Stapleton v. Stapleton , 2012 Ohio 6280 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Stapleton v. Stapleton, 2012-Ohio-6280.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
JOHNNY STAPLETON, JR., :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No: 12CA10
:
v. :
: DECISION AND
TIFFANY STAPLETON, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellee. : Filed: December 27, 2012
APPEARANCES:
Johnny Stapleton, Jr., Chillicothe, Ohio, pro se Appellant.
Robert C. Delawder, Ironton, Ohio, for Appellee.
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Johnny Stapleton Jr. (hereinafter “Johnny”) appeals the judgment of the
Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court granted Johnny and Tiffany
Stapleton (hereinafter “Tiffany”) a divorce from each other. On appeal, Johnny argues
that the trial court erred by awarding Tiffany a fifty-percent interest in the proceeds from
Johnny’s personal-injury lawsuit. We agree. Because Tiffany’s pleadings admit that
there is no marital property to be divided, Johnny did not have to prove that proceeds
from the lawsuit are his separate property. Tiffany’s admission definitively established
this fact. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Lawrence App. No. 12CA10 2
{¶2} After being shot by a police officer, Johnny filed a personal-injury lawsuit
(hereinafter the “Lawsuit”) against various defendants. (Although the particulars of the
Lawsuit are not in the record, we take judicial notice of Case Number 1:11cv375 in the
United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Western Division. See Hart v.
Hudson, 4th Dist. No. 10CA19, 2010-Ohio-5954, ¶ 26.) Johnny filed the Lawsuit on
June 9, 2011, and the Lawsuit was settled on October 11, 2012.
{¶3} On January 31, 2012, Johnny filed a Complaint for Divorce against
Tiffany. Paragraph 9 of Johnny’s complaint states the following:
“The parties [ ] DO [√] DO NOT have marital property to be divided.”
Thus, the face of the complaint shows that Johnny checked the box for DO NOT.
{¶4} On March 5, 2012, Tiffany filed her Answer and Counterclaim. Tiffany’s
Answer and Counterclaim does not reference the Lawsuit. Rather, Tiffany’s Answer
and Counterclaim “admits the allegations contained in paragraph nine (9)” of Johnny’s
complaint. In other words, Tiffany admitted that there was no marital property to be
divided. Moreover, Tiffany’s counterclaim “incorporates [the no-marital-property
admission] as if fully rewritten herein.”
{¶5} On April 11, 2012, the trial court held a divorce hearing. Tiffany appeared
at the hearing, but Johnny did not. During the hearing, Tiffany and her attorney had the
following exchange about the Lawsuit:
“DELAWDER: The only real asset that remains is a law suit that is pending against the
City of Ironton and your [sic] asking the Judge to make an order that you would receive
half of any settlement if there was going to be one?
“STAPLETON: Yes sir.” Transcript at 6.
Lawrence App. No. 12CA10 3
{¶6} On April 13, 2012, the trial court granted Tiffany and Johnny “a divorce
from each other on the grounds of incompatibility.” Divorce Decree at 2. In the divorce
decree, the trial court granted Tiffany a fifty-percent interest in proceeds from the
Lawsuit. As the court held, “[T]here is a pending civil case wherein Johnny Stapleton is
the Plaintiff, which resulted from the Plaintiff being shot, and, upon settlement of the
case, the WIFE will be entitled to ½ of any and all settlement proceeds.” Id.
{¶7} Johnny appeals and asserts the following assignment of error: I. “The trial
court abused its discretion when it ruled Wife was entitled to one-half of Husband’s
personal injury compensation.”
II.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Johnny contends that the trial court erred
in awarding Tiffany a fifty-percent interest in the proceeds from the Lawsuit.
{¶9} “Trial courts must divide marital property equitably between the spouses.
R.C. 3105.171(B). * * * Because the trial court possesses great discretion in reaching an
equitable distribution, we will not reverse its ultimate division of property absent an
abuse of discretion.” O’Rourke v. O’Rourke, 4th Dist. No. 08CA3253, 2010-Ohio-1243,
¶ 15. An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error of judgment; it implies
that the court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶10} “Before a trial court divides property in a domestic proceeding, it must
classify the property as marital or separate. R.C. 3105.171(B). * * * Property acquired
during the marriage is presumed to be marital property, unless it is shown to be
separate property.” Jones v. Jones, 4th Dist. No. 07CA25, 2008-Ohio-2476, ¶ 20. “The
Lawrence App. No. 12CA10 4
court shall distribute a spouse’s separate property to that spouse unless an exception
exists under [R.C. 3105.171(E)] or some other provision of the statute.” Stringfield v.
Stringfield, 7th Dist. No. 05 MO 16, 2007-Ohio-1116, ¶ 14, citing R.C. 3105.171(D).
“Generally, the party claiming that an asset is separate property has the burden of
proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” Hook v. Hook, 189 Ohio
App.3d 440, 2010-Ohio-4165, 938 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.); see also Barkley v.
Barkley, 119 Ohio App. 3d 155, 168, 694 N.E.2d 989 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶11} Johnny bases his appeal on R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vi), which states the
following: “‘Separate property’ means all real and personal property and any interest in
real or personal property that is found by the court to be * * * [c]ompensation to a
spouse for the spouse’s personal injury, except for loss of marital earnings and
compensation for expenses paid from marital assets[.]” And because of R.C.
3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vi), Johnny argues that proceeds from the Lawsuit are separate
property, not marital property. Tiffany, however, argues that Johnny did not meet the
burden of proof for establishing separate property. According to Tiffany, Johnny
did not appear for the hearing on the matter and did not
present any evidence related to the proceeds from pending
litigation. The only evidence presented was that of [Tiffany]
and, after hearing the evidence presented, the Trial Court
made an equitable division of assets and debts and
concluded that [Tiffany] was entitled to one half of the
proceeds from pending litigation involving [Johnny]. Brief of
Appellee at 6.
Lawrence App. No. 12CA10 5
{¶12} Here, we find that proceeds from the Lawsuit are not marital property
subject to division under R.C. 3105.171(B). We also find that Johnny did not have to
present evidence on the issue of marital property versus separate property. This is so
because Tiffany’s Answer and Counterclaim admits that “[t]he parties * * * DO NOT
have marital property to be divided.” (Emphasis sic.) Complaint for Divorce at ¶ 9. “An
admission in a pleading dispenses with the need to present evidence and is equivalent
to proof of the fact.” 75 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Pleading, Section 193; accord Crowl
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Wallace, 7th Dist. No. 08 CA 851, 2008-Ohio-5733, ¶ 24; Rhoden v.
Akron, 61 Ohio App. 3d 725, 727, 573 N.E.2d 1131 (9th Dist.1988). Therefore, because
of Tiffany’s admission, Johnny did not have to prove that his interest in the Lawsuit was
separate property as opposed to marital property. Tiffany’s admission already proved
that fact. See Gerrick v. Gorsuch, 172 Ohio St. 417, 178 N.E.2d 40 (1961), paragraph
two of the syllabus (“A party who has alleged and has the burden of proving a material
fact need not offer any evidence to prove that fact if it is judicially admitted by the
pleadings of the adverse party. In such an instance, any evidence with respect to that
fact can have no material effect.”); Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 10th Dist. No.
08AP-527, 2008-Ohio-6959, ¶ 47.
{¶13} Finally, Tiffany did nothing to change her admission that there was no
marital property to be divided. “An admission in a pleading may be amended pursuant
to Civ.R. 15(A).” Hummel v. Suglia, 11th Dist. No. 2002-L-104, 2003-Ohio-5226, ¶ 16;
see also Hersch v. E.W. Scripps Co., 3 Ohio App. 3d 367, 375, 445 N.E.2d 670 (8th
Dist.1981). But Tiffany did not amend her Answer and Counterclaim before the divorce
hearing. Moreover, the admission in Tiffany’s Answer and Counterclaim cannot be
Lawrence App. No. 12CA10 6
changed to conform to the evidence. In relevant part, Civ.R. 15(B) states: “When issues
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” (Emphasis
added.) But here, the issue of marital property was raised in the pleadings. As a result,
Civ.R. 15(B) cannot apply, and the evidence from the divorce hearing cannot change
Tiffany’s admission. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dicenzo, 1 Ohio App. 3d 68,
69, 439 N.E.2d 456 (10th Dist.1981) (Civ.R. 15(B) did not apply because “the issue of
ownership was raised by plaintiff and admitted by defendant”); Lamb v. Carver, 8th Dist.
No. 70673, 1997 WL 253176, *2-3 (May 15, 1997). As the Tenth Appellate District held,
“[I]f a party fails to introduce in evidence an admission in a pleading and permits that
issue to be tried before the trial court, said party does not waive the benefit of the
admission in the pleading.” State Farm at paragraph two of the syllabus. Therefore,
despite the evidence presented at the divorce hearing, Johnny did not waive the benefit
of Tiffany’s admission.
{¶14} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
Tiffany a fifty-percent interest in any proceeds from the Lawsuit. The admission in
Tiffany’s Answer and Counterclaim definitively establishes that proceeds from the
Lawsuit are not marital property. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court,
and we remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Lawrence App. No. 12CA10 7
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED and this cause BE
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellee shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment & Opinion.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.