In re Adoption of J.B.B. , 2011 Ohio 1653 ( 2011 )

[Cite as In re Adoption of J.B.B. , 2011-Ohio-1653.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SCIOTO COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: :
: Case No. 09CA3335
THE ADOPTION OF J.B.B. : Released: March 30, 2011
:
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
:
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Valerie M. Webb, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, Portsmouth, Ohio, and
Douglas L. Rogers, Ohio State Legal Services Association, Columbus, Ohio,
for Appellant.
Appellees Billie J. Williams and Steven R. Williams did not enter an
appearance.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} Appellant, Monica Burton, appeals the Scioto County Probate
Court’s decision that denied her request to appoint counsel in the adoption
proceeding involving her minor child, J.B.B. She argues that the trial court
erred by denying her request for counsel. We find that the issue is not ripe
for adjudication, because a parenting issue remains pending in the juvenile
court. Consequently, until the juvenile court resolves that issue, the probate
court must refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Because resolution of the
juvenile court proceeding may render the probate court proceeding moot, the
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 2
issue regarding appellant’s right to counsel may never come to fruition.
Accordingly, appellant’s assignment of error is not ripe for review.
I.
FACTS
{¶2} In 2007, appellant’s child became the subject of an abuse,
neglect, and dependency action. Appellant subsequently agreed to place the
child in the custody of her cousin, Billie J. Williams. On September 3, 2009,
appellant filed a motion in juvenile court to request parenting time with her
child.1
{¶3} Less than two weeks later, appellees, Billie J. Williams and
Steven R. Williams, filed a petition to adopt appellant’s child. Appellees
then sought and obtained a stay of the juvenile court proceeding. Appellant
subsequently objected to the adoption proceeding and also filed a motion
requesting the probate court to appoint counsel to represent her in the
adoption proceeding.
{¶4} On November 18, 2009, the trial court denied appellant’s request
to appoint counsel.
II.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1
We obtained this information from appellant’s merit brief. Appellees failed to file an appellate brief in
this matter, and we have consequently accepted appellant’s statement of facts. See App.R. 18(C).
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 3
{¶5} Appellant timely appealed the trial court’s judgment and raises
one assignment of error:
“IT WAS ERROR FOR THE PROBATE COURT IN THE
ADOPTION PROCEEDING TO DENY APPELLANT’S
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.”
III.
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial
court erred by denying her motion that requested the court to appoint
counsel in the adoption proceeding.
{¶7} Before we can review appellant’s assignment of error, we must
sua sponte raise an issue regarding our jurisdiction to consider her
assignment of error. Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution
provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have
such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be
provided by the law.” “For a cause to be justiciable, there must exist a real
controversy presenting issues which are ripe for judicial resolution and
which will have a direct and immediate impact on the parties.” State v.
Stambaugh (1987), 34 Ohio St. 3d 34, 38, 517 N.E.2d 526 (Douglas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Burger Brewing Co. v.
Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 97-98, 296 N.E.2d 261;
see, also, Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St. 3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 4
N.E.2d 964, ¶26 (“In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for
review.”). We must raise justiciability sua sponte. See Stewart v. Stewart
(1999), 134 Ohio App. 3d 556, 558, 731 N.E.2d 743, citing Neiderhiser v.
Borough of Berwick (C.A.3, 1988), 840 F.2d 213, 216.
{¶8} To determine whether an issue is ripe for judicial review, the
court must weigh: (1) the likelihood that the alleged future harm will ever
occur; (2) the likelihood that delayed review will cause hardship to the
parties; and (3) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to
provide fair adjudication. Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club (1988),
523 U.S. 726, 731-733, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 140 L. Ed. 2d 921. Generally, a claim
is not ripe if the claim rests upon “future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States (1998), 523
U.S. 296, 300, 118 S. Ct. 1257, 140 L. Ed. 2d 406.
{¶9} In the case at bar, we find the issue regarding appellant’s right to
counsel in the adoption proceeding is not ripe for review. Instead, it appears
to rest upon a future event that may not occur as anticipated, or may not
occur at all. A juvenile court proceeding involving appellant’s parenting
time with the child has not been concluded. Resolution of the juvenile court
matter may render the adoption proceeding moot, in which case, appellant’s
alleged right to counsel in the adoption proceeding would not be an issue.
Thus, we find it prudent to refrain from issuing what would, in effect, be an
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 5
advisory opinion regarding appellant’s alleged right to counsel in the
adoption proceeding unless and until the juvenile court proceeding is
properly concluded.2
{¶10} We observe that the juvenile court stayed its proceedings
pending resolution of the adoption proceeding. However, the Supreme
Court of Ohio has explicitly stated that a probate court must refrain from
proceeding with the adoption of a child when an issue concerning the
parenting of that child is at issue in the juvenile court. In re Adoption of
P.A.C., 126 Ohio St. 3d 236, 2010-Ohio-3351, 933 N.E.2d 236, at ¶1; In re
Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St. 3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647
at ¶ 8. Thus, pursuant to the explicit language of P.A.C. and Pushcar, until
the juvenile court case is resolved, the probate court is prohibited from
proceeding with the adoption petition.3
2
In reviewing the filings in the adoption case, it appears as though appellees were granted permanent
custody of appellant’s child. If true, it is questionable whether appellant has any rights to assert in the
adoption proceeding. See R.C. 2151.011(B)(30) (“’Permanent custody’ means a legal status that vests in a
public children services agency or a private child placing agency, all parental rights, duties, and obligations,
including the right to consent to adoption, and divests the natural parents or adoptive parents of all parental
rights, privileges, and obligations, including all residual rights and obligations.”). However, due to the
nature of the potential parental rights involved, we find it wise for this matter to be returned to the juvenile
court for resolution before the probate court proceeds with the adoption petition. Our decision is not to be
construed as our opinion on the merits.
3
We are aware that the probate court’s decision is not void due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, but rather, is voidable due to lack of jurisdiction over the particular case. See, e.g., Pratts v.
Hurley, 102 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992. A party ordinarily waives the right to attack
a voidable judgment if the party fails to question the validity of the judgment in a timely manner. See, e.g.,
id. However, in the case at bar, to the extent necessary, we sua sponte recognize the probate court’s
assertion of jurisdiction in this case as plain error. We have previously sua sponte recognized plain error in
matters involving parental rights. See In re McCain, Vinton App. No. 06CA654, 2007-Ohio-1429; see,
also, In re E.P., Wood App. No. WD-09-070, 2010-Ohio-3529. In the case at bar, we believe that it would
be a manifest injustice to allow the adoption petition to proceed when a parental rights issue remains
outstanding.
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 6
{¶11} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we find that
because appellant’s assignment of error is not ripe for review, we lack a
justiciable controversy to consider. As such, we reverse the probate court’s
judgment and remand with instructions to the probate court to stay its
proceedings in accordance with Pushcar and P.A.C.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND
THE CAUSE REMANDED.
Harsha, P.J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶12} I agree with the majority that the probate court did not have the
authority to move forward with the adoption proceeding while an issue of
parenting remained unresolved in the juvenile court. See In re Adoption of
P.A.C., 126 Ohio St. 3d 236, 2010-Ohio-3351, 933 N.E.2d 236 and In re
Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St. 3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d
647. However, rather than find appellant’s assignment of error not yet ripe
for review, I would reverse the probate court’s judgment based on an error in
the exercise of its jurisdiction and remand with instructions to comply with
P.A.C. and Pushcar. In other words, order the probate court to vacate all of
its actions taken after the filing of the petition and to stay any further
proceedings until the juvenile court has resolved all issues concerning
parenting before it.
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 7
Kline, J., dissenting.
{¶13} I respectfully dissent because, in my view, the appellant’s
motion in the juvenile court does not involve an issue concerning parenting.
That is, the appellant’s motion does not relate to the act or process of
becoming a parent.
{¶14} I acknowledge that, “[w]hen an issue concerning parenting of a
minor is pending in the juvenile court, a probate court must refrain from
proceeding with the adoption of that child.” In re Adoption of Pushcar, 110
Ohio St. 3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, syllabus. But as used in Pushcar, I
believe that “parenting” means “the act or process of becoming a parent.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (2002). I base
this interpretation on the juvenile-court proceedings that actually occurred in
Pushcar and In re Adoption of P.A.C., 126 Ohio St. 3d 236, 2010-Ohio-3351.
In both of these cases, determinations of paternity were the relevant issues
pending in the juvenile courts. See Pushcar at ¶¶4, 12-14; P.A.C. at ¶¶3-4,
9-13. Therefore, in both cases, the juvenile courts had to determine whether
the alleged fathers would, indeed, become parents under the law. See, also,
In re Adoption of G.V., 126 Ohio St. 3d 249, 2010-Ohio-3349 (applying
Pushcar in a paternity-determination case). But here, the juvenile court is
not being called upon to make a paternity determination. And because the
juvenile-court proceedings do not involve an issue concerning the act or
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 8
process of becoming a parent (i.e., parenting), I would not apply the holding
in Pushcar to the present case.
{¶15} Furthermore, I see problems with applying Pushcar in this type
of situation, and I believe that these problems support my interpretation of
the word “parenting.” First, the juvenile-court proceedings are irrelevant to
the Williamses’ adoption petition. In their petition to adopt J.B.B., the
Williamses asserted that the appellant’s consent was not required because of
R.C. 3107.07(A). Under R.C. 3107.07(A), “[c]onsent to adoption is not
required of * * * [a] parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption
petition and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable
cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide
for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial
decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding either the
filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of
the petitioner.” J.B.B. was placed in the Williamses’ home on October 16,
2007, and the Williamses filed their adoption petition on September 14,
2009. Thus, under R.C. 3107.07(A), the relevant time periods are either (1)
the year before October 16, 2007, or (2) the year before September 14, 2009.
And in the present case, the juvenile court cannot make any order that would
affect the probate court’s analysis of the appellant’s conduct during the
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 9
relevant time periods. The appellant’s future visitation with J.B.B. has no
bearing on issues that the probate court must consider under the adoption
statutes.
{¶16} Thus, the present case is unlike Pushcar. In Pushcar, the
juvenile-court proceedings would have affected the probate court’s analysis
under the adoption statutes. As the court found, “The requisite one-year
period set forth in the statute could not begin to run until a judicial
ascertainment of paternity – a matter unresolved when the appellant filed his
adoption petition.” Pushcar at ¶14. See, also, G.V. at ¶4 (“The [probate]
court concluded that the one-year period could not begin to run against [the
appellee] until his paternity had been established[.]”); P.A.C. at ¶4 (“The
probate court stayed the adoption proceedings pending a determination in
the parentage action. The juvenile court determined that [the appellant] was
the biological father of P.A.C. The probate court lifted its stay, determined
that a parent * * * did not consent to the adoption[,] and dismissed [the
appellee’s] adoption petition.”). Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio
based its Pushcar holding on the necessity of determining paternity for the
purpose of applying the adoption statutes – i.e., a parenting issue. There are
no similar issues related to the appellant’s motion for visitation.
{¶17} Furthermore, in my view, applying Pushcar to the present case
has troubling implications for adoptions in general. If a motion for visitation
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 10
can stay adoption proceedings, what is to stop the appellant from filing
motion after motion in the juvenile court? In effect, a natural parent could
indefinitely delay adoption proceedings by filing numerous motions that are
unrelated to the probate court’s adoption analysis. This result would
frustrate the twin goals of “providing the child with a permanent and stable
home * * * and ensuring that the adoption process is completed in an
expeditious manner.” In re Adoption of Zschach (1996), 75 Ohio St. 3d 648,
651 (internal citation omitted).
{¶18} Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I cannot agree that a
motion for visitation is a “parenting issue” as contemplated by Pushcar.
Rather, I would find that parenting issues are issues related to the act or
process of becoming a parent. Therefore, I believe that the probate court can
move forward with the adoption proceedings, and I would address the
appellant’s arguments.
{¶19} Finally, I believe that this case presents an excellent
opportunity for the Supreme Court of Ohio to clarify the holding in Pushcar.
{¶20} Accordingly, I dissent.
Scioto App. No. 09CA3335 11
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND THE
CAUSE REMANDED and that the Appellant recover of Appellees costs
herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, to carry this
judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Harsha, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment Only with Opinion.
Kline, J.: Dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ______________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.