Shiloh Ministries, Inc. v. Simco Exploration Corp. , 2019 Ohio 2291 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as Shiloh Ministries, Inc., v. Simco Exploration Corp., 
    2019-Ohio-2291
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
    SHILOH MINISTRIES, INC.,                                 :           OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                    :
    CASE NO. 2018-T-0057
    - vs -                                           :
    SIMCO EXPLORATION                                        :
    CORPORATION, et al.,
    :
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Civil Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2016 CV
    00057.
    Judgement: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    Stephen A. Turner, Turner, May & Shepherd, 185 High Street, N.E., Warren, OH 44481
    (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
    Molly K. Johnson, Johnson and Johnson Law Office, 12 West Main Street, Canfield, OH
    44406 (For Defendants-Appellees).
    MARY JANE TRAPP, J.
    {¶1}      This is an appeal from the judgment entry of the Trumbull County Court of
    Common Pleas, in which the trial court overruled objections filed by appellant, Shiloh
    Ministries, Inc. (“Shiloh”), and adopted the magistrate’s January 26, 2018, Decision and
    Recommendation granting appellee, Ohio Valley Energy Systems (“OVE”), a prescriptive
    easement for oil and gas on Shiloh’s two adjoining parcels of land.
    {¶2}   Shiloh appeals, raising the following three arguments against the
    prescriptive easement granted in OVE’s favor: (1) it was improperly raised due to the trial
    court’s findings on summary judgment, (2) OVE lacked standing to do so, and (3) finally,
    the scope is impermissibly vague.
    {¶3}   We find the trial court’s rulings on the motions for summary judgment did
    not preclude consideration of the affirmative defense of a prescriptive easement at trial.
    OVE had standing to raise the affirmative defense because it established its long history
    of using the southern parcel for its operations. We also find the prescriptive easement
    granted by the trial court is not vague in scope. We do find, however, it is vague as to
    the scope of the relative use of the easement by each party and apportionment of future
    expenses incurred for repair and maintenance of the easement as necessary to prevent
    the use of the easement from becoming an annoyance or nuisance to Shiloh. Thus,
    finding the last assignment of error to have merit in part, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
    and remand for further proceedings accordingly.
    Substantive and Procedural History
    The Parties and Parcels of Land at Issue
    {¶4}   Pastor and president, Reverend Nicholas Furries, leads Shiloh, the owner
    and lessor of the two adjoining parcels of land at issue (the “southern parcel” and
    “northern parcel”). Shiloh’s predecessor in interest, Lighthouse Tabernacle of the Niles
    Peoples Full Gospel Mission Church (“Lighthouse”), led by Reverend Frank M. Hewison
    and his wife, Lois A. Hewison, was the original party to the oil and gas agreements.
    2
    {¶5}    Initially, there was a pastor’s house on the northern parcel and a church on
    the southern parcel. Sometime before 2004, the pastor’s house was demolished. The
    church then renovated and expanded so that it now sits on both parcels of land.
    {¶6}    OVE is the successor corporation of Simco Exploration (“Simco”).                      Its
    primary business is obtaining leases and drilling/managing gas wells. Olympic Oil and
    Gas, Inc. (“Olympic”) was a subcontractor for Simco. Olympic entered into the original
    Oil and Gas Lease and Non-Drilling Lease Agreements with Shiloh on Simco/OVE’s
    behalf. Thus, Olympic is the signature party to the original lease agreements.
    {¶7}    The oil and gas well, “Cheyenne #2,” is located on a property adjacent to
    the northern parcel. Cheyenne #2 was drilled prior to the execution of the agreements in
    1989. It was at that time Olympic approached Lighthouse because it needed a location
    to place the tanks, a meter, and the other equipment associated with the well.
    The Agreements
    {¶8}    There are three agreements between the parties. On October 18, 1989,
    Lighthouse entered into an “Oil and Gas Lease Agreement,” which permitted the lessee
    to conduct surface operations and for equipment to be placed on the northern parcel. It
    also granted Lighthouse a right to a certain amount of free gas.1
    {¶9}    On January 19, 1990, the parties entered into a Non-Drilling Oil and Gas
    Lease Agreement for the use of the southern parcel. This agreement permits the lessee
    to utilize the property “with other properties, which other properties shall bear the burden
    of development.”
    1. In the original 1989 Oil and Gas Agreement, the free gas was piped to the pastor house on the northern
    parcel. In 2004, the agreement was amended to provide for 125,000 cubic feet of gas per year to the
    church on the southern parcel.
    3
    {¶10} Lastly, there is a Meter Site Agreement between Dominion Energy’s
    predecessor, East Ohio Gas Company (“Dominion”) and Lighthouse granting Dominion
    the right to place equipment and pipelines on the southern parcel to transport gas to and
    from the well.
    {¶11} The northern parcel contains underground equipment, pipes and tanks,
    which hold the oil and gas. Piping runs to the southern property where there is a meter,
    regulators, and piping. To access the holding tanks on the northern property, OVE
    crosses the southern property by way of the church’s parking lot. Both OVE and Dominion
    also access the southern property to check and maintain the meters.
    Summary Judgment
    {¶12} On January 11, 2016, Shiloh filed a complaint against OVE setting forth four
    claims for relief: a declaratory judgment that the leases have terminated due to lack of
    commercial production; a declaratory judgment ruling that the leases have terminated due
    to lack of commercial production; a breach of contract for the placement of pipeline and
    meter site equipment on the southern parcel; and lastly, trespass for the installation of
    equipment and continued operations on the southern parcel.
    {¶13} Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found
    Shiloh was “entitled to judgment” on its breach of contract and trespass claims because
    there was no dispute of fact that OVE continually entered upon the southern parcel and
    that equipment had been installed on the southern parcel without permission in violation
    of the agreement. The trial court further found that the elements of continuing trespass
    had been met.
    4
    {¶14} OVE argued that the issues raised by Shiloh were barred by the doctrine of
    res judicata because Shiloh failed to raise them in the parties’ previous 2014 suit.2 The
    court agreed with this argument in part, finding Shiloh was entitled to judgment on the
    claims of trespass and breach of contract only from 2014 to the present since there were
    continuing violations after the date of judgment in the last action.
    {¶15} Turning to the issue of damages, the trial court found that Shiloh had not
    alleged the breach of contract to be material, and it independently found the breach was
    not material. While the court found there was no dispute of fact that the parking lot had
    been damaged by heavy machinery, it found Shiloh failed to provide evidence of the
    monetary cost of repair regarding its trespass claim or evidence of the diminution of the
    land’s value as to its breach of contract claim; thus, genuine issues of material fact
    remained.
    {¶16} Neither        party    raised     the       issue   of   OVE’s      claim     of    adverse
    possession/prescriptive easement in their respective summary judgment motions.
    {¶17} After seemingly granting partial summary judgment in favor of Shiloh on
    trespass and breach of contract claims and partial summary judgment in favor of OVE on
    its res judicata claim, the trial court ruled “both the Defendant and the Plaintiff’s Motions
    for Summary Judgment are DENIED. Case to proceed.”
    The Magistrate’s Hearing and Decision
    2. Shiloh filed suit in 2014, praying for an accounting of all production and receipts for oil and gas sales
    and a reconciliation of the property owners’ royalties; an accounting of all charges for Shiloh’s natural gas
    usages; and a temporary and permanent injunction restraining OVE from interrupting Shiloh’s free gas
    supply and damages. The court found OVE erroneously overbilled Shiloh in the amount of $679.32 and
    encouraged the parties to implement a process whereby Shiloh could obtain free gas from Dominion rather
    than from the well.
    5
    {¶18} The magistrate conducted the trial and issued a decision finding that Shiloh
    failed to provide any evidence showing Cheyenne #2 was not commercially productive.
    The magistrate found that Shiloh did provide evidence of a continuing violation for
    trespass and breach of contract since the April 27, 2015 judgment of the previous suit but
    that the breach of contract was not material. While the magistrate found that the parking
    lot was damaged by OVE’s regular use, it also found that Shiloh did not introduce
    sufficient evidence of the monetary cost to repair the parking lot caused by OVE’s use.
    Further, the magistrate found that Shiloh failed to introduce any evidence of the diminution
    of the value of the property due to the presence of the meter and the value. Thus, there
    was no evidentiary foundation for a determination as to the reasonableness of the
    restoration costs. Finally, the magistrate found that OVE had established all the elements
    of a prescriptive easement and that Shiloh failed to present evidence of permissive use.
    {¶19} The decision imposed “an easement by prescription across Plaintiff’s land
    encompassing the meter site and reasonable right of entry across the non-drilling lease
    parcel to access both the meter site and well equipment on the adjacent parcel.”
    {¶20} The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision after overruling Shiloh’s
    objections and reviewing OVE’s response and the transcript.
    {¶21} Shiloh timely appealed, raising the following assignments of error:
    {¶22} “[1.] The trial court erred when it permitted the appellee to assert the
    affirmative defense of an easement by prescription at trial.
    {¶23} “[2.] The appellees do not have the requisite standing to claim an easement
    by prescription for the equipment on the southern parcel.
    6
    {¶24} “[3.] The trial court erred when [it] granted an easement by prescription
    across the southern parcel that was impermissibly vague.”
    Standard of Review
    {¶25} “On appeal, a trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision will not be
    overruled unless the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the decision.” (Citations
    omitted.) In re Beynenson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3066, 
    2013-Ohio-341
    , ¶12.
    {¶26} “The term of ‘abuse of discretion’ is one of art, ‘connoting judgment
    exercised by a court, which does not comport with reason or the record.’” 
    Id.,
     citing State
    v. Underwood, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-113, 
    2009-Ohio-2089
    , ¶30, citing State v.
    Ferranto, 
    112 Ohio St. 667
    , 676-678 (1925). “The Second Appellate District also recently
    adopted a similar definition of the abuse-of-discretion standard: an abuse of discretion is
    the trial court’s ‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” 
    Id.,
    citing State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 
    2010-Ohio-1900
    , ¶62, quoting
    Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004).
    The Use of a Prescriptive Easement as an Affirmative Defense
    {¶27} Shiloh first contends that because OVE did not raise a prescriptive
    easement defense on summary judgment it was precluded from doing so at trial. Shiloh
    argues the trial court made clear and explicit findings regarding its claim of trespass and
    breach of contract in the court’s summary judgment entry. Thus, the only material issue
    of fact remaining was the amount of damages per Civ.R. 56(D).
    {¶28} Shiloh’s argument is procedurally flawed whether we interpret the court’s
    summary judgment decision as either a partial grant of summary judgment or an outright
    7
    denial of both parties’ motions. OVE would not be prohibited from raising it at trial under
    either interpretation (whether Civ.R. 56(D) applied or not).
    {¶29} Thus, if we take the position that the court’s findings on summary judgment
    were in effect a grant of partial summary judgment, leaving only the issue of damages,
    nothing in Civ.R. 56(D) precludes OVE from raising the affirmative defense of a
    prescriptive easement at trial.     Summary judgment as to less than all claims is
    interlocutory by its very nature and subject to change before a final judgment on the
    merits.
    {¶30} “A party seeking summary judgment must specifically delineate the basis
    for which summary judgment is sought in order to allow the opposing party a meaningful
    opportunity to respond.” Mitseff v. Wheeler, 
    38 Ohio St.3d 112
    , 116 (1988).
    {¶31} “The requirement that a party seeking summary judgment disclose the basis
    for the motion and support the motion with evidence is well founded in Ohio law. ‘The
    burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact falls upon the
    moving party in requesting a summary judgment.’ Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.
    (1978), 
    54 Ohio St.2d 64
    , 66. * * * ‘Reading the requirement of Harless, supra, in
    conjunction with Civ.R. 56 and 7(B)(1), it can readily be seen that the moving party must
    state specifically which areas of the opponent’s claim raise no genuine issue of material
    fact and such assertion may be supported by affidavits or otherwise as allowed by Civ.R.
    56(C).” Id. at 115.
    {¶32} The same reasoning applies if we read the trial court’s summary judgment
    8
    decision as a denial of both party’s motions. Whether Civ.R. 56(D) applies is immaterial
    because either party is free to raise a defense so long as material issues remain to be
    tried and the other party has a meaningful opportunity to respond.
    {¶33} Shiloh’s first assignment of error is without merit.
    Standing
    {¶34} Shiloh next argues OVE does not have the requisite standing to claim an
    easement by prescription for the equipment on the southern parcel. Shiloh contends the
    meter and pipes are solely the property of Dominion and governed by the Meter Site
    Agreement to which OVE is not a party. Thus, Shiloh argues only Dominion, who is not
    a party to the case, can assert a prescriptive easement.
    {¶35} To raise a prescriptive easement as an affirmative defense, OVE only needs
    to show a possessory interest in the estate in which they seek to quiet title, which in this
    case, is an easement of access. Harris v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery
    No. 26796, 
    2016-Ohio-517
    , ¶11. There is no doubt OVE has demonstrated this use in its
    routine oil and gas equipment maintenance.
    {¶36} For example, OVE regularly utilizes the pipes and meter on the southern
    parcel to check the tanks for oil. Victor Masters, OVE’s field supervisor and maintenance
    technician, testified that although Dominion is the owner of the equipment, the equipment
    is a “shared effort” of use, maintenance, and repair.
    {¶37} In addition, OVE is permitted to access the property and regularly does so
    to access the tanks on the northern property per the Non-Drilling Oil and Gas Agreement
    so long as the well is operating. The agreement states, in relevant part, that “the within
    Lease being granted solely for the purpose of permitting the Lessee to unitize the leased
    9
    property with other properties, which other properties shall bear all the burden of
    development.”
    {¶38} The court in Harris, 
    supra,
     explained that “[a]n easement is a right, without
    profit, created by grant or prescription, which the owner of one estate, called the dominant
    estate, may exercise in or over the estate of another, called the servient estate, for the
    benefit of the former. Malone v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Xenia Twp., 2d Dist. Green No.
    06-CA-62, 
    2007-Ohio-3812
    , ¶10, citing Trattar v. Rausch, 
    154 Ohio St. 286
     (1950),
    paragraph one of the syllabus. ‘An easement in or over the land of another may be
    acquired only by grant, express or implied, or by prescription.’ Trattar at paragraph two
    of the syllabus. ‘Prescription is the acquisition of an easement, over the property of
    another, through adverse use of that property.’ Crawford v. Matthews, 4th Dist. Scioto
    No. 97CA2555, 
    1998 WL 720734
    , 2 (Sept. 21, 1998). ‘Prescription is, in essence a form
    of adverse possession. They differ in that prescription grants the adverse user an
    easement or incorporeal rights in the property, while adverse possession grants the
    adverse user legal title.’ Id. at fn. 6.” Id. at ¶12.
    {¶39} There is no question that OVE established standing to raise a prescriptive
    easement claim as it has a long history of using the southern parcel for its oil and gas
    operations.
    {¶40} Shiloh’s second assignment of error is without merit.
    The Prescriptive Easement is Not Impermissibly Vague as to Scope of the
    Easement Area
    {¶41} In its third assignment of error, Shiloh contends that the prescriptive
    easement is impermissibly vague as the trial court failed to convey “any meaningful
    10
    dimension or scope,” giving OVE “veritable free reign to cross the southern parcel where
    and as the Appellees see fit.”
    {¶42} At the outset, we note that Shiloh failed to raise the vagueness of the
    prescriptive easement’s dimension and the scope of OVE’s repair obligations in its
    objections to the magistrate’s decision. Thus, Shiloh’s third assignment of error is waived
    except for a claim of plain error.
    {¶43} “‘Matters referred to magistrates are governed by Civ.R. 53.’ Dinardo v.
    Dinardo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-111, 
    2017-Ohio-4379
    , ¶17. ‘A party may file written
    objections to a magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision
    * * *.’ Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i). ‘However, if a party fails to object on a particular basis, he
    waives the right to assign the court’s adoption of that fact as an error on appeal “[e]xcept
    for a claim of plain error * * *.”’ Dinardo, supra, quoting Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). ‘“The
    objection process gives the trial court the opportunity to review the magistrate’s decision,
    in light of a party’s objections. As a result, the trial court may decide to adopt, reject, or
    modify the magistrate’s decision, hear additional evidence, recommit the matter to the
    magistrate with instructions, or hear the matter. Civ.R. 53(E)(4)(b).”’ Dinardo, 
    supra,
    quoting Arthur v. Trimmer, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 02CA06029, 
    2003-Ohio-2034
    , ¶12.”
    Spencer v. Spencer, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2017-P-0073, 
    2018-Ohio-4277
    , ¶33.
    {¶44} “Plain error in civil cases is defined as error that ‘seriously affects the basic
    fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the
    legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.’” Id. at ¶35, quoting Dinardo, 
    supra, at ¶19
    , quoting Goldfuss v. Davidson, 
    79 Ohio St.3d 116
     (1997), syllabus.
    11
    {¶45} “In applying the plain error doctrine in civil cases, appellate courts must
    proceed with utmost caution, and limit the doctrine to those extremely rare cases where
    exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Id.
    at ¶36, citing Dinardo at ¶20.
    {¶46} We do not find plain error from the trial court’s proceedings that would result
    in a manifest injustice inasmuch as the scope of the easement is clear.
    {¶47} The trial court granted OVE “an easement by prescription across Plaintiff’s
    lands encompassing the meter site and reasonable rights of entry across the non-drilling
    lease parcel to access the meter site and well equipment on the adjacent parcel.”
    {¶48} “The dimension and scope of an easement may be ascertained from the
    language of the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding the grant.” (Citation
    omitted.) Aurora Partners Ill, Ltd. v. Aurora, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-0019, 2013-
    Ohio-4310, ¶17.
    {¶49} The court granted OVE a prescriptive easement to continue using the
    southern parcel as it has been, i.e., to access the tanks on the northern parcel and to
    check the meters and equipment located on the southern.
    {¶50} During the hearing, OVE submitted evidence by way of a plot plan marked
    as Exhibit E and testimony of its customary usage of the properties and hence the scope
    of the easement; namely, that trucks once or twice weekly, during normal business hours,
    access the southern parcel making use of its parking lot to check the meters and
    equipment. The trucks then access the northern parcel to check the tanks via the
    southern parcel’s parking lot and a wooden bridge that leads them to the load line.
    12
    {¶51} There is quite simply nothing to suggest the prescriptive easement grants
    OVE a “veritable free reign to cross the southern parcel however it should so choose,” as
    asserted by Shiloh or that OVE would stray from its customary practice of using the same
    described access route across the property for normal oil and gas well maintenance.
    Future Maintenance and Repair of the Prescriptive Easement
    {¶52} Shiloh also contends that the scope of OVE’s repair obligation under the
    prescriptive easement was not defined. The magistrate reviewed the evidence only for
    damages as to the trespass and breach of contract claims. Specifically, the magistrate
    found that “the evidence does warrant replacement of the parking lot, especially given
    that the breach of contract and trespass claims are barred by res judicata prior to April
    27, 2015, the date of the judgment in the prior proceedings.” Shiloh failed, however, to
    introduce any evidence of the monetary cost to repair the parking lot as a result of OVE’s
    use and to establish any damages by way of the diminution of the value of the property
    due to the presence of the meter and pipeline. OVE’s future maintenance and repair
    obligations regarding prescriptive easement, however, were not determined by the trial
    court.
    {¶53} Since a prescriptive easement is essentially an equitable remedy, we find it
    would be inequitable for OVE to be granted a prescriptive easement without addressing
    the responsibility for future maintenance and repairs of the easement. Pinkerton v.
    Salyers, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3388, 
    2015-Ohio-377
    , ¶19 (“[E]asements created by
    prescription and estoppel are equitable remedies * * *”).
    {¶54} Shiloh’s brief in lieu of closing arguments argued an approximate figure of
    $2,500 as the estimation of OVE’s damage to the parking lot since 2014, but it offered no
    13
    evidence at trial to support this figure. Shiloh only presented testimony of the “terrible”
    condition of the parking lot, specifically “holes,” without further description or location.
    {¶55} The Fifth District Court of Appeals’ decision in Market Enterprises, Inc. v.
    Summerville, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2001CA00315, 
    2002-Ohio-3692
    , provides guidance.
    “‘The burden devolves upon the owner of the dominant estate, of making whatever repairs
    are necessary for his use [of the easement].’ * * * The dominant estate is also required
    to make repairs if ‘necessary to prevent the enjoyment of the right [from] becoming an
    annoyance and nuisance to the owner of the servient tenement, unless the grantor
    himself has expressly undertaken the performance of that duty.’” Id. at 2, citing Natl.
    Exchange Bank v. Cunningham, 
    46 Ohio St. 575
    , 589 (1889).
    {¶56} As in the case before us, the trial court in Market Enterprises, supra, found
    the repairs and maintenance in a parking lot used by both parties were necessary. Based
    upon the trial court’s finding that a pedestrian in the parking lot fell in a sinkhole, the Fifth
    District “conclude[d] the trial court implicitly found the parking lot was becoming or had
    become an annoyance or nuisance.” Id. at 2. The court then determined that inasmuch
    as the easement did not address the responsibility of maintenance and repairs, and
    “because the repairs were necessary to prevent the lot from becoming an annoyance and
    nuisance, * * * the burden devolved upon [the dominant estate]. However, because the
    parking lot was used jointly between the parties, we find the trial court properly determined
    the relative use of each party and apportioned the expenses incurred in maintaining and
    repairing the easement accordingly.” Id.
    {¶57} We find this persuasive and applicable to this matter.
    14
    {¶58} Finding this assignment of error to be with merit, in part, we reverse the
    judgment, in part, and remand to the trial court on this limited basis to the trial court for
    further proceedings to determine the relative use of each party of the easement and
    accordingly apportion the future expenses incurred in maintaining and repairing the
    easement as necessary to prevent the use of the easement from becoming an annoyance
    or nuisance to Shiloh.
    {¶59} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed
    in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J.,
    MATT LYNCH, J.,
    concur.
    15