State v. Williams ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Williams, 2014-Ohio-4196.]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 90845
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    PATRICK WILLIAMS
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    APPLICATION DENIED
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-07-494311-A
    Application for Reopening
    Motion No. 475308
    RELEASE DATE: September 23, 2014
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Gregory Scott Robey
    Robey & Robey
    14402 Granger Road
    Maple Heights, Ohio 44137
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Adam M. Chaloupka
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    8th Floor Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J.:
    {¶1} Patrick Williams has filed an application for reopening pursuant to App.R.
    26(B). Williams is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, as rendered in State v.
    Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90845, 2009-Ohio-2026, which affirmed his
    convictions for aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault. For the reasons that
    follow, the application to reopen is denied.
    {¶2} The appellate judgment was released on April 30, 2009, and journalized on
    May 11, 2009. The application for reopening was not filed until May 29, 2014. This
    falls well outside the time limits of App.R. 26(B)(1), which requires applications to be
    filed within 90 days after journalization of the appellate judgment. The only exception
    that would permit us to review an untimely application is if applicant establishes good
    cause for filing at a later time. 
    Id. {¶3} The
    Supreme Court of Ohio, with regard to the 90-day deadline provided by
    App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has firmly established that
    [c]onsistent enforcement of the rule’s deadline by the appellate courts in
    Ohio protects on the one hand the state’s legitimate interest in the finality of
    its judgments and ensures on the other hand that any claims of ineffective
    assistance of appellate counsel are promptly examined and resolved.
    Ohio and other states “may erect reasonable procedural requirements
    for triggering the right to an adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
    Co., 
    455 U.S. 422
    , 437, 102 S.Ct 1148, 
    71 L. Ed. 2d 265
    (1982), and that is
    what Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the filing of
    applications to reopen. [The applicant] could have retained new attorneys
    after the court of appeals issued its decision in 1994, or he could have filed
    the application on his own. What he could not do was ignore the rule’s
    filing deadline. * * * The 90-day requirement in the rule is “applicable to all
    appellants,” State v. Winstead (1996), 
    74 Ohio St. 3d 277
    , 278,
    1996-Ohio-52, 
    658 N.E.2d 722
    , and [the applicant] offers no sound reason
    why he — unlike so many other Ohio criminal defendants — could not
    comply with that fundamental aspect of the rule.
    State v. Gumm, 
    103 Ohio St. 3d 162
    , 2004-Ohio-4755, 
    814 N.E.2d 861
    , at ¶ 7. See also
    State v. LaMar, 
    102 Ohio St. 3d 467
    , 2004-Ohio-3976, 
    812 N.E.2d 970
    ; State v. Cooey, 
    73 Ohio St. 3d 411
    , 
    653 N.E.2d 252
    (1995); State v. Reddick, 
    72 Ohio St. 3d 88
    , 
    647 N.E.2d 784
    (1995).
    {¶4} Applicant has failed to establish “good cause” for the untimely filing of his
    application for reopening. He maintains that there is good cause for his delayed filing
    because he has had “no personal contact” with his appointed appellate lawyer, and he did
    not receive copies of the appellate filings nor notice of the decision. Additionally,
    applicant asserts that he was only 17 years old at the time of the trial and relied on his
    appellate lawyer to raise all possible issues, to his detriment.
    {¶5} Applicant cites no case that has found any of the foregoing grounds as good
    cause for an application to reopen that is filed approximately five years after the appellate
    decision was journalized. However, there is ample authority that has found these reasons
    do not establish good cause for an untimely application to reopen.
    {¶6} Appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise every
    conceivable assignment of error on appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 
    463 U.S. 745
    , 
    103 S. Ct. 3308
    , 
    77 L. Ed. 2d 987
    (1983); Gumm, supra; State v. Campbell, 
    69 Ohio St. 3d 38
    , 
    630 N.E.2d 339
    (1994).       The United States Supreme Court has upheld the appellate
    attorney’s discretion to decide which issues he or she believes are the most fruitful
    arguments and the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and
    focusing on one central issue or at most a few key issues. Jones.
    {¶7} It is well settled that “neither misplaced reliance on counsel nor lack of
    communication between counsel and appellant provides good cause for a late filing of his
    application for reopening.”       State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.           92646,
    2012-Ohio-3565, ¶ 3, citing State v. Alt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96289, 2012-Ohio-2054;
    State v. Austin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87169, 2012-Ohio-1338; State v. Alexander, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81529, 2004-Ohio-3861.
    {¶8} Citing the applicant’s young age is the equivalent of arguing that his
    ignorance of the law or lack of legal training and knowledge should establish good cause
    for the delayed filing. However, it is equally well established that these grounds do not
    provide good cause to allow review of an application that is filed five years beyond the
    deadline. See State v. Mosley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79463, 2005-Ohio-4137, ¶ 4 (“it
    is well-established that a lack of legal training does not establish ‘good cause’ for the
    untimely filing of an application for reopening”).
    {¶9} Applicant also “cannot rely on his own alleged lack of legal training to
    excuse his failure to comply with the deadline. ‘Lack of effort or imagination, and
    ignorance of the law * * * do not automatically establish good cause for failure to seek
    timely relief’ under App.R. 26(B).” LaMar, 
    102 Ohio St. 3d 467
    at ¶ 9, quoting 
    Reddick, 72 Ohio St. 3d at 91
    .
    {¶10} It is proper to deny applications for reopening solely on the basis that they
    are untimely filed and without good cause for the delay. Gumm, 
    103 Ohio St. 3d 162
    , and
    LaMar. Applicant’s failure to demonstrate good cause is a sufficient basis for denying
    his application for reopening. See, e.g., State v. Almashni, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    92237, 2010-Ohio-898, reopening disallowed, 2012-Ohio-349.
    {¶11} Applicant has not established good cause for filing an untimely application
    for reopening.
    {¶12} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 90845

Judges: Celebrezze

Filed Date: 9/23/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016