State v. Williams , 2018 Ohio 1358 ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2018-Ohio-1358.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2017-07-105
: OPINION
- vs - 4/9/2018
:
CLIFFORD D. WILLIAMS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR1990-08-0665
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Lina N. Alkamhawi, Government
Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee
Richard Cline, Kandra Roberts, Ohio Public Defender's Office, 250 East Broad Street, Suite
1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for defendant-appellant
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Clifford D. Williams, appeals from the decision of the
Butler County Court of Common Pleas that denied his motion for a new mitigation trial. For
the reasons discussed below, this court affirms the lower court's decision.
{¶ 2} In 1990, Williams robbed and murdered Wayman Hamilton, a cab driver who
was transporting him to Hamilton, Ohio. Three days later, Williams shot Jeff Wallace in the
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back of the head after attempting to rob him. Wallace survived. A grand jury indicted
Williams on multiple charges, including aggravated murder and three death-penalty
specifications for causing Hamilton's death. Williams' charges were tried to a jury in 1991.
The jury found Williams guilty of all charges in the indictment, including the death-penalty
specifications.
{¶ 3} After the guilt phase, the trial proceeded to the mitigation phase. After hearing
the evidence, the court instructed the jurors on their responsibility to recommend either a
death sentence or a lesser penalty of life in prison with parole. The court informed the jurors
that they must recommend a death sentence if they found, by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the aggravating circumstances presented at trial outweighed the mitigating
factors. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore recommended that the court impose the death
penalty. The trial court then independently weighed the aggravating circumstances and
mitigating factors, accepted the jury's recommendation, and imposed a sentence of death on
the aggravated murder charge and specifications.
{¶ 4} On appeal, this court affirmed Williams' conviction and death sentence. State
v. Williams, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA91-04-060 and CA92-06-110, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS
5529 (Nov. 2, 1992). In a later appeal as of right, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Williams'
conviction and death sentence. State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St. 3d 153 (1995).
{¶ 5} In 2017, Williams moved the trial court for a new mitigation trial. Williams
argued that the death sentence violated his constitutional rights in light of Hurst v. Florida,
577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). The trial court denied the motion. Williams appeals,
raising a single assignment of error.
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED WILLIAMS' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
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{¶ 7} In Hurst, the United States Supreme Court held that Florida's capital
punishment scheme violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial
jury where the law required a judge to engage in an independent weighing of aggravating and
mitigating facts as a prerequisite to imposing the death penalty. Williams argues that Ohio's
capital punishment laws are similar to those in Florida and violate Hurst.
{¶ 8} In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, there is a general presumption in
favor of the validity of legislation. R.C. 1.47(A); State v. Sinito, 43 Ohio St. 2d 98, 101 (1975).
The party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St. 3d 558, 560 (1996). The Sixth
Amendment provides: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury * * *." The right to an impartial jury, in conjunction
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, requires each element of a crime to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 104, 133 S. Ct.
2151 (2013). The United States Supreme Court has held that any fact that "expose[s] the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict" is an
"element" that must be submitted to a jury. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494, 120
S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
{¶ 9} The Supreme Court has extended the rule of Apprendi to capital punishment.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). In Ring, the Court held that an
Arizona capital sentencing scheme providing that a defendant could not be sentenced to
death unless a judge, independent of the jury, found at least one aggravating circumstance
violated Apprendi. Id. at 592-593. The Court concluded that the required judicial finding of
an aggravated circumstance exposed the defendant to greater punishment than authorized
by the jury's verdict. Id. at 604.
{¶ 10} Similarly, in Hurst, the Supreme Court found that Florida's capital punishment
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scheme violated Apprendi because it required a judge, rather than the jury, to make the
"critical findings" necessary to impose the death penalty. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622. Under the
Florida law, the jury's role in death-penalty sentencing was limited to issuing an "advisory
sentence." Id. at 620. The judge then engaged in the fact-finding process with respect to
aggravating and mitigating facts, could consider evidence not presented to the jury, and then
had a choice to either sentence a defendant to life in prison or death, regardless of the
sentence recommended by the jury. Id. Under the Florida law, the maximum punishment
the defendant could have received without any judicial fact-finding was life in prison. Id. at
622.
{¶ 11} Ohio's capital punishment scheme at the time of Williams' sentence was set
forth in R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04.1 The death penalty cannot be imposed for aggravated
murder unless a statutory aggravating circumstance is specified in the indictment. R.C.
2929.03(B) and (C)(2); and R.C. 2929.04(A). That aggravated circumstance must then be
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, at trial. Id.
{¶ 12} After the conviction, in the penalty phase of the trial, the jury must recommend
either the imposition of a death sentence or a lesser penalty. To make that recommendation,
the jury must weigh the aggravating circumstances against any mitigating factors introduced
by the defendant. R.C. 2929.03(D)(2). If the jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, then the jury must recommend
that a death sentence be imposed. If the jury does not find that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury shall
recommend that the offender be sentenced to a life sentence or other lesser penalty. If the
1. All references in this opinion are to the versions of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 in effect at the time of Williams'
1991 sentence. However, for purposes of this opinion, there are no substantive changes between the 1991
version of the law and the current version.
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jury recommends the lesser penalty, "the court shall impose the sentence recommended by
the jury upon the offender." Id.
{¶ 13} If the jury recommends the death penalty, then the next step involves the court
repeating the analysis undertaken by the jury, i.e., considering whether the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors. R.C. 2929.03(D)(3). If the court so finds, by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court must impose the death penalty. If, instead,
the court does not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating factors, then the court must impose one of the lesser sanctions. Id.
{¶ 14} This court concludes that Ohio's capital sentencing laws in effect at the time of
Williams' sentencing were not unconstitutional under Hurst and that Williams has not met his
burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the statutory scheme beyond a reasonable
doubt. Under R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04, Williams became eligible for the death penalty only
after the jury engaged in two critical fact-finding steps. During the guilt stage of the trial, the
jury found Williams guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of both the aggravated murder and
the aggravating circumstances specified in the indictment. At the sentencing stage, the jury
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating factors. If the jury had not found Williams guilty of the aggravated murder with
specifications, or, had not found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating factors, then the court could not have imposed the death penalty. Accordingly,
under Ohio's death-penalty law, unlike Florida's law in Hurst and Arizona's law in Ring, it was
not possible for the court to make a factual finding during sentencing that exposed Williams
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury.
{¶ 15} Williams argues that the jury only serves an advisory role in death-penalty
sentencing in Ohio because the law only requires the jury to provide a recommendation to
the judge. The jury's role in death-penalty sentencing is not merely advisory. The judge
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cannot impose the death penalty unless recommended by the jury. Williams also contends
that the law is unconstitutional because it does not require the jury to explain its factual
findings with respect to the weighing of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors.
Williams suggests that some form of jury interrogatories might cure this issue. However,
juries are commonly asked to deliver general verdicts. This court does not agree that Hurst
would require jury interrogatories to ensure compliance with the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments in death-penalty sentencing.
{¶ 16} As of the time of this opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the effect of Hurst on capital punishment in Ohio. However, the court has strongly
implied that Hurst is unlikely to have any impact. State v. Roberts, 150 Ohio St. 3d 47, 2017-
Ohio-2998, ¶ 84 (rejecting a defendant's explanation that his Sixth Amendment argument
was untimely because Hurst had not yet been decided as the defendant "could have made
essentially the same Sixth Amendment argument by relying on [Apprendi] and [Ring]").
{¶ 17} Finally, every Ohio court of appeals that has addressed the effect of Hurst on
Ohio's capital sentencing scheme as it existed when the court sentenced Williams has
concluded that it is constitutional.2 State v. Mason, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-16-34, 2016-Ohio-
8400, ¶ 29, appeal accepted, 149 Ohio St. 3d 1462, 2017-Ohio-5699; State v. Jackson, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105530, 2018-Ohio-276, ¶ 16; State v. Carter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
170231, 2018-Ohio-645, ¶ 4-8; see also State v. Mundt, 7th Dist. Noble No. 17 NO 0446,
2017-Ohio-7771, ¶ 9-10. Accordingly, this court overrules Williams' sole assignment of error.
{¶ 18} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
2. The cited cases construed prior but substantively similar versions of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04.
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