In re T.S. , 2012 Ohio 858 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as In re T.S., 
    2012-Ohio-858
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO                     )                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:               NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF MEDINA                  )
    IN RE: T.S.                                          C.A. No.      11CA0033-M
    APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
    CASE No.   2010 12 DQ 0791
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: March 5, 2012
    BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}     Appellant T.S. appeals from the decision of the Medina County Court of Common
    Pleas, Juvenile Division, adjudicating him delinquent. We reverse and remand for proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    I.
    {¶2}     On December 7, 2010, T.S., then 16 years old, was arrested after an altercation
    with his mother. A complaint was filed against T.S., alleging that he was delinquent by violating
    R.C. 2919.25(A), the statute that prohibits domestic violence. The complaint alleged that,
    because T.S. had a previous disposition for domestic violence, the offense would be a felony of
    the fourth degree if committed by an adult. See R.C. 2919.25(D)(3).
    {¶3}     A magistrate held an adjudication hearing and thereafter, in a form document
    labeled as a magistrate’s order, as opposed to a magistrate’s decision, the magistrate adjudicated
    T.S. delinquent. The bottom of the form contained two boxes, one of which could be selected to
    2
    inform the party of the obligations attendant to objecting to a magistrate’s decision and one for
    appealing a magistrate’s order. Notably, the magistrate did not check the box informing the
    parties of their right to object to the magistrate’s decision. T.S. did not file objections, or a copy
    of the transcript of the proceedings in the trial court. The trial court conducted a dispositional
    hearing on February 24, 2011.       In its entry, the court concluded T.S. was delinquent and
    committed him to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum term of
    six months and a maximum term not to exceed attainment of his twenty-first birthday. The trial
    court noted that T.S. had not filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. T.S. has appealed,
    raising a single assignment of error for our review.
    II.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    THE JUVENILE COURT VIOLATED T.S.’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
    UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
    STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO
    CONSTITUTION WHEN IT ADJUDICATED HIM DELINQUENT OF
    DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WHEN THAT DECISION WAS AGAINST THE
    MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
    {¶4}    T.S. asserts in his assignment of error that the decision adjudicating him
    delinquent of domestic violence is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We do not reach
    the merits of T.S.’s argument.
    {¶5}    Initially, we note that the magistrate’s adjudication was in actuality a decision and
    not an order. See Juv.R. 40(D)(2)(a)(i) (“Subject to the terms of the relevant reference, a
    magistrate may enter orders without judicial approval if necessary to regulate the proceedings
    and if not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.”). Thus, T.S. was required to file
    objections to the magistrate’s decision in order to preserve arguments concerning alleged errors
    committed by the trial court in its adoption of the magistrate’s decision.               See Juv.R.
    3
    40(D)(3)(b)(iv) (“Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the
    court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion * * * unless the party has objected to
    that finding or conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b).”); see also In re J.H., 9th Dist. No.
    22384, 
    2005-Ohio-2398
    , ¶ 9.
    {¶6}    However, the magistrate has an affirmative duty to inform the parties in its
    decision that it is a magistrate’s decision and of the necessity of objecting.                Juv.R.
    40(D)(3)(a)(iii) states:
    A magistrate’s decision shall be in writing, identified as a magistrate’s decision
    in the caption, signed by the magistrate, filed with the clerk, and served on all
    parties or their attorneys no later than three days after the decision is filed. A
    magistrate’s decision shall indicate conspicuously that a party shall not assign as
    error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion,
    whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law
    under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to
    that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b).
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶7}    The magistrate failed to do so. In the instant matter, the magistrate mistakenly
    labeled its decision an order and, instead of checking the box which includes the warning
    discussed in Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(iii), the magistrate checked the box concerning a party’s right to
    appeal a magistrate’s order, which does not include the language recited above.
    {¶8}    Courts have noted that Civ.R. 53(D) and Juv.R. 40(D) are analogous. See, e.g., In
    re A.W.C., 4th Dist. No. 09CA31, 
    2010-Ohio-3625
    , ¶ 18. Thus, we conclude it is appropriate to
    rely on our case law examining similar provisions of Civ.R. 53. When addressing a similar
    problem in a civil proceeding involving Civ.R. 53(D), this Court noted that the failure to
    properly label a magistrate’s decision as a decision, combined with the magistrate’s failure to
    provide the appropriate warning concerning objections, created confusion and prejudiced the
    parties. See Williams v. Ormsby, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0080-M, 
    2010-Ohio-3666
    , ¶ 12. This
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    matter is no different. Thus, we decline to address the merits of T.S.’s assignment of error. We
    reverse the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and
    remand the matter so that the magistrate can prepare and file a decision which comports with
    Juv.R. 40, thereby allowing the parties the opportunity to file timely objections and any relevant
    transcript or affidavit in the trial court. Id. at ¶ 13; State v. Navedo, 9th Dist. No. 10CA009923,
    
    2011-Ohio-5003
    , ¶ 14-15.
    III.
    {¶9}    In light of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Medina County Court of
    Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    Judgment reversed
    and cause remanded.
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Medina, Juvenile Division, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    Costs taxed to Appellee.
    5
    EVE V. BELFANCE
    FOR THE COURT
    WHITMORE, J.
    DICKINSON, J.
    CONCUR
    APPEARANCES:
    BROOKE M. BURNS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW KERN, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for Appellee.