State v. Blaylock , 2021 Ohio 2631 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Blaylock, 2021-Ohio-2631.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2020-11-113
: OPINION
- vs - 8/2/2021
:
LORIE BLAYLOCK, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2019-06-0962
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Addison M. Spriggs, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Lorie Blaylock, appeals her conviction in the Butler County Court
of Common Pleas after a jury found her guilty of one count of aggravated possession of
drugs. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On September 11, 2019, the Butler County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Blaylock with one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C.
Butler CA2020-11-113
2925.11(A), a second-degree felony. The matter ultimately proceeded to a two-day jury
trial held on March 9 and 10, 2020. At trial, the state presented evidence indicating Blaylock
was selling methamphetamine from a Butler County residence at the behest for another
individual, Joel Quincy, while Quincy was at work. Following deliberations, the jury returned
a verdict finding Blaylock guilty as charged.
{¶ 3} On April 23, 2020, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. During this
hearing, Quincy interrupted the proceedings and stated, "I didn't get to testify," but "I know
[Blaylock] didn't do it." Despite Quincy's protestations, the trial court nevertheless
sentenced Blaylock pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, Ohio's indefinite sentencing
structure as set forth in R.C. 2967.271, to an indefinite mandatory term of a minimum of
four years in prison to a maximum of six years in prison. There is no dispute that Blaylock
did not raise any challenge to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law with the trial
court either before, during, or after the trial court issued its sentencing decision.
{¶ 4} Blaylock now appeals her conviction, raising two assignments of error for
review.
{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 6} BECAUSE THE REAGAN TOKES ACT VIOLATES THE OHIO AND UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS, MS. BLAYLOCK'S SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
{¶ 7} In her first assignment of error, Blaylock challenges the constitutionality the
Reagan Tokes Law, Ohio's indefinite sentencing structure as set forth in R.C. 2967.271.
However, as noted above, Blaylock never raised this issue with the trial court either before,
during, or after the trial court issued its sentencing decision. As this court has now
repeatedly held, arguments challenging the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law are
forfeited and will not be heard for the first time on appeal in cases where the appellant did
not first raise the issue with the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Hodgkin, 12th Dist. Warren
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No. CA2020-08-048, 2021-Ohio-1353, ¶ 11 (appellant's arguments challenging the
constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law were forfeited and this court declined to hear
them for the first time on appeal where appellant did not first raise the issue with the trial
court); State v. Teasley, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-01-001, 2020-Ohio-4626, ¶ 9
(appellant's arguments challenging the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law were
forfeited and this court declined to hear them for the first time on appeal where appellant
did not first raise the issue with the trial court); and State v. Alexander, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2019-12-204, 2020-Ohio-3838, ¶ 8-9 (appellant's arguments challenging the
constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law were forfeited and this court declined to hear
them for the first time on appeal where appellant did not first raise the issue with the trial
court). Therefore, given this court's precedent declining to hear any arguments challenging
the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law in cases where the issue was not first raised
with the trial court, Blaylock's first assignment of error is overruled.1
{¶ 8} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 9} LORIE BLAYLOCK WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
{¶ 10} In her second assignment of error, Blaylock argues she received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. We disagree.
{¶ 11} "To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must
satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
1. We note that even if Blaylock had not forfeited her challenge to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes
Law, this court has already determined that the Reagan Tokes Law does not run afoul of an offender's due
process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Jackson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-07-077, 2021-
Ohio-778, ¶ 15; State v. Morris, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-205, 2020-Ohio-4103, ¶ 10; State v. Guyton,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-203, 2020-Ohio-3837, ¶ 17. This court has also determined that the Reagan
Tokes Law does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. State v. Suder, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos.
CA2020-06-034 and CA2020-06-035, 2021-Ohio-465, ¶ 25. The same is true as it relates to a challenge
alleging the Reagan Tokes Law impinges on an offender's constitutional right to a jury. State v. Singh, 12th
Dist. Warren No. CA2020-09-056, 2021-Ohio-2158, ¶ 52-54.
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Butler CA2020-11-113
2052 (1984)." State v. Ford, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2019-10-027, 2021-Ohio-782, ¶ 13.
"[U]nder Strickland, in order to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a criminal
defendant must show (1) that his [or her] counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that
that performance prejudiced him [or her]." State v. Simpson, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-
6719, ¶ 18, citing Strickland at 687. To that end, in order for Blaylock to establish she
received ineffective assistance in this case, Blaylock must "(1) show that [her trial] counsel's
performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' as determined by
'prevailing professional norms' and (2) demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for
[her trial] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.'" State v. Graham, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6700 at ¶ 46, quoting Strickland
at 688; and citing State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraphs two and three of
the syllabus. "The failure to make an adequate showing on either prong is fatal to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim." State v. Kaufhold, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-
09-148, 2020-Ohio-3835, ¶ 54, citing State v. Zielinski, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-12-
121, 2011-Ohio-6535, ¶ 50.
{¶ 12} Blaylock argues she received ineffective assistance because her trial counsel
failed to present a "complete defense" on her behalf by not filing "any subpoenas," "any
reciprocal discovery," or "submit a witness list to the state." To support this claim, Blaylock
cites to Quincy's statements made at sentencing, wherein, as noted above, Quincy
interrupted the proceedings and stated, "I didn't get to testify," but "I know [Blaylock] didn't
do it." Given these statements, Blaylock argues it is "likely" that Quincy "would have testified
if subpoenaed," which would have allowed Quincy to testify at trial as to how he knew
Blaylock "didn't do this." Blaylock's argument, however, is purely speculative as to what
Quincy's testimony might have disclosed had he been called to testify. That is to say, while
Blaylock believes Quincy's testimony would have been helpful to her defense, Quincy's
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testimony could have just as easily aided the state in proving its case against her. "Mere
speculation and unsupported suggestions of what might have been established," such as
Blaylock's argument here, "does not demonstrate counsel's deficient performance nor the
prejudice required to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." State v. Gazaway,
12th Dist. Butler CA2018-12-236, 2019-Ohio-5164, ¶ 51.
{¶ 13} The same holds true as it relates to Blaylock's arguments challenging her trial
counsel's decision on what defense strategy should be employed at trial. State v. Baughn,
12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-04-020, 2020-Ohio-5566, ¶ 34 ("[t]he decision regarding
which defense to pursue at trial is a matter of trial strategy, and trial strategy decisions are
not the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel"), citing State v. Murphy, 91
Ohio St.3d 516, 524 (2001). This applies even in cases where the trial strategy used was
ultimately unsuccessful and where there was another possible and better trial strategy
available. State v. Murphy, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-05-128, 2009-Ohio-6745, ¶ 43
("the fact that the trial strategy was ultimately unsuccessful or that there was another
possible and better strategy available does not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel"). This would include, for instance, Blaylock's trial counsel's decision whether to
call Quincy as a witness in her defense. State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-06-
144, 2005-Ohio-3887, ¶ 15 ("[i]n general, the decision whether to call a witness falls within
the rubric of trial strategy and will not be second-guessed by a reviewing court"), citing State
v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, ¶ 125-127. Therefore, finding no merit to
any of the arguments raised herein, Blaylock's second assignment of error lacks merit and
is overruled.
{¶ 14} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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