Higgins v. Buehrer , 2016 Ohio 7214 ( 2016 )

[Cite as Higgins v. Buehrer, 2016-Ohio-7214.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
JACOB A. HIGGINS, : APPEAL NO. C-160288
TRIAL NO. A-1405209
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
STEPHEN BUEHRER, :
ADMINISTRATOR OHIO BUREAU OF
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, :
Defendant-Appellee, :
and :
WALTER R. COSBY CORPORATION, :
Defendant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 5, 2016
Weisser & Wolf and Scott A. Wolf, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Jose A. Martinez, Assistant Attorney
General, for Defendant-Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
SYLVIA S. HENDON, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Jacob Higgins has appealed from the trial court’s
entry finding in favor of defendant-appellee the Ohio Bureau of Workers’
Compensation (“the Bureau”) and holding that he was not entitled to participate in
the workers’ compensation fund for the conditions of depression and anxiety. In two
assignments of error, he argues that the trial court failed to properly apply the
principle of dual causation, and that the trial court erred by failing to review medical
exhibits that had been stipulated by both parties and admitted into evidence.
{¶2} Because the trial court rendered judgment without examining the
stipulated exhibits, we reverse its judgment and remand this cause for a new trial.
Factual Background
{¶3} Higgins had been injured in a workplace accident in 1990 and was
allowed to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for various conditions. In
2013, he moved to amend his claim to allow for participation in the fund for the
conditions of depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. His claim was disallowed at
all administrative levels, and he appealed to the court of common pleas.
{¶4} A bench trial was held on Higgins’ claims on December 12, 2014. At
the start of trial, the court indicated that it had read the transcripts containing the
deposition testimony of both parties’ expert witnesses. Before offering opening
statements, the parties gave the trial court 13 stipulated exhibits concerning Higgins’
prior medical records. Higgins then testified about the history of his injury, his
various life experiences, and his depression and anxiety. At the close of testimony,
the trial court formally accepted the deposition transcripts of both experts and the
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
stipulated exhibits into evidence. After closing arguments, and without examining
the stipulated exhibits, the trial court immediately issued a ruling from the bench
denying Higgins the right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for the
conditions of depression and anxiety.
Failure to Review Exhibits
{¶5} We begin with Higgins’ second assignment of error, as it is dispositive
of this appeal. In that assignment of error, Higgins argues that the trial court erred
in not reviewing the stipulated exhibits that were admitted into evidence by the trial
court. It is apparent on the record that the trial court issued its ruling immediately
upon the close of trial without reviewing these exhibits. And the Bureau concedes
that the trial court failed to examine the exhibits.
{¶6} A trial court has a duty to thoroughly review all evidence and exhibits
that were made a part of the record in the case before it prior to entering judgment.
See Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St. 3d 356, 360, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992)
(holding that “Civ.R. 56(C) places a mandatory duty on a trial court to thoroughly
examine all appropriate materials filed by the parties before ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.”). While this case involves a bench trial, rather than a motion
for summary judgment, the rationale for such a requirement is equally applicable. A
thorough examination of the entire record, including exhibits, is necessary to
determine whether a party has met its imposed burden. Id. at 359.
{¶7} A trial court cannot selectively choose to examine some evidence and
refuse to consider other properly admitted evidence altogether. Once the trial court
has examined the entire record, it is well within the province of the court to find
certain evidence credible and other evidence not credible, and to accordingly give
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
greater weight to particular evidence. But the entire record must be examined before
such credibility determinations can be made.
{¶8} Although the trial court must review the entire record, there is no
requirement that a trial court must state on the record that it has, in fact, considered
all evidence and exhibits. See Burkhart v. Burkhart, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-80-39,
1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 11421, *12-13 (Sept. 4 1981) (holding that “[t]he court’s failure
to mention an exhibit does not indicate a failure of the court to consider the
evidence. The court is deemed to have reviewed the entire record and all of the
evidence admitted * * *.”). Generally, unless the record affirmatively demonstrates
otherwise, we presume the regularity of the proceedings below and that the trial
court considered all parts of the record. See Stanley v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr.,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-999, 2013-Ohio-5140, ¶ 50.
{¶9} This is the rare case in which it has been affirmatively demonstrated
that the trial court failed to consider all evidence. Not only is the trial court’s error
apparent in a reading of the transcript of the proceedings below, but the Bureau has
conceded that the trial court failed to examine the stipulated exhibits. On these facts,
we sustain Higgins’ second assignment of error and hold that the trial court erred in
entering judgment without reviewing all exhibits that had been admitted into
evidence. Our holding renders Higgins’ first assignment of error moot.
{¶10} We reverse the trial court’s entry denying Higgins the right to
participate in the workers’ compensation fund for the conditions of depression and
anxiety, and we remand this cause for a new trial on Higgins’ claims.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FISCHER, P.J., and MOCK, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
5