State v. Ward , 2012 Ohio 6131 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Ward, 
    2012-Ohio-6131
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :         OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
    CASE NO. 2012-T-0010
    - vs -                                    :
    ANDRE A. WARD,                                    :
    Defendant-Appellant.             :
    Criminal Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 09 CR
    774.
    Judgment: Affirmed.
    Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and LuWayne Annos, Assistant
    Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
    44481-1092 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
    Michael A. Partlow, 112 South Water Street, Suite C, Kent, OH 44240 (For Defendant-
    Appellant).
    TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Andre A. Ward, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull County
    Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him guilty of failure to comply with an order or
    signal of a police officer, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) &
    (C)(1)(5)(a)(ii). For the following reasons, we affirm.
    {¶2}     At the jury trial, Officer Altier of the Liberty Township Police testified that
    he was parked in an apartment complex running surveillance in the vicinity of Belmont
    Avenue and Gypsy Lane in Liberty Township, Ohio, at approximately 8:00 p.m. on July
    31, 2009. Office Altier observed a white Buick, driven by a black male, approaching
    with no front license plate. As the vehicle passed, Officer Altier was able to observe
    that the driver had a lean face; long, black, braided hair; and a tattoo of some type of
    writing on his neck. The driver of the vehicle turned and looked directly at Officer Altier
    as he passed the officer’s vehicle.
    {¶3}   Officer Altier began to follow the vehicle to effectuate a traffic stop. As a
    result of running the vehicle’s license plate, Officer Altier learned that it was registered
    to a female, Shalonda Hall, who lived in close proximity.
    {¶4}   Officer Altier pulled behind the vehicle and activated his overhead lights;
    although he initially thought the vehicle was going to stop, it continued eastbound down
    Gypsy Lane. During this time, Officer Altier testified that he was able to observe the
    reflection of the vehicle’s driver through both his rearview and side mirrors: Officer
    Altier noted that when effectuating a traffic stop and pursuing a vehicle, he offsets his
    vehicle to gain a tactical advantage.      At the intersection of Gypsy Lane and Fifth
    Avenue, the vehicle sped off southbound. As he was now following the vehicle out of
    his jurisdiction, Officer Altier requested backup from the Youngstown City Police
    Department. A chase ensued whereby the vehicle traveled approximately 80 miles per
    hour in a residential neighborhood. Due to safety concerns, Officer Altier terminated his
    pursuit of the vehicle.
    {¶5}   Officer Altier testified that he then drove past Ms. Hall’s residence, but the
    vehicle was not in the parking lot. Officer Altier testified that for the next month he
    would periodically drive past Ms. Hall’s residence looking for the vehicle. He observed
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    the vehicle, with different plates, parked in the lot on August 31, 2009. Officer Altier
    called for a tow truck as the vehicle had been involved in a high speed chase. Noticing
    the tow truck, Ms. Hall exited the apartment building and began discussing the situation
    with Officer Altier. During their discussions, a man exited the building and began to
    walk towards Ms. Hall and Officer Altier. Officer Altier testified that he immediately
    recognized the male as the driver of the vehicle.
    {¶6}   Ms. Hall testified for the defense. She indicated that she was in Cleveland
    on the day of the incident and that she had left the keys to the Buick with her uncle. Ms.
    Hall could not recall the name or address of her uncle; she testified that she knew him
    only as “Uncle Junior.” Ms. Hall described “Uncle Junior” as having tattoos and being
    bald.
    {¶7}   At the conclusion of the trial, appellant was found guilty of failure to
    comply with an order or signal of a police officer. Appellant was sentenced to a three-
    year term of imprisonment.
    {¶8}   Appellant timely appealed and, as his first assignment of error, states:
    {¶9}   “The appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.”
    {¶10} To determine whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, a reviewing court must consider the weight of the evidence, including the
    credibility of the witnesses and all reasonable inferences, to determine whether the trier-
    of-fact “lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
    conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387 (1997).      In weighing the evidence submitted at a criminal trial, an
    3
    appellate court must defer to the factual findings of the trier-of-fact regarding the weight
    to be given the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
     (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
    {¶11} Appellant maintains the sole question presented to the jury at his trial was
    one of identity. The jury heard Officer Altier’s testimony that he was able to see the face
    “straight on” of the man driving the vehicle. Further, Officer Altier noted that the driver
    drove 20 to 25 feet away from his cruiser before the chase began. Officer Altier noted
    that once the chase began, he was able to observe the driver’s reflection through both
    the side and rearview mirrors. In fact, Officer Altier testified that he “had a full facial
    shot. [He] could see his face plain as day.” Additionally, Officer Altier’s report indicated
    that he was able to identify the suspect.           In fact, Officer Altier testified that he
    immediately recognized appellant as the suspect when he exited Ms. Hall’s apartment
    building.
    {¶12} Appellant maintains that the report filed by Officer Altier only described the
    suspect as a “light-skinned black male, long braided hair, wearing a white tank top.”
    Appellant argues that Officer Altier did not describe the suspect as having facial hair,
    tattoos or eyeglasses. Yet, as Officer Altier testified, this report was prepared by the
    dispatcher, not himself. Further, as previously indicated, this report stated that Officer
    Altier could identify the driver if located. From the testimony of Officer Altier, it is evident
    that he observed the suspect both during and after the chase. Officer Altier was able to
    immediately identify appellant as the suspect upon observing him exit Ms. Hall’s
    residence. We are mindful that in weighing the evidence submitted at a criminal trial, an
    4
    appellate court must defer to the factual findings of the jury regarding the weight to be
    given the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id.
    {¶13} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.
    {¶14} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:
    {¶15} “The trial court erred, as a matter of law, overruling the appellant’s request
    for a reasonable continuance and objection to the jury venire.”
    {¶16} Prior to voir dire, appellant’s trial counsel orally moved for a continuance
    and the venire to be quashed. Appellant’s trial counsel requested another venire to be
    present for the instant matter.      In making this motion, appellant’s trial counsel
    recognized that there were 26 potential jurors, none of whom were minorities.            In
    overruling such motion, the trial court stated that the selection of the jury is “totally
    random and computerized, monitored by this Court.”
    {¶17} In his brief, appellant does not argue that the trial court abused its
    discretion in overruling his motion to continue. Instead, appellant maintains that it is
    impossible for this court to review whether the jury venire was improper as the trial court
    failed to articulate how the jury pool was established.
    {¶18} The Sixth Amendment guarantee to a jury trial ‘contemplates a jury
    drawn from a fair cross section of the community.’          Taylor v.
    Louisiana, 
    419 U.S. 522
    , 527 (1975). To establish a violation of
    this requirement, the ‘defendant must prove: (1) that the group
    alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2)
    that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
    selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
    5
    persons in the community; and (3) that the representation is due to
    systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.’
    State v. Fulton, 
    57 Ohio St.3d 120
     (1991), paragraph two of the
    syllabus, citing Duren v. Missouri, 
    439 U.S. 357
    , 364 (1979).
    (Emphasis added.) State v. McNeill, 
    83 Ohio St.3d 438
    , 443-444
    (1998).
    {¶19} Before this court is the trial court’s assertion that the jury selection process
    is random and computerized and is monitored by the trial court.            Other than his
    observations that the venire did not contain any minorities, appellant has failed to
    produce evidence demonstrating that minorities were underrepresented on the venire in
    relation to their percentage in the community. See State v. Strodes, 
    48 Ohio St.2d 113
    ,
    115 (1978) (“the array of veniremen need not reflect an exact cross section of the
    community”). Additionally, appellant has not produced any evidence of the systematic
    exclusion of minorities in the jury-selection process. See Ford v. Seabold, 
    841 F.2d 677
    , 685 (6th Cir.1988) (underrepresentation on a single venire is not systematic
    exclusion).
    {¶20} We note that appellant’s trial counsel explored the issue of race during
    voir dire noting that appellant was a black male and the testifying officer was a white
    male. After this notification, none of the potential jurors indicated any discomfort or
    conflict that would suggest prejudice.
    {¶21} Appellant therefore has not met his burden of demonstrating that his Sixth
    Amendment right to have a jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the community was
    violated; “mere speculation as to bias among the pool of prospective jurors will not
    6
    justify quashing the entire venire.” London v. Scurry, 12th Dist. No. CA95-10-033, 
    1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3120
    , *5 (July 22, 1996), citing 47 American Jurisprudence 2d, Jury,
    Section 255, at 923 (1995).
    {¶22} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.
    {¶23} Based on the opinion of this court, the judgment of the Trumbull County
    Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
    CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
    concur.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-T-0010

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 6131

Judges: Cannon

Filed Date: 12/24/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016