State v. Tillis ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Tillis, 
    2017-Ohio-9010
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO MAHONING COUNTY
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SEVENTH DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO,                                        )
    )
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                          )
    )            CASE NO. 16 MA 0130
    V.                                                    )
    )                  OPINION
    TERRENCE TILLIS,                                      )
    )
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.                         )
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                             Criminal Appeal from Court of Common
    Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
    Case No. 14 CR 1132
    JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                                Paul Gains
    Prosecutor
    Ralph M. Rivera
    Assistant Prosecutor
    21 W. Boardman St., 6th Floor
    Youngstown, Ohio 44503
    For Defendant-Appellant                               Attorney Donna Jewell McCollum
    3685 Stutz Drive, Suite 100
    Canfield, Ohio 44406
    JUDGES:
    Hon. Gene Donofrio
    Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
    Hon. Mary DeGenaro
    Dated: December 8, 2017
    [Cite as State v. Tillis, 
    2017-Ohio-9010
    .]
    DONOFRIO, J.
    {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Terrence Tillis, appeals from a Mahoning Country
    Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of burglary, following a jury trial.
    {¶2}     On October 21, 2014, Crystal Jefferson left her house in Youngstown at
    approximately 10:30 a.m. to give a friend a ride. Upon her return home, around
    11:00 a.m., Jefferson went back to sleep. According to Jefferson, she was asleep for
    ten to fifteen minutes when she “felt something” in the bedroom with her. Jefferson
    awoke to see appellant standing in her bedroom doorway. Jefferson recognized
    appellant because she has known him for years and appellant resided next door with
    his girlfriend. Upon seeing appellant in her bedroom, Jefferson began yelling and
    cursing at him to leave. It was at this point that Jefferson saw appellant grab her
    Michael Kors purse and flee from her residence.
    {¶3}     Jefferson got dressed and went next door where appellant was staying
    and banged on the door. Appellant did not open the door or acknowledge Jefferson.
    One of the neighbors heard the commotion and approached Jefferson. The neighbor
    permitted Jefferson to use his phone to call the police. Youngstown Police Officer
    Richard Baldwin and Detective-Sergeant Chad Zubal responded. Officer Baldwin
    took a report on what had transpired. When Detective Zubal heard Jefferson explain
    the situation, and realized the suspect lived next door, Detective Zubal and a few
    other officers approached the house where appellant resided. Appellant answered
    the door for the officers and invited them into the foyer. While inside, the officers did
    not conduct a search because Detective Zubal believed they did not have enough
    evidence to search the residence. Despite the officers not conducting a search of the
    residence, they did conduct a protective sweep to ensure no one else was inside the
    house. The officers did not see Jefferson’s purse during the protective sweep. The
    officers subsequently arrested appellant.
    {¶4}     Jefferson’s purse was not located until Brenda Reed (appellant’s
    girlfriend) went to Jefferson’s house and returned the purse to Jefferson. Jefferson’s
    friend, Laponica Lampley, witnessed Reed give the purse to Jefferson.
    {¶5}     A Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted appellant on one count of
    -2-
    burglary, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1)(D). The matter
    proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found appellant guilty as charged. The trial court
    subsequently sentenced appellant to six years’ incarceration.
    {¶6}   This court granted appellant leave to file a delayed appeal on October
    25, 2016. He now raises one assignment of error.
    {¶7}   Appellant’s sole assignment of error states:
    THE COURT DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS UNDER THE
    FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE TO THE FACT THAT HIS
    CONVICTION FOR BURGLARY WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
    WRIGHT [SIC] OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS
    INCONSISTENT        WITH      THE     EVIDENCE        AND    TESTIMONY
    PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
    {¶8}   In his assignment of error, appellant asserts both that there was
    insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that his conviction was against the
    manifest weight of the evidence. We will address his arguments separately.
    {¶9}   Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his
    conviction.   He contends that the officers arrested him solely on Jefferson’s
    eyewitness testimony. He notes that the police did not collect DNA or fingerprint
    evidence and no one else testified as to seeing him in Jefferson’s home or having
    possession of the purse. Appellant argues that Jefferson’s testimony is insufficient
    evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find the essential elements of burglary.
    {¶10} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine
    whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as a
    matter of law to support the verdict. State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 113, 
    684 N.E.2d 668
     (1997). In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.               State v.
    Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997). Whether the evidence
    is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. 
    Id.
     In reviewing the
    record for sufficiency, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a
    -3-
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 80 Ohio
    St.3d at 113.
    {¶11} The jury convicted appellant of burglary in violation of R.C.
    2911.12(A)(1), which provides: “No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall * * *
    [t]respass in an occupied structure * * * when another person other than an
    accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure * * *
    any criminal offense[.]”
    {¶12} We must examine the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to
    convict appellant of burglary. Plaintiff-appellee, the State of Ohio, presented five
    witnesses.
    {¶13} Jefferson was the first witness. Jefferson testified that on the morning
    in question she left her house at approximately 10:30 a.m. to drop a friend off. (Tr.
    108-109). She then returned home and got back into bed at approximately 11:00
    a.m. (Tr. 109). Jefferson estimated that she was asleep for ten to 15 minutes when
    she “felt something” in the room with her. (Tr. 109-110). She stated that she woke
    up to find appellant was in the room with her. (Tr. 110). Jefferson testified that she
    has known appellant for years. (Tr. 110). At that time, appellant was living next door
    to Jefferson with his girlfriend, Brenda Reed. (Tr. 111).
    {¶14} Jefferson testified that she began “cussing” at appellant and asking him
    why he was in her house. (Tr. 113). She stated that appellant then grabbed her
    purse and ran out of her front door. (Tr. 113). Jefferson stated that she chased after
    appellant but was unable to catch him. (Tr. 116). She then went back inside her
    house to put some clothes on. (Tr. 116-117). Jefferson then went next door to
    Reed’s house and banged on the door. (Tr. 117). No one answered. (Tr. 118).
    Another neighbor saw the commotion, came over, and offered Jefferson his cell
    phone to call the police. (Tr. 118). Jefferson called 911 and the police responded.
    (Tr. 118). She told the police what happened. (Tr. 118-119). Jefferson stated that
    the police eventually brought appellant out of his girlfriend’s house. (Tr. 126). And
    -4-
    when Jefferson went back inside of her house, she noticed that the lock on her
    bedroom window had been broken. (Tr. 120). She testified that it was not broken
    earlier that day. (Tr. 120).
    {¶15} Several days later, Jefferson testified, appellant’s girlfriend came to her
    house and returned the purse that appellant had stolen. (Tr. 127-128). She then
    took the purse to the Youngstown Police Department. (Tr. 132).
    {¶16} On cross examination, Jefferson stated that while appellant was leaving
    her house, she was “pulling” on him. (Tr. 138).
    {¶17} Youngstown Police Officer Richard Baldwin was the second witness.
    Officer Baldwin testified that he responded to a call at approximately 11:00 a.m.
    regarding a burglary. (Tr. 145). When he arrived on the scene, Jefferson explained
    to him that: appellant broke into her house through her bedroom window; he grabbed
    her purse; he started running; she grabbed him but he broke loose; and he ran out of
    the front door. (Tr. 145-146). While Officer Baldwin was taking Jefferson’s report, he
    saw other officers step out onto Reed’s porch with appellant.            (Tr. 148-149).
    Jefferson yelled out that appellant was the man who broke into her house. (Tr. 150).
    Officer Baldwin stated that he did not see the purse during this time. (Tr. 151).
    {¶18} The third witness was Detective-Sergeant Chad Zubal. Detective Zubal
    also responded the burglary call at approximately 11:00 a.m.         (Tr. 161).     Upon
    learning that appellant lived next door to Jefferson, Detective Zubal, along with other
    officers, knocked on Reed’s door.       (Tr. 162).   Appellant answered.     (Tr. 162).
    Detective Zubal testified that he explained to appellant why they were there. (Tr.
    163). He did not conduct a search of the house because the detective did not think
    they had enough reason to search the entire house. (Tr. 163). The police only
    conducted a protective sweep. (Tr. 163). Detective Zubal did not notice the purse
    during the protective sweep. (Tr. 163-164).
    {¶19} Lieutenant Ramon Cox was the fourth witness. He testified that he met
    with Jefferson to file the charge against appellant. (Tr. 175-176). A few days later,
    Lt. Cox stated, Jefferson returned with the stolen purse and gave it to him. (Tr. 176).
    -5-
    {¶20} Laponica Lampley was the final witness. Lampley is Jefferson’s friend.
    She testified she was at Jefferson’s house in the days following the burglary when
    Reed came to the house. (Tr. 186-187). She saw Reed return Jefferson’s stolen
    purse to her. (Tr. 187-189).
    {¶21} This evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s burglary conviction.
    The broken lock on Jefferson’s bedroom window indicates a forced entry. Jefferson
    testified that the bedroom window lock was intact when she left her residence that
    morning, but after appellant fled her residence she noticed that the lock was broken.
    Additionally, Jefferson knew appellant and identified him as the man she found in her
    bedroom who fled from her house with her purse. This evidence, construed in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes each element of burglary. Thus,
    appellant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.
    {¶22} Appellant also argues his conviction is against the manifest weight of
    the evidence. Appellant contends the discrepancies in Jefferson’s testimony make it
    unreliable. Appellant argues that Jefferson changed her account of what happened
    by originally testifying that she was unable to catch appellant while he was fleeing
    and then testifying that she caught him and pulled on him as he fled her residence.
    In addition, appellants points out, the timeline given by Jefferson and the timeline
    given by the police do not correspond. Jefferson testified that she left her residence
    around 10:30 a.m. and returned around 11:00 a.m. Jefferson further testified that
    she was asleep for ten to fifteen minutes before she “felt something” in the room with
    her. Jefferson being asleep for ten to fifteen minutes prior to seeing appellant places
    the time of the encounter around 11:15 a.m. This does not take into account the time
    it took Jefferson to chase appellant out of her residence, get dressed, go next door
    and pound on the door, the neighbor coming over to see what is wrong, and the
    neighbor allowing Jefferson to call the police using his phone. Despite all of these
    things, Officer Baldwin testified that he arrived on scene at 11:00 a.m. Appellant
    argues that the timeline discrepancy in Jefferson’s testimony destroys her credibility
    as a witness.
    -6-
    {¶23} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
    all reasonable inferences and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
    evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
    justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 78
    Ohio St.3d at 387. “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater
    amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather
    than the other.’” Id. (Emphasis sic.) In making its determination, a reviewing court is
    not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution but may
    consider and weigh all of the evidence produced at trial. Id. at 390.
    {¶24} Yet granting a new trial is only appropriate in extraordinary cases where
    the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st Dist.1983). This is because determinations of witness
    credibility, conflicting testimony, and evidence weight are primarily for the trier of the
    facts who sits in the best position to judge the weight of the evidence and the
    witnesses' credibility by observing their gestures, voice inflections, and demeanor.
    State v. Rouse, 7th Dist. No. 04-BE-53, 
    2005-Ohio-6328
    , ¶ 49, citing State v. Hill, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 195
    , 205, 
    661 N.E.2d 1068
     (1996); State v. DeHass, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    ,
    
    227 N.E.2d 212
     (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, “[w]hen there exist two
    fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting versions of events, neither
    of which is unbelievable, it is not our province to choose which one we believe.”
    State v. Dyke, 7th Dist. No. 99-CA-149, 
    2002-Ohio-1152
    .
    {¶25} In order to reverse a jury verdict as against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, all three appellate judges must concur. Thompkins, 778 Ohio St.3d at 389.
    {¶26} Appellant urges that the inconsistencies in Jefferson’s testimony render
    her unreliable. But the inconsistencies are minimal. Jefferson’s recollection of the
    time may have been off by fifteen minutes or so compared to the officers’ account of
    when they responded to the scene.          Additionally, Jefferson may have grabbed
    appellant as he fled from her house or she may not have grabbed him. Neither of
    -7-
    these inconsistencies go to the ultimate issue in this case, however.                The
    inconsistencies relate to Jefferson’s credibility. And her credibility was a matter for
    the jury to weigh.
    {¶27} The jury is in the best position to judge witnesses' credibility and
    conflicting testimony. Rouse, 
    2005-Ohio-6328
    , at ¶ 49, citing Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d at
    205. That is because the jurors can observe witnesses' gestures, voice inflections,
    and demeanor. Id. We will not second-guess the jury's determinations of credibility.
    {¶28} Based on the above, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way in
    finding appellant guilty of burglary. Appellant’s conviction is not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    {¶29} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit and is
    overruled.
    {¶30} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby
    affirmed.
    Waite, J., concurs.
    DeGenaro, J., concurs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16 MA 0130

Judges: Donofrio

Filed Date: 12/8/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/14/2017