State v. Battiste ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Battiste, 2014-Ohio-4683.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100894
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAYSON BATTISTE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-13-573632-A
BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, P.J., Blackmon, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 23, 2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
John F. Corrigan
19885 Detroit Road, Suite 335
Rocky River, Ohio 44116
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Brett Kyker
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶1} Jayson R. Battiste appeals his conviction and sentence imposed in the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. Battiste argues that he was denied his right to
a speedy trial, that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance, that the trial court erred in
sentencing him as a Tier III sex offender and in failing to issue credit for time served in
the Cuyahoga County jail. Finding merit to Battiste’s appeal, we reverse the decision of
the trial court in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶2} In April 2013, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a four-count
indictment charging Battiste with rape, trafficking in persons, kidnapping and unlawful
sexual conduct with a minor. After a series of pretrial hearings, Battiste pleaded guilty
to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The state dismissed the remaining three
counts of the indictment. The trial court sentenced Battiste to 18 months incarceration
and classified him as a Tier III sex offender. At the conclusion of the hearing, defense
counsel asked if Battiste would be given credit for time served, to which the court
responded, “certainly.” Battiste was incarcerated from the date of his arrest on April 19,
2013 through the date of sentencing on October 16, 2013, a total of 181 days.
{¶3} In his first assigned error, Battiste argues the trial court deprived him of his
right to a speedy trial.
{¶4} The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as
well as Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a speedy trial by the state. State v. O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 516 N.E.2d 218(1987). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, the United
States Supreme Court declared that, with regard to fixing a time frame for speedy trials,
“[t]he States * * * are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional
standards * * *.” To that end, the Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 2945.71.
{¶5} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71, a person against whom a felony charge is pending
shall be brought to trial within 270 days after their arrest. For purposes of computing
this time, each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail shall be counted
as three days. Id. Once the defendant has established that the statutory time limit has
expired, they have made their prima facie case for dismissal. State v. Howard, 79 Ohio
App.3d 705, 607 N.E.2d 1121 (8th Dist.1992). The burden then shifts to the state to
demonstrate that sufficient time was tolled pursuant to R.C. 2945.72. State v. Geraldo,
13 Ohio App.3d 27, 468 N.E.2d 328 (6th Dist.1983).
{¶6} In the present case, Battiste has established a prima facie case for dismissal
on speedy trial grounds. He was arrested on April 19, 2013 and remained in the
Cuyahoga County jail for the entire 152 days before he entered his plea on September 18,
2013.
{¶7} The state must now demonstrate acceptable extensions in accordance with
R.C. 2945.72 in order for speedy trial time to be properly tolled. A review of the record
indicates that sufficient time was tolled in accordance with R.C. 2945.72(H), which reads
as follows:
The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case of
felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the
following * * * [t]he period of any continuance granted on the accused’s
own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other
than upon the accused’s own motion * * *.
{¶8} Battiste was arrested on April 19, 2013. On April 24, 2013, Battiste filed a
written request for discovery, tolling time. On May 6, 2013, a pretrial was held and then
continued to May 14, 2013 at the request of Battiste. The docket reflects that a pretrial
was held and continued to a later date at the request of Battiste seven more times before
he ultimately entered a guilty plea on September 18, 2013. For each instance, the court
noted the continuance was requested by the defendant and for all but three, provided a
reason in support.
{¶9} For purposes of speedy trial computation, the only days that are counted
are April 20 - April 24, June 26 - July 15 and September 11 - September 18, because
these are the time periods where no continuance was requested and no proper tolling
event was noted. Since Battiste was incarcerated throughout the entirety of the case,
each of these days counts as three, bringing the total number of days to 99, which falls
short of the 270-day limit.
{¶10} Battiste argues that three specific continuance requests should not be
attributed to him because the trial court failed to specify the reason for the continuance
requests in the corresponding journal entries. This argument lacks merit because this
court in State v. Craig, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88039, 2007-Ohio-1834, held that a trial
court is not required to specify the reason for a continuance request in order for time to be
tolled. “When the defendant’s request for a continuance is in the record, the absence of
an explanation for the continuance in a journal entry should not allow a defendant to use
the speedy-trial statute as a sword rather than a shield that it was designed to be.” Id. at
¶ 29.
{¶11} After reviewing the entire record and calculating the time that elapsed
between appellant’s arrest and his trial, we find that he was brought to trial within the
speedy trial statutory time frame. In view of this, Battiste’s second assigned error must
also fail because he could not show that the outcome of his case would have been
different. Additionally, Battiste’s speedy trial time had not yet run at the time he entered
his guilty plea and, therefore, his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance.
{¶12} Based on the foregoing, Battiste’s first and second assigned errors are
overruled.
{¶13} The state concedes the errors alleged in Battiste’s third and fourth assigned
errors. Specifically, the state agrees that Battiste should be classified as a Tier II sex
offender under R.C. 2950.01(F) and that he should be credited with time he spent in jail
awaiting the conclusion of his case. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial
court and remand for reclassification as a Tier II sex offender and for the issuance of
credit for the 181 days he spent in the county jail.
{¶14} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellee and appellant share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR