State v. Lynch , 2021 Ohio 4094 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Lynch, 2021-Ohio-4094.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-210234
TRIAL NO. B-9804522
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
RALPH LYNCH, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 19, 2021
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W.
Springman, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Kathryn L. Sanford, Assistant Ohio State Public Defender, and Andrew Avellano, for
Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ralph Lynch appeals the denial of his motion for
a new mitigation hearing. Lynch challenges his capital sentence, asserting that the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 136 S.Ct.
616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), renders Ohio’s capital punishment scheme
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to his sentence. The Supreme Court of
Ohio has considered the impact of Hurst in State v. Mason, 153 Ohio St.3d 476,
2018-Ohio-1462, 108 N.E.3d 56 (2018). Based on Mason, we reject Lynch’s
challenges and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedure
A. Lynch’s Trial and Sentencing
{¶2} In 1998, a grand jury indicted defendant-appellant Ralph Lynch for six
felonies related to the death of six-year-old M.L., including three counts of
aggravated murder. The aggravated-murder counts included four allegations of
aggravating circumstances that could render Lynch death-penalty eligible under R.C.
2929.04.
{¶3} Throughout Lynch’s trial, the trial court, prosecutor, and defense
counsel repeatedly told the jury that its sentencing verdict would be a
recommendation to the trial court. During voir dire, the trial court explained
bifurcated capital trials’ sentencing procedures. It informed the jury that, if it found
Lynch guilty of aggravated murder and one or more aggravating circumstances, it
would determine if the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating factors.
If so, the jurors “would be required to make a recommendation to [the] Court that
the death penalty be imposed.” Following voir dire, Lynch moved to prohibit all
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
references to the sentencing verdict being a recommendation. The trial court denied
that motion.
{¶4} The jury found Lynch guilty of all charges and found that all four
aggravating circumstances existed. Namely, it found that Lynch had murdered M.L.:
1.) to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another crime; 2.)
while committing rape; 3.) while committing kidnapping; and 4.) while M.L. was
under the age of 13. See R.C. 2929.04(A).
{¶5} At the start of the penalty phase, the trial court explained that the jury
should determine if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
factors. If so, the jury was “responsible for returning a recommendation of the death
penalty.” And the prosecutor argued to the jury that “the only verdict [the jury
would] be able to return is a recommendation to Judge Kraft that Ralph Lynch be
put to death.”
{¶6} In mitigation, the defense presented evidence that Lynch had survived
poverty, abandonment, and multiple instances of sexual abuse as a child and had
cognitive disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression.
{¶7} During its penalty phase closing argument, the state told the jury:
* * * it will be your duty to find that the sentence of death shall be
imposed upon Ralph L. Lynch. Then it will be your duty to find that
the sentence of death shall be imposed upon Ralph L. Lynch.
It does not say “may be imposed.” It does not say “should be
imposed.” It doesn’t say “could be imposed.” It says “shall be
imposed.”
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶8} The trial court instructed the jury that it would “decide that the
sentence of death shall be imposed” based on finding that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed mitigating factors. The jury recommended that Lynch be
sentenced to death. Following that recommendation, the trial court merged the
aggravated-murder counts and independently reweighed the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. The trial court sentenced Lynch to death.
{¶9} On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio found evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct, but considered it harmless. State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d
514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 124. The court reweighed the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and affirmed Lynch’s sentence. Id. at ¶ 130.
{¶10} Lynch unsuccessfully challenged his sentence in postconviction
petitions in state and federal court. See State v. Lynch, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
010209, 2001 WL 1635760 (Dec. 21, 2001); State v. Lynch, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
050914, 2006-Ohio-5076; Lynch v. Hudson, S.D.Ohio No. 2:07-cv-948, 2017 WL
3404773 (Aug. 9, 2017).
B. Lynch’s Motion for a New Mitigation Trial
{¶11} In 2017, Lynch moved for leave to file a motion for a new mitigation
trial based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst, 577 U.S. 92, 136
S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504. Lynch argued that Hurst rendered Ohio’s death penalty
scheme unconstitutional. According to Lynch, Hurst rendered his sentence improper
because it was the result of procedural irregularities, contrary to law, and based on
an error of law.
{¶12} As Lynch’s motion was pending before the trial court, the Supreme
Court of Ohio decided Mason., 153 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-1462, 108 N.E.3d 56.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Lynch renewed his motion for a new mitigation trial. The trial court denied that
motion “pursuant to Ohio v. Mason.” Lynch appeals.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Facial Challenge
{¶13} Lynch raises two assignments of error for review that we will address
out of order. In his second assignment of error, Lynch contends that Ohio’s death
penalty scheme is facially unconstitutional following Hurst.
{¶14} A statute’s constitutionality is a question of law that we review de
novo. Andreyko v. Cincinnati, 153 Ohio App.3d 108, 2003-Ohio-2759, 791 N.E.2d
1025, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). We begin with a presumption that Ohio’s statutes are
constitutional. (Citations omitted.) State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-
5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 10. In a facial challenge, that presumption can be rebutted by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is clearly incompatible with the
Constitution. (Citations omitted.) Id.{¶15} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to a trial “by an impartial jury.” In conjunction with the
Due Process Clause, that right requires a jury to find every element of a crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103, 133 S.Ct. 2151,
186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Facts that “expose the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict” are elements of a crime that must be
found by a jury. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In capital trials, an aggravating factor is the functional
equivalent of an element of a more serious offense and therefore must be found by a
jury. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶16} The Sixth Amendment “requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact
necessary to impose a death sentence. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”
Hurst, 577 U.S. at 94, 589 S.Ct. 2428, 193 L.Ed.2d 504. In Hurst, the United States
Supreme Court held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional.
Id. Under Florida’s scheme, an advisory jury issued a nonbinding sentencing
recommendation of life or death to the trial court, which included no specific
findings of fact regarding the existence of aggravating circumstances. Id. at 99. The
Supreme Court explained that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury’s verdict to serve
as the basis for a death sentence, not a judge’s fact-finding. Id. at 102. The Court
overruled its precedent that held otherwise. Id. at 104 (overruling Hildwin v.
Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989), and Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984)).
{¶17} Lynch argues that Ohio’s capital sentencing scheme suffers from the
same defects that rendered Florida’s unconstitutional in Hurst.
{¶18} In Ohio, capital trials are bifurcated into two phases—a guilt phase and
a penalty phase. During the guilt phase, the jury determines whether the defendant is
guilty of aggravated murder and if any aggravating circumstances alleged in the
indictment exist. R.C. 2929.03(B).
{¶19} In the penalty phase, the state presents the aggravating circumstances
that the jury found in the guilt phase and the defense presents mitigating factors.
R.C. 2929.04(B) and 2929.03(D)(1). The jury then weighs the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. R.C. 2929.03(D)(2). If a unanimous jury finds that the
aggravating circumstances sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors, “the jury shall
recommend to the court that the sentence of death be imposed.” Id.
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{¶20} If the jury recommends death, the trial court must independently
consider the “evidence raised at trial, the testimony, other evidence, statement of the
offender, arguments of counsel, and, if applicable, the reports submitted to the
court.” R.C. 2929.03(D)(3). The trial court then reweighs the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and determines if the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Upon making that finding, the
trial court “shall impose sentence of death on the offender.” Id. The trial court must
state its specific findings in a separate opinion. R.C. 2929.03(F).
{¶21} Lynch urges this court to adopt a broad reading of Hurst—that the
Sixth Amendment requires the jury to make specific factual findings regarding the
sufficiency of the aggravating circumstances to impose the death penalty, rather than
simply issue recommendations. Lynch contends that a jury’s recommendation
triggers improper independent judicial fact-finding before the trial court imposes the
death penalty, inconsistent with Hurst. While Lynch’s arguments arguably are
somewhat persuasive, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment.
{¶22} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Lynch’s arguments in Mason, 153
Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-1462, 108 N.Ed. 56, at ¶ 29. First, material differences
exist between the two schemes. Unlike in the former Florida death-penalty scheme,
an Ohio jury must make findings in the guilt phase that one or more aggravating
circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 32. That fact-finding was a
“key distinction” for the Supreme Court of Ohio, as it established the aggravating
circumstances that the trial court must weigh against mitigating circumstances. Id. at
¶ 37. Second, an Ohio trial court cannot find additional aggravating circumstances
independent of the jury or increase the sentence based on its own finding. Id. at ¶ 39-
40. Finally, Mason rejected the argument that Hurst requires a jury to exclusively
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
decide whether to impose death. Id. at ¶ 42. Instead, the court concluded that Ohio’s
scheme “safeguards offenders from wayward juries” when the trial court reweighs
the aggravating circumstances found by the jury against the mitigating
circumstances. Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶23} While Lynch disagrees with that reasoning, the Ohio Supreme Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed Mason and upheld Ohio’s capital punishment scheme as
constitutional. See State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d
1092, ¶ 228; State ex rel. O’Malley v. Collier-Williams, 153 Ohio St.3d 553, 2018-
Ohio-3154, 108 N.E.3d 1082, ¶ 20; State v. Goff, 154 Ohio St.3d 218, 2018-Ohio-
3763, 113 N.E.3d 490, ¶ 36; State v. Tench, 156 Ohio St.3d 85, 2018-Ohio-5205, 123
N.E.3d 955, ¶ 279; State v. Grate, 164 Ohio St.3d 9, 2020-Ohio-5584, 172 N.E.3d 8, ¶
151-152; State v. Graham, 164 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-6700, 172 N.E.3d 841, ¶
185-186.
{¶24} Therefore, under State v. Mason, we reject Lynch’s facial challenge to
Ohio’s capital punishment scheme and overrule Lynch’s second assignment of error.
B. As-Applied Challenge
{¶25} In his first assignment of error, Lynch contends that Ohio’s death-
penalty scheme, as applied to his trial proceedings, violates the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. An as-applied challenge requires
clear and convincing evidence that the application of the statute in the context of the
specific case is unconstitutional. Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-
Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898, ¶ 20, 22.
{¶26} Lynch argues that comments made by the trial court, prosecutor, and
his defense counsel unconstitutionally diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility
by characterizing its death sentence as a recommendation. Lynch relies on the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
arguments made in his facial challenge—that under Hurst “a mere recommendation
is not enough”—to argue that those comments were improper.
{¶27} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a
jury in a capital case to be accurately informed of its responsibility for determining
the propriety of imposing the death penalty. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
329, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). To succeed on his Caldwell claim, Lynch
must first show that remarks made during the penalty phase erroneously
“minimize[d] the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness
of death.” Id. at 341. Second, Lynch must show that the remarks to the jury “
‘improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.’ ” Romano v.
Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994), quoting Dugger v.
Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989).
{¶28} During Lynch’s trial, the prosecutor, trial court, and defense counsel
all informed the jury that it could recommend that Lynch be sentenced to death. Yet,
the trial court instructed the jury to “decide which sentence will be imposed” and
that it was the jury’s “duty to find that the sentence of death shall be imposed.” An
“uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of
death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger” that a jury will minimize
the responsibility and importance of its role. Caldwell at 334. But we do not need to
determine whether the trial court’s instructions sufficiently corrected any suggestion
that the responsibility for sentencing Lynch to death rested elsewhere.
{¶29} Lynch’s Caldwell claim fails because the comments to the jury
accurately characterized the role of the jury under Ohio law. Ohio juries make the
necessary factual findings, weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
recommend a sentence. But the defendant cannot receive the death penalty without
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the trial court separately weighing the aggravating circumstances as determined by
the jury against mitigating factors. The jury’s recommendation is just that—a
recommendation that the trial court may accept or reject, based on its independent
weighing of the factors.
{¶30} The remarks by the trial court, prosecutor, and Lynch’s defense
counsel properly described the role assigned to the jury under Ohio law. Therefore,
Lynch’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶31} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Lynch’s two assignments of
error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion
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