State v. Wright ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Wright, 2013-Ohio-4473.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99531
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
GEORGE J. WRIGHT
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-565966
BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 10, 2013
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Aleksandra Chojnacki
Daniel T. Van
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Joseph Vincent Pagano
P.O. Box 16869
Rocky River, Ohio 44116
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} The state of Ohio appeals the decision of the trial court granting George
Wright’s motion to suppress. The state argues the trial court erred in concluding that
Wright was a guest of the hotel at the time of the search and thus maintained a privacy
interest in the hotel room for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Finding no merit to
the instant appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶2} Shortly after midnight on August 13, 2012, Brook Park police officers
received a call of a disturbance at the Airport Plaza Hotel located at 16161 Brookpark
Road. When the officers arrived, they observed a naked man, later identified as hotel
guest George Wright, sweating profusely and foaming at the mouth. Officer Michael
Jaklitch testified that he witnessed Wright knock off an exit sign and a portion of the
in-house sprinkler system while officer Edward Powers stated that Wright ripped wires
down and wrapped them around his neck. Hotel personnel informed the officers that
Wright had been pounding on hotel room doors and disturbing other hotel guests.
Officer Jaklitch stated that it was difficult to speak with Wright “given his medical
condition” and that Wright did admit to him that he had taken the drug PCP. A Brook
Park rescue squad removed Wright from the premises and transported him to Southwest
General Hospital where he was treated and ultimately arrested.
{¶3} Officer Jaklitch testified that after Wright was removed from the hotel,
hotel staff asked the officers to check Wright’s room for damages. Jerald Smith, an
employee of the hotel, opened Wright’s room and allowed Officer Jaklitch inside.
Officer Jaklitch did not have a warrant or Wright’s permission to enter the room.
Officer Jaklitch testified that Wright’s room was in disarray with coffee stains on the
walls, barbeque sauce on the nightstand, wall and bedding and money on the floor.
Officer Jaklitch also testified that he found a bag of suspected crack cocaine and a vial of
suspected PCP in an open drawer in the dresser.
{¶4} The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a five-count indictment
charging Wright with one count of trafficking, two counts of drug possession, one count
of vandalism and one count of possession of criminal tools. Wright filed a motion to
suppress all evidence obtained during the warrantless search of his hotel room and the
trial court heard arguments and testimony on the motion. On February 4, 2013, the trial
court granted Wright’s motion to suppress finding as follows:
[T]he search occurred prior to check-out, Defendant did not voluntarily
abandon the hotel room, and the hotel staff did not make any affirmative
steps to evict Defendant. Thus, Defendant did not relinquish his
expectation of privacy in the hotel room for the duration of his reservation.
{¶5} The state appeals, raising the following assignment of error:
The court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained during the search of the defendant’s hotel room based on a
finding that the defendant possessed a privacy interest in the hotel room at
the time of the search.
{¶6} In State v. Preztak, 181 Ohio App.3d 106, 2009-Ohio-621, 907 N.E.2d
1254 (8th Dist.), this court outlined the standard of review on a motion to suppress.
Our standard of review with respect to motions to suppress is whether the
trial court’s findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. See
State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286, 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist. 1996),
citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604, 645 N.E.2d 802(9th Dist. 1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because “in a
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role
of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and
evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d
521, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).
{¶7} However, once we accept those facts as true, we must independently
determine, as a matter of law and without deference to the trial court’s conclusion,
whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See also State v. Lloyd, 126
Ohio App.3d 95, 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998); State v. Cruz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
98264, 2013-Ohio-1889.
{¶8} In the present case, the parties agree that a registered hotel guest has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his room under the Fourth Amendment. The state
argues that Wright’s disorderly behavior terminated his status as a guest and thereby
extinguished any legitimate privacy interest in the hotel room and that the hotel staff
properly provided the officers with the consent to search the hotel room.
{¶9} This court has previously held that “a hotel employee may enter a room in
performance of its duties, but they cannot per se authorize or give consent to a police
search of that room.” State v. Miller, 77 Ohio App.3d 305, 602 N.E.2d 296 (8th
Dist.1991), citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856(1964). In Miller, this court stated that consent by hotel management is lawful when
the hotel guest surrenders or no longer rents the room that includes, but is not limited to,
relinquishment of the room at check-out time and returning the key without paying for
another night or by voluntarily abandoning the room. Miller. A hotel guest may also
lose his reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room when he is evicted from the
room. United States v. Spicer, S.D. Ohio No. 7-CR-244, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54306(Apr. 16, 2012). There have been a number of federal cases in which courts have
held that a police search of a hotel room was unlawful despite the fact that the officers
received consent to search the room from a hotel employee. Stoner, 376 U.S. 483, 84
S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96
L.Ed. 59 (1951); United States v. Bass, 41 Fed.Appx. 735, 737-738 (6th Cir.2002). In
each of these cases, “the hotel employee did not take any action to divest the hotel guest
of his or her privacy interest in the room.” Spicer. Therefore, “termination of a hotel
tenant’s occupancy rights for unauthorized activity is proper and hotel management can
terminate a guest’s occupancy rights by taking affirmative steps to repossess the room.”
Spicer. Officers, however, cannot reasonably rely on a hotel employee’s consent in
entering the room without actual or implied knowledge that the guest had been evicted
from the hotel room. United States v. Bass, 41 Fed. Appx. 735 (6th Cir.2002).
{¶10} In this case, the state cites to State v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir.1997),
and State v. Fleming, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2003 CA 71, 2004-Ohio-5278, for its
proposition that hotel staff properly consented to a search of the hotel room after
Wright’s disruptive actions terminated his hotel stay thereby constructively evicting him
from his hotel room. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that both Allen and
Fleming are factually distinguishable. In Allen, the hotel manager attempted to take
possession of the hotel room after observing contraband in the room by locking the hotel
guest out of his room. Id. The court in Allen found that the hotel manager’s
affirmative act divested Allen of his status as an occupant of the room while concurrently
terminating his privacy interest in the hotel room and its contents. Id. Similarly, in
Fleming after a report of possible drug activity, the hotel manager requested that Fleming
and the other occupant of the room vacate the premises, and he used a police escort to
aid in the eviction of the parties. Id. Unlike the present case, both Allen and Fleming
involved hotel staff taking affirmative steps to repossess the room after hotel guests
engaged in unauthorized activity, thereby terminating the guests’ reasonable expectations
of privacy.
{¶11} In the facts of the current case, we have no evidence of any affirmative
acts by the hotel staff to divest Wright of his status as an occupant and guest of the hotel.
The staff did not lock Wright out of his room nor did the hotel staff tell Wright that he
was evicted from the hotel. Wright paid for his hotel registration and his destructive
behavior occurred in the common areas of the hotel, not his room. Additionally, there
is no evidence before this court that the hotel staff informed the police officers that they
had evicted Wright from his hotel room.
{¶12} Without any affirmative act on the part of the hotel staff to divest Wright
of his status as an occupant of the hotel room, Wright’s privacy interest in his hotel room
protected him against the warrantless search of his hotel room by the police officers.
Further, without actual or implied knowledge that hotel staff had evicted Wright from
the room, the police could not reasonably rely on the hotel staff’s consent in entering
Wright’s hotel room.
{¶13} We find the trial court’s conclusions to be supported by competent,
credible evidence and agree that Wright’s motion to suppress should have been granted.
{¶14} The state’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶15} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said lower court to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR