State v. Wigle ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Wigle, 2011-Ohio-6239.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25593
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DAVID C. WIGLE AKRON MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 10-CRB-4268
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 7, 2011
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, David Wigle, appeals the judgment of the Akron Municipal Court.
This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On April 25, 2010, appellant, David Wigle, called police because his neighbor,
Nancy Pashley, allegedly trespassed on his property and threatened his sons. Officers arrived at
Wigle’s home and were allowed into the home by Wigle’s wife, Nancy. They proceeded to the
backyard to discuss the allegations with Wigle. After hearing his complaint, the officers went
next door to investigate. Wigle returned inside his home, made popcorn, and sat down to watch
a movie.
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{¶3} After questioning Pashley, the officers learned that she had a protection order
against Wigle from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. She played a video from her
home security camera for the officers. The video was from the previous day and showed Wigle
removing “ornamental grass” from her property. The officers spoke with their supervisor and
were advised that a violation of a protection order should result in an arrest.
{¶4} The officers returned to Wigle’s home and were admitted by his wife. They
advised Wigle of the video demonstrating that he had violated the protection order, and told him
that he was under arrest for the violation. Wigle became argumentative and told the officers that
he was not going to jail. He became loud, angry, made fists and took a fighting stance toward
the officers. The officers drew their tasers and, when it had no effect, Wigle challenged them to
tase him again. The officers also used pepper spray to gain compliance. The pepper spray
brought Wigle to the floor with his hands underneath him. His behavior was described by the
officers as violent, turbulent and alarming. Wigle’s son, Michael Wigle, used a cell phone to
record video footage of portions of the officers’ efforts to arrest Wigle.
{¶5} On April 25, 2010, Wigle was charged with violating a protection order in
violation of R.C. 2919.27, disorderly conduct in violation of Akron City Code 132.01(A), and
resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33. He entered a plea of not guilty on April 29, 2010.
On May 31, 2010, Wigle filed a motion for a bill of particulars, which was denied on July 20,
2010. He also filed a motion to suppress defendant’s statements on June 3, 2010, which was
denied on June 25, 2010. He filed a motion for severance on July 9, 2010, and the trial court
denied the motion on July 13, 2010.
{¶6} Wigle also filed a motion to dismiss the protection order violation as
unconstitutionally applied, and a motion to suppress the video taken by the victim neighbor, and
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multiple motions for discovery. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss and the motion
to suppress. The State contends it provided Wigle open file discovery.
{¶7} A jury trial was conducted on July 22 and July 23, 2010. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty on the resisting arrest and disorderly conduct charges, and not guilty on the
charge of violating protection order. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and
mental evaluation of Wigle. On July 30, 2010, Wigle was sentenced to 90 days of incarceration
with 80 days suspended and ordered to undergo anger management treatment on the resisting
arrest conviction. On the disorderly conduct conviction, Wigle was sentenced to 30 days of
incarceration with 20 days suspended. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
{¶8} Wigle timely filed a notice of appeal. He raises four assignments of error for our
review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN [WIGLE’S]
OBJECTIONS AND INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING IMPROPER
WORDS BY THE PROSECUTOR IN CLOSING.”
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Wigle argues that the trial court erred in failing to
sustain his objections and properly instruct the jury regarding improper words used by the
prosecutor in his closing arguments. We do not agree.
{¶10} “Generally during closing argument, the prosecution is entitled to a certain
amount of latitude. The test regarding prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is whether
the remarks were improper, and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of
the defendant.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted). State v. Jones, 9th Dist. No. 24776,
2010-Ohio-351, at ¶19, quoting State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St. 3d 13, 14. The appellant must
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demonstrate that there is “a reasonable probability that but for the prosecutor’s misconduct, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Overholt, 9th Dist. No. 02CA0108-
M, 2003-Ohio-3500, at ¶47. In addition, “[c]omments made in closing argument are not viewed
in isolation, rather the closing argument is reviewed in its entirety to determine whether remarks
by the prosecutor were prejudicial.” State v. Henry, 9th Dist. No. 02CA008170, 2003-Ohio-
3151, at ¶28, quoting State v. Smith (Jan. 17, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 99CA007451, at *1.
{¶11} During closing arguments, Wigle objected to the prosecutor’s comments
concerning the officers’ entry into the home and its effect on the charge of resisting arrest. R.C.
2921.33(A) states: “No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest
of the person or another.” A lawful arrest is an element of the crime of resisting arrest. R.C.
2921.33; State v. Vactor, 9th Dist. No. 02CA008068, 2003-Ohio-7195, at ¶34. “An arrest is
‘lawful’ if the surrounding circumstances would give a reasonable police officer cause to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Sansalone (1991), 71 Ohio App. 3d 284,
285-286. Throughout the trial, Wigle argued that because the arrest occurred inside of Wigle’s
home, the consent of entry to the home was an issue of fact to be decided by the jury in
determining the lawfulness of the arrest. During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury
that if a defendant questions whether an entry was lawful, “the proper time to address that is
prior to trial with a motion to suppress. That way the judge can evaluate what happened and we
might not even be here today had that been done, but it wasn’t.” Defense counsel objected, and
the trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor went on to say that “[t]he entry into the
home is not an issue for you to consider, because it should have been addressed prior to trial. It
was not, so that is not something for you to consider today.” Defense counsel renewed his
objection after this statement.
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{¶12} In his brief, Wigle argues that the prosecutor commented on the lawfulness of the
officers’ entry into the home, and his comments removed the State’s burden to prove the
element. Assuming without deciding that the statement was improper, we conclude that there is
no “reasonable probability that but for the prosecutor’s [alleged] misconduct, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Overholt at ¶47.
{¶13} “Isolated comments by a prosecutor are not to be taken out of context and given
their most damaging meaning.” State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St. 3d 195, 204, citing Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647. Wigle contends that the issue at trial was whether or
not Wigle’s wife gave the officers her consent to enter their home. There was uncontroverted
testimony that Wigle initially called the police to his home to report a complaint regarding his
neighbor. The officers were initially invited into the home by Wigle’s wife, and she directed
them to the backyard to speak with Wigle. After going next door and speaking with the
neighbor, the police returned to Wigle’s home to confront him regarding the video tape and the
violation of a protection order. Officer Stanar testified as to the wife’s consent to enter the
home. Wigle, his wife, and his son testified to the contrary. This was an issue of disputed fact to
be determined by the jury. The jury is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses
because the jury “is best able to view witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.”
State v. Cook, 9th Dist. No. 21185, 2003-Ohio-727, at ¶30, quoting Giurbino v. Giurbino (1993),
89 Ohio App. 3d 646, 659.
{¶14} The trial court permitted the defendant to pursue the issue of consent during
cross-examination of the officers, direct examination of the defense witnesses, and to argue it
during closing arguments. The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the essential elements
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of resisting arrest, including the fact that the State was required to prove that the arrest was
lawful and that the officers “had the authority to make the arrest at the time and place where the
alleged resisting or interference took place[.]” Wigle has not argued that the definition it gave
was incorrect. Finally, the trial court instructed the jury that the closing arguments presented by
the State and the defendant “are not to be construed [] as evidence in this case or instructions on
the law.” See State v. Boots (Nov. 9, 2001), 2d Dist. No. 2001 CA 1542, at *2 (concluding
defendant was not prejudiced by prosecutor’s incorrect definition of reasonable doubt because
“[t]he trial court made clear to the jurors that they were required to apply the law as set forth by
the court, and the trial court properly defined reasonable doubt and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for the jurors in open court and in its written instructions to the jury.”).
{¶15} In viewing the prosecutor’s closing comments in their totality, we conclude that
Wigle has failed to demonstrate that the comments prejudicially affected his substantial rights or
that, had the statements not been allowed, the result of the case would have been different.
Accordingly, his first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT [WIGLE’S]
MOTION TO SEVER THE CHARGES, THUS PREJUDICING [HIM] AND
CAUSING SUCH CONFUSION IN THE JURY AS TO CAUSE AN UNFAIR
TRIAL.”
{¶16} In his second assignment of error, Wigle argues that the trial court erred when it
failed to grant his motion to sever the charges. We do not agree.
{¶17} “The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial under Crim.R. 8(A) if
the offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character.’” State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St. 3d
160, 163, quoting Crim.R. 8(A). A defendant claiming that the trial court erred in denying a
motion to sever must affirmatively show that his rights were prejudiced and that the trial court
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abused its discretion in refusing separate trials. State v. Torres (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 340, 343.
An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St. 3d 619, 621.
{¶18} The State argues that Wigle has forfeited this argument because he failed to renew
his motion when the state rested or at the close of evidence. However, that waiver only applies if
the defendant moves to sever pursuant to Crim.R. 14. See State v. Smith, 9th Dist. No. 25069,
2010-Ohio-3983, at ¶21. This Court has previously held that “[w]hile a defendant’s failure to
renew a motion to sever based upon Rule 14 results in a forfeiture of that issue, ‘the same is not
true for a motion based upon Rule 8[.]’” State v. Hatfield, 9th Dist. No. 23716, 2008-Ohio-2431,
at ¶14, quoting State v. Williams, 9th Dist. No. 23560, 2008-Ohio-1048, at ¶52 (Dickinson, J.,
concurring).
{¶19} Crim.R. 8(A) provides:
“Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information or
complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether
felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character, or are
based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan,
or are part of a course of criminal conduct.”
{¶20} Crim.R. 14 provides:
“If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or
of defendants in an indictment, information, or complaint, or by such joinder for
trial together of indictments, informations or complaints, the court shall order an
election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide
such other relief as justice requires.”
{¶21} “The difference between the rules is that Rule 8 only addresses the joinder of
multiple charges in the same indictment while Rule 14 also addresses the joinder of completely
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separate indictments.” Hatfield at ¶14, citing United States v. Terry (C.A.9, 1990), 911 F.2d
272, 277-78. Here, Wigle’s motion for separate trials only mentioned Crim.R. 8, and the charges
stem from the same compliant. Therefore, Crim.R. 8 is the applicable rule. Because the failure
to renew a motion to sever based upon Crim.R. 8 does not result in a forfeiture of that issue,
Wigle has not forfeited his argument. Hatfield at ¶14.
{¶22} “When a defendant claims that he was prejudiced by the joinder of multiple
offenses, a court must determine (1) whether evidence of the other crimes would be admissible
even if the counts were severed, and (2) if not, whether the evidence of each crime is simple and
distinct.” State v. Schaim (1992), 65 Ohio St. 3d 51, 59. See, also, State v. Singfield (Mar. 27,
1996), 9th Dist. No. 17160, at *8.
{¶23} In a case similar to this, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to
sever the aggravated burglary charge from the resisting arrest charge because “the offenses were
committed at separate times, in separate locations, and involved separate police officers.” State
v. Porter (Dec. 24, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 18384, at *2. This Court rejected Porter’s arguments and
concluded that the charges were properly joined pursuant to Crim.R. 8. “The charge of resisting
arrest resulted from defendant’s actions during the investigation of the burglary. Defendant was
immediately pursued from the burglary scene, and the two officers originally investigating the
burglary * * * were present during the subsequent struggle and eventual apprehension.” Id. at
*3, citing State v. Cisternino (Oct. 27, 1994), 8th Dist. No. 66387 (concluding that joinder was
proper when violations occurring approximately one week apart were “interrelated”). Here, as in
Porter, the charge of resisting arrest occurred while the officers were investigating the civil
protection order violation. We cannot conclude that joinder was improper simply because the
crimes occurred on two separate dates.
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{¶24} Wigle further argues that the counts should have been severed because the
evidence “was not simple and distinct enough.” We do not agree. Here, as in Porter, “the
evidence of each charge was simple and direct, and the testimony provided by the State’s
witnesses covered in detail the events leading up to the charges.” Id. at *3. Wigle’s neighbor,
Pashley, testified regarding the protection order violation. She claimed that Wigle removed
“ornamental grass” from her property. After seeing video evidence of the allegation, the officers
returned to Wigle’s home to arrest him for the violation. The arresting officers testified that
Wigle became argumentative and refused to cooperate. They were forced to use tasers and
pepper spray to gain compliance. This evidence led to the resisting arrest and disorderly conduct
charges. “The jury was not at risk of confusing the evidence such that the charges should have
been severed.” Id. Furthermore, the fact that the jury acquitted Wigle of the protection order
violation, and convicted him of the remaining charges demonstrates that the jury was capable of
separating the issues. Accordingly, Wigle’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BILL OF PARTICULARS
TIMELY REQUESTED BY [WIGLE], AND SUCH DENIAL PREJUDICED
[HIM].”
{¶25} In his third assignment of error, Wigle argues that the trial court erred in denying
his request for a bill of particulars. We do not agree.
{¶26} Upon review of the record, it is apparent that the trial court properly overruled
Wigle’s request, as it was untimely. Wigle was arraigned on April 29, 2010, and he filed his
motion for the bill of particulars on May 31, 2010. Crim.R. 7(E) requires that motions for a bill
of particulars be filed within twenty-one days of the arraignment. See State v. Maken (Dec. 22,
2000), 2d Dist. No. 17577. The trial court determined that Crim.R. 7(E) was complied with by
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open-file discovery. We need not reach that issue because the request was untimely.
Accordingly, Wigle’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
“[THE] TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [THE] MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS OF [WIGLE] FOR THE REASON THAT
ARRESTING OFFICERS FAILED TO GIVE MIRANDA WARNINGS AND
MADE ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO [HIS] HOME.”
{¶27} In his fourth assignment of error, Wigle argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress his statements because the officers failed to give Miranda warnings and
made an illegal entry into his home. We do not agree.
{¶28} The review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law for
an appellate court. State v. Yeager, 9th Dist. Nos. 21091, 21112, and 21120, 2003-Ohio-1808, at
¶5, citing State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App. 3d 328, 332. This Court “is bound to accept
factual determinations of the trial court made during the suppression hearing so long as they are
supported by competent and credible evidence.” State v. Robinson (Oct. 25, 2000), 9th Dist. No.
19905, at *2, quoting State v. Searls (1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d 739, 741. However, an appellate
court reviews de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Id.
{¶29} In his motion to suppress, Wigle argued that his statements must be suppressed
because he was “without benefit of the ‘Miranda warning.’” The trial court noted that “[o]nly a
custodial interrogation triggers the need for a Miranda rights warning.” See State v. Trent (Dec.
23, 1999), 2d Dist. No. 17705. The trial court denied the motion because there was no custodial
interrogation, Wigle was placed under arrest and handcuffed almost immediately, and because
his statements would be indicative of whether or not he resisted arrest.
{¶30} Our review of the record indicates that there was no custodial interrogation, and
the statements made by Wigle were not in response to any question from the officer. See State v.
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Solomon (Sept. 27, 1978), 9th Dist. No. 8862. Prior to his arrest, the officers inquired why
Wigle went on his neighbor’s property. He responded that it was not him and that he did not do
anything. He then became loud and argumentative. Officer Harrison testified that after Wigle
was told that he was under arrest, Wigle responded, “[N]o I’m not going to jail. No. I’m not
going. You’ll have to tase me.”
{¶31} “The law of Miranda * * * has no application to purely voluntary statements
which are not the result of ‘express questioning or its functional equivalent.’” State v. Coleman
(1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 298, 306, certiorari denied (1990), 493 U.S. 1051, quoting Rhode Island v.
Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 300-01. “It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion
results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation.” Illinois v. Perkins (1990), 496
U.S. 292, 297. Because there was no custodial interrogation, and because the officers asked no
questions after placing Wigle under arrest, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.
{¶32} Wigle further argues that the statements should be suppressed due to an illegal
entry into the home. However, the motion to suppress filed with the trial court only argued that
the evidence should be suppressed due to a Miranda violation. “An appellate court need not
consider an error which a party complaining of the trial court’s judgment could have called, but
did not call, to the trial court’s attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or
corrected by the trial court.” State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, paragraph one of the
syllabus, citing State v. Glaros (1960), 170 Ohio St. 471. We decline to address this argument
that could have been raised in the trial court. Accordingly, Wigle’s fourth assignment of error is
overruled.
III.
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{¶33} Wigle’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Akron
Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal
Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, P. J.
DICKINSON, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
ROBERT T. LYNCH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
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CHERI B. CUNNINGHAM, Director of Law, DOUGLAS J. POWLEY, Chief City Prosecutor,
and CARA KENNERLY-FORD, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Appellee.