State v. Grose , 2014 Ohio 4499 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Grose, 
    2014-Ohio-4499
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JUDGES:
    STATE OF OHIO                                  :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellant   :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                           :
    :
    ALLANDO BAKARI GROSE                           :       Case No. 14CA30
    :
    Defendant-Appellee       :
    :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                           Criminal appeal from the Richland County
    Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2012-
    CR-0049H
    JUDGMENT:                                          Reversed and Vacated
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                            October 9, 2014
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellant                            For Defendant-Appellee
    JOHN NIEFT                                         ROELIFF HARPER
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney                     3 N. Main Street, Ste. 606
    38 South Park Street                               Mansfield, OH 44902
    Mansfield, OH 44902
    [Cite as State v. Grose, 
    2014-Ohio-4499
    .]
    Gwin, P.J.
    {¶1}       Plaintiff-appellant the State of Ohio appeals the March 26, 2014 Judgment
    Entry of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas re-sentencing defendant-appellee
    Allando Bakari Grose upon remand from this Court.1
    Facts and Procedural History
    {¶2}       The facts of this case were thoroughly discussed in State v. Grose, 5th
    Dist. Richland No. 12CA109, 
    2013-Ohio-4387
     [“Grose I”]; however, we provide the
    following brief summation.
    {¶3}       On October 8, 2012, Grose entered pleas of no contest to Count I,
    kidnapping, Count III, extortion, Count IV, aggravated robbery, and Count VI, tampering
    with evidence. The state dismissed Count II, abduction, and Count V, robbery. The trial
    court sentenced Grose to an aggregate prison term of 12 years. On direct appeal,
    Grose argued, in relevant part to the instant appeal, the offenses of kidnapping and
    aggravated robbery should have merged for purposes of sentencing, or, alternatively,
    the extortion and aggravated robbery offenses should have merged, and the trial court
    should have held an allied-offenses hearing. Grose I, ¶44. We found there were
    insufficient facts in the record for this court to make an allied-offense determination in
    the instant case. Grose I, ¶49. We therefore,
    [Sustained] appellant’s third assignment of error and remand the
    case to the trial court for an allied-offense hearing and, if appropriate,
    allow appellee to elect which allied offenses to pursue at resentencing.
    State v. Whitfield, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 319
    , 2010–Ohio–2, 
    922 N.E.2d 182
    ,
    paragraph one of the syllabus. In light of our decision on this assignment
    1
    We note appellee did not file a brief in this case.
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA30                                                           3
    of error, appellant’s argument regarding merger of the offense of extortion
    and aggravated robbery, and his fourth assignment of error regarding an
    allied-offenses hearing, are moot.
    Grose I, ¶ 50. On remand, the state filed a brief arguing that none of these offenses
    were allied. Grose responded that most of the crimes were allied and therefore his
    sentence should be less. The court viewed a cell phone video of the incident. The trial
    court noted that it had not viewed this video prior to Gorse’s initial sentencing in light of
    Gorse’s decision to plead. The trial court then issued a judgment entry on January 28,
    2014, stating that the kidnapping, extortion and aggravated robbery were committed
    with a separate animus and were not therefore subject to merger as allied offenses. The
    trial court was “less convinced” that there was a separate animus for the tampering with
    evidence conviction. The trial court then scheduled a re-sentencing hearing for February
    5, 2014.
    {¶4}   The trial court held a resentencing hearing on March 26, 2014. At the
    hearing, the court gave each party the chance to argue for allied offenses. The trial
    court reiterated that the offenses were not allied finding that each act had a separate
    animus. However, the trial court then altered its previously imposed sentence, running
    each prison term concurrently rather than consecutively. The state objected, arguing
    that the remand was for the limited purpose of determining whether any of the offenses
    were allied. Because the trial court had found none of the offenses to be allied, it could
    not alter its previously valid sentencing entry.
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA30                                                       4
    Assignment of Error
    {¶5}   It is from the trial court’s March 26, 2014 Re-Sentencing entry that the
    state has appealed, raising the following assignment of error,
    {¶6}   “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RESENTENCED ALLANDO
    GROSE AFTER IT HAD DETERMINED THAT THE COUNTS WERE NOT ALLIED
    OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT.”
    Analysis
    {¶7}   The state argues that we remanded this case for the limited purpose of
    holding an allied-offense hearing. The trial court held that hearing made that
    determination and found none of the offenses to be allied. Therefore, the state contends
    the original sentencing entry remained valid and therefore, the trial court erred when it
    altered its previously valid sentence and resentenced Grose. We agree.
    {¶8}   The scope of the sentencing hearing the trial court must conduct after
    remand for an allied offenses sentencing error was addressed by the Supreme Court,
    In a remand based only on an allied-offenses sentencing error, the
    guilty verdicts underlying a defendant’s sentences remain the law of the
    case and are not subject to review. Whitfield, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 319
    , 2010–
    Ohio–2, 
    922 N.E.2d 182
    , at ¶ 26–27. Further, only the sentences for the
    offenses that were affected by the appealed error are reviewed de novo;
    the sentences for any offenses that were not affected by the appealed
    error are not vacated and are not subject to review. [State v.] Saxon, [
    109 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1245
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 824
    ] at paragraph three of
    the syllabus.
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA30                                                      5
    {¶9}      State v. Wilson, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 214
    , 
    2011-Ohio-2669
    , 
    951 N.E.2d 381
    , ¶
    15. The Court in Wilson further held,
    [O]nce the cause is remanded and the offenses to be merged are
    selected by the state, the trial court is required to hold a new sentencing
    hearing and impose sentences for the remaining offenses. Res judicata
    does not preclude a defendant from objecting to issues that arise at the
    new sentencing hearing.
    Wilson, ¶ 34.
    {¶10} In the case at bar, we did not find an allied offense sentencing error,
    vacate Grose’s sentences and remand the case for the trial court to conduct a de novo
    sentencing hearing. See, State v. Wilson, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 214
    , 
    2011-Ohio-2669
    , 
    951 N.E.2d 381
    , ¶14. Rather we remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited
    purpose of establishing the facts underlying the charges. State v. Biondo, 11th Dist.,
    Portage No. 2012-P-0043, 
    2013-Ohio-876
    , ¶12. Once the facts were established, the
    trial court was to analyze Gorse’s conduct under State v. Johnson, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 153
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-6314
    , 
    942 N.E.2d 1061
     and rule whether the crimes at issue should be
    merged for sentencing. Once the trial court determined that the offenses were not allied
    offenses a de novo resentencing hearing was not warranted. State v. Bolton, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 99137, 
    2013-Ohio-2467
    , ¶¶6-7. The trial court’s original sentencing entry
    filed October 8, 2012 found the offenses were not allied offenses and were therefore not
    merged. Therefore, there was no allied offenses’ sentencing error to correct.
    {¶11} The state’s sole assignment of error is sustained. Section 3(B) (2), Article
    IV of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2953.07, give an appellate court the power to
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA30                                                       6
    affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment of an inferior court. Accordingly, the March 26,
    2014 Re-Sentencing entry is vacated and the trial court’s original sentencing entry filed
    October 8, 2012 is reinstated.
    {¶12} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed.
    Pursuant to Section 3(B) (2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2953.07, the
    March 26, 2014 Re-Sentencing entry is vacated and the trial court’s original sentencing
    entry filed October 8, 2012 is reinstated.
    By Gwin, P.J.,
    Delaney, J., and
    Baldwin, J., concur
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14CA30

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 4499

Judges: Gwin

Filed Date: 10/9/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014