State v. Kendrick , 2016 Ohio 4770 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Kendrick, 
    2016-Ohio-4770
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    State of Ohio,                                        :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
    No. 15AP-835
    v.                                                    :              (C.P.C. No. 14CR-2851)
    Laron L. Kendrick,                                    :          (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
    Defendant-Appellant.                 :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on June 30, 2016
    On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L.
    Taylor, for appellee.
    On brief: Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and
    Stephen P. Hardwick, for appellant.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
    KLATT, J.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Laron L. Kendrick, appeals from a judgment of
    conviction entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following
    reasons, we affirm that judgment.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    {¶ 2} On May 29, 2014, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant with
    multiple counts of attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.02, and
    felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11. Each of those counts also contained two
    firearm specifications. The indictment also contained two counts of having a weapon
    No. 15AP-835                                                                              2
    while under a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13. Appellant initially entered a not
    guilty plea to the charges and proceeded to a trial.
    {¶ 3} During his trial, however, appellant decided to withdraw his not guilty plea
    and enter an Alford Plea to two counts of attempted murder. The first count included a
    three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145 and a five-year firearm
    specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.146. The second count only included a three-year
    firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145. The "Entry of Guilty Plea" form signed
    by appellant advised him that he faced up to 33 years in prison as a result of his plea, but
    that the parties had jointly recommended a 20-year prison sentence. After advising
    appellant of the nature of the charges, the effect of his plea and the possible penalties he
    faced, the trial court accepted his plea, found him guilty, and sentenced him to the jointly
    recommended prison sentence of 20 years. In so doing, the trial court ordered him to
    serve concurrent nine-year prison terms for each of the attempted murder counts and
    then added consecutive prison terms for each of the firearm specifications (a total of 11
    years) to arrive at the jointly-recommended prison sentence of 20 years. Appellant's trial
    counsel did not object to the prison sentence.
    II. The Appeal
    {¶ 4} Appellant appeals and assigns the following error:
    The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
    whether to run the three-year firearm specification in Count
    One [concurrently] to the three-year specification in Count
    Three was contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.
    {¶ 5} Appellant argues that the trial court should have imposed concurrent
    sentences for his three-year firearm specifications, thereby reducing his prison sentence
    by three years. He argues that he should have received concurrent sentences because
    those specifications occurred as part of the same act or transaction.                  R.C.
    2929.14(B)(1)(b). We disagree.
    {¶ 6} We first note that appellant did not object to the trial court's imposition of
    consecutive sentences for the two firearm specifications at the sentencing hearing.
    Therefore, our review is limited to plain error. Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Price, 10th Dist.
    No. 13AP-1085, 
    2014-Ohio-4065
    , ¶ 7.          Under Crim.R. 52(B), plain errors affecting
    substantial rights may be noticed by an appellate court even though they were not brought
    No. 15AP-835                                                                                 3
    to the attention of the trial court. To constitute plain error, there must be: (1) an error,
    i.e., a deviation from a legal rule, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affected
    substantial rights, i.e., affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Barnes, 
    94 Ohio St.3d 21
    ,
    27 (2002); State v. Ganguly, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-383, 
    2015-Ohio-845
    , ¶ 41. Even if an
    error satisfies these prongs, appellate courts are not required to correct the error.
    Appellate courts retain discretion to correct plain errors. State v. Fillmore, 10th Dist. No.
    15AP-509, 
    2015-Ohio-5280
    , ¶ 6; State v. Litreal, 
    170 Ohio App.3d 670
    , 
    2006-Ohio-5416
    ,
    ¶ 12 (4th Dist.). Courts are to notice plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) " 'with the utmost
    caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
    justice.' " Barnes, quoting State v. Long, 
    53 Ohio St.2d 91
     (1978), paragraph three of
    syllabus; State v. Pilgrim, 
    184 Ohio App.3d 675
    , 
    2009-Ohio-5357
    , ¶ 58 (10th Dist.).
    {¶ 7} Appellant was convicted of two three-year firearm specifications pursuant
    to R.C. 2941.145. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a), the trial court was required to
    impose a prison term for those specifications. As appellant argues, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b)
    provides that a trial court shall not impose more than one such prison term for felonies
    committed as part of the same act or transaction. That statute, however, contains an
    exception which applies to appellant's case. Price at ¶ 8; State v. Sheffey, 8th Dist. No.
    98944, 
    2013-Ohio-2463
    , ¶ 27-28.         That exception, found in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g),
    provides that:
    If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more
    felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated
    murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, attempted
    murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if
    the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification
    of the type described under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in
    connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing
    court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified
    under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two
    most serious specifications of which the offender is convicted
    or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion,
    also may impose on the offender the prison term specified
    under that division for any or all of the remaining
    specifications.
    {¶ 8} In this case, appellant was convicted of two felonies, specifically two counts
    of attempted murder. With each of those offenses, he was also convicted of a firearm
    No. 15AP-835                                                                                               4
    specification described under division R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a).1                       Thus, under R.C.
    2929.14(B)(1)(g), the trial court was required to impose a prison term for each of the two
    most serious firearm specifications. Price at ¶ 11. Here, because appellant was only
    convicted of two such specifications, the trial court had to impose a prison term for both
    of those specifications. State v. Murphy, 8th Dist. No. 98124, 
    2013-Ohio-2196
    , ¶ 8.
    Additionally, those prison terms had to be consecutive.                         R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a).
    Accordingly, the trial court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by sentencing appellant to
    consecutive prison terms for both of his three-year firearm specifications.2
    III. Conclusion
    {¶ 9} We overrule appellant's assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
    Judgment affirmed.
    BROWN and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
    1This appeal does not address the R.C. 2941.146 five-year firearm specification sentence. We note,
    however, that appellant's sentence for that specification is set forth in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(c), not R.C.
    2929.14(B)(1)(a).
    2 While not articulated as an assignment of error, this conclusion compels the rejection of appellant's
    arguments that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the trial court's imposition of consecutive
    sentences.