In re S.H. ( 2011 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as In re S.H., 
    2011-Ohio-5335
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO                     )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF LORAIN                  )
    IN RE: S.H.                                            C.A. No.        10CA009945
    APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
    CASE No.   07 JC 19945
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: October 17, 2011
    WHITMORE, Judge.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Brenda H. (“Mother”), appeals from a judgment of the Lorain County
    Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that placed her minor child in the legal custody of
    the child’s paternal aunt and uncle. This Court affirms.
    I
    {¶2}     Mother is the natural mother of S.H., born May 10, 1999. Although S.H.’s father
    was involved in the earlier stages of this case, he is not a party to the appeal.
    {¶3}     Lorain County Children Services (“LCCS”) became involved with the family
    during June 2007 because S.H. had not been attending school. LCCS also had concerns about
    the unclean living conditions of the home and the fact that both parents suffered from untreated
    mental health problems. The parents initially agreed to work with LCCS on a voluntary safety
    plan, but LCCS later filed a dependency and neglect complaint due to domestic violence between
    2
    Mother and the father and the parents’ inability to meet S.H.’s basic needs. S.H. was later
    adjudicated a neglected and dependent child and placed in the home of a relative.
    {¶4}    Over the next several months, the parents worked on the reunification goals of the
    case plan. S.H. was later diagnosed with epilepsy and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
    (“ADHD”) and began taking two prescription medications to control her epileptic seizures and
    the behavioral problems associated with ADHD. During August 2008, because the parents
    demonstrated an ability to meet S.H.’s medical and other needs, the trial court returned S.H. to
    her parents’ custody, under an order of protective supervision to LCCS.
    {¶5}    Four months later, S.H. was again removed from Mother’s home. Mother and
    S.H. were no longer living with S.H.’s father but were living with Mother’s brother, who had
    been convicted of a sex offense against S.H.’s older half-sibling. LCCS also reported unclean
    living conditions in the home and that S.H. was having increasing problems with her epilepsy,
    her behavioral problems, and her academic performance. LCCS also believed that Mother was
    no longer attending counseling.
    {¶6}    S.H. was placed in the Florida home of a paternal aunt and uncle and has lived
    there ever since. Eventually, LCCS moved the trial court to place S.H. in the legal custody of the
    aunt and uncle. Mother later filed her own motion for legal custody of S.H. Following a hearing
    on the motions, the magistrate recommended that S.H. be placed in the legal custody of her aunt
    and uncle. Mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that the evidence did not
    support the magistrate’s decision and that the magistrate erred in relying on the report of the
    guardian ad litem. The trial court overruled the objections and ordered that S.H. be placed in the
    legal custody of her aunt and uncle. Mother appeals and raises one assignment of error.
    3
    II
    Assignment of Error
    “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, WHEN
    OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF MOTHER, IT ADOPTED THE JUDGMENT OF
    THE MAGISTRATE GRANTING LEGAL CUSTODY OF S.H. TO A
    PATERNAL AUNT AND UNCLE, WHERE SUCH JUDGMENT WAS
    AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
    {¶7}    In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court erred in
    overruling her objections to the magistrate’s decision and ordering that S.H. be placed in the
    legal custody of the aunt and uncle. Specifically, she argues that the trial court’s decision was
    not supported by the evidence. We disagree.
    {¶8}    Initially, we note that Mother has raised two additional issues that this Court will
    not address on the merits: whether the trial court was required to explicitly find that LCCS made
    reasonable efforts to reunify S.H. with Mother, and whether Mother’s compliance with the case
    plan overcame the implicit determination of her unsuitability that resulted from the dependency
    and neglect adjudication. She has failed to properly raise either argument on appeal by assigning
    them as error. App.R. 12(A)(1)(b). Moreover, Mother did not timely raise these issues at the
    hearing before the magistrate or through her objections to the magistrate’s decision and she has
    not argued that the trial court committed plain error. See Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv).
    {¶9}    Following an adjudication of neglect, dependency, or abuse, the juvenile court’s
    determination of whether to place a child in the legal custody of a parent or a non-parent is based
    solely on the best interest of the child. See In re D.R., 9th Dist. No. 21218, 
    2003-Ohio-2852
    , at
    ¶17; In re C.R., 
    108 Ohio St.3d 369
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1191
    , paragraph two of the syllabus (holding
    that an adjudication of abuse, dependency, or neglect is an implicit determination of the parent’s
    unsuitability). “Although there is no specific test or set of criteria set forth in the statutory
    4
    scheme, courts agree that the trial court must base its decision on the best interest of the child.”
    In re N.P., 9th Dist. No. 21707, 
    2004-Ohio-110
    , at ¶23, citing In re Fulton, 12th Dist. No.
    CA2002-09-236, 
    2003-Ohio-5984
    , at ¶11. The juvenile court’s disposition of legal custody to a
    relative is a less drastic disposition than permanent custody to a children services agency because
    it does not terminate parental rights but instead “leaves intact ‘residual parental rights, privileges,
    and responsibilities.’” In re Shepherd (Mar. 26, 2001), 4th Dist. No. 00CA12, at *7, quoting
    R.C. 2151.011(B)(19). The trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for legal custody is
    within its sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. In re M.S., 9th
    Dist. No. 22158, 
    2005-Ohio-10
    , at ¶11. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s
    attitude is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219.
    {¶10} The trial court’s decision to place S.H. in the legal custody of her aunt and uncle
    was fully supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. The magistrate heard testimony
    from the caseworker, the guardian ad litem, and the paternal aunt and uncle, each of whom
    testified about how well S.H. was doing in the home of her aunt and uncle. Mother does not
    question the credibility of the witnesses, nor does she point to any evidence to support her
    implicit argument that the trial court should have placed S.H. in her legal custody instead. In
    fact, Mother did not testify at the hearing, nor did she present any evidence to support her own
    motion for legal custody.
    {¶11} The caseworker testified that she had observed S.H. at the aunt and uncle’s home
    in Florida and had maintained regular telephone contact and written communication with the
    aunt and uncle, as well as S.H.’s counselor and other service providers.             The caseworker
    explained how S.H. was thriving in their home. Because the aunt and uncle were semi-retired
    5
    and their own two children were grown, they had been able to devote significant attention to
    working one-on-one with S.H. and had ensured that she received the medical care, counseling,
    and educational services that she needed. It was apparent from the testimony of all witnesses
    that the aunt and uncle had the ability and desire to meet all of S.H.’s needs and that they would
    continue to do so an ongoing basis.
    {¶12} During the thirteen months that S.H. had been living with her aunt and uncle, she
    had made considerable progress addressing her educational, medical, and behavioral problems.
    When S.H. was first placed in their home, she was failing every subject in school; her academic
    performance and fine motor skills were significantly delayed for her age; she had trouble
    concentrating, following the rules, and making friends at school; she had anxiety that was
    causing her to chew on her skin; she was not sleeping well; and her epilepsy was not under
    control. The aunt and uncle ensured that S.H. took her medication regularly and received regular
    medical attention. Through adjustment of S.H.’s two medications, counseling, and the aunt and
    uncle providing her with a more consistent and stable environment, S.H.’s problems were
    stabilized. She was no longer having epileptic seizures or chewing on her skin and she was
    sleeping and controlling her behavior better.
    {¶13} The aunt and uncle enrolled S.H. in school, ensured that she attended regularly,
    and became actively involved in her schooling. They worked with S.H. on her homework each
    night and arranged for her to regularly work with a tutor and an occupational therapist. They
    also involved S.H. in several extracurricular activities, which improved her confidence and social
    skills.     At the time of the hearing, all witnesses reported that S.H. had made significant
    improvements during the year that she had spent with her aunt and uncle. Her academic
    performance still was not up to grade level, but she was receiving passing grades and high marks
    6
    for the effort that she exerted. The caseworker and the guardian ad litem were confident that the
    aunt and uncle could provide a suitable permanent home for S.H.
    {¶14} S.H. had been living outside Mother’s home for more than a year and had been
    involved with LCCS for more than two years due to concerns about the safety of Mother’s home
    and her ability to meet S.H.’s needs. Mother had yet to demonstrate to LCCS or the trial court
    that she could meet S.H.’s educational, emotional, and medical needs on an ongoing basis.
    Although S.H. expressed love for Mother and enjoyed visiting her, she reported to her counselor
    that she felt safer and more secure with the aunt and uncle. S.H. still had concerns about
    violence in Mother’s home and Mother’s ability to care for her. Mother had only recently started
    counseling to address her lengthy history of physical and sexual abuse and its impact on her
    ability to make safe and appropriate decisions for herself and her children. She still was married
    to S.H.’s father, with whom she has a history of domestic violence. The caseworker and
    guardian ad litem both expressed concerns about Mother’s ability to provide S.H. with a stable
    and secure home. The guardian ad litem further emphasized that S.H. had been removed from
    Mother’s home two different times. She expressed her concern that another failed attempt at
    reunification with Mother would be very hard on S.H.
    {¶15} The aunt and uncle had been facilitating visits between Mother and S.H. and
    testified that they would continue to do so. They understood that S.H. loved Mother and that a
    continued relationship with Mother is in S.H.’s best interest. Given the evidence presented at the
    hearing, the trial court reasonably concluded that it was in the best interest of S.H. to be placed in
    the legal custody of her paternal aunt and uncle. Mother’s assignment of error is overruled.
    7
    III
    {¶16} Mother’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County
    Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
    this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    Costs taxed to Appellant.
    BETH WHITMORE
    FOR THE COURT
    BELFANCE, P. J.
    DICKINSON, J.
    CONCUR
    8
    APPEARANCES:
    HOLLACE B. WEIZEL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and AMY L. PRICE, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
    for Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10CA009945

Judges: Whitmore

Filed Date: 10/17/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021