Id., quoting In re Jane Doe I, 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 137-138, 566 N.E.2d 1181(1991).
B. Admissibility of Sandra Inman’s Out of Court Statement to Law Enforcement
{¶ 21} Appellant contends that Sandra Inman was unavailable to testify as a witness, and
thus, her out-of-court statement to Speckman was admissible under Evid.R. 804(B)(3), which
provides:
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 8
Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness: * * *
(3) Statement against interest. A statement that was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability, whether offered to
exculpate or inculpate the accused, is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
{¶ 22} Appellant argues that each of the requirements for the admission of Sandra’s
statement under Evid.R. 804(B)(3) was met. First, he asserts that Sandra was unavailable to
testify as a witness by virtue of Evid.R. 601(B) – the spousal incompetence rule. Second, he
states that Sandra’s statement was “self-incriminating.” Finally, appellant asserts that Sandra’s
statement was corroborated by both the state’s opening statement in his son’s trial, and by the
stipulated testimony of John Anthony Methany.3
{¶ 23} The state responds that Sandra was not unavailable to testify, and thus, Evid.R.
804(B)(3) does not apply. We agree. At the time that the trial court disallowed Speckman’s
testimony of Sandra’s statement, it had not been established that Sandra was unavailable to
testify.
3
During trial, the parties stipulated that Mr. Methany would testify that on March 22, 2011, while driving his car in
Logan, Ohio, at approximately 7 p.m., he saw a white Crown Victoria. The parties further stipulated that Methany
would testify that the Crown Victoria looked like an old police cruiser; that a blond woman was driving the car; that
an unidentified male was in the front seat; and that Inman II was in the backseat.
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 9
{¶ 24} It is true that appellant’s trial counsel indicated that if called to the stand to
testify, Sandra would invoke spousal privilege/incompetence and her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. Appellant, however, did not attempt to call Sandra as a witness. “ ‘A
showing of unavailability under Evid.R. 804 must be based on testimony of witnesses rather than
hearsay not under oath unless unavailability is conceded by the party against whom the statement
is being offered.’ ” State v. Osman, 4th Dist. Athens No. 09CA36, 2011-Ohio-4626, ¶ 73,
quoting State v. Keairns, 9 Ohio St.3d 228, 460 N.E.2d 245 (1984), paragraph three of the
syllabus; see also State v. Platt, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-1148, 2005-Ohio-705, ¶ 76
(holding that co-defendant, not called to testify was not “unavailable” for purposes of Evid.R.
804(B)(3), where defense counsel did not call co-defendant to stand because it was anticipated
that co-defendant would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
Furthermore, a spouse is not unavailable for purposes of Evid.R. 804, just because the spouse
may be incompetent to testify under Evid.R. 601(B). See State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
02CA0045, 2003-Ohio-2850, ¶ 10 (“If a spouse is incompetent to testify under Evid.R. 601(B),
the spouse is not unavailable under Evid.R. 804(A)(1).” This is especially true, because a
testifying spouse can waive incompetence and elect to testify. Evid.R. 601(B)(2).
{¶ 25} Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Sandra was unavailable for purposes
of Evid.R. 804(B)(3), we would find no fault with the trial court’s exclusion of Speckman’s
testimony. Appellant’s proffer of Speckman’s testimony indicated that Speckman would testify
that Sandra, appellant’s co-defendant, had implicated her son, Inman II, as Summer’s killer; and
that she and appellant were in the front seat of the Crown Victoria when Summer was murdered.
{¶ 26} Sandra’s statement is not a statement against interest, but rather, the statement
places blame on her son for the murder. As explained by the Fifth District Court of Appeals:
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 10
Evid.R. 804(B)(3) provides for the admission of statements against interest
because it is assumed no reasonable person would fabricate self-incriminating
remarks. While it may be unlikely a reasonable person would fabricate statements
which implicate himself in a crime, it may be likely a reasonable person would
fabricate statements neutral to his position and inculpatory of another. This is
especially true in the case of a co-defendant, who often has an incentive to
fabricate facts which are inculpatory of another. Because the rationale behind the
admission of statements against interest does not support the admission of those
portions of statement which are neutral to the declarant and/or inculpatory of
another, we find such portions are inadmissible under Evid.R. 804(B)(3) and
should be redacted prior to the admission of the inculpatory statement.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Stapleton, 5th Dist. Perry No. 97CA62, 1998 WL 666774, *4 (Aug.
31, 1998). See also State v. Rafferty, 2nd Dist. Champaign No. 2012CA15, 2013-Ohio-1585, ¶
16 (quoting Stapleton), and State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d
216, ¶ 63 (holding that Evid.R. 804(B)(3) requires that the declarant’s statement so far subject
him to criminal liability that a reasonable person would not make the statement unless true, and
that, “[a] reasonable person might easily make a false statement that minimized his involvement
in the offense.”).
{¶ 27} In the case at hand, appellant wished to introduce the portion of Sandra’s
statement that accused their son of killing Summer. That statement, however, was not a
statement against Sandra’s own penal interest, and thus, it is not admissible under Evid.R.
804(B)(3).
C. Admissibility of the State’s Opening Remarks in the Trial of Inman II
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 11
{¶ 28} Appellant also wished to introduce the prosecution’s statement, made during
opening statements of his son’s trial, which alleged that Inman II was the person responsible for
fastening the zip tie around Summer’s neck. Appellant contends that the statement is admissible
as a non-hearsay admission of a party opponent under Evid.R. 801(D)(2).
{¶ 29} Despite appellant’s arguments, it is well settled that counsel remarks made during
opening statements are not evidence. State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 338, 652 N.E.2d 1000(1995); State v. Davis, 4th Dist. Ross No. 10CA3188, 2011-Ohio-1747, ¶ 31. Rather, opening
statements often serve to state the party’s theory of the case. State v. Warmus, 197 Ohio App.3d
383, 2011-Ohio-5827, 967 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 30} We fail to see how remarks that have no evidentiary value at the trial in which
they are made, are somehow admissible in the subsequent trial of a co-defendant. Simply put,
counsel remarks made during opening statements are not evidence, and thus are inadmissible,
whether offered at the trial in which they are made, or at a subsequent trial. Accordingly, the trial
court did not error in its refusal to permit appellant to introduce the remarks.
D. Prejudice to Appellant
{¶ 31} Even if the trial court erred in refusing to admit Sandra’s statement, or the
statement of the prosecutor made during opening statements of Inman II’s trial, we fail to see
how appellant was prejudiced.
{¶ 32} “ ‘It is axiomatic that in order for there to be reversible error, there must be
prejudice to the appellant.’ ” State v. Evans, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 10CA1, 2012-Ohio-1562, ¶
43, quoting State v. Rembert, 5th Dist. Richland No. 04CA66, 2005-Ohio-4718, ¶ 15.
{¶ 33} Appellant contends that the statements in question are important because they
demonstrate: (1) that he was not the principal offender in the murder of Summer; and (2) that he
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 12
did not have the specific intent to kill Summer. Appellant, however, ignores the law of
complicity.4
{¶ 34} R.C. 2903.01, defines aggravated murder, in pertinent part, as follows:5
(A) No person shall purposefully6, and with prior calculation and design, cause
the death of another * * *.
(B) No person shall purposefully cause the death of another * * * while
committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after
committing or attempting to commit, kidnapping * * *.
{¶ 35} Under R.C. 2923.03(F), a defendant “may be convicted of [an] offense upon
proof that he was complicit in its commission, even though the indictment ‘is stated * * * in
terms of the principal offense’ and does not mention complicity.” State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d
246, 251, 762 N.E.2d 940 (2002). R.C. 2923.03 defines complicity, in relevant part, as follows:
(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of
an offense, shall do any of the following: * * *
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; * * *.
{¶ 36} “To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C.
2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged,
cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the
defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754
N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. The defendant’s intent may be inferred from the circumstances
4
It should be noted that the trial court instructed the jury on the law of complicity.
5
Appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and R.C.
2903.01(B).
6
See R.C. 2901.22(A): “A person acts purposefully when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result, or,
when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender
intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature”).
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 13
surrounding the crime. Id.; see also State v. Markins, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3387, 2013-
Ohio-602, ¶ 32. The defendant’s “ ‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from
presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’ ” Johnson at
245, quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 273 N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971); see also
Markins at ¶ 33.
{¶ 37} Here, appellant asserts that the statements demonstrate that he was not the
principal offender, and thus he did not act with the requisite criminal intent required for
aggravated murder, i.e., he did not purposefully cause the death of his daughter-in-law.
{¶ 38} To resolve this issue we look to the circumstances surrounding Summer’s death
and appellant’s presence, companionship and conduct before and after Summer’s death to
determine whether appellant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, or advised the
principal in the aggravated murder of Summer.
{¶ 39} According to the evidence adduced at trial, appellant accompanied his son and his
wife to the Century National Bank in Logan, knowing that Summer would be alone, at the bank.
At the bank, appellant and his son stun-gunned Summer, and forced her into the backseat of their
inescapable vehicle, a vehicle which appellant had purchased just days earlier. While in the
vehicle, someone tied three zip ties around Summer’s hands, and fastened the fatal zip tie around
her neck. After Summer was killed, appellant assisted his co-defendants in placing Summer’s
body in the septic tank of the Faith Tabernacle Church. Appellant also participated in cleaning
the vehicle, removing a spotlight from the vehicle’s body, and replacing the vehicle’s tires.
Finally, appellant participated in creating a false alibi and relating that alibi to law enforcement.
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 14
{¶ 40} Considering the testimony at trial, there was ample evidence to support a verdict
that appellant was complicit in the killing of Summer and that appellant purposefully, and with
prior calculation and design, caused the death of Summer, or, alternatively, that appellant was
complicit in purposefully causing Summer’s death while committing or attempting to commit
kidnapping. Accordingly, any error by the trial court in preventing appellant from introducing
the statements was not prejudicial error, requiring reversal, because under the law of complicity
it need not be established that appellant was the principal offender.
{¶ 41} We also note that both of appellant’s aggravated murder charges included
identical death penalty specifications. Such specification being that appellant committed
aggravated murder while committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and appellant was the principal offender; or
alternatively, that appellant committed aggravated murder while committing, attempting to
commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and that
appellant acted with prior calculation and design. In addition to finding appellant guilty on both
counts of aggravated murder, the jury also found that the state proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, both alternative specifications attached to each aggravated murder charge. Moreover, the
state pursued the prior calculation and design specification during the mitigation phase of the
trial; not the principal offender specification. Thus, appellant’s argument is also without merit to
the extent that he contends the mitigation phase of the trial was unfair because of the trial court’s
refusal to permit the introduction of the statements.
IV. Conclusion
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 15
{¶ 42} In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow appellant to
introduce, at his trial, the statement of Sandra Inman, and the statement of the prosecution made
during opening remarks of Inman II’s trial. Moreover, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that
the exclusion of the statements was error, such error did not prejudice the appellant.
Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the trial court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 13CA3374 16
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein
taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County
Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The
purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued
by this entry, it will terminate at the earliest of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the
failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-
five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration
of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment & Opinion.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court
By:
Marie Hoover, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the
time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.