State v. Dodson ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Dodson, 2014-Ohio-4197.]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 98521
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    JEFFREY DODSON
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    APPLICATION DENIED
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-11-555731
    Application for Reopening
    Motion No. 476756
    RELEASE DATE: September 23, 2014
    FOR APPELLANT
    Jeffrey Dodson, pro se
    Inmate No. 623-109
    Belmont Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 540
    St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Jesse W. Canonico
    Brett Hammond
    Assistant County Prosecutors
    The Justice Center, 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
    {¶1} Jeffrey Dodson has filed an application for reopening pursuant to App.R.
    26(B). Dodson is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, rendered in State v.
    Dodson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98521, 2013-Ohio-1344, that affirmed the sentence of
    incarceration in part, imposed in State v. Dodson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-11-555731,
    vacated the sentence in part, and remanded for resentencing.         We decline to reopen
    Dodson’s appeal.
    {¶2} App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires that Dodson establish “a showing of good cause
    for untimely filing if the application is filed more than 90 days after journalization of the
    appellate judgment,” which is subject to reopening. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with
    regard to the 90-day deadline as provided by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has established that:
    We now reject [the applicant’s] claims that those excuses gave good cause
    to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R. 26(B).* * * Consistent enforcement
    of the rule’s deadline by the appellate courts in Ohio protects on the one
    hand the state’s legitimate interest in the finality of its judgments and
    ensures on the other hand that any claims of ineffective assistance of
    appellate counsel are promptly examined and resolved.
    Ohio and other states “may erect reasonable procedural requirements for
    triggering the right to an adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
    (1982), 
    455 U.S. 422
    , 437, 
    102 S. Ct. 1148
    , 
    71 L. Ed. 2d 265
    , and that is what
    Ohio has done by creating a 90- day deadline for the filing of applications
    to reopen. * * * The 90-day requirement in the rule is applicable to all
    appellants, State v. Winstead (1996), 
    74 Ohio St. 3d 277
    , 278, 
    658 N.E.2d 722
    , and [the applicant] offers no sound reason why he — unlike so many
    other Ohio criminal defendants — could not comply with that fundamental
    aspect of the rule. (Emphasis added.) State v. Gumm, 
    103 Ohio St. 3d 162
    ,
    2004-Ohio-4755, 
    814 N.E.2d 861
    , at ¶ 7. See also, State v. Lamar, 
    102 Ohio St. 3d 467
    , 2004-Ohio-3976, 
    812 N.E.2d 970
    ; State v. Cooey, 73 Ohio
    St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 
    653 N.E.2d 252
    ; State v. Reddick, 
    72 Ohio St. 3d 88
    , 1995-Ohio-248, 
    647 N.E.2d 784
    .
    See also State v. LaMar, 
    102 Ohio St. 3d 467
    , 2004-Ohio-3976, 
    812 N.E.2d 970
    ; State v.
    Cooey, 
    73 Ohio St. 3d 411
    , 1995-Ohio-328, 
    653 N.E.2d 252
    ; State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio
    St.3d 88, 1995-Ohio-249, 
    647 N.E.2d 784
    .
    {¶3} Herein, Dodson is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment that was
    journalized on April 4, 2013. The application for reopening was not filed until July 16,
    2014, more than 90 days after journalization of the appellate judgment in State v. 
    Dodson, supra
    .
    {¶4} Dodson argues that because “[he] is pro se and is not an attorney and it can be
    seen that on that basis the error in not filing the App.R. 26(B) petition in a timely manner
    is a genuine misunderstanding of the procedural requirements,”       “good cause” exists for
    the untimely filing of his application for reopening. This court has long held that lack of
    legal counsel, when attempting to file an App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, does
    not establish “good cause” for filing beyond the ninety day limitation. State v. Hornack,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81021, 2005-Ohio-5843.            See also State v. 
    Lamar, supra
    .
    Difficulty in conducting legal research or limited access to legal materials does not
    establish “good cause” for the untimely filing of an application for reopening. State v.
    Houston, 
    73 Ohio St. 3d 346
    , 1995-Ohio-317, 
    652 N.E.2d 1018
    ; State v. Kinder, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 94722, 2012-Ohio-1339; State v. Lawson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84402,
    2006-Ohio-3939.      Finally, a lack of legal training, effort or imagination, and ignorance
    of the law do not establish “good cause” for failure to seek timely relief pursuant to
    App.R. 26(B). State v. Farrow, 
    115 Ohio St. 3d 205
    , 2007-Ohio-4792, 
    874 N.E.2d 526
    ,
    citing State v. Winstead, 
    74 Ohio St. 3d 277
    , 1996-Ohio-52, 
    658 N.E.2d 722
    . Herein,
    Dodson has failed to establish “a showing of good cause” for the untimely filing of his
    application for reopening, premised upon lack of legal counsel, lack of legal training,
    ignorance of the law, and limited access to legal materials.
    {¶5} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied.
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98521

Judges: Jones

Filed Date: 9/23/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014