Freedom Fund v. Lvreis, Inc. , 2022 Ohio 786 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as Freedom Fund v. Lvreis, Inc., 
    2022-Ohio-786
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    FREEDOM FUND, LLC,                                      :   APPEAL NO. C-210356
    TRIAL NO. A-1902386
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                           :
    vs.                                                 :
    O P I N I O N.
    LVREIS, INC.,                                           :
    Defendant-Appellant.                          :
    Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Case Remanded
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 16, 2022
    Matre Law Group Co., LPA, and James A. Matre, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    McNamee & McNamee, PLL, and Cynthia P. McNamee, for Defendant-Appellant.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    BOCK, Judge.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellant LVREIS, Inc., (“LVREIS”) appeals the trial court’s
    judgment quieting the title of real property in favor of plaintiff-appellee Freedom
    Fund, LLC, (“Freedom Fund”).
    I.      Facts and Procedure
    {¶2}   Freedom Fund is an Idaho-based member-managed investment limited
    liability company (“LLC”) created in October 2012. In December 2012, Ray Perron and
    Jay Greenwalt registered Freedom Fund with the Ohio secretary of state as a foreign
    entity. They filed a certificate of authority along with Freedom Fund’s Idaho and Ohio
    registrations. According to the original operating agreement, Freedom Fund was
    managed by Perron (47.5 percent interest), Greenwalt (47.5 percent interest), and
    Mountain West IRA (“the trust”) (5 percent interest). Its business purpose was to
    engage in note and/or real estate acquisition. It was to be managed “by any member
    individually or all members jointly.”
    {¶3}   There were multiple operating agreements in existence, but only the
    2012 original operating agreement and the 2012 amended operating agreement were
    entered into the record.
    {¶4}   Article V of the original operating agreement, entitled “Membership
    Withdrawal and Transfer Provisions,” provides:
    (2)    Restrictions on the Transfer of Membership: A member shall not
    transfer his or her membership in the LLC unless all non-transferring
    members in the LLC first agree to approve the admission of the
    transferee into this LLC. Further, no member may encumber a part or
    all of his or her membership in the LLC mortgage, pledge, granting of a
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    security interest, lien, or otherwise, unless the encumbrance has first
    been approved in writing by all other members of the LLC.
    Notwithstanding the above provision, any member shall be
    allowed to assign an economic interest in his or her membership to
    another person without the approval of the other members. Such an
    assignment shall not include a transfer of the member’s voting or
    management rights in this LLC, and the assignee shall not become a
    member of the LLC.
    {¶5}   Article VII, entitled “General Provisions,” provides:
    (3) All Necessary Acts: Any member individually or all members jointly
    and Officers of this LLC are authorized to perform all acts necessary to
    perfect the organization of this LLC and to carry out its business
    operations expeditiously and efficiently. * * * other officers, or all
    members jointly of the LLC, may certify to other businesses, financial
    institutions and individuals as to the authority of one or more members
    or officers of this LLC to transact specific items of business on behalf of
    the LLC.
    {¶6}   The 2012 “Certification of Authority,” filed with the original operating
    agreement in Ohio, states:
    This LLC is managed by its Members * * * Each of these persons has
    managerial authority of the LLC and is empowered to transact business
    on its behalf.
    {¶7}   Later in October 2012, Perron signed a “Sale and Assignment
    Agreement,” purporting to assign all of Freedom Fund’s membership interest to Loan
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Buddies, an Idaho LLC, as collateral for a loan to acquire real property in Ohio. Julie
    Myers, the manager of Loan Buddies, was named Freedom Fund’s new manager.
    {¶8}   The real property located at 340 Glensprings Drive, City of Springdale,
    Hamilton County, Ohio 45246 (“Glensprings property”) was one of the properties that
    Freedom Fund acquired with the loan. The parties also signed an “Option Agreement,”
    which allowed Perron to buy the membership interest back once the loan was repaid.
    The record is devoid of any documents showing that Greenwalt or the trust conveyed
    any of their interest to Loan Buddies.
    {¶9}   In November 2012, Loan Buddies filed an amended operating
    agreement with the Idaho secretary of state to convert Freedom Fund from a member-
    managed LLC to a manager-managed LLC. Myers purportedly amended the filings to
    make Loan Buddies the sole member of Freedom Fund and to name herself manager
    “responsible for the management of the company’s business and activities with all
    rights and powers generally conferred by law or necessary * * *.”
    {¶10} In October 2015, Greenwalt signed a $90,000 promissory note secured
    by a mortgage on the Glensprings property. LVREIS, a Nevada private lending
    corporation, was the holder of the note and mortgage. No other Freedom Fund
    member signed the mortgage. The parties stipulated that the LVREIS mortgage was
    recorded with the Hamilton County recorder.
    {¶11} In June 2016, eight months after the LVREIS loan was recorded, Myers,
    signing as the manager of Freedom Fund, recorded a mortgage that was held by Loan
    Buddies with the Hamilton County recorder.
    {¶12} In January 2018, LVREIS paid $23,263.70 in delinquent real estate
    taxes on the Glensprings property after the Hamilton County treasurer filed for a tax
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    foreclosure against it, naming Freedom Fund and LVREIS as codefendants. LVREIS
    subsequently paid another $8,628.82 and $4,501.20 to satisfy the 2019 and 2020 real
    estate taxes and assessments, for a total of $36,393.09.
    A. The Lawsuit
    {¶13} In May 2019, Freedom Fund filed a complaint to quiet the title to the
    Glensprings property in its favor. In its complaint, it alleged that Greenwalt was not a
    “member, manager, officer or agent of Freedom Fund” when he signed the LVREIS
    mortgage, and that Greenwalt had no authority to do so.
    {¶14} In August 2019, LVREIS (1) answered Freedom Fund’s complaint, (2)
    counterclaimed to quiet title, and for declaratory judgment, breach of note, and
    foreclosure; and (3) filed a third-party complaint against Greenwalt.
    B. The Trial
    {¶15} The parties confirmed that there was no stipulation as to who actually
    received the money loaned by LVREIS.
    Gary Clark’s Testimony
    {¶16} Clark, a member of Loan Buddies, testified that Greenwalt and Perron
    were the faces of Freedom Fund and the “boots on the ground” in Ohio from 2012 until
    2016. He stated that Perron and Greenwalt had no authority to mortgage the
    Glensprings property. Clark testified that he did not know who paid the delinquent
    taxes on the Glensprings property until the matter had been dismissed.
    {¶17} Clark conceded that there was no document signed by both Perron and
    Greenwalt transferring their membership interest in Freedom Fund.
    {¶18} Clark testified that Loan Buddies filed a mortgage on the Glensprings
    property in 2016—eight months after the LVREIS mortgage was signed—because its
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    attorney told them to. Clark further testified that Freedom Fund never received any of
    the proceeds from the LVREIS loan.
    Richard P. Turner’s Testimony
    {¶19} Turner, the title agent who handled the closing on the 2015 LVREIS
    mortgage, testified that:
    There was an issue with Ray Perron. * * * there was a delay in the
    funding of the loan because he was expected to sign that guaranty * * *
    there is no signature in the file. I thought that was resolved because they
    funded the loan at that point.
    {¶20} Upon the court’s inquiry as to whether the title company had disbursed
    the funds and to whom the funds were disbursed, Turner testified:
    * * * there was a simultaneous closing with an entity wholly owned by
    Jay Greenwalt and Ray Perron by the name of Vendi, LLC. At the same
    time that they closed this transaction with us they bought another
    property.
    Trial Court’s Judgment
    {¶21} The trial court first found that Freedom Fund had no authority to
    transfer its members’ interests to Loan Buddies under the 2012 assignment
    agreement. It determined that the 2012 assignment agreement conveyed no part of
    Greenwalt’s membership interest—or that of the trust—and that it may have been
    effective only to convey Perron’s 47.5 percent interest, by estoppel, because he signed
    it on behalf of Freedom Fund. The court concluded that Greenwalt had retained his
    membership interest “along with whatever authority he had as a member.”
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶22} The trial court further found that, because Loan Buddies was not
    Freedom Fund’s sole member, the amended operating agreement did not strip
    Greenwalt of his authority as a member.
    {¶23} The court analyzed Idaho Code Section 30-25-407(b)(4) and R.C.
    1705.25(A)(2) and determined that Greenwalt’s mortgaging Freedom Fund’s assets for
    another company’s benefit was outside of the ordinary course of business. Further, it
    determined that LVREIS knew that Greenwalt was purchasing property for another
    company with the proceeds of the loan without any benefit flowing to Freedom Fund.
    Therefore, it concluded that Greenwalt had no authority, actual or implied, to
    mortgage the Glensprings property.
    {¶24} Moreover, the trial court concluded that Freedom Fund’s knowledge of
    the mortgage and LVREIS’s payment of the real estate taxes did not amount to
    Freedom Fund ratifying the mortgage because it was not “fully informed of all of the
    material facts to the agent[’]s action.” The court found that the facts did not establish
    that Freedom Fund knew that funds were used to purchase property for a different
    company. Freedom Fund’s knowledge of the mortgage and payment of taxes was
    insufficient to show that Freedom Fund was fully informed of Greenwalt’s self-dealing,
    and therefore did not establish ratification.
    Law
    {¶25} The standard of review following a civil bench trial is whether the trial
    court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence as supported by
    competent, credible evidence. CyrusOne, LLC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 
    2021-Ohio-1971
    ,
    
    174 N.E.3d 41
    , ¶ 48 (1st Dist.). Under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review, every
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the findings of
    fact. 
    Id.
    {¶26} The interpretation of statutes and written contracts are questions of law
    that are reviewed de novo. State v. Straley, 
    139 Ohio St.3d 339
    , 
    2014-Ohio-2139
    , 
    11 N.E.3d 1175
    , ¶ 9 (statutory interpretation is a matter of law reviewed de novo); Hyde
    Park Circle, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati, 
    2016-Ohio-3130
    , 
    66 N.E.3d 99
    , ¶ 15 (1st Dist.) (the
    interpretation of contracts is reviewed de novo).
    {¶27} Contracts that are clear and unambiguous will be enforced according to
    their terms. Retirement Corp. of Am. v. Henning, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180643,
    
    2019-Ohio-4589
    , ¶ 18. “A court must construe a contract against its drafter, but when
    the terms are unambiguous and clear on their face, the court need not look beyond the
    plain language of the contract to determine the rights and obligations of the parties.”
    World Harvest Church v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 
    148 Ohio St.3d 11
    , 
    2016-Ohio-2913
    ,
    
    68 N.E.3d 738
    , ¶ 36, quoting Beasley v. Monoko, Inc., 
    195 Ohio App.3d 93
    , 2011-Ohio-
    3995, 
    958 N.E.2d 1003
    , ¶ 30 (10th Dist.).
    Analysis
    {¶28} In its sole assignment of error, LVREIS asserts that the trial court erred
    by quieting title in the Glensprings property in favor of Freedom Fund and by finding
    that the LVREIS mortgage on the Glensprings property was void.
    A. Greenwalt Remained a Member of Freedom Fund
    {¶29} Idaho Code Section 30-25-105 provides that with some exceptions, an
    LLC’s operating agreement governs the LLC’s and its members’ rights, duties,
    relationships, activities, and conditions for amending the operating agreement.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Moreover, “to the extent the operating agreement does not provide for a matter
    described in subsection (a) of this section, this chapter governs the matter.”
    {¶30} Thus, under Idaho law, the express terms of an LLC’s operating
    agreement controls over statute. Ohio law is similar—R.C. 1705.081(A) provides that
    an LLC’s operating agreement governs the LLC’s relationships. Therefore, applicable
    state laws are defaults and only control where an LLC’s operating agreement is silent.
    {¶31} The trial court correctly concluded that Greenwalt remained a member
    of Freedom Fund. Article V(2) of the operating agreement states that a member cannot
    transfer his or her membership in Freedom Fund unless all of the nontransferring
    members approve the transfer. The record does not contain approval by Greenwalt or
    the trust, as the nontransferring members, to permit any member to transfer
    membership. Even if Perron successfully transferred his own interest in Freedom
    Fund, Greenwalt and the trust remained members because neither consented to
    transferring their interests.
    B. Greenwalt Had Authority to Mortgage the Glensprings Property
    {¶32} Generally, when an agent enters into a contract on behalf of a principal,
    the principal will be bound by the terms of that contract, so long as the agent was acting
    with actual or implied authority to enter into the contract. Mtge. Network, Inc. v.
    Ameribanc Mtge. Lending, LLC, 
    177 Ohio App.3d 733
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4112
    , 
    895 N.E.2d 917
     (1oth Dist.).
    {¶33} The amended operating agreement that Loan Buddies filed with the
    Idaho secretary of state—which purported to convert Freedom Fund from a member-
    managed LLC to a manager-managed LLC, named Loan Buddies as the sole owner of
    Freedom Fund, and named Myers manager of Freedom Fund—was invalid because
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Greenwalt had not transferred his interest. As such, we look to relevant statutory
    provisions and original operating agreement to determine whether Greenwalt had
    authority to mortgage the Glensprings property.
    Actual Authority
    {¶34} Express authority is authority that is “directly granted to or conferred
    upon the agent or employee in express terms by the principal, and it extends only to
    such powers as the principal gives the agent in direct terms.” (Citations omitted.) Nee
    v. State Industries, Inc. Express, 
    2013-Ohio-4794
    , 2 N.E.3d 129o, ¶ 63 (8th Dist.).
    Implied authority may also arise from the express delegation of actual authority and
    carries with it the power to do all that which is reasonably necessary to carry into effect
    the power actually conferred. 
    Id.
    {¶35} Freedom Fund’s original operating agreement, which names Greenwalt,
    Perron, and the trust as members of Freedom Fund, specifically states that “[t]his LLC
    shall be managed by any member individually or all members jointly.”
    {¶36} Article VII of the original operating agreement allowed individual
    members to “perform all acts necessary to carry out its business operations
    expeditiously and efficiently.” Further, Greenwalt individually could certify to
    financial institutions that he had authority to “transact specific items of business on
    behalf of the LLC.”
    {¶37} The trial court relied on Idaho Code Section 30-25-407, which requires
    affirmative consent of all members to take action outside of an LLC’s ordinary course
    of business.
    {¶38} As discussed above, Freedom Fund’s operating agreement controls
    Greenwalt’s authority, other than when the operating agreement is silent. Moreover,
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Freedom Fund’s business purpose was to acquire notes and real estate. Its operating
    agreement gave members the authority to carry on the business of Freedom Fund
    jointly or individually.
    {¶39} Greenwalt’s acts—regardless of who benefitted—were encompassed in
    Freedom Fund’s business purpose. Greenwalt was authorized to transact Freedom
    Fund’s business (acquiring notes and real estate) and to certify to LVREIS that he had
    authority to mortgage the Glensprings property.
    {¶40} Additionally, former R.C. 1705.35 bolsters LVREIS’s position:
    “Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or disposition
    of property of a limited liability company are valid and binding upon the company if
    the instruments or documents are executed by one or more members of the company
    * * *.”
    {¶41} Former R.C. 1705.35 does not conflict with any provision in the
    operating agreement. It is clear that Greenwalt was a member of Freedom Fund when
    he signed the documents with LVREIS. Therefore, former R.C. 1705.35, in conjunction
    with Articles II and VII of the original operating agreement, renders Greenwalt’s
    signature on the mortgage valid and binds Freedom Fund.
    {¶42} LVREIS’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
    Conclusion
    {¶43} Greenwalt had actual authority to execute the LVREIS loan documents.
    Therefore, we do not analyze apparent authority or ratification. We reverse the trial
    court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court to conduct proceedings
    consistent with this court’s opinion.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Judgment reversed and case remanded.
    BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion
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