State v. Battiste , 2015 Ohio 3586 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Battiste, 2015-Ohio-3586.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 102299
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAYSON BATTISTE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-13-579620-A
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 3, 2015
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
BY: Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Maxwell Martin
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jayson Battiste (“Battiste”), appeals from his conviction
for sexual battery, raising four assignments of error for review:
1. Appellant’s conviction for sexual battery is against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
2. The trial court violated appellant’s due process rights when it excluded
evidence of the victim’s prostitution on the basis of Ohio’s Rape Shield
Act.
3. The trial court committed reversible error and violated appellant’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial when it improperly permitted the
police detective to offer opinions on appellant’s guilt.
4. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm Battiste’s
conviction.
I. Procedural and Factual History
{¶3} In November 2013, Battiste and codefendant, Michael Taylor (“Taylor”),
were named in a four-count indictment charging them with one count of rape, in violation
of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); one count of attempted rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)
and 2923.02; one count of sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(3); and one
count of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4). The charges stem from a report
of a sexual assault made by the complaining witness, D.T., in connection with events that
occurred in July 2003.
{¶4} Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit Battiste
from introducing evidence of D.T.’s prior sexual activity. The trial court granted the
state’s motion in limine to “preclude admission of evidence under Ohio’s rape shield
statute * * * insofar as it seeks to preclude evidence offered at trial by the defendant of
D.T.’s prior sexual activity only to impeach her credibility.”
{¶5} In September 2014, Battiste’s case proceeded to a jury trial where the
following evidence was adduced. 1 In July 2003, then 21-year-old D.T. attended the
Cleveland Puerto Rican Festival with her friend T.J. The two friends walked around,
listened to music, ate food, and D.T. consumed alcohol. D.T. estimated that she drank
between three to six beers over the course of the day and was taking prescription
medications during that time period. While at the festival, D.T. and T.J. met two men.
D.T. could not remember the names of the men, but recalled that they were African
American males around her age.
{¶6} Later that evening the men agreed to give D.T. and T.J. a ride home. D.T.
could not remember what time it was when they left the festival but stated that it was
“dark out.” D.T. testified that T.J. was dropped off first, but that she did not remember
1 The trial court originally ruled that the codefendants would be tried
together, but trial commenced against Taylor separately when Battiste’s attorney
became ill. Taylor was found guilty of sexual battery in May 2014. This court
affirmed Taylor’s conviction in State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101615,
2015-Ohio-2033.
seeing T.J. exit the vehicle because she had fallen asleep in the backseat during the car
ride. According to D.T., the next thing she remembered was waking up in the backseat
of the parked car with a man on top of her. At that point, her skirt was up, her underwear
was missing, and the man was “having sex with [her].” D.T. clarified on the record that
the man’s penis penetrated her vagina. D.T. testified that she did not consent to sexual
relations, and that she was unconscious when the man got on top of her. D.T. managed
to get out of the car and used her cell phone to call a friend to pick her up. When she
exited the car, she observed a second man standing outside the car.
{¶7} T.J. testified that she remembered meeting D.T. at the Cleveland Puerto
Rican Festival in July 2003. She stated that she did not recall seeing D.T. drink that day,
but confirmed that D.T. drank during that time period. Additionally, T.J. corroborated
D.T.’s testimony that they met two men at the festival and accepted rides home from them
later that evening. T.J. testified that she was dropped off first and did not recall D.T.
being asleep at the time she exited the vehicle. T.J. first estimated that she arrived at her
house around 8:00 p.m., but later testified that it was probably closer to 10:30 p.m.
{¶8} During her cross-examination, T.J. admitted that D.T. had previously stated
that she “wouldn’t mind selling her body for sex.” However, on redirect, T.J. clarified
that she recalled telling detectives that she had no reason to believe D.T. was planning to
engage in prostitution that day.
{¶9} At approximately 1:00 p.m. the next day, D.T. had a friend take her to the
Cleveland Clinic emergency room. During her initial examination, D.T. told medical
personnel that she had been vaginally raped by two males. D.T. stated that she went
home after the sexual assault and washed her vaginal area before following a friend’s
encouragement to go to the hospital for treatment. She also indicated that she had
consensual sex with her boyfriend approximately two days earlier.
{¶10} Dr. Jonathan Glauser, the treating physician, testified that he evaluated D.T.
and collected evidence for a rape kit pursuant to hospital protocol. Dr. Glauser testified
that D.T. did not have any vaginal trauma, physical injuries to any other part of her body,
or “physical evidence of trauma that needed to be addressed.” However, Dr. Glauser
stated that is is not uncommon for a victim of a sexual assault to have no “obvious signs
of trauma.” According to medical records, D.T. was alert, cooperative and did not
appear to be distressed. Dr. Glauser clarified that there is no uniform reaction amongst
rape victims and that some victims react hysterically while others react calmly, or some
manner between those extremes.
{¶11} D.T.’s case was assigned to Detective Rochell Bush (“Det. Bush”) of the
Cleveland Police Department. Following numerous attempts to contact and meet with
D.T., Det. Bush determined not to go forward with the investigation based on D.T.’s lack
of cooperation.
{¶12} In 2006, the case was assigned to Detective Christina Cottom (“Det.
Cottom”) after Battiste was identified as a possible suspect in this matter through the
Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) database. Det. Cottom testified that in the
course of reopening her investigation she made contact with D.T. According to Det.
Cottom, D.T. stated that she “could not remember, quite remember this rape, but would
call back and set up an appointment to come down and give a statement.” However,
D.T. never called to schedule an appointment, and Det. Cottom was unsuccessful in her
subsequent attempts to contact D.T. As a result, the case was held in abeyance.
{¶13} In 2013, Taylor was identified as a possible suspect in this matter through
CODIS. At that point, Det. Cottom contacted D.T. and scheduled a face-to-face
meeting. On this occasion, D.T. was cooperative and came to Det. Cottom’s office to
provide a statement and to view two separate photo arrays. Det. Cottom testified that
one of the purposes of showing D.T. the photo arrays was to eliminate any consensual sex
partners from her investigation. Ultimately, D.T. was unable to identify Battiste or
Taylor in the separate photo arrays.
{¶14} In the course of her investigation, Detective Cottom interviewed Battiste and
showed him photographs of D.T. and T.J. Det. Cottom testified that Battiste “denied
knowing either of the women, and informed me that he knows just about every woman
that he’s ever been with and still did not recognize either of the women.” Battiste stated
that he was Taylor’s roommate in 2003 but denied ever having sex with a woman Taylor
had sex with. Battiste further denied ever having sex with D.T.
{¶15} Forensic scientist, Heather Bizub, testified that in 2013, she compared the
DNA samples obtained from Battiste and Taylor to the DNA sample found in D.T.’s rape
kit. The semen found on the vaginal swabs from D.T. resulted in a mixture that was
consistent with contributions from the victim, Taylor, Battiste, and at least one unknown
individual.
{¶16} At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Battiste guilty of sexual battery.
He was acquitted of the remaining charges. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced
Battiste to a maximum prison sentence of five years.
{¶17} Battiste now appeals from his sexual battery conviction.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶18} In his first assignment of error, Battiste argues his conviction for sexual
battery is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶19} The manifest weight of the evidence standard of review requires us to
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App. 3d
339, 340, 515 N.E.2d 1009 (9th Dist.1986). The use of the word “manifest” means that
the trier of fact’s decision must be plainly or obviously contrary to all of the evidence.
This is a difficult burden for an appellant to overcome because the resolution of factual
issues resides with the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212
(1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of fact has the authority to “believe or
disbelieve any witness or accept part of what a witness says and reject the rest.” State v.
Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964).
{¶20} Reviewing courts give great deference to the trier of fact. We do so
because:
The fact-finder * * * occupies a superior position in determining credibility.
The fact-finder can hear and see as well as observe the body language,
evaluate voice inflections, observe hand gestures, perceive the interplay
between the witness and the examiner, and watch the witness’s reaction to
exhibits and the like. Determining credibility from a sterile transcript is a
Herculean endeavor. A reviewing court must, therefore, accord due
deference to the credibility determinations made by the fact-finder.
State v. Thompson, 127 Ohio App. 3d 511, 529, 713 N.E.2d 456 (8th Dist.1998).
{¶21} Battiste was convicted of a single count of sexual battery in violation of
R.C. 2907.03(A)(3), which states:
No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the
offender, when * * * [t]he offender knows that the other person submits because the other
person is unaware that the act is being committed.
{¶22} In challenging the weight of the evidence supporting his conviction, Battiste maintains
that D.T.’s testimony is “totally unreliable, contrary to common sense, and inconsistent with the
testimony of her friend [T.J.].” In relation to the element of the crime requiring proof that the victim
submits because he or she is “unaware that the act is being committed,” Battiste argues that “it is
preposterous to believe that a 21-year-old ‘passed out’ after drinking 3 to 6 beers over the course of
several hours and remained unconscious * * * while two men had sex with her.”
{¶23} After careful review of the record in its entirety, we are unable to conclude
that this is the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction. The jury, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to weigh the credibility
of D.T.’s testimony and was free to believe all or part of it. It is clear from the jury’s
finding of not guilty on the remaining charges that it carefully considered all relevant
testimony and any inconsistencies when rendering its verdict. Defense counsel had the
opportunity to cross-examine D.T. on the perceived inconsistencies with her time line and
version of the incident, including the events that took place after T.J. was dropped off at
her home for the evening. While Battiste disputes D.T.’s testimony that she was “passed
out” at the time the sexual conduct occurred, we must defer to the trier of facts
assessment of her credibility with respect to that element of the offense. Accordingly, we
cannot say the jury clearly lost its way, thus creating such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that Battiste’s sexual battery conviction must be reversed.
{¶24} Battiste’s first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Rape Shield Statute
{¶25} In his second assignment of error, Battiste argues the trial court violated his
due process rights when it excluded evidence of D.T.’s sexual history, including her
alleged reputation as a prostitute.
{¶26} R.C. 2907.02(D), commonly known as the rape shield statute, states in
pertinent part:
Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity, opinion
evidence of the victim’s sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the
victim’s sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it
involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the
victim’s past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that
the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact not at issue in the case
and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value.
{¶27} The statute essentially prohibits the introduction of any extrinsic evidence
pertaining to the victim’s sexual activity, with limited exceptions. Ohio courts have
recognized that application of the rape shield statute may not unduly infringe upon a
defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation, right to a fair trial, and right to present a
defense. See State v. Young, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92127, 2009-Ohio-5354; State v.
Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 17-18, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979).
{¶28} To protect a defendant’s constitutional rights, courts must “balance the state
interest which the [rape shield] statute is designed to protect against the probative value
of the excluded evidence.” Gardner at 17. “The key to assessing the probative value of
the excluded evidence is its relevancy to the matters as proof of which it is offered.” Id.
{¶29} In Gardner, the Ohio Supreme Court found that “[e]vidence that [the]
complainant had a reputation as a prostitute is not sufficiently probative of consent to
outweigh the state’s legitimate interests in excluding the testimony, at least where there is
no suggestion in the record that financial arrangements were entered into for sexual
activities in this instance.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 18. On the other hand, where the
proffered evidence is offered for more than mere impeachment of credibility, and is
directly probative of a material issue in the case, the evidence should not be excluded
under the rape shield law. State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986).
{¶30} In State v. Ciacchi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92705, 2010-Ohio-1975, this
court was asked to confront the limited exceptions to the rape shield statute and
determine, under the specific facts of that case, whether evidence of the victim’s
solicitations for sex in exchange for money was offered merely to impeach the victim’s
credibility or whether it was directly probative of the element of consent. In Ciacchi, the
defendant testified that the victim propositioned him on the street and that he went to her
apartment after paying her $20 for oral sex. Id. at ¶ 18. However, the trial court
prevented the defendant from providing further details of the conversation that occurred
on the street and inside the victim’s apartment. Applying the case law set forth in
Gardner, this court reversed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial, finding
that the evidence was “not precluded by Ohio’s rape shield law” because the victim’s
statements soliciting sex for money on the street and the victim’s statements made at her
apartment were “directly related to the specific sexual encounter at issue in the case.” Id.
at ¶ 24. Thus, the testimonial evidence went directly to the issue of consent. Id.
{¶31} After careful review of the record, we find Ciacchi to be factually
distinguishable. In the case at hand, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a
financial arrangement was entered into between D.T. and Battiste. To be fair, T.J.
indicated that she was aware D.T. may have exchanged sex for money in the past.
However, with respect to this specific instance, T.J. confirmed during her redirect
examination that there was nothing that led her to believe D.T. was planning to, or in fact
did, exchange sex for money on the night of the incident. Additionally, D.T. adamantly
denied defense counsel’s repeated accusations that she engaged in sex for money or
drugs.
{¶32} Thus, unlike the circumstances of Ciacchi, there is nothing in the record, nor
was there any testimony presented, to suggest that prostitution was involved in the
specific sexual encounter at issue in this case. In fact, Battiste denied ever having sex
with D.T., in exchange for money or otherwise, during his interview with Det. Cottom.
Thus, evidence of D.T.’s prior sexual activity would serve only to impeach her credibility,
which is precisely the type of evidence R.C. 2907.02(D) was created to preclude. See
State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 36, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986). As stated in Gardner,
without specific evidence indicating a suggestion of a sexual agreement for money in
relation to Battiste’s interaction with D.T., evidence of D.T.’s past prostitution conviction
was not sufficiently probative of consent to outweigh the interests in excluding the
evidence.
{¶33} Furthermore, we find no merit to Battiste’s argument that the state “opened
the door” for defense counsel to introduce evidence of D.T.’s prior prostitution conviction
once it elicited testimony from T.J. that she had no reason to believe D.T. was planning to
engage in sex with either of the men who drove her home on the evening of the sexual
assault. Battiste correctly states that a party may use relevant information to rebut the
inference arising from evidence when a party opens the door to otherwise inadmissible
evidence. State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St. 3d 29, 565 N.E.2d 549 (1991). However, in our
view, evidence of D.T.’s sexual history would not rebut T.J.’s narrow testimony
concerning what she personally observed on the night of the incident.
{¶34} Battiste’s second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Opinion Testimony
{¶35} In his third assignment of error, Battiste argues the trial court committed
reversible error and violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial when it
improperly permitted the police detective to offer opinions on his guilt.
{¶36} Generally, “the opinion of a witness as to whether another witness is being
truthful is inadmissible.” State v. Dzelajlija, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88805,
2007-Ohio-4050, ¶ 34, citing State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St. 3d 108, 128, 545 N.E.2d 1220
(1989). “In our system of justice, it is the fact finder, not the expert or lay witness, who
bears the burden of assessing the credibility or veracity of a witness.” Id., citing State v.
Eastham, 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 312, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988).
{¶37} The testimony in question occurred when Det. Cottom was discussing the
photo array she prepared for D.T. in the course of her investigation. Specifically,
Battiste challenges Det. Cottom’s statement that the identity of the “assailant” in this case
was not at issue due to the DNA evidence collected from D.T.’s rape kit:
Q. And what was the purpose of the office visit?
A. Again, it’s to obtain further information, to see if [D.T.]’s able to recall, if she can give
me any leads, any names, license plates, description of the car.
Q. Now, you already know the identities of the two assailants at this point; is that correct?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. So are you relying on her necessarily to lead you in the direction of solving who did
this?
A. No. At this point in time, I know who did it, so I would prepare a photo spread for
her to see if she could identify through photographs.
{¶38} Battiste’s counsel failed to object to this portion of Det. Cottom’s testimony at trial, and
therefore, he has waived all but plain error. State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St. 3d 335, 343, 744 N.E.2d 1163
(2001); State v. Tibbs, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89723, 2008-Ohio-1258, ¶ 9. Plain error exists where,
but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been different. Tibbs at ¶ 9. Appellate
courts find plain error only in exceptional circumstances where it is necessary to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Id.
{¶39} By permitting Det. Cottom to refer to Battiste as the person “who did it,”
Battiste argues the trial court violated the well-established prohibition against witness
bolstering and denied him a fair trial. However, read in the context of Det. Cottom’s
entire testimony, we are unable to conclude that Det. Cottom was offering an opinion as
to the truthfulness of D.T.’s accusations or to the guilt or innocence of Battiste. Instead,
Det. Cottom was merely explaining that Battiste and Taylor were the only two individuals
being investigated for the crimes based on the available DNA evidence. Accordingly,
we conclude that the admission of Det. Cottom’s testimony did not amount to error, plain
or otherwise.
{¶40} Battiste’s third assignment of error is overruled.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶41} In his fourth assignment of error, Battiste argues he was denied effective
assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s (1) failure to object to the Det. Cottom’s
improper opinion testimony, and (2) failure to file a motion to dismiss due to prejudicial
preindictment delay.
{¶42} The test for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to prove
“(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we
examine whether counsel’s acts or omissions “were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance” and “recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to
have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. To establish the second element, the
defendant must demonstrate that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on has having produced a just result.” Id. at 686.
{¶43} Based on our resolution of Battiste’s third assignment of error, defense
counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to Det.
Cottom’s reference to Battiste as the “assailant.” As stated, Det. Cottom was not
testifying to D.T.’s veracity and an objection would have proven unsuccessful.
{¶44} Moreover, with respect to Battiste’s second basis for claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel, we believe that a motion to dismiss for preindictment delay would
have been equally unsuccessful.
{¶45} A defendant’s due process rights can be violated by preindictment delay
under certain circumstances. U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30
L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971); U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752
(1977). “An unjustifiable delay between the commission of an offense and a defendant’s
indictment therefor[e], which results in actual prejudice to the defendant, is a violation of
the right to due process of law * * *.” State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St. 3d 150, 472 N.E.2d
1097 (1984), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶46} Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether preindictment delay
constitutes a due process violation. The defendant has the initial burden to show that he
was substantially and actually prejudiced due to the delay. State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio
St.3d 215, 217,702 N.E.2d 1199 (1998). The burden then shifts to the state to produce
evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay. State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St. 3d 437,
2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 51, citing Whiting at 217. The due process inquiry
therefore involves a balancing test by the court, viewing the prejudice to the defendant in
light of the reasons for the delay. Luck at 154, citing Lovasco at 789-790.
{¶47} In reviewing preindictment delay, “[t]he determination of ‘actual prejudice’
involves ‘a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case.’” Walls at ¶ 52,
quoting Marion at 325. In making this assessment, courts must consider the evidence as
it exists when the indictment is filed and the prejudice the defendant will suffer at trial
due to the delay. Walls at ¶ 52; Luck at 154.
{¶48} This court has previously established the standard for demonstrating actual
prejudice as the “exculpatory evidence standard”:
[T]he defendant may not rely on speculation or vague assertions of
prejudice. Proof of actual prejudice must be specific, particularized, and
non-speculative. Therefore, in order to establish actual prejudice, the
defendant must demonstrate the exculpatory value of the evidence of which
he was deprived due to the delay.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101202, 2015-Ohio-415, ¶
11; see also State v. McFeeture, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100434, 2015-Ohio-1814; State
v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100501, 2014-Ohio-3034; State v. Clemons, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 99754, 2013-Ohio-5131. The defendant must therefore show “how lost
witnesses and physical evidence would have proven the defendant’s asserted defense.”
Smith at ¶ 26, citing State v. Davis, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05 MA 235, 2007-Ohio-7216,
¶ 17 (“Without proof of prejudice, meaning something which adversely affects [a
defendant’s] ability to defend himself at trial, there is no due process violation for
preindictment delay in prosecution.”).
{¶49} In a recent en banc decision in State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
101258, 2015-Ohio-2853, however, this court revised its approach to establishing actual
prejudice. Relying on our decision in State v. Mack, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100964,
2014-Ohio-4817 (prejudice may be established by contending the delay resulted in the
loss of witness testimony), we concluded that the appropriate standard for determining
actual prejudice is “basic concepts of due process and fundamental justice.” Jones at ¶
47. In evaluating Jones’s claim of prejudice under this standard, this court found Jones
suffered actual prejudice where the following factors were considered (1) the case was
being reviewed prior to trial and therefore lacked the benefit of the state’s evidence
against the defendant, (2) the defendant’s identity was known from the beginning; the
case lacked physical evidence and essentially depended upon a credibility determination,
(3) the victim had not been located, (4) a witness was unavailable, (5) the state engaged in
a minimal investigation before “closing” the case, and (6) nothing occurred in the time
between the initial investigation and the indictment 20 years later. Jones at ¶ 41-47.
This court found that under these circumstances, where the state failed to take action for
20 years, “requiring Jones to demonstrate that any missing evidence or unavailable
witness testimony would have been exculpatory is simply violative of his due process
rights.” Id. at ¶ 46.
{¶50} Once a defendant has established actual prejudice, the state must produce
evidence of a justifiable reason for delay in the commencement of prosecution. Walls,
96 Ohio St. 3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, at ¶ 51; Whiting, 84 Ohio St. 3d at
217, 702 N.E.2d 1199. A delay can be found to be unjustifiable when the state’s reason
for the delay is to intentionally gain a tactical advantage over the defendant, see U.S. v.
Marion, 404 U.S. at 324, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468, or when the state, through
negligence or error in judgment, effectively ceases the active investigation of a case, but
later decides to commence prosecution upon the same evidence that was available to it at
the time that its active investigation was ceased. Luck, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 158, 472 N.E.2d
1097. The length of delay will typically be the “key factor” in determining whether a
delay caused by the state’s negligence or error in judgment is justifiable. Id.
{¶51} In this case, Battiste asserts that he was prejudiced by (1) his faded memory,
(2) the faded memories of D.T. and T.J., and (3) the inability to locate the individual who
took D.T. to the hospital. With respect to Battiste’s argument concerning the witnesses’
faded memories, we find there is nothing in the record to suggest Battiste was prejudiced
by D.T. and T.J.’s inability to recall certain details of the incident. In fact, defense
counsel frequently utilized D.T.’s inability to recall details to Battiste’s advantage
throughout trial, including closing arguments where counsel stated, “don’t you think you
would remember something about someone who raped you?”
{¶52} Furthermore, Battiste did not testify at trial. Therefore, this court has no
basis to review whether his impaired memory prejudicially impeded the “basic concepts
of due process and fundamental justice.” See State v. Dixon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
102335, 2015-Ohio-3144, ¶ 26, citing State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100501,
2014-Ohio-3034, ¶ 26 (“a defendant’s own general assertion that he does not remember
details of an event that occurred nearly 20 years ago does not, in and of itself, constitute
actual prejudice.”).
{¶53} Similarly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that defense counsel’s
inability to locate the individual who took D.T. to the hospital deprived him of due
process or fundamental justice. Within his brief, Battiste contends that he was unable to
rebut the state’s theory that D.T. was “passed out” at the time of the sexual battery
because he was unable to question the missing witness about D.T.’s physical and
emotional condition prior to arriving at the hospital. In addition to speculating as to what
the missing witness would have testified, such evidence would have been cumulative to
much of the rebuttal testimony defense counsel elicited during the cross-examination of
D.T., T.J., and Dr. Glauser concerning D.T.’s level of sobriety and physical condition
during the relevant time periods.
{¶54} Based on these facts, Battiste has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice
pursuant to the standard set forth in Jones. As such, we find that Battiste has failed to
prove that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss for preindictment delay
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if we assume, arguendo, that trial
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as a result of
his failure to file a motion to dismiss, Battiste has not established he was prejudiced as a
result of his trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness or a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different had the motion been filed. See
Strickland 466 U.S. 668, at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
{¶55} Battiste’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶56} Battiste’s sexual battery conviction was supported by the manifest weight of
the evidence. Furthermore, the trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the
victim’s prior sexual history pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(D). Finally, defense counsel was
not deficient for failing to file a motion to dismiss based on preindictment delay or by
failing to object to portions of testimony provided by the state’s witnesses.
{¶57} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION ATTACHED)
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURRING:
{¶58} I concur fully with the judgment and analysis of the majority. I write
separately to address my ongoing opposition to the holding of the majority in our recent
en banc decision in State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101258, 2015-Ohio-2853,
discussed in ¶ 48 of the opinion.
{¶59} Although the majority here correctly distinguishes Jones from the facts at
play in this case, I nevertheless continue to believe Jones was wrongly decided and has
minimal precedential value. Jones effectively watered down the first prong of the
long-standing preindictment delay standard outlined by the majority. Further, Jones
failed to even address the second prong of that test.
{¶60} This case also points out the unworkable and inherently inconsistent
approach Jones brings to preindictment delay analysis. Under Jones, speculation and
dubious claims of missing or lost evidence create a “due process and fundamental right”
standard replacing the traditional “exculpatory evidence” standard.