Yazdani-Isfehani v. Yazdani-Isfehani ( 2012 )

[Cite as Yazdani-Isfehani v. Yazdani-Isfehani, 2012-Ohio-1031.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
Elizabeth Yazdani-Isfehani, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee. :
: Case No. 11CA1
v. :
: DECISION AND
Ramin Yazdani-Isfehani, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. : Filed: March 8, 2012
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Susan Gwinn, Athens, Ohio, for Appellant.
Elizabeth Yazdani-Isfehani, Albany, Ohio, pro se, Appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Ramin Yazdani-Isfehani (hereinafter “Ramin”) appeals the judgment of the
Athens County Court of Common Pleas, which determined that the spousal support he
pays to his ex-wife, Elizabeth Yazdani-Isfehani (hereinafter “Elizabeth”), shall continue
until January 15, 2015. Ramin contends that the trial court erred by continuing
Elizabeth’s spousal support for an additional five years. Because the trial court
reviewed the magistrate’s decision under an appellate standard of review, we (1) do not
reach the merits of Ramin’s argument and (2) reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I.
{¶2} Ramin and Elizabeth married in December 1987, and during the marriage, the
couple had six children. Elizabeth separated from Ramin in October 2004, when she
Athens App. No. 11CA1 2
and the couple’s children moved out of the marital home. The couple’s final divorce
hearing was in April 2007.
{¶3} We have issued two decisions relating to the couple’s divorce proceedings.
Our first decision was in Yazdani-Isfehani v. Yazdani-Isfehani, 170 Ohio App.3d 1,
2006-Ohio-7105. And our second decision was in Yazdani-Isfehani v. Yazdani-Isfehani,
Athens App. No. 08CA3, 2008-Ohio-4662 (hereinafter “Yazdani-Isfehani II”).
{¶4} In Yazdani-Isfehani II, Ramin appealed Elizabeth’s award of spousal support.
Ramin challenged both the amount and the duration of spousal support. Id. at ¶6. We
affirmed the amount of spousal support. Id. at ¶23. However, because the duration of
support was indefinite, we remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at ¶25. . We held
that, based on Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 64, the trial court erred by failing
to determine whether Elizabeth had “the resources, ability and potential to be self-
supporting[.]” Yazdani-Isfehani II at ¶32. We remanded the case to allow the trial court
to continue its Kunkle analysis. Id. at ¶33.
{¶5} Following our remand, the trial court referred the matter to a magistrate. And
the magistrate held a hearing to determine whether Elizabeth had the resources, ability,
and potential to be self-supporting. The magistrate issued a decision, and Ramin filed
five objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court addressed Ramin’s
objections (overruling four and sustaining one), and it ordered Ramin to pay spousal
support of $1,400 per month to Elizabeth until January 21, 2015.
{¶6} Ramin appeals and asserts the following assignment of error: I. “The trial
court erred in awarding the plaintiff sustenance spousal support in the amount of $1,400
a month for five more years.”
Athens App. No. 11CA1 3
II.
{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Ramin contends that the trial court erred when
it awarded Elizabeth $1,400 per month in spousal support until January 21, 2015. As
stated, Ramin objected to the magistrate’s decision. And the trial court then ruled on
Ramin’s objections in its judgment entry.
{¶8} Initially, we note that the trial court reviewed the magistrate’s decision under
an inappropriate standard. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides the following: “If one or more
objections to a magistrate’s decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those
objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as
to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the
factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” Significantly, Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d)
“contemplates a de novo review of any issue of fact or law that a magistrate has
determined when an appropriate objection is timely filed. The trial court may not
properly defer to the magistrate in the exercise of the trial court’s de novo review. The
magistrate is a subordinate officer of the trial court, not an independent officer
performing a separate function.” Jones v. Smith, 187 Ohio App.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-131,
at ¶9 (citation omitted). Thus, “[a] trial court errs when it reviews a magistrate’s decision
using an appellate standard of review because such action prevents an appellate court
from conducting the appropriate review of the trial court’s decision. Francis v.
McDermott, [Darke App.] No. 1744, 2008-Ohio-6723, at ¶14; Quick v. Kwiatkowski (Aug.
3, 2001), [Montgomery App.] No. 18620[.] In such instances, reversal of the trial court’s
decision and remand of the proceedings are required.” Jones at ¶9.
Athens App. No. 11CA1 4
{¶9} In general, we presume that a trial court conducted an independent analysis
of a magistrate’s decision. Mahlerwein v. Mahlerwein, 160 Ohio App.3d 564, 2005-
Ohio-1835, at ¶47. To demonstrate that a trial court erred in reviewing a magistrate’s
decision, a party must “affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court failed to conduct the
independent analysis.” Jones at ¶10, citing Arnold v. Arnold, Athens App. No. 04CA36,
2005-Ohio-5272, at ¶31; Mahlerwein at ¶47. Here, Ramin does not raise the trial
court’s standard of review as error. Nevertheless, the language in the judgment entry
shows that the trial court reviewed the magistrate’s decision under an abuse-of-
discretion standard, which is an appellate standard of review. See Kovacs v. Kovacs,
Erie App. No. E-03-051, 2004-Ohio-2777, at ¶5-9. And the trial court’s use of an
appellate standard of review prevents us from reviewing the trial court’s decision. Jones
at ¶9.
{¶10} The trial court used abuse-of-discretion language in overruling Ramin’s
second objection to the magistrate’s decision. In his second objection, Ramin asserted
that “[t]he Magistrate erred in awarding [Elizabeth] five more years of spousal support,
which was unreasonable and arbitrary.” Judgment Entry at 2. In ruling on Ramin’s
second objection, the trial court stated: “It should be evident this Court believes that
while [Elizabeth] may be able to become self-supporting, it is likely to take a long time,
and this is a direct result of how the family unit ([Ramin] and [Elizabeth]) created in
some way a disabled [wife] and in another required much more from her in terms of
raising the parties’ children. This Court believes five years of spousal support may be
adequate, and concludes the recommendation from the Magistrate is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. Rather, she looked at the prospects for recovery for [Elizabeth] and
Athens App. No. 11CA1 5
concluded at least five more years are required. These conclusions were reached after
consulting the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18 and individually attempting to apply them
to this case. Thus, the Court finds Objection #2 without merit and OVERRULES it.”
Judgment Entry at 3-4.
{¶11} By using the term “unreasonable or arbitrary,” it is apparent that the trial court
reviewed the magistrate’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (An abuse of discretion “implies
that the court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.”). And by
“applying the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard to the magistrate’s decision, the court failed
to conduct a proper independent de novo review of the objections to its magistrate’s
decision.” Kovacs at ¶8.
{¶12} Because the trial court “used the appellate abuse-of-discretion standard in
reviewing the magistrate’s decision[,] * * * we are unable to conclude that the trial court
independently, and without deference to the magistrate, reviewed the matter before it.”
Jones at ¶14. Therefore, we are “prevent[ed] * * * from conducting the appropriate
review of the trial court’s decision.” Id. at ¶9. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the trial court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Athens App. No. 11CA1 6
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND THIS CAUSE BE
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellee shall pay the
costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Athens County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Abele, P.J.: Dissents.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.